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Re-politicising South-South development cooperation: negotiating accountability at 
home and abroad  
 
Laura Trajber Waisbich  
 
Accountability is a ubiquitous issue in international development cooperation. Development accountability 
means different things to different actors in the field and has been framed and negotiated in different ways. 
Governments and civil society groups in the South have historically played an important role in 
problematising development cooperation accountability, challenging ‘traditional’ donor priorities, ways of 
working and outcomes. In the 2010s—as Southern development providers grew in material, symbolic and 
political importance—accountability also emerged as a disputed issue within South-South development 
cooperation (SSC).  
 
This thesis follows a multi-sited and multi-scalar approach to understanding how accountability is being 
conceived and disputed in the field of SSC, in global and domestic arenas, using Brazil, China and India as 
paradigmatic sites for inquiry. The study examines how different forms of discursive problematisations of 
accountability in SSC—coming from different transnational and domestic stakeholders—interact with the 
politicisation of SSC at different scales, and generates new forms of accountability politics and new 
instances of negotiation of SSC by different actors. 
 
Assessing a kaleidoscopic and rapidly shifting landscape, this thesis shows instances where particular SSC 
accountability narratives and policy instruments are being generated and travelling across boundaries. It 
explores the kinds of sociopolitical disputes (development knowledges, geopolitical, bureaucratic and state-
society relations) they create. Mapping, tracing and analysing contemporary forms of disputes over SSC 
accountability across scales and geographies, this study emphasises prevalent global development 
‘measurementalities’ pushing Southern providers to craft alternative ways to measure (quantify and evaluate) 
their ‘development effort’; and the paradoxes counting and showing SSC create domestically. It also 
emphasises the materiality and thus political salience of certain SSC modalities, notably agricultural 
development and infrastructure building, as important drivers for other ongoing sociopolitical intermestic 
SSC accountability disputes in the three countries.  
 
Unpacking multiple global and domestic negotiations over responsibilities for doing development at home 
and abroad, this study offers a contribution to understanding the politicised consolidation of SSC in some 
of its emblematic protagonists. By doing so, it illuminates the shifting expectations of appropriate, good 
and just foreign policy and development cooperation in rising powers, like Brazil, China and India, in times 
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O que ela quer da gente é coragem. 
 
[In the living of life, things get mixed up.  
Life is like that: first it blows hot, then, cold;  
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What life demands of us is courage.] 
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Glossary   
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AIIB – Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
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CAU – China Agricultural University  
CBDR – Common But Differentiated Responsibility Principle 
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CGFome – Coordenação-Geral de Cooperação Humanitária e Combate à Fome [General-Coordination of Humanitarian 
Cooperation and International Action against Hunger, Government of Brazil] 
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CIDCA – China’s International Development Cooperation Agency 
CIDRN – China International Development Research Network  
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EMBRAPA – Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária [Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation] 
FAO – United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization  
FASE – Federação de Órgãos para Assistência Social e Educacional [Federation of Organs for Social and Educational 
Assistance] 
FDI - Foreign Direct Investment 
FIDC – Forum for Indian Development Cooperation 
FNDE – Fundo Nacional de Desenvolvimento da Educação [National Fund for Educational Development, Ministry of 
Education, Government of Brazil] 
G77+China – Group of 77 and China at the United Nations  
GIZ – Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit [German Corporation for International Cooperation] 
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GPEDC – Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation 
INESC – Instituto de Estudos Socioeconômicos [Institute for Socioeconomic Studies] 
INGOs – International Non-Governmental Organisations 
IPEA – Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada [Institute of Applied Economic Research]  
IsDB - Islamic Development Bank  
JICA – Japan International Cooperation Agency 
LOCs/IDEAS – Lines of Credit for Development Projects, Indian Development and Economic Assistance Scheme 
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation 
MDGs – Millennium Development Goals  
MDS – Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social [Ministry of Social Development, Government of Brazil] 
MEA – Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India  
MOFCOM – Ministry of Commerce, Government of China  
MRE or Itamaraty – Ministério das Relações Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Brazil] 
NDB – New Development Bank  
NeST – Network of Southern Think Tanks 
NGOs – Non-Governmental Organisations   
ODA – Official Development Assistance 
OECD-DAC – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee 
PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores [Brazil’s Workers’ Party] 
PRIA – Participatory Research in Asia 
REBRIP – Rede Brasileira Pela Integração dos Povos [Brazilian Network for Peoples’ Integration] 
RIS – Research Information System for Developing Countries 
SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals  
SEGIB - Secretaría General Iberoamericana [Ibero-American General Secretariat] 
SSC – South-South cooperation 
TCU – Tribunal de Contas da União [Federal Court of Accounts, Government of Brazil] 
TOSSD – Total Official Support for Sustainable Development 
UN – United Nations 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNDCF – United Nations Development Cooperation Forum 
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme  
UNESCAP – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
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UNOSSC – United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation  
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The struggle ensues because there is no easy way of dispensing with these universals in the condition of political modernity. 
Without them there would be no social science that addresses issues of modern social justice.  
(Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Provincializing Europe”, 2000) 
 
 
The concepts of the social sciences can always be translated from one context to another,  
as Dipesh Chakrabarty reminds they can operate just as well outside the west as within, and just as badly.  






Accountability is a ubiquitous issue in the field of international development cooperation. As in other 
spheres of public life, here too, the term appears polysemic and contentious. Accountability is an 
international norm, a sector of concern and intervention, a global discourse to discipline or transform power 
relations, and a set of mechanisms to manage development cooperation relations and policies. It is also a 
‘development buzzword’: gaining purchase and power by embracing multiple meanings and a normative 
resonance that places ‘the sanctity of its goals beyond reproach’ (Cornwall 2007, 472). Concerns with 
accountability in/of development cooperation have increased immensely since the 1990s, targeting the 
‘accountability deficits’ of Southern ‘aid recipients’, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), bilateral 
agencies, development banks, humanitarian actors, development practitioners and beyond.  
 
Governments and civil society in the South, historically positioned as Official Development Assistance 
(ODA or aid) ‘recipients’, have been important actors in foregrounding ‘aid accountability’ issues. Together 
with critics within Aidland,1 Southern actors have challenged ‘donor’ countries’ aid priorities and practices 
as much as their outcomes. In the last decade, following the growth in material, symbolic and political 
significance of a group of (re)emerging ‘development cooperation providers’ from the South—including 
Brazil, China and India and many others—accountability has become a divisive issue within what is now 
widely known as South-South cooperation (SSC). It has entered diplomatic and para-diplomatic SSC policy 
debates and integrated the rhetoric of national and transnational civil society actors challenging SSC policy 
priorities or contesting interventions on the ground. In different ways, accountability also became part of 
policy and expert debates within large Southern providers and of their nascent SSC policy-institutional 
frameworks. 
 
Despite its growing presence in policy debates, accountability in/of SSC remains poorly, and often very 
superficially, understood. Accountability in this thesis is defined as the continuously negotiated relationships 
of power and obligation between public powerholders and those subjected to or affected by their 
development cooperation-related actions. Accountability in SSC, therefore, concerns the forms of 
behaviour and social relationships between different powerholders in ‘Southern providers’ (elected and 
non-elected officials, bureaucrats, and those acting on behalf of the state) and a range of stakeholders 
(citizens at home, citizens abroad, other Southern governments, and traditional governmental and non-
governmental development actors in the field).  It also concerns the underpinning values, obligations and 
 
1 In this original sense, developed by aid anthropologists, Aidland refers to the international development industry: the lives, 
motivations, and personalities of development professionals, as well as the individual agency and relationships in the aid 
sector (Mosse 2011; Harrison 2013). In the same vein, here I refer allegorically to the social world constituted around SSC 
(its emerging formal and informal norms and institutions) and inhabited by SSC practitioners as the SSC-land. 
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mechanisms of power control (political, social, legal, financial and/or managerial) being negotiated between 
powerholders and these different groups.  
 
This thesis provides the most detailed account to date of the ways in which international development 
accountability issues are travelling from, to and within the South and reaching the core of contemporary 
SSC politics. It investigates emerging sociopolitical disputes over what accountability in SSC means and 
how it should be practiced, characterised here as SSC accountability politics. Accountability politics as defined 
by Jonathan Fox (2007a, 2) is ‘the arena of conflict over whether and how those in power are held publicly 
responsible for their decisions’. The multiple forms of SSC accountability politics mapped in this study 
illustrate how politically disruptive it can be to debate and act on SSC accountability both in terms of 
governing and disciplining ‘Southern providers’ (from outside and from within) as well as means to dispute 
and transform development. Investigating how SSC accountability is debated, negotiated and 
operationalised is, moreover, a window into the increasingly contested nature of SSC in key rising powers 
and into the multiple competing expectations over domestic and global responsibilities for/when doing 
development at home and abroad. 
 
 
Research scope and main contributions  
 
 
This thesis asks the following question:  
• How is accountability being conceived and disputed in the field of South-South development 
cooperation? 
In a complementary vein, it also asks:   
• What are the issues, underpinning accountability logics and social expectations on South-South 
cooperation providers’ policies and practices at play? 
• How do emerging accountability disputes relate to the unfolding consolidation of South-South 
cooperation at the global level and as a domestic policy field in rising powers? 
 
To respond to these questions, I have embarked on an inductive, empirically-driven, mapping and analysis 
of current SSC accountability politics based on a transnational relational comparison of three paradigmatic 
Southern providers: Brazil, China and India. The multi-sited and multi-scalar nature of  this inquiry (detailed 
in Chapter 2) offers a wide-ranging contribution—beyond a single country or project case study—to 
understanding how emerging global and domestic SSC accountability politics are playing out simultaneously 




Drawing from empirical data, I have developed an integrative conceptual framework to unpack how state, 
civil society and external actors interact, dispute and negotiate meanings, institutional reforms and 
mechanisms related to public accountability in the context of SSC. Chapter 1 locates this multidisciplinary 
research endeavour at the crossroads of critical development studies, international relations (IR) and 
accountability studies. It also introduces my framework for examining how different discursive 
problematisations of accountability in/of SSC—coming from transnational and domestic stakeholders—
interact with the politicisation of SSC at different scales and generated instances of negotiation of accountability 
in SSC, but also of rising powers’ foreign policies and international identities.  
 
Existing scholarship has extensively explored the promises and shortcomings of the public accountability 
agenda in, on the one hand, politicising—and even democratising—multilateralism (Zweifel 2006; Zürn 
2014) and, on the other, attempting to ‘fix’ North-South development cooperation practices and relations 
(Fox and Brown 1998; McGee 2013; Jensen and Winthereik 2013; Eyben et al. 2015). My thesis contributes 
to this literature with empirics from ‘other existing life practices’ (Chakrabarty 2008 [2000], 20), namely 
Southern providers, and shows how SSC accountability narratives and policy instruments are being 
generated, how they travel across boundaries and the kinds of sociopolitical disputes they create.  
 
My intellectual contribution is articulated as follows. I first posit that the rise of SSC accountability politics 
is a response to the increasing politicisation of the global development field, as well as the politicisation of 
SSC amongst and within Southern providers. Politicisation is hence both cause and consequence of multiple 
competing actors bargaining and negotiating SSC (and SSC accountability) at home and abroad. Next, I 
argue that several coexisting types of disputes over accountability in/of SSC currently shape the field, both 
globally and within rising powers like Brazil, China and India. Disputes refer to different accountability 
lines (who in SSC providers is accountable to whom) and different underpinning accountability logics 
(international, democratic, social, bureaucratic and managerial). Disputes also refer and interact with 
broader sociopolitical issues shaping the way rising powers act in the field of development cooperation 
(development knowledges, geopolitics, bureaucratic politics and state-society relations). The particular ways 
in which accountability politics unfold in each setting depend on international identities and hierarchies, 
shifting development cooperation and foreign policy priorities, public policy and management dynamics 
and patterns of state-society relations. Following a fractal, juxtaposed, approach, in each chapter I examine 
certain aspects of this kaleidoscopic landscape and discuss politically salient forms of accountability politics 
taking place in global and national arenas. 
 
In Chapter 3, I deconstruct and ‘provincialize’ (Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]) ‘traditional aid’ accountability 
dynamics. The chapter examines the particular sociopolitical and historical conditions shaping how 
accountability has emerged and evolved as an issue in Aidland, since the 1990s, within and across members 
of the Development Assistance Committee from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development (OECD-DAC), and in multilaterals like the World Bank. Through this account I show how 
the will to ‘fix’ accountability deficits led to ‘aid reforms’ and to the construction of numerous global and 
national accountability tools. Next, I discuss how, in the 2010s, Southern-led development cooperation 
became heavily scrutinised, both in the policy circles and in academia. This scrutiny, I argue, has led to the 
issue of transparency in SSC and of Southern providers’ conformity with DAC standards and ‘best practices’ 
for donors becoming ‘accountability problems’ to be acted upon.  
 
In Chapter 4, I discuss geopolitical and sociotechnical disputes over measuring SSC, in particular 
quantifying and reporting SSC flows and assessing SSC impact and effectiveness. Using the case of the 
Second High-Level UN South-South Cooperation Conference (BAPA+40), held in 2019, and the 
diplomatic and para-diplomatic negotiations before and after the event, I show rising powers’ diplomatic 
resistance to be co-opted into existing aid measurement norms, standards and practices. I also show their 
discursive and knowledge battles over measuring SSC. Unfolding negotiations, I argue, reveal growing 
assertiveness and willingness by governmental and knowledge actors in Brazil, China and India to debate 
SSC measurement so as to internationally stage success, solidarity and/or generosity and find alternative, 
more favourable, ‘Southern ways’ to practice accountability. In parallel, I also discuss how Southern 
countries have started to put in place different accountability tools: online measurement platforms; 
evaluations; guidelines for projects; consultation forums; and more. This growing experimentation 
responded to both outside conformity pressures and SSC providers’ own differentiation claims and status-
seeking strategies. Lastly, I introduce the idea of ‘SSC measurement paradoxes’ in which Southern providers 
construct alternative forms of demonstrating success without challenging the ranking and ‘rendering 
technical’ (T. M. Li 2007) logics governing the field. By looking at measurement paradoxes, I also show 
how Southern providers navigate the domestic-foreign policy tensions that measuring, and rendering their 
global development engagements visible, bring about.   
 
The following two chapters look at domestic SSC accountability politics in Brazil (Chapter 5) and in India 
and China (Chapter 6). These chapters explore how the global push to measure SSC manifested 
domestically and interacted with other types of domestic foreign policy and accountability politics in each 
context (including audit, managerial, politico-bureaucratic and citizenship politics). In the case of Brazil, I 
make three contributions: first, that accountability in/of Brazilian SSC has been disputed in a plural, 
controversial and rapidly shifting environment, marked by numerous public and expert problematisations 
of and negotiations over accountability. These have touched narrow (procedural) and broad (substantive) 
SSC accountability issues as well as narrow (SSC-specific) and broad (foreign policy and national 
development) policy realms. Second, Brazil is the country that has mostly experimented with quantification, 
reporting and assessing its development cooperation. Experimentation has been fostered by different 
‘development organisations’ (the Brazilian Cooperation Agency, public institutions implementing technical 
cooperation and UN agencies) and in partnership with national knowledge actors and ‘traditional’ donors, 
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as a political tool to showcase Brazilian SSC and convince domestic and external audiences of its value. 
This journey to craft ‘Brazilian ways’ to measure SSC, I posit, created its own epistemic disputes and 
visibility politics. Lastly, I show how Brazilian SSC was not the subject of an all-encompassing audit 
attention. Audit dynamics are fragmented and responsive to the different material and political visibility of 
certain components of the ‘Brazilian SSC compact’: while the international operations of the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES) were subjected to public and audit attention (due to the increased domestic 
political polarisation, civil society mobilisation, and the mega anti-corruption operation Lava Jato), Brazilian 
technical cooperation remained below-the-radar. 
 
My analysis of India and China are less comprehensive—a choice I methodologically justify in Chapter 2— 
yet rich additions to the overall landscape of contemporary disputes over SSC accountability, and important 
opportunities to maintain understanding and recognition of Southern diversity and to reveal the relational 
politics between different Southern providers. In India, I depict a landscape characterised by low intensity 
domestic accountability politics around development cooperation, except for the case of India’s Lines of 
Credit for Development Projects (LOCs) scheme. My initial contend is that both pan-partisan nationalistic 
consensus on the purposes of SSC for Indian foreign policy ambitions and domestic constituencies’ low 
priority and lack of incentives (and resources) to monitor India’s global footprint contribute to limited 
public and policy disputes around the role and workings of institutions involved in SSC (namely the Ministry 
of External Affairs – MEA and other Indian actors, including national corporations partnering with the 
state to implement projects overseas).   
 
My second contribution is that attention to Indian LOCs—and the calls for increased political, legal and 
social accountability in this particular development financing instrument— is in contrast with the public 
and political invisibility of most other dimensions of the ‘Indian SSC compact’. Moreover, I posit, recent 
changes in the LOCs scheme, including modest accountability reforms, responded mostly to diplomatic 
and financial sustainability needs to improve delivery and enhance this geo-economic diplomacy tool rather 
than to a concern with justifying it to domestic publics or with ‘development effectiveness’ on the ground.  
 
Lastly, as for measurement politics, I claim that the Government of India’s openly critical stances of the 
‘SSC accountability agenda’ at the global level was matched with an internal dismissal of the issue. Those 
responsible and/or implementing SSC felt little pressure, or need, to expand accountability and measuring 
tools domestically. Likewise, those controlling the intellectual SSC agenda within India, notably the MEA-
affiliated think tank Research Information System (RIS), showed little political will to operationalise an 
‘Indian way’ to count or evaluate SSC. Domestic experimentation, therefore, mostly happened ‘from below’, 




In China, I concentrated the analysis on the measurement politics of Chinese SSC. China’s case is one of 
controlled experimentation with the managerial aspects of the SSC accountability agenda and growing, 
albeit selective, concerns with operationalising ‘Chinese ways’ to justify flows and outcomes, as means of 
improving the management of the country’s development cooperation and the reputational risks of its ever-
expanding international exposure. Looking at the policymaking landscape within China, I found that parts 
of the Chinese SSC bureaucracy and knowledge actors have been ‘piloting’ SSC measurements and engaging 
in controlled transparency, including in partnership with traditional development actors. Rather than an 
explicit need to showcase conceptual or methodological innovations, as in Brazil or India, Chinese 
bureaucrats and experts have often framed their efforts as part of an ongoing ‘learning’ journey to improve 
SSC management, delivery and China’s practices as a development actor. Nonetheless, efforts remain 
marginal within the broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) landscape.       
 
Next, in Chapter 7, I look at one particular form of accountability politics cutting across the national and 
transnational scales in the three countries, namely civil society pro-accountability mobilisation. Examining 
accountability calls ‘from below’ and emerging ‘SSC monitoring movements’, I first argue that civil society 
mobilisation has generated three overlapping forms of problematisation of SSC accountability related to 
transparency, participation and SSC development models. By disputing accountability in SSC in these three 
ways, civil society groups within rising powers have re-politicised SSC at home and transnationally. Second, 
I claim that while some projects have been targets of transnational campaigns, mobilisation by national 
groups in Brazil, China and India at the policy-level also happened at home. As such, campaign-like 
mobilisation to challenge particular ‘problematic projects’ (most notably on South-South agricultural 
cooperation and Southern development finance infrastructure building) coexisted, rather than preceded, 
attempts to reform state SSC-related policies in a more sustained and systematic way. Finally, I argue that 
civil society actors adopted a mixed of collaborative-confrontation and insider-outsider modes of 
engagement with those responsible and/or implementing SSC in the three countries, in an attempt to 
reinvent existing contestation strategies to engage rising powers in the terms of their SSC initiatives. 
 
Chapter 8 closes this thesis by revisiting the main findings regarding the drivers for politicisation and 
creation of ‘arenas of conflict’ (Fox 2007a) over SSC accountability and the main drivers for Southern 
providers to act upon, reform and experiment with accountability in their development cooperation. While 
doing so, I review prevalent forms of SSC accountability politics across all research sites, pointing to the  
materiality and thus political salience of certain SSC modalities and to ubiquitous development 
‘measurementalities’ (T. Mitchell 2002) as constitutive of many of the unfolding disputes. This final chapter 
also considers ongoing, and seemingly intractable, negotiations over global development responsibilities 
and the challenges to reimagine them in a contested ‘equator-less’, ‘beyond aid’, world (Eyben and Savage 




Research relevance  
 
 
This study is the first comprehensive academic research and analysis on SSC accountability. Drawing on the 
critical turn in SSC studies, it offers an empirically rich account of  how foreign policy interacts with the 
domestic accountability dynamics in matters of  development cooperation. It engages with the stickiness 
and political importance of  North/South identities in global development while challenging simplistic 
analytical assumptions of  intractable North-South divides in the field.  
 
Accountability, an apparently technical concept, can reveal profound geopolitical issues: of  claimed and 
contested international identities, good governance discourses and ‘aid conditionalities’ and of  persistent 
imaginaries of  Southern countries being land of  ‘absences’ and ‘figures of  lack’ (McEwan 2009; Shipley 
2010), ‘deficient recipients’ and ‘incomplete donors’ (Six 2009). It also reveals issues of  contested 
Western/Eurocentrism: in the refusal of  some Southern partners to adhere and be co-opted into existing 
OECD-led development assumptions and norms, including ‘aid accountability’. It finally draws the 
attention to foreign and SSC policymaking dynamics and their interaction with issues of  ‘justice among and 
within states’ (Mawdsley 2014a): of  symbolic, discursive and material battles over who gains and who loses 
in development processes promoted under the South-South label and over whose voice counts to negotiate 
what development is or should be.  
 
By virtue of  taking place outside ‘colonially-rooted discourses’ separating poverty at home from poverty 
abroad (Mosse 2011), South-South development exchanges were initially perceived as a welcome challenge 
to unequal aid relations and unidirectional development policy learning. As the interactions became more 
frequent and more contested, investigating growing calls for and disputes over accountability helps 
illuminating how, and whether, alternative South-South development cooperation models generate 
developmental benefits while ‘avoiding a race to the bottom, by competing national interests, sacrificing 
well-being, environmental sustainability and social and political justice’ (Mawdsley 2012a, 46).  
 
Unpacking accountability in SSC also has a policy relevance. Understanding SSC is paramount for the 
community of practitioners interested in the ‘pathways to development cooperation accountability’ in the 
21st century. It also offers a window into how development accountability ‘enabling and disabling factors’ 
(Gaventa and McGee 2013) play out in different institutional contexts. This ‘knowing from the South’ 
(Sabaratnam 2011; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012) is even more important in the current context where ‘the 
South’, in all its plurality, is a hub of policy innovations and of forms of contestation that are increasingly 
travelling northwards. Understanding accountability politics ‘from the South’ provide insights not only on 
precarities and informalities but also on solutions that are increasingly global (Roy 2015; Constantine and 
Shankland 2017). This thesis offers thus a possibility to examine accountability politics in SSC as pre-
figuring forms of accountability politics in ‘traditional’/Northern donors in a shifting world. Ramping 
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inequality in advanced economies, and the budgetary trade-offs they imply, or the ‘aid system fragmentation’ 
trend within DAC donors (Kharas and Rogerson 2017; Gulrajani 2017) are powerful reminders of the 
policy and accountability dilemmas of both North-South and South-South cooperation in the decade ahead.  
 
Thinking ‘with and from the South’ on development cooperation accountability means taking seriously the 
convergence and divergence dynamics within the field: recognising both the ‘Southernisation’ of global 
development (Esteves 2017; Mawdsley 2018d) and the ‘isomorphic pressures’ on development cooperation 
providers cutting across the North–South axis (Gulrajani and Faure 2019). At the same time, it means 
understanding the time-bounded sociopolitical configurations that shape accountability politics in Southern 
partners like Brazil, India and China in the post-2015 era. Navigating the tensions of understanding ‘from 
the South’ while writing from Cambridge (see Appendix 1 for an extended note), this study shows multiple 
accountability dynamics taking place in and around SSC and thus challenges prevailing simplistic policy and 
scholarly debates on ‘SSC accountability deficits’ and on ‘development cooperation accountability as a 
Western issue or imposition’. It does so by adopting an analytical standpoint that embraces the interplay 
between structure and agency and between global and local explanatory factors shaping SSC policymaking. 
It looks at the category of rising powers (and at their position in existing international hierarchies) as well 
as at governmental, institutional and citizens’ agency to explain why certain types of SSC accountability 
politics emerge and why. This cartography of SSC accountability politics, bridging the global circulation of 
policy, norms and practices and context-specific dynamics of policymaking and state-society relations, offers 






Chapter 1. The politics of accountability in South-South 
cooperation: concepts and theories 
 
 
This chapter situates accountability in/of South-South cooperation as a research topic and introduces my 
conceptual framework to examining it. In the next two sections, I first locate this intellectual effort at the 
crossroads of the multidisciplinary critical SSC and accountability scholarship and then introduce the study 
of accountability in/of SSC as a lens into the contested consolidation of this policy and political field in 
rising powers. The third section examines the state of the debate on SSC accountability. I end the chapter 
detailing the integrative conceptual framework that will guide my study of contemporary SSC accountability 
politics in this thesis.  
 
 
Studying South-South cooperation ‘politics in time’  
 
 
South-South development cooperation, understood as the transfer and exchange of resources, technologies 
and knowledge between developing countries, has grown exponentially in the past two decades as a result 
of the increased engagement of ‘new’ or ‘(re)emerging’ development cooperation ‘providers’2 from the 
South (Woods 2008; Mawdsley 2012a; Gu, Shankland and Chenoy 2016). Southern providers include Brazil, 
China, India but also South Africa, Mexico, Turkey, Indonesia, South Korea and many more, including 
some small, impoverished and even fragile states. Their growing role in global development has spurred 
the consolidation of an interdisciplinary field of studies in Northern and Southern academic and applied-
research institutions (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2018; Mawdsley, Fourie, and Nauta 2019; Medina and 
Muñoz 2019). 
 
Even if most Southern providers explicitly challenge the widely recognised asymmetrical ‘donor-recipient’ 
relations, power asymmetries remain constitutive of SSC. This is particularly true in the case of rising powers 
and other large SSC providers members of the UN ‘Core Group of Southern Partners’3 (Bracho 2017).4 
 
2 Most Southern providers explicit reject the classic terminology ‘donor-recipient’ and prefer to be called ‘development 
partners’. Throughout this dissertation I refer to them as SSC or Southern ‘providers’, using the term ‘traditional donors’ to 
refer to the members of the OECD-DAC and to international development organisations, such as UN agencies (e.g., UNDP), 
multilateral development banks (e.g., World Bank) and private foundations (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation). For an 
early critical discussion on the label ‘donors’ to refer to the Southern providers and its implications, see Mawdsley (2012a). 
3 Created in 2013, the group gathers 15 countries considered ‘the main partners in South-South cooperation by the volume 
of development cooperation provided’ (UNDESA 2014). 
4 Besides ‘large’ and ‘small’ Southern providers, Bracho also differentiates between ‘Big SSC’ and ‘Little SSC’. The former 
refers to the more recent SSC agenda from the early 2000s onwards, led by rising powers, whereas the latter refers to the 
classic ‘horizontal technical cooperation’, dating back from the Third World activism during the Cold War, and as it takes 
places in Latin America, championed by countries like Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Cuba and Venezuela (Lechini 2009; 
Malacalza 2016; Muhr 2016). For more on historical and current forms of SSC, see Mawdsley (2012a); Pino (2014). 
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The focus of this thesis is precisely on rising powers—particularly Brazil, China and India—acting as 
providers of development knowledges, technologies and resources; and on the emerging accountability-
related sociopolitical disputes their South-South development engagements generate.  
 
Notwithstanding the limitations of categories such as ‘rising’ or ‘emerging’ powers,5 this label captures 
Brazil, China and India’s shared peripheral experiences and identities as ‘Southern/developing’ countries 
(Cesarino 2015; Fourie, Nauta and Mawdsley 2019) as well as their power, status and recognition-seeking 
ambitions as rapidly-growing economies, members of the BRICS, and large contributors to global 
development efforts (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Hurrell 2013; Stuenkel 2015; Gu, Shankland and 
Chenoy 2016). Framing their development cooperation as ‘from the South, to the South’ rising powers have 
pursued a complex ‘bid for differentiation’ (Abdenur 2014; Milani and Duarte 2015) and continuous 
‘oppositional claims’ (Cesarino 2013) of non-adherence and compliance with standards formulated under 
the umbrella of the OECD-DAC (S. Kim and Lightfoot 2011; Zoccal and Esteves 2018). In this thesis, I 
recognise the performative role played by discourses of ‘Southernness’ while also considering the political 
consequences of the sociohistorical differences that separate them from the ‘established/Northern’ powers, 
thus firmly locating this research within the growing interdisciplinary body of critical work on SSC.  
 
Critical South-South cooperation research 
 
Critical SSC studies emerged in the mid-2000s as a lens to investigate development cooperation among 
developing countries beyond the grand narratives and over-simplistic scripts present in some media, policy 
analysis and in the early (mostly IR-centred) research on the issue (Mawdsley et al. 2019).6 Attentive to 
power within and across South-South relations, this body of work questions how SSC is formulated, 
enacted, and performed. It deconstructs its principles and official narratives and seeks to understand the 
contested nature of SSC and its uneven socio, political, economic and/or environmental effects, debunking 
some of its political and epistemic ‘myths’ (Cabral et al. 2013; Bergamaschi, Moore and Tickner 2017). 
Critical SSC research pays attention to the conflicts and negotiations of Southern development actors at 
home and those resulting from South-South encounters on the ground.  
 
 
5 For a critique of the label, see Fonseca, Paes and Cunha (2016). 
6 Not coincidentally, critical SSC scholarship relied on conceptual and analytical tools from other disciplines such as 
development studies, anthropology, area studies, and beyond. 
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Drawing on the vast critical turn in social sciences and development studies,7 this scholarship has 
investigated SSC through four main (and often combined) lenses: political economy,8 postcolonialism and subaltern 
studies,9 knowledge and power10 and governance.11 This thesis is situated at the conjuncture of the two last streams 
and in direct conversation with the growing domestic politics and bureaucratic turns in development 
cooperation studies, notably Lancaster’s (2007) seminal book Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic 
Politics and subsequent studies along similar lines (e.g. Veen 2011; Yanguas and Hulme 2015; Milani 2018).12  
 
Here I critically investigate SSC accountability politics as a lens into the competing interests and ideas 
shaping the production of foreign policy and development cooperation and its consolidation as ‘a policy 
and political field’ (Milani 2018) in large SSC providers at this particular historical juncture. Studying SSC 
‘accountability politics in time’ (Nelson, Bloom and Shankland 2018)13 means situating it at the crossroads 
of two phenomena: first, the unfolding global development convergence-divergence dynamics and, second, 
SSC consolidation and politicisation moment.  
 
Global convergence-divergence dynamics 
 
Development scholars widely agree that the ‘re-emergence’14 of SSC in the early 2000s alongside the new 
global geographies of poverty and inequality have contributed to significantly change the development 
landscape (Mawdsley 2017; Horner and Hulme 2017; Zoccal and Esteves 2018). Together these shifts have 
accelerated the emergence of what some call a ‘post/beyond aid world’ (Mawdsley, Savage and Sung-Mi 
2014; Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo 2015) and set in motion new convergence and divergence politico-
 
7 In development studies, the critical turn covers not only postcolonial and de-colonial approaches to development 
(Escobar 2012; McEwan 2009; Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Radcliffe 2015), but also studies on knowledge and power in 
development (J. Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002; T. M. Li 2007; Roy and Crane 2015) and their implications to ‘aid 
bureaucracies’ (Long and Long 1992; Eyben 2000; Bebbington 2006; Mosse 2005; 2011), on to how global public 
policies/development ideas and their ‘scripts’ and ‘rationalities’ are formed and circulate within the broader political 
economy (T. M. Li 2007; Mosse 2011; A. Roy 2012).  
8 See, for example, Bond and Garcia (2015); Shankland and Gonçalves (2016); Santarelli (2016); Garcia, Kato and Fontes 
(2012). 
9 See, for example, Six (2009); Mohan and Power (2009); Pál (2013); Amar (2013); Han (2015); Taela (2017); Sheridan 
(2018); Santos, Siman and Fernández (2019). 
10 See, for example, Morais de Sá e Silva (2005); Scoones et al. (2016); Santarelli (2016); Shankland and Gonçalves (2016); 
Zhang et al. (2019); Cheng (2020). 
11 See, for example, Leite (2013); Cesarino (2013); Cabral (2016); Zea (2016); Gu, Shankland and Chenoy (2016); Dye and 
Alencastro (2020). Several of the empirical-based contributions within this last stream are found in the work of scholars 
studying Brazil, which has been more explicitly and consistently looking at the multiple dimensions of the domestic, 
intermestic, and transnational politics of SSC (Waisbich, Pomeroy and Leite forthcoming), emphasising ‘contradictions’ 
(Milani 2018), ‘disjunctions’ (Santarelli 2016), and ‘contestations’ (Shankland and Gonçalves 2016) of Brazilian SSC. For 
discussions on ‘contradictions’ in the Indian case, see Chanana (2009); Nigam (2015). 
12 Lancaster (2007) discussed the cases of the United States, Japan, France, Germany and Denmark. Drawing on her work, 
Veen (2011) looked at Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. Along similar lines, Milani (2018) has examined Brazil.  
13 The authors draw on Pierson’s (2004) work on the importance of history for a range of social processes, where he argues 
that that placing politics in time—constructing ‘moving pictures’ rather than snapshots—can vastly enrich our 
understanding of complex social dynamics, and greatly improve the theories and methods that we use to explain them. 
14 Beyond the notion of ‘re-emergence’ (Mawdsley 2012b), alternative characterisations include ‘re-birth’ (Bergamaschi, 
Moore and Tickner 2017), ‘re-incarnation (Chaturvedi 2012) and the ‘SSC expansionary phase’ (Mawdsley 2019a).  
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normative dynamics between two competing ‘sub-fields’ (Esteves and Assunção 2014): Aidland and SSC-
land. An important feature of this increasingly plural landscape, permeated by ‘ambivalent, multi-
dimensional and politicized’ relations between emerging powers and the broader apparatus of international 
development (Cesarino 2013, 25), is the loss of monopoly from traditional development aid actors and 
consequently a loss of their hegemonic discourse (Esteves and Assunção 2014; Bracho 2017).  
 
Before moving forward, a word on the notion of development cooperation as a ‘field’ and SSC as a ‘sub-
field’. Deriving from Pierre Bourdieu’s work15 and the ‘social’ and ‘practice’ turns in IR,16 the notion of 
social (and political) field is important because it apprehends SSC not only as an ‘issue-area’ in international 
affairs (e.g., Malacaza 2014) or a ‘foreign policy tool’ (e.g., Puente 2010) but also an ensemble of rules and 
practices. Such conceptualisation is particularly useful as allows for situating unfolding SSC accountability 
politics within existing symbolic, political and material ‘battles’17 over development cooperation and over 
international hierarchies (Zarakol 2017). In this thesis I further combine this gaze with other non-
structuralist operationalisations of the notion of policy field (or ‘domain’) in policy studies to understand SSC 
actors, networks and their practices (Burstein 1991; Cefaï 1996). Combined, the notions of policy, political 
and social fields enable a socially attentive gaze into the struggles upon the structured positions and 
identities of ‘traditional/Northern’ and ‘new/Southern’ development partners and into how these positions 
and identities are constantly renegotiated internally and externally.  
 
Back to the shifting geographies of development cooperation, rather than an isolated phenomenon 
convergence-divergence dynamics are closely related to the shifting global governance dynamics 
(Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Stuenkel 2016; Acharya and Buzan 2019). Disputes around SSC 
accountability, therefore, are nested within a broader context in which rising powers, markedly China18, are 
objects of ‘social pressure’ or ‘socialisation’19 to comply with existing global norms and ways of acting and 
being ‘responsible’ and ‘accountable’ internationally. The context is also one in which Southern 
powerhouses act to challenge or resist these very norms and practices. Across different issue-areas, rising 
 
15 Initially transposed to study the development cooperation realm by Brazilian SSC scholarship, see Esteves and Assunção 
(2014); Zoccal and Esteves (2018); Milani (2018); Moreira (2020). 
16 See Towns and Rumelili (2017); Zarakol (2017) for enlightening summaries of the differences in IR scholarship between 
structural and post-structural approaches (drawing, for instance, on critical theory and Bourdieu’s notion of ‘fields’) and 
pragmatic approaches (drawing on collectives of practice, assemblage theory and others).  
17 Cesarino (2013) speaks of a ‘global battleground’, while Esteves and Assunção (2014) of ‘doxa battles’. The use of 
Bourdieu’s notion of ‘doxa’ emphasises what is assumed and taken for granted in this particular field, paying attention to 
what it was constructed and enacted by traditional donors since the origins of the aid system.  
18 The focus on China has been visibly greater than in any other ‘rising power’. An illustration of that can be seen in the 
inaugural issue of the Southern-led Rising Power Quarterly, entirely devoted to China and on its growing role in global 
politics. See https://risingpowersproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Rising-Powers-Quarterly-Volume-1-Issue-1.pdf  
(last access: 03/08/2020). 
19 The notion of ‘socialisation’ has been extensively explored by the French school of IR, which takes an explicitly 
sociological approach to the study of international affairs (e.g. Devin 2002). More recently, under the social turn in 
Anglophone IR, increased attention to social dynamics such as practice (Adler and Pouliot 2011), international hierarchies 
(Zarakol 2017), social pressure (Towns and Rumelili 2017), border-making and stigmatisation (Adler-Nissen 2014; Zarakol 
2014), and ranking and status (Renshon 2017). 
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powers’ diplomatic practices have been portrayed as ‘challenging the status quo’ (Badie 2013; Xiaoyun and 
Carey 2014; Alden and Alves 2017),20 ‘reformists’ or ‘modestly revisionist’ (Abdenur 2014; Stuenkel 2015; 
Milani and Duarte 2015). Their behaviour have also been portrayed as ‘ambiguous’, ‘inconsistent’ or 
‘ambivalent’ for adopting mix of compliance and resistance stances to the so-called ‘Western international 
liberal order’ (Sullivan de Estrada 2015; Smith 2016; D. B. Lopes, Casarões and Gama 2020).21 
 
IR scholarship offers additional insights into rising powers’ uneasy relationship with global development 
norms. Critical scholars compellingly argued that global standards and norms act as accomplices in 
Othering, either through ‘stigmatisation’ (Zarakol 2014; Adler-Nissen 2014) or ‘infantilization’ (Epstein 
2012), and ‘exert pressure on states through the hierarchical relations that they establish between them’ 
(Towns and Rumelili 2017, 763). Towns and Rumelili further posit that different states manage social 
pressure differently (reject, abide, appear to abide, try to transform norms) according to their positions in the 
social hierarchy. Positionality matters here because rising powers fit in the hierarchy bounded by the 
constrains of a semi-peripherical (or semi-central) position but also with the rooms for manoeuvre and 
agency offered by their ‘emergent/rising’ status.  
 
Scholarship on norm diffusion is equally useful here as to offer insights into how local actors engage and 
‘domesticate’ global norms (e.g. Risse-Kappen 1994; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Acharya 2004). 
Acharya’s widely referred ‘localisation framework’ is an important reference point to understand the 
normative ‘translation’ and ‘hybridisation’ work by Southern actors.22 In conversation with Acharya, 
scholarship on rising powers has also discussed how Brazil, China and India attempted to craft alternative, 
differentiated, and innovative ways to participate in international life, either simultaneously accepting 
international norms’ content and rejecting their implementation in practice (Kenkel and Martins 2016; 
Kenkel and Destradi 2019) or dealing with existing norms in innovating ways based on ‘particularist 
practices’ (Leveringhaus and Sullivan de Estrada 2018, 483). Though focused on the nuclear and human 
security regimes, these studies offer nuanced and multi-layered views on the normative role of Southern 
powers and their somehow ‘dual innovation’ in relation to global norms: domesticating (and hybridising) 
them during the internalisation process as well as creating new alternative global understandings,23 
something noticeable in matters of development cooperation accountability, as I will demonstrate.  
 
A last relevant contribution from IR studies associates rising powers’ ‘diplomatic ambivalence’ and domestic 
politics. Here scholars highlighted the ‘tensions’, ‘ambiguities’, ‘dilemmas’ and ‘traps’ embedded in the 
 
20 Badie labelled this move as a ‘contestation/dissent diplomacy’ (diplomatie constestataire, in French).  
21 China is portraited as increasingly more assertive in some policy realms (Johnston 2013), but so far not changing the 
fundamental combination of non-conformist thinking, identity projection, and search for differentiated forms of 
conformity that has characterised its rise in the past decades (Leveringhaus and Sullivan de Estrada 2018). 
22 Translation is also a key concept in policy diffusion studies (e.g. Stone 2012; Hassenteufel and de Maillard 2013). See 
Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2018) for a discussion on the relation between ‘translation’ and ‘resistance’ in policy transfer.  
23 I thank Dr. Carlos Milani for enlightening me on this point (personal communication with Carlos Milani, 2020). 
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position of ‘emerging power’ and how these translated into policymaking and stances (van der Westhuizen 
and Milani 2019; Santos, Siman and Fernández 2019; D. B. Lopes, Casarões and Gama 2020; Haug 2020).24 
In the field of development, this gives rise to tensions between status signalling with ‘becoming a provider’ 
and domestic development needs, as well as to multiple forms of ‘anxieties’, including at the practitioners’ 
level (Cheng 2020; Doucette 2020). Rising powers’ compliance, resistance and/or innovation stances in the 
field are, therefore, unavoidably shaped by both diplomatic autonomy and status-recognition aims and by 
domestic politics, in which diverse national constituencies hold different expectations on SSC and on its 
returns. Analytically, such proposition reinforces that domestic dynamics matter: they impact on Southern 
providers’ willingness and capacity to play active global development roles and set limits to external 
engagements, both structurally and across time (Six 2009; van der Westhuizen and Milani 2019). 
 
‘Co-optation’ or ‘Southernisation’?  
 
Existing global development scholarship has produced different and sometimes opposing evidence on who 
is converging with whom on what. Some scholars describe the current landscape as a progressive 
‘Southernisation’ of development, based on the diagnosis of a substantive and ontologically challenging ‘re-
emergence’ of SSC (Esteves 2017; Mawdsley 2018b). This process is well captured by what Zoccal and 
Esteves (2018) termed the ‘BRICS effect’, materialised, for instance, in the attractiveness of a ‘Beijing 
consensus’ on win-win economic cooperation and infrastructure building in the South or in DAC members 
increasingly concerned to combine aid spending with other national interests (Gulrajani 2017).  
 
Another version of this tale looks at social policy travel ‘from the South’ and at how Southern-led poverty 
alleviation technical cooperation has changed ‘traditional’ donors’ thematic priorities and ways of working. 
Examples include the renewed global fight against hunger (Stone, Porto de Oliveira and Pal 2019; Fukuda-
Parr and Muchhala 2020) and the global diffusion of ‘Southern-grown’ social protection schemes and 
instruments, like Conditional Cash Transfers (Morais de Sá e Silva 2017; Osorio Gonnet 2018).25 These 
policy studies highlight the particular historical juncture when rising powers acquired power, authority and 
resources to diffuse their policies to other developing countries and to multilaterals (Leite, Pomeroy and 
Suyama 2015; Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou 2017). In both tales, ‘traditional’ donors’ ways of working 
and thematic priorities are seen as increasing influenced by their emulation or learnings from SSC (S. Kim 
and Lightfoot 2011; Constantine and Shankland 2017). 
 
24 Many IR scholars unpacking these dynamics have used Brazil and/or South Africa as their empirical sites. Milani, Pinheiro 
and M. R S. Lima (2017, 585) describe Brazil’s ‘graduation dilemma’, for instance, as the one where ‘decision-makers have 
the opportunity to choose and the intention of choosing between different international strategies: between a more 
autonomous type of development or a more dependent one; in security terms, between bandwagoning and balancing; when 
building a multilateral policy, between traditional alliances and innovative, flexible coalitions; in geopolitical terms and in the 
field of development cooperation, between an emphasis on North–South or an emphasis on South-South relations’.  
25 Here I have adopted the term ‘policy diffusion’ as an umbrella term for the diverse body of work on policy transfer, 
diffusion, circulation, and/or mobility. For a recent appraisal of these different agendas and their new research frontiers, 
see Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2018). 
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Alongside ‘Southernisation’, scholars have studied the opposite process: SSC convergence with existing 
ODA norms and practices. Convergence is due, firstly, to direct and indirect socialisation pressures, or even 
co-optation attempts, but also opening-up, outreach and courtship efforts by DAC donors, multilaterals 
and international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) (Paulo and Reisen 2010; Eyben 2013; Bracho 
2017). This also includes partnering with rising powers to reform SSC management and systems and/or to 
work together in the benefit of third countries through triangular cooperation (McEwan and Mawdsley 
2012; Abdenur and Da Fonseca 2013; Leite, Pomeroy and Suyama 2015; D. Zhang 2017; Zoccal 2020a).26 
The creation of the China-DAC Study Group,27 in 2009, or UK’s DFID Emerging Powers Initiative and 
Strategy, exemplify this will to work with rising powers and shape their global development behaviour.28 
Concurrently, convergence with existing Northern standards has also been explained by a will to integrate 
coming from rising powers themselves, illustrated by a waning of the global Bandung revisionist impetus 
(Esteves and Assunção 2014) and the adoption of more pragmatic, result-oriented, development 
cooperation approaches (Suyama, Waisbich and Leite 2016; Zhang 2017; Mawdsley 2019).  
 
While seemingly conflicting the two scripts—‘Southernisation’ and ‘co-optation’—are not mutually 
exclusive. Rather, they reveal unfolding ‘mutual’ or ‘two-way’ socialisation dynamics in the field (Abdenur 
2014; Alden and Alves 2017; Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou 2017), with negotiations taking place and 
eventually leading to the formation of new shared development norms and/or expectations on ‘appropriate’ 
development cooperation provider behaviour and new organisational structures for doing and justifying 
development cooperation. Accordingly, here I adopt a relational gaze that is attentive, on the one hand, to 
the mutually constitutive changes shaping traditional aid, SSC and North-South relations and, on the other, 
to the domestic-international interfaces that also shape foreign policy/SSC behaviour.  
 
Consolidation, politicisation and accountability politics  
 
Spatial-temporal sensitivity is key to the study of SSC. Mawdsley (2019) suggestion of a ‘SSC consolidation 
phase’ from approximately 2015 onwards offers a temporal marker for locating contemporary SSC 
accountability politics. According to Mawdsley, in the current ‘SSC 3.0 moment’, Southern  providers have 
to ‘manage the success’ from the previous expansionary phase in the early 2000s.29 As a consequence, 
 
26 According to the UN, triangular cooperation involves Southern-driven partnerships between two or more developing 
countries supported by one or more developed countries or multilateral organizations to implement development 
cooperation programmes and projects (UN 2012). 
27 The group functioned briefly, mostly between 2009 and 2011. See https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-
relations/china-dac-study-group.htm (last access: 27/07/2020). 
28 The Rising Powers Initiative, previously called Rising Powers Hub, is a portfolio with several initiatives that contribute to 
this socialising goal, such as the BBDI – Building Brazilian Development Impact in Low Income Countries (led by the then 
DFID Brazil) or DFID China Partnership with the Development Research Centre of the State Council of China on Knowledge 
for Development to ‘provide an intellectual force to China’s international opening up strategy’ (DFID 2017b; DFID 2017a). 
29 In Mawdsley periodisation, the first phase corresponds to the initial SSC moment under the Cold War ‘Bandung Spirit’ and 
its subsequent developments, in the late 1970s, when SSC principles were agreed at the 1978 United Nations Conference on 
Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries, giving birth to the landmark Buenos Aires Action Plan (BAPA). This was 
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important shifts in narratives, modalities and institutions are taking place within key SSC providers and at 
the global level, including: (i) more pragmatic/result-oriented SSC narratives; (ii) less strong non-
interference modalities of engagement; and (iii) less ideational and operational distinction from DAC 
members.  Albeit tentative, this periodisation captures changes unfolding in Brazil, China and India in the 
last decade. The exact dates and the nature of these ‘consolidation’, ‘institutionalisation’ or 
‘professionalisation’ dynamics, as they have been referred, can vary across countries.30 Yet the year of 2015 
is undeniably a global watershed, with the approval of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, Addis 
Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development, and the Paris Agreement on climate change.  
 
This thesis draws on this proposition as to unpack particular sociopolitical dynamics generated by this 
somewhat successful expansionary phase in large SSC providers focusing on the politicised nature of this 
consolidation moment. In particular, it focuses on the growing need Brazil, China and India have to manage 
sociopolitical conflicts over their SSC, including accountability-related conflicts, as one of the key dynamics in 
this particular historical juncture.  
 
Much of the initial characterisation of large Southern providers has emphasised the diversity of institutional 
forms and practices across countries but also its low institutionalised, emerging, in-the-making character 
(Cesarino 2013; Cabral 2016; Gu, Shankland and Chenoy 2016; Bergamaschi, Moore and Tickner 2017). 
Scholars have also highlighted the decentralised, fragmented and/or institutionally dispersed nature of SSC 
policy-making and implementation (Leite et al. 2014; Gu, Chen and Haibin 2016; Doucette 2020) and the 
ad hoc, ‘learning by doing’ and ‘testing waters’ approaches adopted by SSC partners (Chaturvedi 2012; 
Shimomura and Ohashi 2013; D. Zhang 2020). More recent studies suggested, however, the occurrence of 
institutional reforms, such as the creation of development cooperation agencies in a range of Southern 
countries, including in China, but also re-arrangements due to the relative contraction of SSC activities in 
countries like Brazil, South Africa, and other Latin American nations (Mawdsley 2019; Cesarino 2019; 
Medina and Muñoz 2019; D. Zhang 2020). Either way, the majority of SSC providers seem to be moving 
towards experimenting with institutionalisation.31  
 
Dynamics of policy and institutional change are an entry door for questions of accountability politics, which 
become constitutive of SSC disputed or contested institutionalisation dynamics, globally and within large Southern 
providers. An assumption underpinning this thesis is that disputed institutionalisations shape and are 
shaped by new forms of re-politicisation of SSC. Politicisation, a major concept for the study of policy and 
 
followed by a second phase, South-South Cooperation 2.0, which corresponds to the re-emergence of SSC in the early 2000s 
and to its significant expansion. See Morais de Sá e Silva (2010) for an alternative chronology.  
30 Brazilian scholars, for instance, point to an institutionalisation phase starting in Brazil from 2010 onwards (Ramanzini Jr., 
Mariano, and Almeida 2015; Milani 2017; Cesarino 2019), a period that coincides with the end of Lula da Silva’s era. In 
India, debates about institutional reforms started around 2010, even if the enacting of changes, including the creation of 
India’s development agency, the MEA-affiliated DPA, happened some years later (Chaturvedi 2012). 
31 Here the idea of institutionalisation follows Douglas North’s (1990) classic definition of institutions as the ‘rules of the 
game’ governing social interactions. 
17 
 
development processes, is understood here along the lines suggested by Tania Li (2007), as the act of 
rendering visible the political character of development cooperation. This is convergent with categorisations 
of politicisation in world politics, such as the one offered by Zürn (2014, 50), as ‘the demand for or the act 
of transporting an issue into the field of politics – making previously unpolitical matters political’. Or Milani 
and Pinheiro’s (2013, 30) characterisation of politicisation in foreign policymaking as the ‘intensification of 
the debate of ideas, values and interests on political choices, and also et pour cause, of inter and intra-
bureaucratic disputes, debates between different social actors and the best way to consider their demands’. 
In all three definitions, ‘the political’ refers, as argued by Chantal Mouffe (1993), to the occurrence of 
agonism in society and to the competing interests and world views different actors hold. It also refers to 
the ‘practice of politics’: ‘the critical scrutiny, in word and deed, of the truths of government, opening them 
up for contestation and debate between people with different interests and claims’ (T. M. Li 2007, 270).  
 
SSC was born out of an explicitly politically radical discourse by the then Third World during the Cold War 
around global economic justice. Its expansion in the 2000s reflected somewhat updated claims and hopes 
of its transformative potential. SSC re-emerged as desired and desirable, embedded in proud official 
narratives on the similarities and adaptability of Southern knowledges and technologies and as a welcome 
expanded room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis Northern aid paradigms and conditionalities. SSC is, as suggested 
by Cesarino (2013, 26), ‘always and already explicitly politicized’ in ways Northern aid is not intended to 
be. If Northern aid is permeated by sanitised technical evidence-based discourses about development (J. 
Ferguson 1994; T. M. Li 2007; Rottenburg 2009), Southern claims to development are, alternatively, 
situated, and self-proclaimed as ‘better’ and ‘more appropriate’ exactly because of this political situatedness. 
Put it another way: while Western donors denied and concealed history (above all, colonialism), the 
emerging South decided to build upon it (Six 2009).  
 
Yet SSC expansion has also led to changes in its nature towards less-radical, mainstream, techno-scientific 
forms of development cooperation (Morais de Sá e Silva 2005; Pino 2014; Muhr 2016). Such de-
politicisation happened, for instance, through upholding conventional modernising assumptions of how 
development works (Han 2015; Cheng 2020) or through unidirectional sharing of Southern-grown ‘best 
practices’ from middle-income to lower-income Southern countries (Shankland and Gonçalves 2016). Both 
reinforced global hierarchies and underplayed the political-economic relations that constitute development 
challenges in the first place. In this context, the emergence of internal and external calls for Southern 
providers to justify their policies and practices—labelled here SSC accountability politics—constitute lenses 
into the re-politicisation of SSC coming from within Southern providers, from other Southern partners and 
from Aidland. Applying such lens into ‘SSC consolidation moment’ contributes, therefore, to unpacking the 
disputes around power and responsibility in global development and the political-institutional-citizenship 




Accountability politics: a lens into the disputed nature of development 
cooperation   
 
The word “accountability” is not a magic potion; sprinkling the term onto something does not, in and of itself, make that 
thing useful or good or welfare-enhancing (Honing 2020, 7)  
 
 
Accountability is an old term rendered a buzzword in the new century,32 including in global development. 
In English, the concept embraces the two meanings implied in the verb ‘to account’: the act of bookkeeping 
and the act of providing an account. It was this English rendition, bridging ‘the financial and the moral’ 
(Strathern 2003), that became global and slowly dislocated other concepts used to understand power and 
governance in public affairs (Fox 2018). 
 
This thesis is concerned with public accountability in the field of development cooperation and thus with the 
relationships of power and obligations between public powerholders (elected officials, bureaucrats and 
those acting on behalf of the state) and those subjected to or affected by their development cooperation-
related actions (Hickey and Mohan 2008; Bovens, Goodin and Schillemans 2014; Isunza and Lavalle 2018). 
Public accountability is a chameleonic and unstable concept due to its conceptual breadth, under-specificity 
and to the tensions between its normative and descriptive dimensions (Rached 2016). The term refers to 
different forms of power control and obligations: political, social, legal, financial and managerial. As a 
‘cultural keyword’ (Dubnick 2014), moreover, it often encompasses rather than replaces correlated concepts 
such as responsibility, responsiveness, answerability and/or citizen oversight (Peters 2002).33 In this thesis, 
I employ the notion of public accountability broadly as to embrace its multiple associated meanings. This 
broad operationalisation allows for an empirical mapping of multiple coexisting disputes over regulation 
and control of public behaviour in contemporary SSC, in its many forms. It also helps unpacking how these 
disputes relate to questions of domestic and international responsibility, authority and legitimacy of rising 
powers’ foreign and development policies in the present days.34   
 
From Principal-Agent to Accountability Politics 
 
Public accountability is commonly understood as having both a ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ face, namely answerability 
and enforceability, of ‘giving an account’ and ‘being held to account’ (Schedler 1999; Fox 2007a). Whereas 
 
32 The etymology of the concept comes from the Old French words of acont and acontable, originally referring to the 
financial account and to the act of being called to pay or called to count on demand. 
33 On responsiveness and its linkages with the Deepening Democracy school of thought that ‘advocates the direct 
participation of citizens in governance and, broadly speaking, includes the promotion of social movements and their claims 
to services as rights, see Fung and Wright (2001); Gaventa (2006); Isunza and Lavalle (2018). 
34 On the linkages between international accountability and international responsibility, see Grant and Keohane (2005); 
Bukovansky et al. (2012). 
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the soft face is closely tied to notions of public transparency and justification, the hard one relates to 
sanctions and redress. The dominant paradigm for studying public accountability has been Principal-Agent 
theory. Reflecting the rational-choice approach, this framework describes the chain of power delegation in 
democracies with ‘principals’ being citizens and ‘agents’ being elected officials and public servants 
(Gailmard 2014). Within democratic theory, Principal-Agent has subsequently led to the study of check-
and-balance relations within and outside the state, categorised by O’Donnell (1998) as ‘horizontal’ 
accountability, as opposed to the electoral ‘vertical’ accountability.  
 
Many have since moved away from Principal-Agent approaches towards other understandings that 
emphasise the socially constructed nature of accountability relations and the power dimensions of how 
public accountability is negotiated between multiple stakeholders (state officials, citizens, interest groups, 
political parties, the media, etc.) holding diverse accountability demands (e.g Fox 2007a; Bovens, Curtin 
and Hart 2010; Berghmans, Simons and Vandenabeele 2017; Nelson, Bloom and Shankland 2018; Isunza 
and Lavalle 2018). These constructivist contributions highlight how accountability is socially produced with 
context-bounded expectations of ‘right’, ‘good’, ‘just’ or ‘appropriate’ public behaviour; of what counts as 
an account; of whether/when to include the sanctions; and of who to be held responsible (Newell and 
Bellour 2002; Fontaine et al. 2016). As argued by Newell and Bellour (2002), the construction of 
accountabilities and the definition of rights and duties that flow from accountability relations is a political 
process. Demands and responses are relations of power in a state of flux, they are a product of particular 
historical and material circumstances.  
 
A valuable contribution to this explicitly social and political gaze on accountability is found in the work of 
Jonathan Fox on accountability politics. Accountability politics is a promising conceptual-analytical device to 
study accountability in/of SSC for three main reasons. First, it goes beyond Principal-Agent models of 
vertical/electoral accountability and investigates longer and more indirect35 accountability processes and 
relations within and around state agencies and bureaucracies.36 Accountability politics is thus a lens to 
understand the social foundations of processes of public institutional change, or ‘pro-accountability 
changes’ (Fox 2007a, 2).37 Second, it inserts power at the core of the analysis thus departing from de-
 
35 Even among classic political theory scholarship, the relationship between democracy and accountability is also not a 
direct one. When examining the case of delegative democracies O'Donnell (1998) suggested, for instance, the concept of 
horizontal accountability to capture other control dynamics beyond the electoral one. Likewise Przeworski, Stokes and 
Manin (1999) argued that electoral competition not necessarily generated public accountability.  
36 Other studies following a similar approach include: Bovens, Curtin and Hart’s (2010) study on the European Union 
institutions; Isunza and Lavalle’s (2018) edited collection on ‘non-electoral democratic control mechanisms’; Hickey and 
King’s (2016) study on social protection development programmes; Nelson, Bloom and Shankland’s (2018) edited collection 
on the politics of accountability for reducing health inequalities; and Joshi’s (2019) edited collection on accountability in 
fragile states.  
37 Others in the field have also conceptually explored the relation between accountability struggles and reforms. Rached 
(2016, 318), for instance, argues that despite its omnipresence and ubiquity, accountability has not always been at the 
‘forefront of public demands for legitimate authority’, operating instead at a lower waveband, through inciting reformist 
initiatives (also Dubnick 2011). This is a point I will come back to in subsequent chapters.  
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politicised notions of accountability reliant on legal and/or technocratic notions of (good) governance 
(Newell and Wheeler 2006; Eyben 2008). Lastly, it embraces the multi-directional, multi-scalar and even 
the material nature of accountability relations, exemplified in descriptors like accountability ‘ecosystems’ 
(Halloran 2016), ‘webs’ (Bovens, Curtin and Hart 2010), and ‘regimes’ (Isunza and Lavalle 2018; Waisbich 
et al. 2019), a point to which I will return shortly.  
 
Accountability and the politics of global development  
 
Much of public accountability scholarship is concerned with ‘accountability deficits’ and how ‘to fix’ them 
(Mulgan 2014). Concerns with, but also perceptions of, deficits are particularly acute in the field of 
development cooperation (Faria 2005; Laporte 2015). Deficits are intrinsically related to how power 
dynamics play out internationally: the realm of ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau 1992) and where 
states’ action respond to multiple layers of responsibility and authority and overlapping non-electoral power 
control regimes (Kahler 2004; Grant and Keohane 2005; Bovens, Curtin and Hart 2010). Notions of deficits  
are also shaped by the challenges that ‘promoting development abroad’ bring to establishing who are the 
stakeholders in this multi-actor, multi-level, accountability relation (Eyben and Ferguson 2004; de Renzio 
2016). Deficit imaginaries further result from the nature of the ‘development apparatus’ and from its 
improvement practices attempting, while never fully accomplishing, to rend aid practices ‘effective’ by 
showing successes and concealing failures (Ferguson 1994; Mosse 2004; T. M. Li 2007; Rottenburg 2009).  
 
Existing academic and policy-oriented knowledge on ‘aid accountability’ has enlightened different aspects 
of the issue.38 This includes research on ‘aid relations’ and their workings (who is accountable, or held to 
account, to whom and how ‘aid accountability’ is enacted or practiced) and on what the polymorphous notion 
of accountability ‘is’ and/or ‘does’ for the field. Across both streams, power-sensitive studies examined 
how accountability became a policy priority and a sector of intervention for multilateral and bilateral 
development donors (Hickey and Mohan 2008; Gaventa and McGee 2013; Swedlund 2017) and how 
development initiatives promoted or undermined accountability in recipient countries (Hickey, Sen, and 
Bukenya 2014; Fox 2020). Scholars have also studied accountability-related mobilisation by groups affected 
by aid projects on the ground, particularly large infrastructure ones (Fox and Brown 1998; Goetz and 
Jenkins 2001; Park 2019).  
 
 
38 Due to close connections between academic knowledge and practice in much of the development scholarship (Sumner 
and Tribe 2008), several scholars have studied development accountability in a policy-oriented way. Drawing on either a 
policy management perspective or a democratic rights-based perspective, this literature discusses pathways to state and 
aid accountability, including through policy evaluations and recommendations. For those working within or in conversation 
with the ‘deepening democracy’ theory, studies have created increasingly rich lists of enabling factors or conditions under 
which pro-accountability institutions (state and non-state alike) ‘actually manage to limit political power and sanction its 
abuse’ for improved states and ‘donors’ accountability (Fox 2007a, 11). 
21 
 
Moreover, power-sensitive studies have deconstructed ‘accountability demand-supply’ dynamics in the 
field. They demonstrated how aid organisations (bilateral and multilateral) have prioritised ‘upwards’ (to 
other governmental bodies in donor countries) over ‘mutual accountability’ between partner governments 
and over ‘downwards’ accountability to two almost irreconcilable categories of citizens: ‘taxpayers’ in donor 
countries and the ‘poor and marginalised people’39 in recipient countries (Eyben and Ferguson 2004; also 
Chapter 3). They also noted that, when considering ‘downwards accountability’, donors have prioritised 
‘taxpayers’ over the ‘poor aid beneficiaries’ who are not only spatially distant from the policymaking settings 
to demand justification but also problematically disempowered to ask for any justification, creating a so-
called ‘broken feedback-loop’ (Eyben and Ferguson 2004; McGee 2013). In this thesis, I build on these 
power-sensitive studies, highlighting the relational and polymorphous material and discursive nature of 
accountability and the multi-dimensional productive work accountability does in the field.  
 
A norm, a tool, a discourse and an arena of conflict    
 
Accountability is first a norm and, more specifically, an international ‘soft norm’ (Paulo and Reisen 2010) 
ruling Aidland since the 2000s. As a norm, accountability works, albeit always imperfectly, as ‘global 
standard’ or a ‘governance-object’ (Dunn 2005; Acuto and Curtis 2013) and functions as a boundary-
making, disciplining, ranking and hierarchisation device (Towns and Rumelili 2017). The accountability 
norm is constitutive of what scholars referred as the ‘donorship model’ or ‘doxa’ (Lancaster 2007; Esteves 
and Assunção 2014): the set of standards and social expectations on donors. In other words, DAC’s own 
acquis communautaire. Countries in the ‘donors club’, are expected to provide concessional resources to 
promote development abroad, engaging in ‘gift-like’ spending targeting beneficiaries abroad (Eyben 2008). 
This commitment was formalised in the 1970s at the UN-level with an agreement by ‘advanced countries’ 
to make efforts to provide 0.7% of their GNI as ODA (Clemens and Moss 2005; Vanheukelom et al. 
2012).40 Donors are also expected to untie aid (from the condition to be used to procure goods or services 
from the provider); to report aid flows according to DAC statistics; to participate in peer-reviews; and to 
follow Aid Effectiveness principles. Conceiving accountability as a global norm also helps understanding 
the subsequent emergence of global and national transparency and accountability policy and institutional 
reforms in donor and recipient countries and the creation of countless tools ‘to make aid accountability 
work’ (Honig and Weaver 2019), a topic I will explore in Chapter 3.  
 
39 For a critical discussion on the notion of the ‘poor’ and the challenges of using this framing for thinking politically and 
achieving the fuller goal of social justice, see Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya (2014). 
40 The idea of a target was first mentioned in 1958, as a proposal by the World Council of Churches, and at the time it was 
of 1%. UNCTAD took the idea forward in the 1960s, providing background studies and suggesting figures around 0.75% of 
GNP. The Pearson’s Commission report in 1969 further drawn the attention to the target, suggesting instead the 0.7% of 
the GNI. In 1970, the UNGA adopted without vote a declaration on the Second Development Decade which included the 
agreement on advanced countries making the effort. While in the 1970s the target was an estimate of development 
assistance needs, for the time, in the following decades it became a political international standard and a commitment by 
traditional donors. More recent agreements in the context of Agenda 2030 include a commitment by developed countries 
to provide the equivalent of 0.15–0.2 % of their GNI in the form of ODA for least-developed countries (LDCs) in greatest 




This leads to a second conceptualisation of accountability in IDC, this time as a tool. Accountability tools—
including transparency and accounting systems, project and flow databases, project reports, impact 
evaluation reports, monitoring and evaluation matrices, Theories of Change, LogFrames and beyond—
have been studied as mechanisms (Joshi and Houtzager 2012; McGee 2013), infrastructures (Jensen and 
Winthereik 2013) and artefacts (Mosse 2011; Eyben et al. 2015).41 Accountability tools, we are told, respond 
to different aims and pushes from multiple actors and thus create different—and sometimes competing—
accountability lines, logics and ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ (Jasanoff 2015). Some are social measures of 
quantitative performance or statistics, while others are management tools. Some aim at creating reporting 
systems on aid financial flows to external accounting bodies, others at fostering project/activity 
documentation practices towards citizens in donor and recipient countries. Some are embedded in 
technology-solutions of open data, while others are technology-free solutions for organisational learning. 
Most are several of those things at the same time. 
 
While certain development scholars have studied tools and mechanisms to provide policy-relevant analysis 
of how to improve them,42 others have investigated their sociopolitical effects (e.g. Rottenburg 2009; Eyben 
et al. 2015), notably the connection between accountability tools and the surge of neoliberal New Public 
Management-based forms of audit control and ‘governance by/through numbers’ or ‘measurementalities’ 
(Porter 1995; J. Scott 1999; T. Mitchell 2002).43 A more recent stream of critical scholarship has also 
examined the ways tools have evolved embedded in ‘techno-emancipatory’ conceptions of information and 
communication technologies (ICTs) and infused with the idea that technology can free information and 
empower real or imagined publics to control development actors (Jensen and Winthereik 2013; McGee 
2013; Narayanaswamy 2015). Constructed to ‘create accountability’, tools are seeing as connecting different 
partners into the larger reporting chain and allowing for data on cooperation projects, financial flows, and 
outcomes to move upstream. Aid data, as I once heard during an international development conference in 
India, defies gravity: it goes up.  
 
While assessing tools in action, scholars described widespread perceptions of aid accountability tools having 
‘delivered too little’ and ‘not worked’ in practice (Eyben 2008; Laporte 2015; T. Kim and Lim 2017). At the 
same time, scholars also described aid organisations becoming hostages of a technocratic thinking that takes 
for granted the ‘fixing’ powers of accountability mechanisms (McGee 2013; Jensen and Winthereik 2013). 
By focusing on ‘getting tools right’, aid practitioners overlooked the (intended and unintended) effects of 
 
41 An alternative concept equally mobilised in the critical development literature is one of ‘dispositif’ (J. Ferguson 1994; T. 
M. Li 2007).   
42 On this policy vein, see, inter alia, Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014); Renzio (2016); Honig (2020).  
43 In his work, T. Mitchell uses the concepts of ‘cauculability’ (2000) and ‘economentality’ (2009) to refer to the need the 
development apparatus has to fund things that are measurable. 
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accountability ‘technical-fixes’ on North-South asymmetries and on marginalising partners in the South, 
both governments and their citizens (Llanos 2019), a point I develop further in Chapters 3.  
 
In sum, conceiving accountability as a (governance/governmentality) tool offers a window into the 
materiality of  processes and instruments used to manage relations, assess results and generate evidence, as 
well as into the co-evolution of  social and organisational practices in the field. It also allows for investigating 
the negotiations that informed the construction of  these instruments (from open-data platforms to 
independent oversight bodies), including how multiple actors engage to define standards, the judgements 
about whether the standards were respected, or not, and the particular kinds of  authority and different 
accountability logics underpinning them (Berghmans, Simons and Vandenabeele 2017; Sovacool, Naudé 
Fourie and Tan-Mullins 2019).  
 
Third, accountability is also a discourse, as demanding and providing accounts are examples of ‘language in 
action’ (Dermot 2009; Dubnick 2014). As a discourse, accountability is understood as serving different 
actors to both govern and contest development cooperation relations. Accountability discourses, on the 
one hand, produce socialisation and discipline effects (through ‘naming and shaming’, stigmatising and peer 
pressure) on actors in the donor-recipient dyad and within the ‘donor club’ (S. Kim and Lightfoot 2011; 
Swedlund 2017). On the other hand, accountability discourses work as claim-making tools for ‘aid 
recipients’, external and internal policy ‘reformers’ (Fox and Brown 1998; Bebbington 2006; Honig and 
Weaver 2019), activists in global ‘aid monitoring movements’ (McGee 2013; Jensen and Winthereik 2013) 
and domestic constituencies in both donors and recipients seeking to contest and change development 
cooperation policies and practices.  
 
As a norm, a tool and a discourse, accountability operates as a ‘global assemblage’ (Ong and Collier 2005), 
shaping material, collective and discursive relationships in field. At the same time, I contend, it operates as 
a discursive-politics arena where several types of policy and political debates and disputes unfold and where 
different actors negotiate development cooperation relations and practices. Arenas are spaces of 
interactions between actors involved in negotiations and deliberation (or non-deliberation) that punctuate 
the conduct of public policies, from agenda-setting to implementation (Fouilleux and Jobert 2017). Arenas 
are also spaces where compromises over polices are generated and updated. Arenas of conflict over 
accountability in/of SSC, or SSC accountability politics, are thus generative of broader policy and political 
arenas where debates and disputes about SSC unfold and where SSC as a policy field is constantly negotiated 
and constituted.  
 
Accordingly, when tracing disputes over accountability in/of SSC, this thesis will simultaneously deal with 
what I label here narrow and broad accountability politics. The former are the arenas of conflict over whether 
and how public officials publicise and justify their SSC policies and actions. Narrow accountability politics 
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encompasses substantive disputes over authority and control as well as procedural disputes over how 
powerholders do/practice accountability.44 As for the latter, these are the arenas of conflict over SSC-related 
policy options and public action. Broad accountability politics encompass both procedural and substantial 
disputes over SSC and foreign policymaking. 45 
 
  
Accountability in South-South cooperation: the state of the debate 
 
 
So far accountability has received insufficient attention in SSC scholarly literature. For my literature review, 
I found only one published academic paper attempting to conceptualise accountability in SSC and a few 
empirically-oriented studies discussing SSC accountability through single case studies, notably regarding 
Brazilian and Chinese initiatives (see below).46 Yet several critical SSC studies, despite not focusing on SSC 
accountability per se, contain valuable insights on accountability-related sociopolitical disputes broadly 
defined. In this section, I review these contributions pointing to the gaps I intend to fill with this thesis. 
 
Paradigmatic ‘accountability crises’: the case of ProSavana   
  
Few other SSC initiatives have been as extensively critically scrutinised as ProSavana: a trilateral agricultural 
development cooperation programme between Brazil, Japan and Mozambique that ran between 2009 and 
2020. ProSavana is one of  the few Brazilian SSC initiatives that faced a strong civil society opposition on 
the ground backed by a strong transnational coalition (see Chapter 7). ProSavana, has drawn a lot of  
attention of  SSC scholars working on Brazil, Mozambique and/or agricultural development, and several of  
them have included accountability-related reflections in their broader analysis.47 So far there is neither 
equivalent among Indian initiatives nor among the—often mentioned but less systematically analysed—
controversies around Chinese investments in Africa. Below I discuss two scholarly studies on ProSavana 
that explicitly examined the initiative through accountability lenses. 
 
In ‘ProSAVANA and the Expanding Scope of  Accountability in Brazil's Development Cooperation’, Cabral and Leite 
(2015) discuss the cross-regional civil society mobilisation contesting ProSavana as a landmark for 
 
44 My use of ‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ here draws on Isunza and Lavalle (2018)’s discussion of non-electoral democratic 
accountability mechanisms, which they refer to ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ controls, based on Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of 
Liberty. 
45 When discussing non-electoral democratic accountability mechanisms, Isunza and Lavalle (2018) employed a similar 
differentiation, which they refer to ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ controls, based on Isaiah Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty. 
46 Few studies had the term ‘accountability’ in their title, abstract, and/or keywords. Multiple bibliometric searches using 
Scopus, until March 2020, returned six entries for the combined search with the key-words ‘accountability’ and ‘South-
South cooperation’, only two of which had the term ‘accountability’ in their titles and key-words.  
47 Examples include Pierri (2013); Cesarino (2013); Santarelli (2016); Cabral (2016); Shankland and Gonçalves (2016); 
Milhorance and Bursztyn (2017); Durán and Chichava (2017); Funada-Classen (2019), among others (see Chapter 7).   
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accountability politics in Brazilian SSC and Brazilian foreign policy. Their paper shows how in the mid-
2010s, the ‘ProSavana crisis’ fed into growing attention of  Brazilian domestic actors to SSC in the country 
and contributed to generate new accountability dynamics and new policy dialogue channels, at least for a 
short-period. They also argue that the ‘ProSavana crisis’ made it more difficult for the Brazilian government 
to sustain, discursively and in practice, that the country had no national development cooperation policy 
and operated on the basis of  the SSC demand-driven principle. This tension between SSC institutional 
consolidation dynamics and its guiding principles is central to contemporary SSC accountability politics, 
not only in Brazil but also in India and China, as I will show in subsequent chapters. 
 
Horn’s (2018) paper, entitled ‘Accountability and Ownership in Brazil’s Development Cooperation: The Case of  
ProSavana in Mozambique’, uses this same initiative to critically engage with official claims that SSC promotes 
greater development cooperation ‘ownership’. From a rights-based development approach, she highlights 
the disjunctions and tensions between different ‘lines of  accountability’. She founds that in the case of  
ProSavana, the absence of  explicit political conditionalities failed to increase recipient’s ownership. 
Alternatively, Mozambican decision-makers merely acted as facilitators for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
and the interests of  the business sector, which in the long run weaken domestic political accountability for 
agricultural transformation and create new forms of  economic dependency in Africa. Horn further 
suggests that increased ownership should not be limited to greater agency and negotiating space for 
recipient governments (responding to the pitfalls of  the donor-led model) rather it should include the rights, 
representation, and welfare of  affected communities (responding to less state-centred conceptions of  
development cooperation). 
 
Notwithstanding the richness these studies bring to the table, there is still a knowledge gap on the different 
accountability politics shaping Brazilian SSC beyond this paradigmatic case. There is, moreover, little 
understanding of  how other forms of  disputes around accountability in/of  Brazilian SSC relate to the 
legacies of  the ProSavana crisis as well as to the sociopolitical dynamics that unfolded in Brazil since 2015, 
something this thesis aims to examine. 
 
Unaccountable South-South relations? The case of China’s development cooperation 
 
Studies on accountability in/of  China’s SSC are less geographically and thematically concentrated, with the 
most insightful contributions being Mohan’s (2014) chapter ‘China in Africa: Impacts and prospects for accountable 
development’; Laporte’s (2017) chapter ‘Emerging Donors on the Field: A Study Case of  China and South Korea in 
Lao PDR’; and Yeophantong’s (2020) paper ‘China and the Accountability Politics of  Hydropower Development: How 
Effective are Transnational Advocacy Networks in the Mekong Region?’. Each of  these studies is discussed below. 
 
A central contribution of  Mohan’s chapter is his argument that, despite China’s non-interference principles, 
country’s engagements have strongly relied on ‘inter-elite brokerage’, a model that often bypassed domestic 
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channels of  debate and accountability in African partners. As such, Chinese engagements had multi-layered 
and uneven effects on governance, politics and accountability dynamics in Africa, depending on the types 
of  African states.48 The author also claims that impacts might not be always ‘anti-development’ or 
‘undermine democratic governance’ and are subjected to new forms of  negotiations, as a result of  increased 
African agency (and subnational politics) and of  civil society mobilisation. Mainly concerned with impacts 
on the ground, his chapter says very little, however, about SSC accountability politics within China and how 
Chinese stakeholders conceive and act upon these issues when doing development in Africa.  
 
Laporte’s (2017) chapter features another study of  dynamics on the ground, examining socio-environmental 
norms, safeguards and practices ruling externally-funded hydropower projects in Laos. Looking at a 
different geographical setting, her contribution provides a two-layered comparative analysis between 
emerging and OECD-DAC providers and between two ‘Asian providers’: China and South Korea.49 She 
argues that Southern providers are challenging established international development finance socio-
environmental norms, but doing so in non-homogenous ways and not necessarily promoting a normative 
‘race to the bottom’.50 Laporte offers two hypotheses for the relation between the integration of  socio-
environmental norms into emerging powers’ investments: first, socialisation pressures from ‘traditional’ 
donors and, second, the bargaining power of  the other Southern partner and its own interest/will to push 
for standards to be respected by development partners/loan-granters. While echoing growing scholarly 
work on recipients’ agency in South-South exchanges (e.g. Mohan and Lampert 2013; Dye and Alencastro 
2020), an uncharted territory in her analysis is again the role played by domestic factors (actors, institutions 
and their interplay) in the ‘emerging donor’, something this thesis hopes to illuminate.    
 
Yeophantong’s (2020) study also focuses on China dam-building in the Mekong region. Assessing 
transnational pro-accountability mobilisation in the context of  China-funded/built projects, she argues that 
civil society activism has elevated hydropower development in the region into a ‘exigent social and 
environmental problem’ (ibid, 103). Yeophantong argues that transnational mobilisation has the potential 
to shape Chinese-builders’ (both policy banks and state-owned-enterprises) practices on the ground, and in 
some cases has succeeded to halt projects. Local mobilisation, she argues, also provides an opportunity for 
Chinese actors to learn how to operate overseas, based on increased awareness of  the political and 
reputational risks of  projects going wrong. An important contribution of  this study is to underscore the 
mediation and brokerage role played by local groups in Mekong countries that have decided to act as 
‘insiders’ not completely alienating local governments and Chinese investors, a point to which I will return 
in Chapter 7.  
 
48 In Mohan’s typology, African states were clustered as: ‘pariahs’, ‘illiberal with weak democracies’ and ‘democracies with 
diversified economies’. 
49 Her empirical study enriches the earlier conceptual and normative discussions on ‘Eastern/Asian donors’ (e.g., Paulo and 
Reisen 2010; S. Kim and Lightfoot 2011; T. Kim and Lim 2017). 
50 This nuanced argument is also found elsewhere (e.g. Zimmermann and Smith 2011; Waisbich and Borges 2020).   
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Attempts to conceptualise South-South Cooperation accountability  
 
The last and more conceptually ambitious contribution is the paper by T. Kim and Lim (2017), entitled 
‘Forging “Soft” Accountability in Unlikely Settings: A Conceptual Analysis of Mutual Accountability in the Context of 
South-South Cooperation’. This paper discusses the prospects for the emergence of a ‘SSC accountability 
regime’ and argues for a ‘soft’ version of Aidland’s ‘mutual accountability principle’ (see Chapter 3) to be 
applied to SSC. The authors based their proposition on the ‘differentiated nature’ of SSC: its principles 
(horizontality, non-interference and mutual benefits), the nature of SSC modalities (mainly, technical 
cooperation and development finance for infrastructure-building), and Southern countries being ‘unlikely 
settings’ with distinct political regimes, political systems, domestic accountability mechanisms and strong 
non-interference foreign policy principles.  
 
For Kim and Lim, a ‘softening’ of the accountability principle is needed to escape from an alleged 
‘politicisation problem’: the fact that accountability politicises development ‘while Southern partners work 
together for solidarity and common goals’ (ibid, 185). According to them, there is no need to ‘politicise 
SSC’ because its guiding principles already solve the underlying problems that made accountability a 
prominent issue for ODA in the first place. Related to this last point, the authors claim that ‘aid mutual 
accountability’ is not only a Western concept but also a tool used to weigh down local partners and buck-
pass on development interventions failures.  
 
Their conceptual proposition is therefore based on a ‘minimal approach to mutual accountability’ (ibid, 
198-199) that focus on responsibility rather than enforceability, since SSC is not ‘institutionally mature’ 
(ibid, 197), and is voluntary-based and responsive to local conditions in Southern partners. For the authors, 
this tailored approach can work for SSC modalities such as technical cooperation because trust among 
partners is high (due to clear mandates and to the idea of mutual benefits) and interventions do not require 
performance assessment as resources invested are low. As for infrastructure-building, they argue, Southern 
countries have already shown strategic concerns with ‘minimal’ accountability, such as safeguards to prevent 
financial and reputational risks.  
 
Kim and Lim’s contribution has both potential and shortcomings. The authors are among the few scholars 
characterising accountability in SSC thinking with the grain. They critically engage with Western (universal) 
conceptions of development cooperation accountability, offering conceptual alternatives, and engage with 
widely acknowledged shortcomings of ‘mutual accountability’ in Aidland (see Chapter 3).51 Their reflection 
on the relationship between certain SSC modalities and the accountability challenges they generate is also 
insightful. However, their proposition is infused with over-essentialising and acritical tropes regarding 
 
51 An epistemic effort that also echoes longstanding epistemic postcolonial critiques, including the more recent wave of 
global/non-Western IR (e.g. Acharya and Buzan 2019; Tickner and Smith 2020). 
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Southern providers and SSC. It relies, for instance, on a simplistic characterisation of domestic contexts 
and state-society relations in the South and on presumed identical ‘mutual expectations’ Southern countries 
have when cooperating. Their study also fails to incorporate existing scholarly work on forms of public 
responsibility, control and regulation and on formal and informal, sanctioned and no-sanctioned, forms of 
public accountability in non-Western settings, including in authoritarian and/or fragile contexts.52  
 
As this review shows, academic knowledge on SSC accountability remains incipient. Despite growing policy 
debates on rising powers’ non-conformity with existing ODA norms generating accountability ‘challenges’ 
or ‘deficits’ (see Chapter 3), and while other aspects of SSC have been met with greater understanding, and 
even appreciation, few have tried to systematically study or conceptualise accountability in/of SSC. It is 
true that critical SSC scholarship has not completely overlooked issues of accountability in/of SSC. This 
includes discussions on SSC transparency (e.g. Mawdsley, Savage and Sung-Mi 2014; Sears 2019), on rights-
based SSC (e.g. Mawdsley 2014a), on citizen participation in SSC mostly in BRICS countries (e.g Marcolini 
2014; Mawdsley and Roychoudhury 2016; Pomeroy et al. 2016; Milhorance and Bursztyn 2017), and on the 
impacts of China-Africa engagements on democratic governance in Africa (e.g Bräutigam 2009). Yet few 
studies have explicitly approached the topic—mostly focusing on Brazil and China—but still within a 
narrow geographic and thematic concentration. This array of studies provides important but insufficient 
basis to understand how accountability is conceived, practiced and disputed in SSC. Existing studies are 
also ill-suited to inform policy-relevant discussions on what accountability mechanisms are being 
operationalised for SSC, under what logics, responding to what kind of demands, something this thesis also 
hopes to illuminate.   
 
 
Conceptual framework  
 
 
In this final section I delineate the integrative conceptual framework guiding this study. Following a 
qualitative and grounded approach, I have acted as ‘researcher-bricoleur’ mobilising concepts to make sense 
of the ideas contained in my empirical data (Corbin and Strauss 2008). The proposed framework brings 
together, in an eclectic and interdisciplinary manner, different approaches from critical development 
studies, foreign policy analysis and critical accountability studies. 
 
Integrative frameworks have been used to counter the insufficiencies of single approaches and offer 
nuanced accounts of the complexity and multidimensional character of certain social phenomena, including 
policy processes. In this thesis, it bridges the discursive dimensions of accountability politics (i.e., policy 
and political debates and the knowledge controversies around whether and how to account for SSC 
 
52 See, for instance, Stromseth, Malesky and Gueorguiev (2017); Isunza and Lavalle (2018); Joshi (2019). 
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initiatives and their results) with its sociopolitical effects (i.e., the creation of arenas of conflict and tools 
where a range of actors dispute the meanings and practices of SSC globally and domestically in key Southern 
providers). Such framework takes seriously the growing concerns within critical development studies to 
integrate discourse and politics more consistently (Li 2007; Leach and Tadros 2014; Cabral 2016) while 
enabling analytical connections between discourses and politics across different scales and geographies.  
 
Politicisation of South-South cooperation: problematisations of and negotiations over accountability  
 
In dialogue with the multidisciplinary scholarship on SSC and development accountability presented above, 
here I orient my examination of current disputes over accountability in/of SSC through the combined 
notions of problematisations of and negotiations over accountability and their relation to the unfolding 
politicisation of SSC in rising powers like Brazil, China and India. 
 
Problematisation is the first thread guiding the investigation of how disputes over SSC accountability emerge. 
By mobilising this notion, I ask: how is accountability in/of SSC rendered problematic? What kinds of SSC 
accountability problems are publicly formulated and by whom? The concept of problematisation has been 
extensively employed by development scholars since the 1990s, largely inspired by Michael Foucault’s work 
on governmentality. Besides working as a method for critical inquiry (see Bacchi 2012; Barnett 2017), the 
notion of problematisation has been deployed as the socially constructed discursive operation through 
which development issues are made visible as problems in being made into target for governmental 
(development/aid) interventions. James Ferguson’s seminal book The Anti-Politics Machine (1994) is perhaps 
the first articulation of this argument.53 Examining aid interventions in Lesotho, Ferguson suggests that 
‘development institutions’ generate their own forms of discourse that problematises (under)development. 
Development discourses, he proceeds, create a structure of knowledge around objects and countries to be 
developed therefore justifying interventions. Development organisations are not interested in analysing the 
political and structural causes of poverty. They make countries, like Lesotho, ‘with all right deficiencies’ 
(ibid, 70) candidates for apolitical and technical interventions, that only the ‘development apparatus’ can 
provide. According to Ferguson, these interventions generate the expansion and entrenchment of 
bureaucratic state power, while denying its politics. Development becomes—intentionally or 
unintendedly—the ‘anti-politics machine’.54  
 
Tania Li’s book The Will to Improve (2007) follows Ferguson’s work and also examines development 
problematisations, which to her relates to ‘how problems come to be defined as problems in relation to 
particular schemes of thought, diagnoses of deficiency and promises of improvement’ (ibid, 264). Crucial 
 
53 Others include Escobar’s (2012), Roy’s (2012), Roy and Crane’s (2015) discussions of global poverty; Mitchel’s (2002) 
work on expertise and techno-politics in Egypt; and Li’s (2007) work on improvement schemes in Indonesia. 
54 Further critiques, such as Huber and Joshi (2015) work on dams in the Himalayas extend this analysis emphasising the 
intentionality of the state in promoting anti-politics interventions.  
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to her analysis is how ‘certain kinds of problems and solutions become thinkable whereas others are 
submerged’ (ibid, 386). In her study of ‘improvement schemes’ in Indonesia, she describes two interrelated 
practices present in development programmes: ‘problematisation’ and ‘rendering technical’. In Li’s work, 
problematisation functions to ‘identifying deficiencies that need to be rectified’ (ibid, 7), while ‘rendering 
technical’ is the set of practices to rend intelligible the domain to be governed and improved.  
 
These two ethnographic contributions are essential starting points to examine the ‘problematisation’ of  
accountability in SSC. They suggest paying attention to discourses of  (lack of) accountability that render 
both accountability in SSC (and SSC as a whole) problematic and thus a target for technical ‘improvement’ 
interventions by a range of  governments and development experts. Their work allude to the importance 
of  examining the social effects of  discursive problematisations of  accountability, conceiving them as 
‘narratives in action and interaction’ (Leach and Tadros 2014, 242). In particular, they offer tools to reflect 
on the sociopolitical conflicts that emerge from accountability problematisations and their simultaneous 
de-/re-politicisation effects. This argument is more clearly formulated by Li when arguing that, while the 
‘anti-politics’ interventions by experts had multiple socioeconomic effects on people’s lives,55 rather than 
making local groups abject or depoliticised, development schemes have ‘awakened people’s critical 
sensibilities’, creating opportunities for subjects to mobilise, assert their claims and resist (ibid, 91). 
 
Drawing on this idea of  simultaneous instances of  ‘closures’ and ‘openings’ generated by the development 
machine—and here by the problematisations of  SSC accountability—in this thesis I move further away 
from classic governmentality notions of  problematisation as de-politicisation (or ‘anti-politics’) by bringing 
in other usages of  the concept coming from political sociology and policy studies. In widely applied middle-
range policy theories such as ‘agenda-setting’ or ‘issue-formation’, the notion of  problematisation is used 
to describe the formation of  ‘policy problems’ (Sabatier 1988; Kingdon 2013). Likewise, in social theory it 
speaks to the formation of  ‘social/public problems’ and to the sociopolitical processes through which social 
issues are made public and acted upon (Bourdieu, Wacquant and Farage 1994). In his book The Public and 
its Problems, Dewey (1927) suggests that problematisation occurs when awareness-building and collective 
action are fostered by those who are not directly affected by a particular problem hence constituting a 
‘public’ around it. The problematic situation becomes a socially visible ‘public problem’ whereas state’s 
further recognition of  a public problem renders it a ‘political problem’ (Cefaï 1996, 14).  
 
Both the policy and sociological approaches highlight the role of  social interaction in generating meanings 
and forming debates, discussions or disagreement over ‘problematic’ issues and over their resolution.56 
Particularly useful here is how these approaches combine the formation of  ‘public problems’ (in the realm 
 
55 Among the effects, Li mentions privatising land, forming capital, forging wage labour, creating mobility and migration. 
56 An understanding that is close to what the sociologist Jürgen Habermas named the ‘public sphere’ and to Fouilleux and 
Jobert’s work on ‘arenas’, mentioned above. 
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of  public affairs or government) with notions of  ‘public’, ‘publicisation’ and ‘politicisation’. These 
frameworks allow for examining different stakeholders (political leadership, parties, political coalitions, 
business actors and civil society), their expectations of  state development-related actions and ways to justify 
it and the unfolding debates and discussions on SSC and SSC accountability problems they engage in. They 
enable, moreover, investigating the formation of  public problems around SSC and SSC accountability as 
constituting and being constituted by the formation of  ‘SSC publics’: different social actors—similar to 
‘stakeholders’ or ‘constituencies’—more or less directly impacted or affected by SSC interventions.   
 
When juxtaposing the governmentality and the sociological lenses one immediately notes their opposing 
views on the relation between problematisation and politicisation. While in Foucault-inspired studies 
problematisation is the very discursive operation through which a situation generates de-politicisation, in 
the pragmatist and policy accounts problematisation is conducive to politicisation, as issues are made object 
of public debate and collective action by social actors and by the state. Rather than underplaying these 
diverging assumptions, I take them as a central issue to my own reflections on SSC accountability, 
suggesting that, rather than an either/or situation, problematisations of accountability can have both de-
and re-politicising effects in the field of SSC.  
 
The second thread is negotiation, which functions in the integrative framework as a descriptive-analytical 
concept to capture agency and political action in the field of SSC. The idea of negotiation prompts 
interrogations about the actions, practices, behaviours and the types of interaction and bargain between 
distinct SSC actors in different ‘arenas of conflict’ over accountability. Negotiations are both processes and 
outcomes of emerging disputes over SSC accountability. Looking at SSC accountability negotiations means 
engaging with three interrelated dynamics, namely: negotiations of development cooperation accountability; 
negotiations of development; and negotiations of foreign policy.  
 
Due to the relational nature of accountability, the notion of negotiation helps unpacking disputes over how 
development actors justify their development cooperation actions and how these have shaped the 
construction of particular types of mechanisms over time. This approach is found, for instance, in 
Berghmans, Simons and Vandenabeele (2017) study of accountability of INGOs. Their study highlights the 
multiplicity of stakeholders demanding accountability from INGOs (final beneficiaries, taxpayers/donors, 
watchdogs and so on) and the mutual negotiations between them. It also shows how each accountability 
demand is embedded in particular relationships sustained by particular accountability logics57 and how these 
logics create different kinds of instruments58 for INGOs to give account and be held accountable. A similar 
 
57 In their study of INGOs, the different accountability logics at play are: governmental control; means for the principal to 
verify the agent has fulfilled the contract; demonstrating to peers; responsiveness; cooperation and democratic dialogue; 
indirect and transparency-generated; and market-like dynamics of competition and supply-demand. 
58 Their social understanding of accountability instruments draws on the instrumentation approach developed by 
Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007), where public policy instruments are a ‘condensed form of knowledge about social control 
and ways of exercising it’. 
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point is made by Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-Mullins (2019) in their analysis of the evolution of the 
World Bank oversight body: the Inspection Panel. Their study shows how the Panel changed, since its 
creation in the mid-1990s, according to internal and external pressures and competing interests and 
expectations of stakeholder groups (borrowing states, donor states, management, the development NGOs 
community and local communities affected by projects). Such an account of the internal and external 
negotiations shaping the functioning of the Panel is a rich illustration of the plurality of expectations shaping 
negotiations over accountability mechanisms in global development.  
 
Negotiations also illuminate how development is disputed and agreed upon in the context of SSC.  
Scholarship is abundant on political economy and actor-centred studies examining negotiations in 
development cooperation, either in the form of ‘developments encounters’ at the project-level or 
negotiations of aid relations and partnerships (e.g. Long and Long 1992; Mosse 2005; T. M. Li 2007; 
Rottenburg 2009). Here I draw more specifically on the latter. In The Development Dance, for instance, 
Swedlund (2017) looked at ‘North-South aid negotiations’ as policy bargains (over amount of aid, technical 
control and policy influence) between aid agencies and recipient governments, between aid agencies and 
their own governments and among governments themselves. Despite admittedly overlooking the intra-state 
and domestic politics, Swedlund’s book delineates different types of negotiations taking place around 
expectations on the amount of aid and delivery by ‘donors’ and the specific policy actions and reforms by 
‘recipients’. His argument is also interesting in what it connects aid negotiations and accountability issues, 
stating that ‘aid commitment failures’ on both sides explain the search for new and more effective ways (he 
calls ‘fashions’) to deliver aid, such as the ‘ownership’ and ‘budget support’ turns, that are ‘more easily 
measured and enforced’ (ibid, 14; also Chapter 3).  
 
In the past decade, studies on SSC have also examined issues of negotiations between emerging powers 
and their cooperation partners, mostly in Africa, either through the lenses of ‘encounters on the ground’ 
(e.g. Cesarino 2014; Taela 2017; Chuanhong Zhang et al. 2019) or through the lenses of partners’ agency. 
Mohan and Lampert’s (2013) paper on China-Africa relations offers an early rendition of the agency by 
‘less-developed partners’ in negotiating South-South relations, featuring African business and political elite 
shaping China’s presence in the continent and examples of ‘subnational politics’ (Mawdsley 2012a) and 
local resistance, for instance by local manufacturers against Chinese traders. Many others have unpacked 
what it means to be negotiating (with) rising powers in the context of SSC, since, examining agency at the 
intergovernmental level (e.g Alemu and Scoones 2013; Laporte 2017; Moreira 2020) and negotiations 
involving the private sector (e.g. Chen 2018; Dye and Alencastro 2020) and civil society (e.g. Durán and 
Chichava 2017; Milhorance and Bursztyn 2017). Attention to agency in/by the other Southern partner, 
therefore, helps locating accountability negotiations within political negotiations happening between local 
actors and rising powers. These negotiations also remind us that accountability norms and tools are 
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constantly negotiated on the ground, at a project level, as seen in the case of China’s dam-building in the 
Mekong region, mentioned above.  
 
Finally, negotiating SSC accountability is about negotiating foreign policy.59 Using critical IR and Foreign 
Policy Analysis lenses, SSC accountability-related negotiations can be thought an interplay between 
domestic and external sources of foreign policy behaviour. Examining foreign policy negotiations, means, 
on the one hand, observing inter-state SSC accountability negotiations and inserting development 
cooperation negotiations within geopolitical bargains where Brazil, China and India negotiate (notably with 
existing powers) the terms of their international engagements in an autonomous, non-subordinated, way 
(Narlikar 2013). On the other, negotiations are also taking place within emerging powers, in the context of 
increasingly distributive foreign policymaking60. Here negotiations happen along the axes of bureaucratic 
politics and state-society relations on whether SSC is an appropriate strategy and who gains and who loses with 
SSC initiatives internally (Hill 2003; Nel and Van der Westhuizen 2003; Milani and Pinheiro 2013; Alden 
and Brummer 2019).61 Hence, looking at the SSC accountability politics through the prism of foreign policy 
negotiations allows simultaneously for identifying arenas of diplomatic geopolitical and/or epistemic 
conflicts around SSC accountability and for tracing the bureaucratic and state-society disputes embedded 
in foreign policymaking dynamics within large SSC providers.  
 
Global and domestic arenas of conflict: actors, spaces and accountability lines   
 
A last aspect of the conceptual framework relates to my choice to study politically salient62 forms of 
accountability politics taking place across global and national scales; a decision I justify in methodological 
terms in Chapter 2. This explicitly multi-scalar kaleidoscopic gaze on the politics of accountability conceive 
actors problematising and negotiating accountability in/of SSC as an assemblage of stakeholders (citizens 
across the South-South dyad, other Southern governments, traditional development partners, global 
 
59 Negotiation is a classic subject in international affairs. The notion of negotiation adopted in this dissertation goes beyond 
classic IR realist inter-state negotiation paradigms, based on ‘rational-choice models’ and their successive iterations, but 
also beyond the initial attempts to discuss the domestic sources of foreign policy, such as the consolidated ‘two-level game 
theory’, developed by Putnam (1993). 
60 The distributive effect of any public policy can refers to who wins and who loses from certain governmental course of 
action (Sefton 2008). International scholars have extensively discussed the particularities of foreign policy in what it 
delivers in terms of distributive (or even redistributive) effects and in how citizens perceived the distribution of benefits 
(M. R. S. de Lima 2000; Hill 2003).  
61 See Faria and Belém Lopes (2019) for a discussion of the heated bargains between those immediately in charge of 
Brazilian foreign policy and a range of governmental and non-governmental actors within the so-called ‘Brazilian foreign 
policy community’—a concept widely applied by scholars looking at public opinion and foreign policy issue in Brazil (e.g. 
Faria 2008; Almeida and Guimarães 2017)—during the Workers Party era (2003-2016) on the appropriateness of PT’s 
South-South strategy (see Chapter 5). 
62 The notion of ‘political salience’ has been used in political science in different ways. This includes the studies on the 
political salience of culture and identity in politics (see Posner 2004) or the scholarship on electoral behaviour describing 
issues that matter politically for voters. While often more quantitative-based, this latter stream bears a close relation to 
the notion of ‘issue salience’ in more classic qualitative scholarship on policy problems and agenda-setting, connecting 
salience with visibility in policy dynamics. My own operationalisation of political salience, as well as visibility, in this 
dissertation draws on this last stream of work.    
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development policy communities, etc.) with their own demands and expectations on what ‘appropriate’ 
SSC provider behaviour is or should be and on how SSC providers should justify their acts and deeds.63 It 
sees SSC accountability dynamics, therefore, as embedded in complex multi-level, multi-layered and multi-
actors governance systems, along a ‘domestic-international continuum’ (Milani and Pinheiro 2013).  
 
In an attempt to apprehend this complex landscape, I suggest that ‘arenas of conflict’ over SSC 
accountability crosscut domestic and transnational citizen struggles, domestic foreign policy politics, and 
global geopolitical and epistemic disputes. In the geopolitical realm, SSC accountability politics interact with 
material and symbolic disputes, including over international status and recognition, in the field of 
development cooperation and in international affairs, more broadly. For development knowledge politics, SSC 
accountability politics relate to disputes over knowing and counting SSC to control it and over Southern 
agency to negotiate and dispute meanings and ways of measuring development cooperation. As for the 
domestic politics of foreign policy, SSC accountability interacts with unfolding SSC domestic foreign policy 
politics, materialised in particular institutionalisation bureaucratic disputes within the state and in 
accountability claims ‘from below’, from civil society, in their interaction with the state and its international 
development role.  
 
Attentive to the ‘international-domestic nexus’ in SSC dynamics (van der Westhuizen and Milani 2019), or 
to what Manning (1977) called the intermestic politics, and to the interplay between international and 
domestic forces in constituting accountability-related ideas, policies and governance instruments (A. Gupta 
2012; Prashant Sharma 2014), this thesis unpacks, in a relational way, global and domestic forms of SSC 
accountability politics. Attention to global SSC accountability politics responds to need to apprehend 
transnational debates, conflicts and negotiations over SSC accountability. ‘The global’ here means, first, the 
trans-national geographical scale and the locus where certain types of problematisations of and negotiations 
over SSC accountability unfold and materialise.64 Second, the inherently trans-national manifestations of 
SSC accountability politics that refer to negotiations between Southern providers and a range of external 
actors (state and non-state) around roles, responsibilities and actions beyond national borders. Analytically, 
I understand global SSC accountability politics as both external/international context influencing SSC 
accountability politics domestically65 and the site of production of transnational SSC accountability 
dynamics. 
 
Domestic SSC accountability politics, conversely, is the different ways in which domestic actors dispute and 
negotiate understandings of SSC and SSC accountability and how to practice, in contexts where SSC is a 
 
63 Citizens’ struggles have been a major focus for scholarship on accountability politics and development (Newell and 
Wheeler 2006; Fox 2007a), including in SSC (Cabral and Leite 2015; Yeophantong 2020).  
64 A similar take on the ‘transnational’ as a level of analysis for contentious politics is found, for instance, in the social 
movements’ scholarship. See, for instance, Tarrow (2001; also Chapter 7).  
65 See Hickey, Sen, and Bukenya (2014) for such a conceptualisation of ‘transnational politics of development’.   
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policy field in consolidation, and often a sub-set of foreign policy. This conceptualisation locates the 
unfolding disputes in what scholars call the domestic politics of foreign policy (Hill 2003; Ratton Sanchez 
et al. 2006; Milani and Pinheiro 2013) and the domestic politics of aid and SSC (Lancaster 2007; Veen 2011; 
van der Westhuizen and Milani 2019). SSC accountability debates and the negotiations taking place 
domestically are shaped by existing foreign policy and SSC policymaking dynamics (and its visibility and 
political salience in domestic politics and public debates), the national policy and public management styles, 
the patterns of state-society relations and the electoral and non-electoral democratic control mechanisms 
to discipline and dispute country’s international footprints, led by the executive power. These factors play 
out in context-specific ways across SSC providers, as I discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. Figure 1, below, is a 
heuristic depiction of my approach to investigating accountability politics in SSC through coexisting spaces, 
actors and accountability lines.  
 






















Source: author’s own elaboration 
 
Finally, a combined attention to global and domestic forms of SSC accountability politics recognises that 
these are processes informed by transnational policy and normative mobilities that do not possess a logic 
and/or internal rationality (T. Mitchell 2002) and cut across political territories in complex ways and ‘form 
unique hybridizations and creolizations in different settings’ (A. Gupta 2012, 106). More importantly, it 
recognises that particular domestic manifestations depend on local conditions of possibility and 
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embeddedness in national social-political structures (political-bureaucratic fields, subnational institutions, 
national issues, etc.) that translate global forms on a daily basis (Risse-Kappen 1994; Acharya 2004; Clarke 






This chapter located my research topic at the intersection of  two multidisciplinary research fields, namely 
SSC studies and accountability studies, and introduced my conceptual framework to critically investigate 
SSC ‘accountability politics in time’. As stated, this thesis examines SSC as a sub-set of  global development 
practices and a policy field under construction within a group of  prominent SSC providers and builds on 
the idea of  a current consolidation phase of  SSC characterised by a series of  policy and institutional 
reforms. This moment is marked by disputed institutionalisations where accountability politics constitutes 
a window into the increasing contested nature of  SSC globally and within large SSC providers. The study 
of  SSC accountability politics helps thus to understand the growing politicisation of  SSC, the underlying 
sociopolitical processes that make SSC a contentious issue, and the emergence of  multiple global and 
national ‘arenas of  conflict’ around it.  
 
The proposed conceptual framework relies on two major conceptual threads: problematisation and negotiation. 
Examining problematisations of accountability in/of SSC help unveiling the discursive dimensions of 
accountability politics and the ways different actors understand SSC accountability as a government and/or 
public problem to be acted upon. Tracing problematisations allows for understanding the emergence of 
accountability as an issue in/to SSC, the identification of the different actors and their understandings of 
accountability, and the re-/de-politicising practices that unfold. Additionally, when tracing negotiations over 
accountability in/of SSC I seek to describe the interactions and the exchanges between those in charge of 
SSC initiatives and the multiple stakeholders disputing who, whether and how powerholders justify SSC 
flows and practices and how they justify acting as a Southern development partner. By empirically mapping 
unfolding problematisations and negotiations of accountability in/of SSC, this thesis highlights three 
interconnected dimensions shaping SSC policies and practices: geopolitics, development knowledge 
politics, and foreign policy politics (both bureaucratic politics and state-society relations) thus offering a 
kaleidoscopic gaze into contemporary SSC politics along the domestic-international continuum and across 
emblematic SSC providers.  
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Chapter 2. Research methodology 
 
 
This chapter describes the research design and research process adopted in this thesis. In the sections to 
follow I first present the methodological strategies devised to study accountability politics in South-South 
cooperation. I then move to the methods employed for data collection and data analysis. Appendix 3 






This thesis prioritised an inductive, empirical-based, qualitative approach to examining accountability in/of 
SSC. Drawing on the grounded theory approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008), three interlinked 
methodological strategies were adopted. First, a multi-sited mapping of contemporary forms of SSC 
accountability politics. Second, a process-tracing of SSC accountability-related disputes and the policy 
and/or institutional reforms they generate in global and domestic SSC policy spaces. Third, a transnational 
relational comparison of accountability politics in three emblematic SSC providers: Brazil, China and India.  
 
Mapping accountability disputes  
 
The first methodological strategy employed was to map different forms of accountability politics in 
contemporary SSC, using Brazil, China and India as main empirical sites. To support the mapping exercise, 
I relied on approaches developed by Science and Technology Studies (STS) scholars when mapping 
sociotechnical, scientific and political controversies66 as well as on object-tracing approaches adopted by political 
geographers and political ethnographers studying global phenomena.  
 
Mapping strategies have proved to be useful for scholars grasping the multi-relational and diffuse nature of 
international accountability in cases as diverse as the European Union (Bovens, Curtin, and Hart 2010), 
climate governance (Rached 2013) or INGOs (Berghmans, Simons and Vandenabeele 2017).67 Here, the 
value of mapping is two-fold. First, to identify the multiple forms through which SSC policies, their outcomes, 
and how governments explain both are discursively problematised and debated nationally and globally. 
Second, to illuminate emerging SSC accountability sociotechnical assemblages (and the actors, spaces, tools and 
competing accountability logics that comprise them), working with dynamics ‘on the move’, still not 
 
66 Cartographie de controverses, in French. See https://controverses.sciences-po.fr/index-3.html (last access: 25/07/2020). 
This approach was first developed by Bruno Latour and other colleagues to study sociotechnical controversies. It has been 
expanded since also to what Rennes (2016) calls ‘political controversies’: those where actors problematise and publicise a 
situation or project as entailing (in)justice and general interest issues.   
67 As well as for scholars studying domestic development issues (Newell and Wheeler 2006; Dewachter et al. 2018). 
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stabilised, closed or ‘black boxed’ (Venturini 2010, 258). Albeit not all SSC accountability disputes fit the 
category of ‘controversies’ in the original sense employed by STS scholars,68 their approach is valuable to 
identify emerging arenas, institutions and actors where negotiations over SSC take place; the issues emerging 
in public/policy debates; and the positions different actors hold (Venturini 2008; Rennes 2016).  
  
Alongside mapping SSC accountability debates, I have drawn on the growing body of work on global 
assemblages (e.g. Ong and Collier 2005; Rankin 2011; Tsing 2015) and on the transnational circulation of 
policy ideas, instruments and programmes (e.g. Hassenteufel 2005; Peck and Theodore 2015; Porto de 
Oliveira 2017) to trace accountability as an object. This meant following simultaneously the thing, the actor, 
the policy and the conflict to trace the ways accountability—as an idea, a discourse, a global norm and a 




The second strategy adopted was process-tracing of disputes and unfolding negotiations over SSC 
accountability. Process-tracing is a methodological approach defined as the use of heuristic case studies to 
inductively generate new hypotheses (Bennett 2004). Here, process-tracing enabled to closely follow 
politically salient social-political processes generating different forms of accountability disputes in SSC, the 
negotiation dynamics unfolding, and their sociopolitical consequences, including eventual policy-
institutional changes or reforms.  
 
The process-tracing started with and relied on the mapping to retrieve, first at the discursive (or policy 
debate) level, the coexisting narratives and storylines (Roe 1994; Hajer 2005) and problematisations of  SSC 
accountability. However, the process-tracing did not end at the discursive level and sought to look for the 
effects and sociopolitical implications of  accountability narratives. In other words, to trace, first, how SSC 
accountability debates emerge and how ideas of  accountability are negotiated; second, how debates 
eventually drive public interventions and shape how governments do/practice accountability in SSC; and 
third, how disputes over SSC accountability contribute to de-/re-politicising SSC. 
 
Together the mapping exercise and the process-tracing led to the identification of different global and 
national discourses and political-policy dynamics around SSC accountability, even when discourses, debates 
and disputes were not openly or exclusively framed by actors themselves as being about SSC accountability. 
Combining the two strategies was also a way to respond to the epistemic challenge of navigating discourses 
and politics within the loose global and domestic ‘regimes of SSC’  (Cesarino 2013; Milani and Duarte 2015; 
also Appendix 1). Unlike ODA, SSC has no single institutional locus where debates are taking place—what 
 
68 According to Rennes (2016), political controversies can be differentiated from other types of political debates (including 
polemics) based on a range of features or properties, including polarisation, structured argumentation by actors, 
continuous/reiterated exchanges, and publicity. 
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a SSC expert once called ‘SSC homelessness’69—and therefore requires the researcher to follow multiple 
research tracks in order to make sense of the political significance of certain spaces, moments and events 
across time. A detailed account of how I have operationalised these two methodological strategies can be 
found in Appendix 2. 
 
Transnational relational comparison 
 
As a third strategy, this thesis relied on a transnational relational comparison, using Brazil, China and India 
as main empirical sites for data-gathering and analysis. The multi-scalar and multi-sited nature of the inquiry 
aimed not only at revealing the domestic-transnational connections shaping accountability politics in a 
defined set of key Southern providers, but also at allowing for the three countries to function as repositories 
of exemplary SSC accountability politics and sites for inquiring on the ‘dialectical relationships between 
shared and distinctive experiences, between common dilemmas and specific responses’ (Hill 2003, 46). 
 
Geographical, anthropological and policy research are attentive to scales, mobility and relationality in policy-
related phenomena (e.g. Marcus 1995; Ong and Collier 2005; Xiang 2013; Peck and Theodore 2015; 
Robinson 2016). This thesis draws upon this scholarship to capture the multiple dynamics through which 
different forms of accountability politics are produced and negotiated at global arenas as well as domestically 
in key SSC providers. Such research design engages with the growing concerns in comparative public policy, 
foreign policy analysis and critical SSC research with both ‘methodological nationalism’ and ‘methodological 
globalism’ (Clarke et al. 2015; Bergamaschi, Moore and Tickner 2017; Peters 2018). To study simultaneously 
Brazil, China and India is also an attempt to simultaneously avoid the Western-centric bias that take SSC 
providers as an ‘unaccomplished copy’ of DAC donors (Muhr 2016) and the Non-Western bias that either 
essentialise Southern/Non-Western identities as necessarily different or use ‘Asian powerhouses’ as the 
only sources of ‘alternative sites’ for conceptualisations (Alden and Brummer 2019; also Appendix 1).  
 
Multi-scalar analysis, or the act of scaling up and down and jumping across scales, enables the identification 
of ‘different languages, rhetorics, ideals, justifications and rationalities’ around accountability in SSC that 
circulate at different scales and are mutually constitutive (Gould 2004 cited in Clarke et al. 2015). Seeking 
to avoid macro and micro-reductionisms, this analytical gaze aims to understand how conflicts around SSC 
and SSC accountability in one particular context are shaped and constituted by both relations of interiority 
and exteriority (Dittmer 2014; Savage 2019). At the same time, multi-sited analysis enables the development 
of transnational relational comparisons as to assess how competing global and domestic pressures play out 
and shape emerging forms of accountability politics and policy and institutional changes across SSC 
providers. Relational comparisons, as suggested by Marxist geographers and scholars in urban and policy 
 
69 This expression was coined by Luara Lopes, from the Brazilian think tank Articulação SUL (personal communication with 
Luara Lopes, 2019).  
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mobility studies (e.g. A. Roy 2012; Robinson 2016; Hart 2016), bring different geographies ‘into the same 
frame of analysis, as connected yet distinctively different nodes in globally interconnected historical 
geographies – and as sites in the production of global processes in specific spatio-historical conjunctures, 
rather than as just recipients of them’ (Hart 2016, 373).  
 
Hart’s approach to comparisons, in particular, explicitly challenges hierarchies opposing Western (ideal-
types) forms to other deviating-variant, ‘less modern’, ones.70 This is both methodologically and 
conceptually important when using Southern providers as empirical sites, as implicit or explicit comparisons 
with Northern/‘traditional’ donors are at the heart of SSC and SSC accountability politics. Such approach 
is also coherent with decolonial and ‘anti-orientalist’ lenses that avoid comparing Southern state formations, 
policy processes and notions of public accountability to an imagined Western past. Rather such lenses focus 
instead on comparing Southern political formations to understand processes ‘in the South and from the 
South’ (Sabaratnam 2011; A. Gupta 2012). Hence by relying on a transnational relational comparation this 
thesis avoids converging (modernising) explanations for the rise of accountability debates in SSC while 
being attentive to variations across Southern polities.  
 
Brazil, China and India 
 
Brazil, China and India are paradigmatic Southern providers and undoubtedly the most widely studied 
ones.71 Materially speaking, they feature among the largest SSC providers, China above all. Ideationally, 
there is wide recognition that these countries are important forces behind the shifting geographies of 
development cooperation. As ‘SSC protagonists’ (De Bruyn 2019), these countries face greater domestic 
and external scrutiny of their global development footprint and thus constitute appropriate sites to 
investigate emerging SSC accountability politics. 
 
Notwithstanding the commonalities there is great variation among the three countries. Differences are 
found in the domestic realm in terms of sociohistorical and political configurations, including political 
regimes and policy styles, but also in their international identity, status and diplomatic stances vis-à-vis the 
so-called international liberal order. Although the three countries have historically exhibited a ‘non-status 
quo’ foreign policy behaviour, both China and India are characterised as ‘global players’ or ‘revisionist 
states’ while Brazil fits the category of ‘rising middle-power’ or ‘regional power’ (Narlikar 2013; 
Leveringhaus and De Estrada 2018; Milani 2019). Moreover, Brazil was historically less overtly a Third 
 
70 Hart (2016) differentiates her proposition from other existing comparative strategies, in particular Charles Tilly’s 
‘encompassing comparison’ holding onto conceptions of world-history that relied on notions of a common generative 
processes and strong diffusionist assumptions.   
71 Among the three, China is the most studied, followed by Brazil, and lastly India (Chaturvedi 2012). For critiques on the 
over-focus on BASIC countries in SSC scholarship, see Muhr (2016); Bergamaschi, Moore and Tickner (2017); Haug (2020).  
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World champion (Cervo and Bueno 2002).72 China and India, on the contrary, have more openly advanced 
their non-Western/Eastern credentials, besides having been historical Third World leaders, even if the 
legacy of non-alignment is less consensual in contemporary Indian foreign policy circles.73 Identity issues, 
as argued in Chapter 4, are central to rising powers’ global development engagement and shape the contours 
of the geopolitical disputes around SSC accountability. 
 
Differences are also found in how Brazil, China and India engaged in development cooperation in the past 
and re-emerged in the early 2000s: their public narratives on development cooperation,74 their definitions 
of SSC, the modalities and instruments employed and their positionality vis-à-vis the OECD and the 
DAC.75 Normatively, Brazil has kept a ‘safe distance’ from the OECD while strategically engaging with the 
organisation and with the DAC. In 2016, the country requested membership of the OECD76 and today 
occupies a middle-position (like Mexico and Turkey) between ‘DAC-philos’ and opposers.77 Meanwhile, 
India has traditionally adopted a more resistant position towards the OECD and the DAC and China a very 
pragmatic one (Abdenur 2014; Pal 2014).78 Their participation in triangular cooperation arrangements with 
‘traditional’ donors also differs, with Brazil more invested in this modality than the other two (Paulo 2018; 
Milani 2019; D. Zhang 2020). 
 
As for their profile as development partners, while Brazil made technical cooperation and capacity 
development on agriculture, social and health sectors the core of its SSC, both India and China have 
strongly emphasised a mix of economic cooperation, infrastructure-building and technical cooperation 
applied to productive sectors (Chaturvedi 2012; Leite et al. 2014; Chenoy and Joshi 2016; Gu, Chen and 
Haibin 2016). Even if priorities remain in flux, differences have political implications and gave birth to what 
 
72 During the Cold War, the country adopted what Ambassador Fonseca Jr. (1998) calls a ‘specific non-alignment’ 
combining Third World positions and active championing of development issues at the UN (Dauvergne and Farias 2012) 
with loyalty to Western values. Brazilian law professor and former Foreign Minister Celso Lafer (2001-2002) once defined 
Brazil as ‘an “Other West”, a poorer and more problematic one, but still the West’ (Lafer 2000 cited in Faria and Belém 
Lopes 2019). The very tension between alignment and autonomy (vis-à-vis the West and mostly the United States) has 
been a major tension in Brazilian foreign policy since the 19th century (Cervo and Bueno 2002; Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007). 
73 See, for instance, Khilnani et al. (2012) for a call to a return to a ‘non-alignment 2.0’ and Hall (2016) and Miller and 
Sullivan de Estrada (2017) on ‘multialignment’ and ‘pragmatism’ under Narenda Modi.  
74 According to Lauria and Fumagalli (2019, 3), a public narrative is ‘the way donor countries present themselves to other 
donor countries, receiving countries, international organizations, and their citizens’.  
75 It is important, nonetheless, to recognise the differences between Brazil, China and India’s engagements with OECD, 
broadly speaking, and with the DAC, in particular. While stances towards the DAC have been mostly critical and cautious, 
the three countries have expanded their dialogue with the OECD in the last decades on issue such as tax reform, anti-
corruption, and others, in more or less formal capacities (Pal 2014). Likewise, all three countries are active members of the 
un-orthodox OECD Development Centre.  
76 The OECD bid is still unclear, as the organisation has not formally initiated the membership ascension process due to 
internal disagreement among current members on enlargement issues and on Brazil’s candidature in particular. For an 
early analysis on the bid, see Esteves, Waisbich and Belém Lopes (2017). 
77 According to Casarões (2020), the cooperation agreement between the OECD and Brazil, in 2015, can be read as a sign of 
status downgrading, with Brazil moving away from its previous position of ‘key external partner’, together with other 
emerging economies, to a position of aspiring member alongside other ‘middle-sized’ states, like Colombia and Argentina. 
78 A similar analysis of the three countries, based on a broader survey of several international issues and realms, is found in 
Narlikar (2013).  
42 
 
some call the ‘Latin American/Asian SSC divide’ (Chaturvedi 2018) and the ‘soft/hard SSC divides’ (NeST 
2019).  
 
There are finally differences in how cooperation is operationalised. Due to the technical nature of most 
Brazilian SSC, its ‘national ecosystem for SSC’ (IsDB/South Centre 2019) is comparatively more dispersed 
than the one in India or China’s, even if fragmentation is a feature of all three systems. Despite having a 
cooperation agency since 1987, Brazil’s SSC is inhabited by more than a hundred public bodies in the 
implementation side, making institutional and individual agency particularly relevant to understanding 
decisions on accountability-related tools or their absence. India’s cooperation agency, the MEA-affiliated 
DPA, was created in 2012, whereas China’s agency, CIDCA, was set-up in 2018.79 Both China and India 
follow a ‘business-friendly’ approach to their SSC and thus the business sector is an important part of the 
accountability dynamics. The participation of business actors is less preponderant, while not absent, in the 
case of Brazil (Chenoy and Joshi 2016; Gu, Chen and Haibin 2016; Dye and Alencastro 2020).   
 
Focus on Brazil  
 
While seeking to understand an ensemble of interconnected SSC accountability politics and their similitudes 
and differences, my study does not offer, as in a classic ‘intra-class comparison’ study (Sartori 1991), a 
methodological symmetrical, side-by-side, comparative assessment of dynamics in the three countries.80 
Rather I use Brazil as a main site for analytical insights. The main implication is that Brazilian SSC domestic 
accountability politics are analysed in more in-depth ways than the ones in India and China. The limitations 
of data are compensated, nonetheless, by the quality of the interpretation and by the added value of having 
all three countries examined in a relational way.  
 
Working comparatively unavoidably brings conceptual and methodological questions. The first one being 
the appropriateness of having China as a research site. Working with China did pose methodological 
challenges of research access and language barriers and analytical challenges to work with variance in 
political regimes. Rather than ignoring these issues, my well-pondered choice to include China responds to 
a recognition of its undisputable relevance as a Southern provider and its importance in shaping the 
direction of travel of global development politics. I further justify this choice in two complementary ways. 
Methodologically, China features in the analysis of global SSC accountability politics but less significantly 
so in the cross-country analysis of domestic dynamics, for which I have relied more on Brazilian and, to a 
lesser extent, on Indian-related data. Conceptually, while recognising the importance of political regimes in 
 
79 While both ABC and DPA are formally subordinated to Brazil’s and India’s ministries of external affairs, respectively. The 
creation of CIDCA was an attempt to centralise functions until then then split between the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has elevated China’s SSC system from a government department under 
MOFCOM to a vice-ministerial central state agency under the State Council. 
80 See Peck and Theodore (2015) study for a similar non-symmetrical design.  
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shaping SSC accountability dynamics in each country, studying China is consistent with the proposed 
characterisation of accountability politics as a lens onto the disputed nature of SSC and the recognition of 
multiple ‘accountability regimes’ currently shaping the actions of SSC providers.81 As such, the Chinese case 
allows for exploring forms of non-electoral accountability politics—such as bureaucratic and geopolitical—
and provides the most different case along a continuum of more open polities, like Brazil and India.  
 
Additionally, working with rather than shying away or dismissing regime variance is consistent with the task 
of assessing SSC ‘accountability politics in time’. For China, this means factoring-in country’s ‘gradual shift 
towards a polity adapted to an increasingly complex and pluralist society’ (Ho 2007, 188) and inquiring what 
it means to the possibilities that domestic and external actors currently have to engage and question political 
authority regarding China’s role in the world. As for Brazil and India, it means looking at shifts towards less 
pluralistic configurations, if not de-democratisation, and what they mean for notions of how the power to 
promote development at home and abroad is exercised and contested. 
 
I end this section reflecting on the limits, the trade-offs and the incompleteness of the proposed research 
design. My focus on comparing Southern powerhouses, due to their size and prominence, is one among 
other possible approaches, including focusing on different SSC partners within a region, on (former) 
socialist states or on comparing different legal codes and bureaucratic forms. Additionally, my findings are 
necessarily limited by the choice to study multiple forms of accountability politics in more than one 
jurisdiction rather than narrowing-down to one single country or project. Lastly, I recognise the epistemic 
limitations of my findings in two additional ways. First, because observing selected sectors, institutions or 
initiatives ‘cannot provide knowledge of the state by analogy or extension’ (A. Gupta 2012, 53). Second, 
because I am necessarily bounded by the challenges of apprehending SSC dynamics in flux and recognising 
the time-bounded nature of SSC accountability politics mapped out in this thesis (see Appendix 3 for an 
extended reflection).  
 
 
Data collection and data analysis methods  
 
 
The thesis relied on a set of qualitative data collection and data analysis methods. Data collection efforts 
were limited to contemporary SSC dynamics. The year of 2015 was used as an approximate landmark due 
to the multiple international development agreements agreed upon, around that time, notably the Agenda 
2030 and the Paris climate agreement, and their impact in the field. The year of 2015 is also a relevant 
 
81 This is also in line with more recent scholarship on accountability beyond liberal democratic regimes, mentioned in 
Chapter 1, including those studying transparency, participation, non-electoral democratic controls and publicity-
based/internet-driven accountability in China (G. Yang 2006; Distelhorst 2012; Stromseth, Malesky and Gueorguiev 2017; 
Isunza and Lavalle 2018; Chatelard, Audin and Daniel 2018; H. C. Li 2019). 
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marker for the current consolidation moment of SSC. In Brazil, this period coincides with the beginning 
of the political-economic national crisis and with the end of the Workers’ Party (PT) rule following the 
divisive impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016, which have deeply affected the trajectory of Brazilian 
SSC activism and exchanges (see Chapter 5 and Appendix 3). In India, Prime Minister Narenda Modi (BJP), 
started his first term in 2014 and his personal foreign policy agenda is seen as greatly impacting on Indian 
development footprint abroad (Chenoy and Joshi 2016). Significant discursive and policy shifts also took 
place in China around this time. Under Xi Jinping (in power since 2012), China’s foreign policy became 
more assertive and the country expanded its commitments to global development (SIC PRC 2019). This 
includes the launching of the all-encompassing BRI, in 2013, and China’s increased engagement with the 





This study employed a mix of qualitative field and desk-based data collection methods, namely: (1) 
documentary research; (2) semi-structured and informal interviews; and (3) participant observation.  
 
In the documentary research, I analysed national and international policy documents using official 
governmental and non-governmental sources and media reviews.82 While doing so, I relied on textual 
approaches and discourse analysis, paying attention to ‘floating signifiers’: ideas that can be granted different 
interpretations and proliferate during dislocation and/or before the new hegemonic discursive order is 
established and meaning becomes temporarily fixed again (Cabral 2016).83 
  
I also extensively relied on field-based research. Figure 2 presents my fieldwork timeline and the visits made 
to my research sites between 2017-2020.84 The timeline makes clear the multi-sited nature of this study as 
well as my data-collection emphasis on Brazil and on participant observation at SSC-relevant international 
events, including meetings hosted by the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB), the UN BAPA+40 
Conference, as well as SSC diplomatic and para-diplomatic political dialogues.  
 
82 For Brazil, I have mostly used the Portuguese-language Folha de São Paulo, Estado de São Paulo, Valor Econômico and O 
Globo. For India, the English-language The Hindu, Hindustan Times, Times of India and The Wire. As for China, the English-
edition of Xinhua and the English-language The Global Times. 
83 Others have followed a similar textual approach to the study of power and accountability dynamics in development 
cooperation, including Ferguson (1994); Li (2007); Dermot (2009); Berghmans, Simons and Vandenabeel  (2017).  




Figure 2 - Fieldwork timeline 
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In total, I conducted 137 semi-structured and informal interviews with government officials and civil servants 
working in what I named here ‘SSC bureaucracies’85, representatives of civil society and academia, and 
representatives of international organisations working on SSC. These were ‘elite interviews’ where 
respondents were chosen because of their position, their knowledge of internal SSC politics, and their role 
and situatedness regarding SSC policy processes. I combined this initial stratified sampling based on 
participants’ affiliation with snowballing techniques, which led me to additional accountability issues and 
empirical sites (Jensen and Winthereik 2013). I also relied on ethnography-inspired methods to ‘studying 
up’ development organisations (Laura Nader 1972; Rottenburg 2009; Mosse 2011; Eyben 2014) and 
engaged in informal conversations with research participants, during key-policy meetings or events, and 
with other relevant social actors throughout my fieldwork. 
 
Figure 3 summarises the distribution of my research participants per country and according to their 
profile.86 Interviews were conducted in person, in most cases, or remotely (by telephone or online voice-
call) in English, Portuguese, French or Spanish, depending on my respondents’ preferences, and recorded 
when possible. Interviews generally lasted for 90 minutes, although some were shorter and others lasted 
more than 2 hours. Interviews were analysed with the help of a specialised software for qualitative analysis, 
NVivo. My coding of themes and issues started with Brazilian SSC and transnational SSC-related sources 
and then moved to the other ones, in a reiterated and mutually-informing manner. In order to protect my 
participants’ identities, and considering the small size of SSC-land, both direct quoting and indirect 
referencing from interviewees were anonymised. Respondents have been assigned codes composed by a 
country identifier and a random number.87 Translations of direct quotes into English are my own.  
 
In Brazil, the research participants included representatives from ‘SSC bureaucracies’ working with 
policymaking and/or as implementers in line-ministries and other public agencies, representatives of audit 
institutions, knowledge actors (from academia and think tanks), representatives of civil society, and 
representatives of international organisations working on SSC in Brazil. In some key institutions, several 
people were interviewed individually and/or in focus groups. Most interviewees were currently or 
previously affiliated with governmental institutions (at the senior or mid-level management or as frontline 
SSC workers) or worked on SSC outside the state (in interest groups and/or academics).88 My focus on 
these practitioners aimed at capturing the voices of those who had views on SSC accountability and first-
 
85 Drawing upon the ‘bureaucratic turn’ in development studies and anthropology of aid, I use the term to refer to the 
state or public institutions— or to the state apparatus, in more Foucauldian terms—in Southern providers that engage in 
SSC activities as their core-function or as part of their mandate. This includes development cooperation agencies, but also 
specific departments within line-ministries or other public agency that is involved in SSC initiatives.  On ‘aid bureaucracies’ 
and ‘development organisations’, see Rottenburg (2009); Yanguas and Hulme (2015).  
86 A fully anonymised list of my interviews and another of the different institutions represented in my sample can be find in 
Appendix 4.   
87 BR for Brazil, CH for China, IN for India, OSS for representatives of other SSC providers, and ODP for representatives of 
other development partners, including governmental representatives from DAC members, the OECD and Aidland 
development experts in academia or civil society.  
88 Many of them transitioned from one category to another either before the start or during my fieldwork. 
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hand experience with operationalising tools and mechanisms. For the views of the highest political 
authorities, I relied on official documents, oral presentations in events and media reviews.  
 
My samples for India and China were smaller. In India, my main participants were either affiliated with key 
SSC governmental institutions or were knowledge actors and civil society organisations (CSOs) 
representatives, while in China I mostly interviewed knowledge actors and CSOs representatives. While 
aiming for a certain degree of standardisation across the three countries, based on social position in the 
SSC field and on functional roles, I have also sought to balance the need to facilitate cross-country 
comparison and the desire not to undermine the experience of accountability in different contexts. Due to 
my research focus on the policymaking side in Brazil, China and India, I have conducted fewer semi-
structured interviews with representatives from other Southern partners and from ‘traditional’ donors. 
Albeit limited their voices are far from absent from my empirics as they were also captured through the 
media and documental review and during participant observation at SSC events, including in countries such 
as Mexico, South Africa, Mozambique and Ethiopia (see Figures 3 and 4).  
 
The last method employed was participant observation of national and international events, both 
governmental and civil society meetings. Drawing on existing ethnographies of aid (e.g., Mosse 2005; 
Rottenburg 2009; Eyben and Savage 2013; Eyben 2014) and on the growing numbers of ethnographies of 
SSC (e.g. Cesarino 2014; Shankland and Gonçalves 2016; Chuanhong Zhang et al. 2019; Cheng 2020), I 
employed a multi-sited ethnographic data collection on national and transnational SSC spaces (see Figure 
4). The data retrieved through these observations was triangulated with other sources and complemented 
with reflections on observant participation at other relevant events prior to 2017.   
 
When conducting this multi-sited project, I had to negotiate different research access and positionalities 
(see Appendix 3 for an extended discussion). This has facilitated looking at my research topic from a 
pluriversal way, with no-single locus of enunciation, and with multiple situated knowledges (Haraway 1988). 
Due to the unevenness of access to the different sites and time spent in the field, the way I mobilise data 
from the three sites is thus unique to each setting. Such a ‘fractal and polymorphous’ engagement, echoing 
Jensen and Winthereik (2013), represents a ‘choice of illustrations to invoke the range of empirical settings 
that indicate the breadth of analytical themes and illustrate different ways to practice accountability’ (ibid, 
48). This approach is not only coherent with the spirit of transnational relational comparisons but also 
speaks to the plea made by Kaag and Ocadiz (2019, 82) for a ‘kaleidoscopic’ approach to study SSC that 
can ‘bring different partial perspectives and knowledge together in order to complement one another for a 
better and more complete comprehension’. Here I operationalise their call not only at the researcher 
positionality level, but also at the methodological level, as a commitment to plurality and to partial accounts 
as ways of knowing the state and state-society dynamics.   
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Chapter 3. How the ‘accountability problem’ emerged in South-
South cooperation: an historical and analytical overview 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the formation of accountability as a problem for a set of actors in the global 
development community and the particular ways this problem was framed and acted upon. This is a 
deconstruction exercise to set the sociohistorical conditions that allowed for certain conceptions, concerns 
and particular kinds of accountability-related disputes to emerge in the field. It not only helps 
‘provincializing’ (Chakrabarty 2008 [2000]) accountability dynamics that dominate development 
cooperation but also renders visible the interplay between the re-emergence of SSC and ‘aid accountability’ 
concerns and the interconnectedness of accountability politics in both North-South and South-South 
cooperation in the recent years.  
 
The chapter is divided as follows. In the first section, I retrace the rise of ‘aid accountability deficits’ as a 
problem in the early 2000s, relating it to growing New Public Management (NPM) audit cultures across 
‘traditional’ donor countries and to shifting aid governance and legitimacy stakes. Next, I explore the main 
‘aid reform’ debates that emerged as tentative responses to ‘fix’ Aidland and how accountability concerns 
were put at its centre, notably in the OECD-led Aid Effectiveness Agenda. The first section ends with a 
discussion on the proliferation of transparency and accountability tools and on their sociopolitical effects. 
In the second section, I examine the construction of accountability in/of SSC as a problem, first by 
traditional donors and existing ‘aid monitoring movements’ and then by actors in the South, both 
governments and civil society. I then introduce rising powers’ initial diplomatic responses to these external 
concerns and their use of differentiation claims to first resist and then to find ‘Southern ways’ to engage 
and experiment with SSC accountability. 
 
 
Aid accountability as a problem 
 
 
While the ubiquity of accountability debates and tools in contemporary global development create the 
impression that this ‘global circulating script’ (A. Roy 2012) is a longstanding feature of the field, this is not 
the case. Signs of a fading optimism regarding ODA and questioning over its purposes and results dates 
back from the 1969 Pearson Commission Report.89 Yet it was from the 1990s onwards that accountability 
attained political and academic salience (Wenar 2006; Riddell 2007; Laporte 2015). Its emergence as an issue 
and a problem for/in Aidland, I contend, is closely related to the politicisation of development cooperation, 
reflecting ongoing disputes around its purposes and practices.  
 




Throughout its history, different constituencies within and outside Aidland sought to contest but also 
reimagine aid. Questions emerged around how aid was operationalised and how its developmental 
outcomes were benchmarked against either the (narrow) poverty alleviation focus or the (broader) structural 
developmental changes and growth in the South (Cassen 1986; The South Commission 1990; Easterly 2006; 
D. Moyo 2009; Lin and Wang 2017). There were also questions around how taxpayers’ money in ‘rich 
countries’ was spent in development initiatives in ‘poor countries’: to what end, who benefited and whether 
‘poor people in the South’ were benefitting at all  (Eyben and Ferguson 2004; Yanguas 2018a).  
 
Growing questioning, in academic and policy spaces, as well as in public arenas, set the scene for an identity 
and legitimacy crisis—a ‘donor puzzle’ (Esteves and Assunção 2014)—to which the 2008 financial crisis 
and the re-emergence of SSC contributed to accentuate (Zimmermann and Smith 2011; Eyben and Savage 
2013; Yanguas 2018a). This has prompted a wave of normative codification and reforms at the global level 
and in several bilateral and multilateral donors, leading to what is now known as the ‘Aid Effectiveness 
Agenda’.90 In what follows, I recount this process in a thematic rather than purely chronological fashion, 
emphasising the different ways aid accountability was identified as missing and the types of debates, reforms 
and tools put in place to solve Aidand’s ‘accountability problem’.   
 
 Accountability deficits: unaccountable Southern recipients and aid organisations? 
 
Unsurprisingly, policy and academic debates largely revolved around aid accountability deficits. Concerns 
escalated since the 1990s in response to the geopolitical changes of a post-Cold War world (Riddell 2007) 
and to the consolidation of result-based policymaking and audit cultures within the core of the aid system, 
both in the OECD as well as domestically in some of DAC’s most active members (Strathern 2003; Pal 
2014; Hadjiisky 2017). Debates mostly revolved around two types of ‘problematic accountability deficits’: 
in Southern recipients and in aid organisations.  
 
Development NGOs pioneered the accountability debate in the 1990s, as a self-reflective exercise on their 
own work and relations with communities they worked on and with (McGee 2013). Around the same time, 
concerns with and debates on accountability in/of Southern recipients begun to emerge out of donors’ 
mounting prioritisation of the so-called ‘good governance agenda’.  This multidimensional agenda revolved 
around fighting poor governance and corruption and ‘deepening democracy’ in the South, through 
strengthening civil society and citizen participation in policy processes, as much as reforming the state, 
budget management and policymaking in recipient countries (Goetz and Jenkins 2005). The World Bank 
Poverty Reduction Strategies are a telling embodiment of this spirit (Cooke and Kothari 2004; Hickey and 
 
90 The linkages between crisis and accountability and accountability and legitimacy are not unique to Aidland. A similar story 
has been observed, for instance, in the case of the European Union (Bovens, Curtin and Hart 2010).  
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Mohan 2008; Gaventa and McGee 2013). There and elsewhere, donors’ gradual shift from ‘project to 
budget support’ underscored a perceived need to curb recipients’ mismanagement of aid in other to achieve 
‘aid effectiveness’ (OECD 1996; Commission for Africa 2005; Swedlund 2017).  
 
Hence, this first framing of the problem—as a Southern recipients’ accountability deficit—contributed to 
strengthen donors’ good governance agenda (Carothers and Brechenmacher 2014), entangling both 
discussions and generating its own set of sociopolitical and governmentality effects. Besides promoting 
governance reforms in Southern countries,91 accountability-related aid portfolios of the post-structural 
adjustment era have themselves created new forms of ‘process-based’ aid conditionality, whereby current 
and/or future lending became dependent on performance outcomes and adoption of accountability tools 
to improve aid management, reinforcing the already asymmetrical North-South dyad (Hickey and Mohan 
2008; Rottenburg 2009).  
 
As for development organisations, while marginal throughout the Cold War, concerns with accountability 
deficits became omnipresent and intrinsically related to understandings of accountability as ‘answerability 
for performance’ (World Bank 2003). Development organisations performance, nonetheless, remained an 
open-concept, meaning either ‘value-for-money’ or ‘effective poverty reduction’/‘pro-poor outcomes’, and 
often a combination of both.92 Concerns with performance also stemmed from the results-based and 
evidence-based policymaking turn of the last decades (Howlett 2009; Parkhurst 2017), which prompted 
development organisations to ‘demonstrate results based on hard evidence’ (Eyben et al. 2015). Monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) became a ‘best practice’ for donors, at least rhetorically (Laporte 2015; Honig and 
Gulrajani 2018).93 Additionally, from 2005 onwards, following a growing global open government wave, 
‘aid transparency’ also joined the already diverse array of problematic deficits (McGee 2013; Jensen and 
Winthereik 2013; Honig and Weaver 2019).  
 
Domestic constituencies and Southern recipients’ concerns  
 
Distinct stakeholders within donor countries became important voices in problematising aid accountability 
deficits and raising different expectations on DAC donors’ policies and spending. Under mounting 
concerns with results-based public action, particularly after the 2008 financial crisis, parliaments, political 
opposition forces and voices within governing parties called, for instance, for greater ‘aid effectiveness’ and 
 
91 Carothers and Brechenmacher (2014) differentiate between three streams of aid initiatives, namely: governance, 
democracy, and human rights. The authors argue that aid providers typically present and group together the concepts of 
accountability, transparency, participation, and inclusion in policy documents as an apparently mutually reinforcing set, 
despite acknowledging their links are only partial. 
92 With countries like the UK being more concerned and aligned with the poverty reduction goal than others like the US 
(Wenar 2006; Gulrajani and Calleja 2019). 
93 Riddell (2007) points out that, at least at the time of his survey, the majority of traditional donors were only starting to 
implement evaluations in a consistent manner.  
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for improving ‘aid transparency’ to curb aid mismanagement (Yanguas 2018a; Gulrajani and Faure 2019).94 
Concurrently, CSOs in the ‘aid monitoring movements’ advanced their range of accountability concerns, 
including the need for greater transparency in the aid sector and for bilateral and multilateral donors to 
promote citizen-centred development interventions and uphold ‘democratic ownership’ of 
aid/development cooperation (Fox and Brown 1998; Jensen and Winthereik 2013). Networks of ‘aid 
watchdogs’, such as the Better Aid Coalition or the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness,95 
often called on Northern donors to be accountable not only to domestic taxpayers but also to fulfilling 
global development goals and targets, including meeting the 0.7% GNI/ODA target and upholding socio-
environmental justice in development-related projects (Park 2019). 
 
Other than domestic constituencies, Southern recipients also had their own aid accountability concerns. 
This included challenging unequal North-South relations and the (lack) of accountability of Northern 
donors for fulfilling the 0.7% target. Southern recipients also denounced the insufficiencies of the donor-
led reformist agenda that overlooked what they perceived as the real development, not aid, effectiveness 
issues. Much of this critique was formulated between the 2005 and 2008, during the series of OECD-led 
High-Level Forums and specially in Accra, and found great echo among CSOs (Brown and Morton 2008), 
as I will discuss shortly.  
 
Importantly, while accountability was perceived as problematic by different stakeholders in various 
overlapping ways, in the 2000s an ‘aid effectiveness’ paradigm—concerned with aid performance and with 
justifying aid expenditures to Northern taxpayers—became the majoritarian global circulating script (Eyben 
2008). Though hegemonic, management concerns never fully supplanted other understandings of 
accountability thus creating a patchwork of globally circulating accountability ‘focuses and logics’ (McGee 
2013). This plurality remains presently visible and reveals different expectations of what accountability 
should be and do to the field and the kind of reforms needed to achieve it. 
 
Aid reforms and the effectiveness-accountability nexus 
 
The multifaceted reformist wave that engulfed Aidland in the 2000s encompassed aid governance reforms, 
development organisations’ transparency reforms and aid agencies management reforms. Combined they 
have come to constitute the ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’: a self-critique attempt by the DAC to ‘fix’ Aidland, 
creating new social contracts and compacts96—between donors and recipients and between governments 
and their domestic constituencies—on the purposes of aid and on the benchmarks to assess it (S. Kim and 
Lightfoot 2011; Eyben 2013; Esteves and Assunção 2014; Swedlund 2017). Accountability had a special 
 
94 Their criticism grew in the wake of #AidToo debates on sexual and human rights abuses in Aidland (Yanguas 2018b). 
95 Both networks later merged into the CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness. The Partnership was funded in 
December 2012 to unite CSOs on the issue of effective development cooperation. See https://csopartnership.org/ (last 
access: 16/10/2020).  
96 For a discussion on social contracts (delegated authority) and compacts (normative authority), see Pouliot (2017). 
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place in the Agenda and through the successive aid reforms debates in the 2000s both issues—effectiveness 
and accountability—became closely entangled.  
 
The ‘Effectiveness Agenda’ was built through a series of DAC-led debates, the so-called High Level Forums 
that took place in Rome (2002), Paris (2005), Accra (2008) and Busan (2011). A new wave of normative 
codification resulted from these series of debates, in particular the 2005 Paris Principles on Aid 
Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, putting ‘mutual accountability’ between donors and 
recipients at is centre.  
 
The Agenda was based on agreed commitments to enhance aid effectiveness and monitoring schemes to 
make sure compliance was achieved by donors and recipients. To support the 2005 Paris Declaration, the 
DAC developed a set of 12 indicators to measure progress on aid effectiveness and promote greater mutual 
accountability (OECD 2005).97 ‘Mutual accountability’ was—alongside the principles of ownership, 
alignment, donor harmonisation and results-focused development—conducive to make development 
interventions work (see Box 1, below). It was also a meta-commitment, an intended (collective) 
accountability towards fulfilling the Agenda itself. 
 
Different commentators have since pointed to the shortcomings of this principle. ‘Mutual accountability’ 
was resisted by several donors in Paris for being too stringent and costly (Menocal and Rogerson 2006) 
and, at the same time, perceived by many in the South and in global civil society networks as loose and 
vague (Eyben 2008; Jensen and Winthereik 2013; T. Kim and Lim 2017). Southern actors further criticised 
the insufficient commitments from donors, since the Declaration only had one indicator on mutual 
accountability, namely to create country-level mechanisms in recipient countries (Bissio 2013; Ocampo and 
Arteaga 2014). 
 
Despite the acknowledged shortcomings, accountability as a principle and a statement was there to stay. 
After Paris, it became one of Aidland’s major meta-narratives in three overlapping ways: first, as an external 
need for donors to manage their relations with recipients. Second, as an internal governance tool to improve 
performance and increase the domestic authority and legitimacy of aid organisations. Third, as an 
international norm to secure the fulfilment of donors’ commitments to global development. As mentioned, 
as time progressed the first and second understandings prevailed over the third one, but not without 




97 The background for the mutual accountability principle is the Managing for Development Results initiative launched by 








The Paris Agenda and its discontents  
 
While the Agenda became a compass for Aidland, it did not fully dissipate the criticism that led to its 
adoption in the first place. From the perspective of Southern actors, the Agenda had two major 
shortcomings: first, at the procedural level, the DAC, a ‘closed space’, had decided on the Declaration 
(Eyben 2013). Second, at the content level, the Agenda focused on means (i.e., aid) rather than on 
development ends (Bissio 2013). The Paris agenda had, consequently, both input and output legitimacy 
shortcomings (Taggart 2020). Moreover, by trying to solve the ‘donor puzzle’ and  ‘fix’ Aidland, the Agenda 
was less about meeting recipients needs and more about making both sides to keep their promises 
(Swedlund 2017), besides safeguarding donors’ legitimacy towards their own internal constituencies 
(Esteves and Assunção 2014).  
 
Due to its aid-management focus, Paris equally failed to fully incorporate the emerging powers and their 
differentiation claims as countries to be recognised not as ‘Non-DAC donors’ but as practicing something 
different: SSC (Bracho 2017). In the subsequent Forum, in Accra, SSC was recognised in more substantial 
way, but by then, the geographies of global development were quickly changing. In 2007, another 
development cooperation space was created at the UN-level, the Development Cooperation Forum 
(UNDCF), with a mission to debate development (not aid) effectiveness, a point I will return to shortly. 
Crafted as an inclusive space for all UN members (rather than a donor-centred one),98 the UNDCF 
 
98 UNDCF is nested under the UN Economic and Social Council - ECOSOC and is, therefore, open to all member states.  
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illustrates not only the growing pluralisation of policy and norm-setting arenas (Verschaeve and Orbie 2016; 
Esteves and Assunção 2014) but also the growing fragmentation in the field, which became clearer in the 
last High-Level Forum, in Busan, when ‘beyond aid’ became the talk of the day (Janus, Klingebiel and Paulo 
2015).  
 
The 2011 meeting in Busan featured a ‘fractured landscape’ with donors’ anxieties about emerging powers, 
uncertainties and contradictions in constructing a new, inclusive, ‘equator-less’ global partnership (the 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation - GPEDC) (Eyben and Savage 2013). 
Bringing the emerging powers into the ‘effectiveness tent’ was a key issue for the DAC. And yet, in Busan, 
the continuous monitoring of the Paris commitments was superseded because the agenda was already 
moving elsewhere. It was time to move beyond ‘aid effectiveness’ to talk about ‘development effectiveness’. 
 
The ‘development effectiveness agenda’ was, however, even more polysemic. For some Southern partners, 
it meant bringing trade, FDI, and the private and state-led sector into the discussions. For others it meant 
upholding ‘equal roles for both partners in a development partnership’ (Chaturvedi 2012, 572) and seeking 
for greater ‘policy coherence’ from donors.99 For counter-hegemonic actors within DAC and civil society 
networks, it meant broadening the agenda ‘beyond growth’ and including rights-based development and 
crosscutting issues like the environment, governance, social and gender (Eyben 2013; Menocal and 
Rogerson 2006). Concurrently, for some Northern countries, it meant results-based development 
management and ‘value-for-money’ interventions. While the shift from ‘aid’ to ‘development’ manged to 
reframe some of the terminology it has not dislodged the importance of ‘effectiveness debates’ in the field. 
Rather it broadened the disputes since development is an equally, if not more, contested term. 
 
Importantly, the (shorted-lived) Busan deal featured a range of issues that remain at the heart of 
contemporary development cooperation accountability politics. First, it included an agreement on 
‘differential commitments’ for traditional donors and SSC partners (art. 14) where SSC commitments are 
listed as ‘reference’ and ‘voluntary’ (art. 2).100 Second, Busan reinforced fissures within the South, away 
from classic G77+China stances at the UN that portrayed ‘the South’ as a homogenous entity. While the 
deal was short-lived, the association between a provider’s (Northern/Southern) identity and the level and 
nature of its commitments remains at the heart of the current ‘burden-sharing game’ (Bracho 2017, 27) 
over global development responsibilities. Lastly, Busan negotiations introduced the issue of transparency 
in/of SSC (Mawdsley, Savage and Sung-Mi 2014; Pino 2014), as a prelude to what would become an intense 
debate in the coming years.  
 
 
99 For a discussion on policy coherence in the context of global development, see Carbone (2012); Keijzer (2012).  
100 For an insider discussion about the disputes in Busan and in the following GPEDC meetings on the issue of ‘differential 
commitments’, see Bracho (2017). 
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Accountability mechanisms and its discontents 
 
Aid reforms also brought about new global and national accountability tools to help ‘fixing’ the 
accountability problems. These were established at the DAC-level, in bilateral aid agencies, in multilateral 
banks, across the UN system, in recipient countries, and in the not-for-profit sector (Fox and Brown 1998; 
Eyben 2008; Berghmans, Simons and Vandenabeele 2017; Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-Mullins 2019; 
Morasso and Lamas 2020). Despite their diversity in nature and purposes, numerous tools were set-up to 
measure aid and demonstrate aid flows and their effectiveness (Mosse 2011; Eyben and Guijt 2015; Honig 
2020) and much of  the ‘aid accountability debate’ turned into discussing the technicalities to perfect this 
task. Aidland’s focus on building mechanisms and tools, I contend, contributed to consolidate two 
accountability dynamics in the field: first, sustaining the aid industry’s needs to produce and perform 
‘success’ to different publics (Mosse 2004; Rottenburg 2009) and, second, opening space for several 
stakeholders—including critical voices within Aidland, civil society groups, and Southern recipients—to 
contest aid practices and aid relations through either advocating for the adoption of  mechanisms or 
renegotiating their functioning. In what follows I will discuss some of  these mechanisms, the negotiations 
around them, and their sociopolitical effects. 
    
Development cooperation is a sector that has for long focused on ‘universal technical solutions’ and ‘best 
practices’ (Ferguson 1994; Honig and Gulrajani 2018). It is also a sector with tendencies to legal and para-
legal harmonisation (de Chazournes 2011) and bureaucratic isomorphism (Yanguas and Hulme 2015). 
Policy and normative diffusion traditionally relied on a limited number of  centres, namely the OECD-DAC 
and the World Bank, and on the leadership of  certain countries within these spaces, for long the United 
States (US) and some European countries like the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany (Lancaster 2007).  
 
The DAC functions as a ‘closed space’ that decides what global development is and how to measure it in a 
club diplomacy manner (Eyben 2013). DAC’s ‘oligarchic’ nature (Badie 2013) helps understanding the 
historical and present disputes between this space and other ‘universal membership’ spaces, such UNCTAD 
or the UNDCF,101 and the role played by Brazil, China and India in historically advocating for the 
democratisation of  global development governance (Alexandroff  and Cooper 2010; Hurrell 2013). Their 
criticism of  the legitimacy of  DAC-led initiatives in light of  the limited representation of  Southern voices 
inside this space strongly shapes SSC global accountability politics, as I will show in Chapter 4.  
 
At the global level, the OECD-DAC has been a major space for accountability standard-setting. 
Standardisation (or attempts to reach it) have been done through a vast network of  ‘soft law’: non-binding 
 
101 The divergences started already in the 1960s, when the then UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold disagreed with 
the creation of the DAC outside the UN. In the following decades, the DAC and UNCTAD often diverged on issues of 
development and development cooperation. A new divide emerged, in 2007, when the UNDCF was created.  
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rules and codes of  conduct (Paulo and Reisen 2010; S. Kim and Lightfoot 2011).102 The most significant 
creation by the DAC has been the very concept of  Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its body of  
statistics. Due to the peer-nature of  the DAC, the need to generate quantifiable and comparable data on 
donors became a major feature of  its accountability regime and the ODA statistics its main infrastructural 
response.103 As a social measure, ODA definition and statistics attempt to harmonise practices within the 
field (Hynes and Scott 2013). At the same time, as a measurement and reporting tool to count aid spending, 
ODA statistics are a proxy for ‘state aid efforts’ and an indicator of  performance as much as of  ‘generosity’ 
(Veen 2011, 140).  
 
The concept of  ODA and its statistics are, nonetheless, far from static and have been renegotiated several 
times to adapt to new realities in donors’ aid practices.104 DAC members took almost ten years to agree on 
a first ODA definition, in 1969. The concept was then refined in 1972 with the ‘development purpose’ of  
aid and ‘levels of  concessionality’105 as central components (Riddell 2007).106 The statistical definition of  
ODA has continuously changed since. Internally, heated technical-political controversies appeared over 
whether and how to count aid modalities such as technical cooperation, emergency aid, debt relief  and over 
measuring concessionality levels (Vanheukelom et al. 2012; Hynes and Scott 2013; S. Scott 2019).107 ODA 
metrics was also criticised by aid watchdogs and Southern practitioners to whom the counting allowed for 
‘phantom aid’: funds not made available to developing countries because they are in-country spending in 
Northern countries (Development Initiatives 2014).  
 
102 This is coherent with OECD overall business model, which is reliant on an agreed-upon community of values, 
international soft law, policy transfer and peer-review (Pal 2014; Hadjiisky 2017). According to Pal (2014, 196), the OECD 
acts as an ‘ideational artist’ in global policymaking through the use of research, persuasion, modelling, peer-review and a 
host of other tools. 
103 The role ODA statistics play in ‘donorship’ is equally linked to the statistics-heavy identity of OECD as an organisation. 
104 Debates mostly occurred in donor spaces with donor stakeholders, with the UN spaces playing a secondary role 
(Vanheukelom et al. 2012). 
105 Concessionality measures the softness of a credit and is used by the DAC to reflect the benefit to the borrower in 
comparison to a loan at market rate. OECD methods to define concessionality (and the terms for grant element and 
discount rate) differ from the World Bank’s one (see Bhattacharya and Rashmin 2020). 
106 Until 2017, the DAC defined ODA as ‘those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA Recipients and to 
multilateral institutions which are: (i) provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their 
executive agencies; and (ii) each transaction of which: (a) is administered with the promotion of the economic 
development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and (b)  
is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per 
cent)’. In 2018, the DAC agreed on a new definition for the ‘grant equivalent measure of ODA’. See 
http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-
standards/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm (last access: 04/12/2020).  
107 Regarding the subsequent changes, for some these were minor ‘interpretation changes’ (Riddell 2007; Hynes and Scott 
2013), while for others both ‘minor and strong changes’(Vanheukelom et al. 2012). For instance, some administration 
costs, in-country costs with refugees, education/scholarships, and elements of debt forgiveness were also partially 
included in the statistical measure.  In the recent years, the DAC initiated a discussion, strongly led by the UK, on 
‘modernising’ ODA (UK Parliament 2018) to broaden it to further include spending with peacekeeping and humanitarian 
aid (including with refugee support beyond the first-year of arrival) and also to go beyond the poverty focus (Gulrajani 
2019). Debates on whether to revise ODA-eligibility and graduation is another example of how the concept is not-static. In 
2012, the OECD-DAC launched its own ‘modernisation of its statistical system’, with changes with regard to the 
measurement of concessional loans to the public sector, private sector instruments, peace and security expenditures, and 
in-donor refugee costs. Later, in 2019, the OCDE has decided that the ‘grant equivalent system’ would become the 
standard for measuring ODA replacing the previous ‘cash or flow basis’ method. See https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-




These definitional and statistical debates highlight the nature of  aid metrics as inherently political ‘moving 
targets’ (Sears 2019). This is why, following the adoption of  the Agenda 2030, attempts were made to 
develop a new universal metrics, the Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD). Under 
negotiation since 2015, TOSSD still lacks buy-in from large SSC providers, like Brazil, China and India.108 
These countries perceived the proposed new measure more as survival strategy for the DAC than a 
measurement need for the SDGs (Besharati 2017; Li 2019), or worse, as a DAC attempt to ‘subsume SSC 
into its data structure’ (M. Chakrabarti 2019, 53) and further dilute Northern historical responsibilities 
towards Southern countries (Besharati 2017).  
 
Besides the ODA metrics, another accountability tool is the DAC Peer Review Mechanism, a compliance 
instrument used to put ODA ‘soft law’ in practice (Paulo and Reisen 2010). Peer reviews are a type of  
accountability mechanism where donors ‘hold mirrors to each other’ (OPM 2008).109 The mechanism works 
through peer pressure and soft persuasion. Every five years, each member is evaluated by its peers against 
a set of  references including the Paris Declaration and DAC ‘best practices’ (OECD 2020). The DAC then 
makes recommendations and suggestions for improvement. Together, peer reviews and ODA metrics 
became the major global accountability tools in Aidland.  
 
Outside the DAC, several other global accountability infrastructures bloomed in the past decades. This 
include the World Bank Inspection Panel, the first and most comprehensive ‘independent accountability 
mechanism’ or ‘accountability office’110 inside a multilateral development bank and a benchmark to other 
Northern-led multilaterals (Caitlin et al. 2016; Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-Mullins 2019).111 The Bank 
has also been an important ‘knowledge actor’ (Bebbington 2006; Bazbauers 2018) in shaping broader 
understandings around development cooperation and development finance accountability. This includes 
mainstreaming the notions of  ‘socio-environmental safeguards’ and ‘do-no-harm’ in development 
projects112 and diffusing several M&E artefacts, such as the LogFrames, cost-benefits analysis, and 
Randomised Control Trials (RCTs).113  
 
108 INT-BR-47; INT-BR-44; INT-OSS-16. Brazil (through ABC and IPEA) and China (through the MOFCOM-affiliated think tank 
CAITEC) have joined as observers (not proper members) of the TOSSD task-force, while India is not participating at all. In 
the recent years, domestic political shifts in Brazil have, nonetheless, made the country more eager to engage with the 
OECD and in 2020, the country formally joined the task-force. Other Southern countries, like Mexico, have participated 
more actively both from GPEDC and from the TOSSD debates. 
109 Mirror mechanisms coexist with other types of mechanisms including ‘spotlight’ (non-official mechanisms) and ‘two-
way mirrors’ (mutual performance oversight by both donors and recipients). 
110 See https://www.accountabilitycounsel.org/accountability-resources/accountability-office-faqs/ (last access 
05/08/2020). 
111 For a comprehensive review on independent accountability mechanisms across a range of multilateral development 
banks, see Caitlin et al. (2016). 
112 This includes standards and safeguard based on the principle of ‘do-no-harm’, as well as benchmarks for private 
development finance, such as the World Bank International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards on 
Environmental and Social Sustainability. For more on the ‘do-no-harm’ approach, see Chapter 7. 
113 These instruments were not necessarily developed by the World Bank, but the Bank has helped disseminating them. In 




The UN development system has also developed and mainstreamed its own tools. The UN Evaluation Group, 
for instance, has a standard-setting role, creating evaluation standards and guidelines for several 
organisations in the system.114 Simultaneously, agencies like UNICEF, known for its strong evaluation 
culture, have produced and tailored mandate-specific accountability infrastructures.115 Anotehr example is 
the UN Office for the Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs, which has also developed its own artefacts 
for greater transparency of  humanitarian donations, such as the Financial Tracking Services platform.116  
 
In the recent years, non-state and multi-stakeholder initiatives have also developed numerous tools, 
indicators and benchmarks for donors’ transparency. This includes the International Aid Transparency Initiative 
(IATI), a voluntary initiative gathering CSOs, donors and recipient governments. In 2011, IATI members 
have agreed on a standard for development organisations to publish their aid-related engagements.117 
Connected to IATI, the London-based NGO Publish What You Fund (PWYF) has developed, in 2011, the 
annual Aid Transparency Index (ATI) for development organisations. Lastly, there is AidData, a collaborative 
research initiative established in 2004 in the US, to provide granular data on aid projects worldwide.118 Since 
2017, the initiative hosts the China AidData.119  
 
These ICT-based transparency initiatives are firmly embedded in the ‘revolution in aid data’ that took place 
in the mid-2000s, with an increasing focus on ‘data for development’ (data4dev). The 2030 Agenda has been 
largely framed along these lines, recognising ‘good data systems’ to achieve the SDGs as important and 
often lacking. Yet another buzzword, data4dev brings promises to the field as well as its own forms of  politics 
(who counts and what counts as development data) and even de-politicisation, with data being treated as 
purely the realm of  statisticians or web-developers (Jensen and Winthereik 2013; Ruppert, Isin and Bigo 
2017; Fukuda‐Parr and McNeill 2019).  
 
Alongside transparency, and often interacting with it, the current landscape is also populated by numerous 
M&E tools. These respond to multiple interests within Aidland: gathering knowledge (‘knowing projects’), 
upward reporting (to donors and their principals) and/or enabling participation in the field. While 
increasingly informed by efficiency concerns, evaluation remains a political act, inseparable from broader 
political processes, strategies and interests of decision-makers (Faria 2005; Parkhurst 2017). Evidence-
gathering plays a key role in status-seeking dynamics that prompt different countries to showcase success 
 
nationally in several Western countries to assess public policies. For a critical historical background on the use of 
LogFrames and of its de-contextualising and technification effects, see Laporte (2015). 
114 This includes the UNEG Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation, first approved in 2008 and revised in 2020 (see UNEG 2020). 
115 For example, the UNICEF-Adapted UNEG Evaluation Reports Standards (UNICEF 2017). 
116 See https://fts.unocha.org/  (last access: 17/01/2020). Brazil, China and India are listed as humanitarian aid donors and 
have their contributions recorded in the database. 
117 Currently, IATI hosts a database on aid flows by more than 1000 organisations. Brazil, China and India opted out. 
118 See http://aiddata.org/our-story (last access: 03/01/2020).  
119 See https://www.aiddata.org/china (last access: 03/01/2020); also Dreher et al. (2017).  
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to seek for recognition or assert power. It also plays a role in domestic politics, whereby aid organisations 
show results to secure funding within domestic budgets and public support (Rottenburg 2009; Jensen and 
Winthereik 2013; Laporte 2015). Evidence-gathering in Aidland is also infused by power dynamics and 
raises questions of whose knowledge on processes and outcomes counts, what kind of evidence counts, 
and how to use them. Existing knowledge regimes create rigid, albeit always contested, gradients of what is 
evidence and what is acceptable evidence to prove successful development interventions, as the intractable 
debates on RCTs illustrate.120 The role of experts and the ‘quali-quanti’ disputes are particularly important 
here, as they constitute a central piece of Aidland’s evaluation infrastructures and determine their social 
workings, their (perceived) legitimacy and their ability to produce success and accountability.  
 
National aid accountability mechanisms  
 
Accountability mechanisms were also established at the national level. While the various national 
experiences across DAC members and Southern recipients will not be examined here,121 it is important to 
emphasise that national aid transparency legislations, aid-tracking tools and reporting systems established 
in DAC members were developed both reflecting global trends as well as responding to national 
circumstances. Domestic factors include political culture and policy styles, horizontal accountability 
practices and also how aid interacted with other policy domains. It also important to highlight the 
fragmentation, and in some cases even ‘duelling’ (PWYF 2017) among tools, that happened at the national 
level. Both trends, ‘vernacularisation’122 and fragmentation, are found in SSC providers, as discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
Besides transparency tools, donor countries have also developed and refined different audit and control 
systems for political and financial accountability purposes. In the UK, since 2011 development cooperation 
has been internally subjected to the oversight by the Parliament and by the Independent Commission for 
 
120 For critical analysis on the use of RCTs see Chambers (2017); Jannuzzi (2018); Kabeer (2020). A recent surge in this 
debate after the 2019 Nobel of Economics award to two major champions of RCTs in development illustrates that these 
disputes IDC are far from over. See Kvangraven (2020) for a recent discussion about the ‘rule of randomistas’ in the field. 
121 This includes transparency reforms took place in Germany (at GIZ) and in the US (USAID published its strategic paper on 
open data in 2015, whereas the Millennium Challenge Corporation has put a premium on gathering and publishing data 
and became the leading US institution in the ATI). National guarantees on transparency were adopted to promote national 
frameworks’ alignment with international standards such as the ATI in countries like the United Kingdom (following the 
2015 Aid Strategy and the 2017 Cabinet Office transparency commitment), Sweden, and the US (through the 2016 Foreign 
Aid Transparency and Accountability Act). Open-data aid transparency infrastructures also mushroomed, particularly since 
2011: Denmark’s Danida Open Aid (in 2014), Sweden’s openaid.se (in 2014), the UK DFID’s Development Tracker (in 2013), 
USAID’s Global Aid Explorer (in 2015), and the US Government’s Foreign Assistance Dashboard (in 2010). See Honig and 
Weaver (2019) for a detailed account on national transparency tools in donor countries. 
122 I borrow this term from Prashant Sharma (2014), who applied the term in the context of the adoption by India of its 
Right to Information Act, in 2005, amidst a global trend of access to information/freedom of information legislation in the 
world in the 2000s.  
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Aid Impact (ICAI).123 In the US, political-financial control of aid has been done through the Congress.124 
Congress oversight has been noticeable in the case of the World Bank and other multilaterals where 
Washington is the major shareholder (Babb 2009; Park 2019). In Denmark, the National Audit Office not 
only controls the legality of expenditures but also offers consultancy-like recommendations to the Danish 
aid agency on its workings. Changes in auditing towards efficiency-related control, what Jensen and 
Winthereik (2013) called ‘audit implosion’, are growing worldwide, including in Brazil (Peters 2002; 
Filgueiras 2019; also Chapter 5). 
 
The social-political implications of aid accountability debates, reforms and tools 
 
This last sub-section reflects the sociopolitical implications of  the past, and still unfinished, debates, 
reforms and accountability tools in Aidland. In particular, I explore three set of  dynamics: socialisation, 
negotiations and de-/re-politicisation of  development cooperation.   
 
The socialisation effects of  accountability debates, reforms and tools are materialised in boundary-making, 
hierarchising and competition dynamics within the field. This is mainly due to the generative work of  
accountability reforms and tools in standardising practices among donors and in producing compliance-
resistance dynamics. The genealogy of  ODA and its quantitative metrics, for instance, show DAC’s role in 
creating a tool to regulate its members’ behaviour and set the boundaries of  what ‘donorship’ means in 
practice; assuring the birth of  a ‘community of  donors’ (Lancaster 2007; Esteves and Assunção 2014). 
These boundaries, as postulated by critical IR scholarship (see Chapter 1), have hierarchising effects inside 
and outside the DAC. Inside, groups were formed (the like-minded groups, those who meet the 0.7% target, 
those who target poverty alleviation, etc.) and certain types of  deviance became more or less stigmatised, 
for instance the Japanese ‘Asian model for aid’.125 Outside, boundaries have strengthened recipient-donor 
inequalities and spurred the stigmatisation of  ‘Non-DAC’ providers. 
 
Accountability norms and tools have allowed therefore for the crystallisation of  a relatively stable—albeit 
always contested from within—shared identity among donors based on variable degrees of  conformity 
with DAC norms.126 Measures, rankings, and other performance indicators functioned as levers of  ‘social 
 
123 Until 2020 legislative oversight was done by the International Development Parliamentary Select Committee and ICAI. 
See https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/government-responses-to-the-independent-commission-for-aid-impact-
icai-reports (last access 01/09/2020). The implications of the DFID-FCO merger under the new Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Development Office (FCDO), announced in June 2020, to this accountability system are still unclear at the time of this 
writing (Bishop 2020; Worley 2020). 
124 The 2016 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act also requires the US President to set forth guidelines for 
M&E country’s aid. In January 2018, the Office of Management and Budget issued the required guidelines for federal 
agencies. The Act also contained a provision for General Accountability Office to analyse the guidelines established by the 
Office; and assess the implementation of the guidelines by the agencies. 
125 On the ‘Asian model’ in the case of Japan, China, India, and South Korea, see Jerve (2007); S. Kim and Lightfoot (2011); 
Doucette (2020).   
126 Inside donor-led institutions, these dynamics responded to the very heterogeneity of donor countries, their diverse aid 
practices and their domestic politics at home (Lancaster 2007; Veen 2011). 
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pressure’ in favour of  ‘DAC-ability’ (S. Kim and Lightfoot 2011). Moreover, with their ‘commensurability 
effects’ (Espeland and Saunder 2007), tools like the ODA metrics or the ATI ranking generated 
comparability but also competition among donors. This was not an unwelcomed effect; considering the 
rhetoric of  needing to expand flows of  ODA to meet global development goals and targets set at different 
points.  
 
Yet competition has not led to full convergence among individual donor states and the history of  aid 
remained ‘replete with donor countries failing to commit aid funds that have been pledged, to budget aid 
the quantities committed, and to disburse funds in the amounts budgeted’ (Riddell 2007, 46). Examples of  
implementation gaps and/or resistance inside the donor community include the US (implicit or explicit) 
refusal to adhere to the 0.7% ODA/GNI target (Clemens and Moss 2005) but also DAC donors’ uneven 
compliance with the ATI, even among different ‘aid bureaucracies’ inside a same country, as in the case of  
the UK (Bond 2018).127 ‘DAC-ability’, therefore, has always been multifaceted, ambiguous and incomplete, 
including among major donors like the US, Germany and the UK (Paulo and Reisen 2010; S. Kim and 
Lightfoot 2011; Gulrajani and Calleja 2019). Rendering visible the simultaneous normative compliance and 
deviance within the DAC is particularly important as to show that ‘traditional’ donors have not always been 
more consistently compliant with norms they themselves helped design than outsiders, including China, in 
the more recent years (Bräutigam 2009).128 
 
Another set of  dynamics refers to the past and ongoing geopolitical, epistemic and citizenship 
accountability-related negotiations within and around the DAC and its accountability standards. Internally, 
epistemic disputes and negotiations are visible not only in the fact that the OECD Working Group working 
on ODA was first called the ‘DAC Group on Statistical Problems’ (our emphasis) but also in the successive 
changes in the concept of  ODA and how to measure it through the decades. The recent incorporation of  
debt relief  into the ODA accounting in the context of  the Covid-19 outbreak illustrates the always-moving 
ODA metrics and the debates around it.129 Externally, unfinished North-South negotiations over the 
TOSSD further highlight the sociotechnical and political disputes between experts in and outside Aidland 
over what and whose knowledge counts.  
 
‘Aid monitoring movements’ have also negotiated these reforms and tools, using them to dispute aid 
budgets and results and to exert pressure on development organisations to adopt and improve 
accountability mechanisms in the first place. Mechanisms, particularly data-focused ones, provided a starting 
 
127 As aid started to be disbursed by different agencies within the UK, the former DFID kept scored higher than for instance 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.  In 2018, for instance, DFID ranked third for transparency out of 45 global aid 
donors in the Aid Transparency Index, while the Foreign Office was ranked 40th (PWYF 2018). 
128 An illustration of this point is found in Haug (2020) when discussing Turkey, where he argues that Turkey reporting 
practices to the DAC have both accepted DAC normative powers while subverting its rules.  
129 In the summer of 2020, as a response to Covid-19, the DAC has decided to include debt relief as part of its ODA 
definition, sparking opposition among civil society that feared this would generate incentives for donors to provide more 
loans and less grants and that they would use debt reliefs to meet the 0.7 ODA/GNI target (Saldinger 2020). 
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point from which agreements could be forged or disagreements voiced (A. Gupta 2012; McGee 2013). 
National and transnational advocacy campaigns managed to create alternative information tools or to use 
existing ones to ‘name and shame’ accountability norms’ ‘underperformers and violators’ (Towns and 
Rumelili 2017). Aid transparency movements also used these tools to dispute the quantum of  flows, how 
to measure it, as much as results on the ground.   
 
Finally, looking at these multiple sociopolitical implications in a combined manner, is possible to argue that 
reforms and tools have simultaneously de- and re-politicised global development accountability debates. 
Undoubtedly, much of  the political discomfort embedding Aidland’s credibility crisis ended up being 
channelled, and often reduced, to managerial reforms that rendered accountability technical and limited to 
building managerial-fixes and counting tools. Arguably, accounting-based accountability—related to a 
longstanding ‘metrics obsession’ in the field130—contributed to de-politicise accountability in Aidland. As 
suggested by Espeland and Sauder (2007, 36), ‘once accountability is understood quantitatively and is 
equated with good governance, the meanings of  many core values—efficiency, improvement, accessibility, 
transparency, responsibility, responsiveness, and even democracy—are redefined and reinscribed in our 
institutions as technical rather than political accomplishments’.  
 
At the same time, tools created have also been object of  numerous critiques and debates and challenged by 
the ‘practice of  politics’ (T. M. Li 2007). Rather than purely technical-methodological debates, these can be 
seen as openings for a range of  publics to dispute development cooperation policies and practices. Debates 
allowed for different sociotechnical conceptions about how accountability mechanisms work in practice to 
emerge, but also for deep divergences on development and aid policies and practices to be vocalised, in at 
least three ways. First, Southern governments, as ‘aid recipients’, grew increasingly critical of  the 
‘Effectiveness Agenda’ and of  how overlapping accountability mechanisms were imposed on their 
bureaucracies creating heavy management burden (Hickey and Mohan 2008; Jensen and Winthereik 
2013).131 Tools were also criticised for being ‘technocratic artifacts’ (Laporte 2017), contributing to 
‘downgrading recipients’ and ‘abusing power’ (Laporte 2015; T. Kim and Lim 2017), or generating a ‘tower 
of  Babel’ and bypassing national accountability institutions and mechanisms on the ground (Namburete 
2018; Llanos 2019).  
 
Second, discontent has also grown within Aidland, not only because tools made some problems more visible 
but also because they generated other problems to the field. Discussing why accountability mechanisms 
‘fail’ allowed for politics to be brought back by critics within Aidland for instance when questioning the 
obsession with ‘accounting for aid rather than promoting accountable aid’ and with ‘building mechanisms’ 
 
130 See Chambers (2017) and Roy (2015) on the concept of poverty; Ferguson (1994) and Swyngedouw (2013) on World 
Bank and UN reports; Fukuda-Parr (2016) on the politics of goals setting for the MDGs; and Fukuda‐Parr and McNeill 2019 




rather than making sense of aid as a set of (political) relations between different partners and constituencies 
(Eyben 2008; Hickey and Mohan 2008; Gaventa and McGee 2013). Politics was equally reinserted when 
practitioners became more aware of the effects programming, projecting and assessing had on donor-
recipient accountability and trust relations between countries (Gulrajani and Faure 2019). Lastly, re-
politicisation is also seen in the questioning around how the ‘reformed aid paradigm’ created new forms of 
audit control and generated new infrastructures that could not deliver on the expected horizontal and trust 
relationships (Swedlund 2017; Namburete 2018).  
 
Third, politics was reinfused at a practice-level. As Espeland and Sauder (2007) argue, quantitative measures 
produce reflexivity on actors themselves and encourage them to question their faith in the ‘objectivity of 
numbers’ (Porter 1996). For some aid practitioners, reflections also meant questioning their own faith in 
the aid industry, displaying growing signs of discomfort with Aidland’s measuring and documentation 
practices (that count rather than account results and/or overclaim impact)132 and with the organisational 
consequences of these (crowding out learning and adaptation, including learning from failure) (Riddell 2007; 
Laporte 2015; Honig and Gulrajani 2018).133  
 
In sum, despite its many embedded tensions, both reforms and tools have opened the space for different 
actors and publics to re-politicise development cooperation policies, practices and relations. It offered 
‘Southern recipients’ the possibility to re-state longstanding claims on the shortcomings of the Washington 
Consensus agenda and on the asymmetries of North-South cooperation. It also made possible, in some 
cases, to reengage the very idea of partnerships and renegotiate some of the aid terms, along the principles 
of ownership and donors’ alignment to national priorities.134 It finally offered domestic constituencies (and 
civil society groups in both Northern donors and Southern recipients) possibilities to use the information 
generated through transparency infrastructures to push for reforms and claim citizenship, voicing concerns 
about domestic and foreign policies priorities and disputing the meaning of development and development 
cooperation. This is a point to which I will return when discussing SSC accountability-related social 
mobilisation in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
132 Eyben and Guijt (2015) have once characterised these documentation practices as ‘counting beans’ and generating 
‘sausage numbers’. The former relates to the over-bureaucratisation of the development cooperation activity and the ways 
in which organisations and their staff are trapped into chains of counting, reporting, producing information to the visible 
and imagined users of ‘transparency and accountability infrastructures’ and doing less of the proper development-related 
work. While the latter is about current measurement regimes, often based on measuring performance for control rather 
than learning, creating incentives to focus on what can be counted (measurable) not on everything that counts (including 
complex and unmeasurable things). 
133 See Devex ‘What Went Wrong?’ project as an attempt, available at https://devex.shorthandstories.com/what-went-
wrong/ (last access: 27/07/2020). 
134 Winthereik and Jensen (2013) account of Vietnam and Denmark is one example of those re-negotiated terms, also 
Laporte (2017) on Laos and the ways in which the government developed, in 2006, a local version of the Paris Declaration, 
the Vietiene Declaration, to coordinate donors’ efforts in the country. 
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Accountability in South-South cooperation as a problem 
 
 
In the early 2000s, not only was Aidland trying to reform itself but also SSC (re)entered the scene and 
brought new elements to this equation. Several observers conceived the ‘crisis in Aidland’ as an important 
factor for the emergence and ‘initial success’ of a Southern-led development cooperation paradigm (Esteves 
and Assunção 2014; M. Chakrabarti 2016; Muhr 2016; Mawdsley 2019). Indeed, SSC providers used the 
wave of aid reforms to sustain their own ‘bid to difference’. Up to a certain point, SSC was perceived or 
portraited as having a higher moral ground because aid was failing and because SSC providers were 
proposing alternatives (S. Kim and Lightfoot 2011; Zoccal and Esteves 2018).  
 
Embedded in a competitive and heavily measured and audited landscape, the growing visibility and political 
significance of SSC also started to generate its own forms of accountability debates and disputes. In this 
context, I argue, both the existing norms and ways of practicing ‘aid accountability’ and the unfolding 
North-South politics are important shapers of the set of global geopolitical and knowledge disputes around 
SSC accountability that emerged in the mid-2000s. Problematisations of accountability in/of SSC came first 
and foremost from traditional donors and from Aidland practitioners. As SSC flows continued to rise, 
however, SSC accountability also became the object of different sorts of social-political problematisation 
by stakeholders in the South: including knowledge actors, CSOs within rising powers, and, more recently, 
other Southern governments and their domestic publics.  
 
Transparency and ‘heterodox practices’ as problems  
 
While rising powers have been historically vocal in exposing donors’ accountability deficits and questioning 
their accountability tools, in the early 2000s, large Southern providers also became the object of 
accountability calls. In this context, I contend, SSC accountability deficits became problematic for many in 
Aidland in two inter-related ways: first, SSC transparency deficits and, second, Southern providers’ 
‘heterodox practices’.135  
 
In the context of increased material and symbolic competition between Northern and Southern providers 
and renewed pushes for mobilising resources to meet the SDGs, SSC transparency started to emerge as a 
problem for policymakers from DAC donors and for existing ‘aid monitoring movements’. Absences were 
identified in the availability of data on the total quantum of SSC flows, on the exact nature of flows and on 
SSC performance and impacts on the ground (Di Ciommo 2017; Besharati 2018). In a 2014 report entitled 
 
135 Here I borrow the expression from Cesarino (2013, 17) to whom an example of negative assessment of emerging 
donors by those who stand by development aid would be that ‘through their heterodox and unaccountable practices, new 
donors would be jeopardizing the good work achieved by traditional aid thus far’. 
67 
 
‘Non-DAC Countries and the Debate on Measuring Post-2015 Development Finance’, the OECD put the issue as 
follows:  
 
The increasingly important role of emerging donors’ is a phrase frequently seen in publications on development co-
operation over recent years. There remain, however, few reliable data to show the extent to which it is a reality. This 
‘evidence deficit’ is broadly recognised as a challenge that needs to be addressed. (OECD 2014, 2).  
 
The same report indicated that data collection efforts on SSC failed ‘to capture annual, comparable and 
validated monetised information on development co-operation by bilateral providers. This information is 
available whenever non-DAC providers report their data to the OECD’ (ibid, 4). Aid watchdogs, like 
PWYF, also extended their transparency concerns to ‘emerging donors’, as illustrated in this op-ed: 
 
Unfortunately, the transparency of these emerging donors has lagged behind their budgets. Why does this matter? 
Not just because transparency has been agreed as an international principle, though it has, but because publishing 
comprehensive, timely and comparable information on aid and development finance is essential to making development 
more effective. This is true whether we are talking about north-south aid, south-south cooperation or any other kind 
of international assistance. (Simons 2017). 
 
As the two extracts reveal, SSC transparency was becoming problematic to those in Aidland for at least 
three reasons. First, because SSC providers were not reporting to external bodies (e.g., the DAC or IATI) 
due to non-membership and acknowledged rejection of their hegemony and metrics. Second, due to the 
‘blurred’ lines of South-South development flows and the high share of in-kind cooperation and non-
monetary cooperation flows, which were methodologically and politically difficult to account through ODA 
metrics (see Chapter 4). Third, because accounting systems in Southern providers neither recorded nor 
publicised certain development cooperation flows, due to lack of political will, technical capacity, or due to 
the absence of national (open)data transparency policies.  
 
Considering the triple role transparency plays in ODA (as an international ‘soft law’, a ‘best practice’ for 
development organisations and a governing tool), there are two ways to situate the emergence of 
transparency calls directed to Southern providers. First, as an extension of DAC ‘club dynamics’ to the 
‘newcomers’, as happened with South Korea and with the Eastern European countries in the mid-2000s. 
Integrating Southern providers became even more crucial after 2015, in light of the renewed calls for robust 
measurement tools, enhanced statistical systems and open data for development to assist tracking ‘the 
trillions of dollars’ needed to achieve the SDGs (Esteves 2017). Second, as a product of the anxieties within 
Aidland and a urge to know and discipline Southern providers, where ‘lack of transparency’ worked as a 
stigmatising discourse. Under this script, SSC data ‘scarcity’ acted as the broken mirror of (a real or 
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imagined) ODA data ‘abundance’ in the North, matching and reinforcing negative descriptions of SSC 
landscapes as ‘poorly institutionalised’ and of Southern partners as ‘opaque’.  
 
Hence, finding ways to conceptualise and measure SSC, both quantifying and evaluating it, were the logical 
solution ‘to fix’ the SSC transparency problem and bring Southern providers closer to ‘donorship’ practices: 
not only measurement-related but also to the broader set of standards and expectations on donor behaviour, 
including untying aid, targeting poverty alleviation, respecting a minimum set of socio-environmental 
standards, mainstreaming gender issues and promoting local participation (Bräutigam 2009; Paulo and 
Reisen 2010; Xiaoyun and Carey 2014; Laporte 2017). The problematisation of SSC ‘heterodox practices’ 
became visible in both bilateral donors and UN agencies strategic dialogues with large Southern providers 
to support (and socialise) them into being ‘proper donors’. An example can be found in UK’s Emerging 
Powers Strategy, approved in July 2015 (now superseded), which attempted to work with Brazil, China, 
India, and others to: 
 
i) making [their] development assistance more effective; ii) enhancing the development impact of [their] investment 
in poorer countries and regions; iii) responding better to global challenges and iv) working towards an international 
system that reflects the needs of poor countries. (DFID 2017b).  
 
The ways SSC transparency and ‘heterodox practices’ have been problematised contributed to discursively 
produce contrasting comparisons with how accountability is thought of and (perceived as) practiced by 
DAC members. Taking Southern providers as unaccomplished copies of DAC donors, deficit discourses 
contributed, intentionally or not, to Othering them: as incomplete, not-quite-yet, or ‘deviant from the DAC 
ideal-type’ (Lauria and Fumagalli 2019). Othering operated as means to control, socialise and integrate 
Southern providers, repeating the disciplining modus operandi of the DAC. While open pressure on (and 
stigmatising of) rising powers, and in particular China, have been common practices among governments 
and experts in Aidland since the early 2000s (Mawdsley 2018a), overt ‘co-optation’ practices (Abdenur and 
Da Fonseca 2013) coexisted, nonetheless, with more subtle discursive formulations. This includes 
discourses by Aidland practitioners I often heard along the lines of ‘We don’t understand much about SSC’ 
or ‘We don’t fully know what SSC is, what is inside this label, what exactly SSC providers do’.136 Othering 
dynamics have, nonetheless, produced their own forms of responses from SSC providers, generating acts 
of internalised stigmatisation and non-compliance or ‘compliance with resentment’ (Zarakol 2014) with 
formal accountability norms and expectations. These are visible, as I will show shortly and in Chapter 4, 
when Southern governmental voices, particularly in rising powers, opposed to this presumed ‘normalcy’ 
and called for ‘Southern ways’ to measure and report their development cooperation.    
 
 
136 An example of that can be seen in this UK-based Overseas Development Institute debate with at the time incoming DAC 
Chair Susanna Moorehead, available https://www.odi.org/events/4613-odi-conversation-dac-chair-susanna-moorehead 
(last access: 28/07/2020). 
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The Dragon in the room  
 
While deficit concerns targeted all Southern providers, China has been particularly singled out. Besides the 
more openly anti-China criticism from the early days (e.g. Collier 2008; Naím 2009),137 other deficit framings 
include China’s ‘rejection’ of the transparency goal or norm (Honig and Weaver 2019), China’s government 
‘lack of will’ to publish comprehensive data on foreign aid due to domestic concerns (Gu, Chen and Haibin 
2016; D. Zhang 2017; UNDP China 2017; Liao et al. 2018), and China’s ‘alternative aid model’ creating 
conceptual and practical challenges to transparency (Paulo and Reisen 2010).  
 
Transparency concerns also show how knowing and controlling China, particularly in Africa, have grown 
as interlocked processes. Africanists were among the early formulators of the ‘China data problem’, since 
they encountered China when studying development in Africa and ‘have identified data reliability as a major 
impediment for assessing the magnitude and significance of these flows’ (Sears 2019, 139). Quickly, tracking 
China’s aid and other development finance flows became a contested field of research (Milani 2019). The 
epistemic problem was not only to understand the phenomenon and its implications to African 
development, but also to compare it (with traditional donors and with other rising powers), which often 
led to a plethora of propositions of how to count Chinese flows and to both overcounting or undercounting 
dynamics (see Chapter 4 and 6).138   
 
China has also been the omnipresent case for the remaining normative discussions. Here the accountability 
problem was framed in terms of ‘development impact’ or ‘effectiveness’, with ‘China’s accountability 
deficits’ serving as a discursive umbrella for concerns ranging from ‘normative deviance’, ‘rogue aid 
practices’ or the potential ‘negative impacts’ of Chinese engagements on the ground on issues such as 
democracy, human rights and governance, labour standards, debt and socio-environmental sustainability 
(Bräutigam 2009; Paulo and Reisen 2010; Mohan 2014). Concretely, these concerns led to a rise in strategic 
dialogues and negotiations between ‘traditional’ donors and China over the inclusion of socio-
environmental safeguards in China’s overseas investments, including during the creation of the Asia 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and in the Green Belt and Road Initiative (Green BRI).139  
 
Certain concerns with socio-environmental and human rights impacts of SSC on local communities 
thematically converged with INGOs and Southern-based CSOs own problematisations of SSC 
 
137 Collier (2008) argues that China has different ‘ethical foundations for its operations` and thus could not be expected to 
join global transparency initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. Cultural and/or regime differences 
between China and the ‘liberal West’ have been a recurrent trope in global normative discussions. For an extensive 
critique, see Bräutigam (2009). 
138 A similar rendition of this urge to understand Chinese flows is found in the case of BRI and the challenges outsiders find 
in making sense of which projects fall inside the ‘BRI umbrella’ and which does not. 
139 During AIIB set-up phase European countries wishing to join the China-initiated financial institution have insisted on the 
need for AIIB to adopt classic ‘do-no-harm’ principles and tools, present in virtually all the multilateral development banks, 
and put in place safeguards to avoid and/or compensate adverse social and environmental impacts (which the bank 
eventually did, although in a hybrid and innovative way) (Vazquez and Chin 2019).    
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accountability, not only regarding China but for all rising powers (Pomeroy et al. 2016; Poskitt, Shankland 
and Taela 2016; Thompson and Wet 2018; Yeophantong 2020). This alignment engendered different forms 
of collaboration between traditional development actors, INGOs and Southern CSOs on transparency and 
socio-environmental issues. Support from traditional development actors to Southern CSOs came either 
through aid budgets or through Northern-based foundations and INGOs grants to local actors to research 
and watchdog SSC providers, with great emphasis on BRICS-related development cooperation with Africa 
and the BRICS-led NDB. Among the main foundations and INGOs one finds German party and political 
foundations (Heinrich Böll, Rosa Luxemburg and Friedrich-Ebert), Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, 
Mott Foundation, The Asia Foundation, the Oxfam Confederation, Action Aid, Greenpeace, WWF, and 
many more.140 Several of these partnerships also adopted the broad topic of accountability in/of SSC as a 
major agenda.141 
 
CSOs based in rising power have therefore participated in constructing the ‘SSC accountability problem’, 
either independently or partnering with actors in the development apparatus. They entered existing ‘aid 
monitoring movements’ and/or contributed to the integration of SSC as a topic into existing networks and 
tools, exemplified by AidData database on China or the listing of Southern providers in PWYF and Reality 
of Aid reports (Reality of Aid Project 2010; Publish What You Fund 2017). While embedded in broader 
global discussions and networks, their problematisation of SSC accountability, ‘from within and from 
below’, was done in their own terms, as national CSOs in rising powers perceived ‘SSC accountability 
deficits’ as obstacles for their own policy and political engagement with the agenda, as I will discuss in 
Chapter 7. 
 
Calls for accountability and Southern providers’ differentiation claims: resistance, reluctance and innovation 
 
How did rising powers responded to the growing concerns with SSC accountability coming from this 
plethora of external actors? I start unpacking this question here, arguing that, while upholding strong 
differentiation claims vis-à-vis ODA and the DAC, rising powers transitioned in the 2010s from an openly 
critical-resistance position on issues of accountability to a critical-innovation approach to the topic. The 
following chapters will substantiate this claim discussing rising powers’ diplomatic and para-diplomatic 
 
140 As an example, under its portfolio on ‘transforming development finance’, the Mott Foundation has provided grants for 
a range of CSOs and academic institutions based in both Northern and Southern countries, mostly to work on Brazil and 
China’s development finance. See https://www.mott.org/work/environment/finance/ (last access: 19/10/2020). 
141 The Oxfam-Gates ‘Leaders Empowered to Alleviate Poverty - LEAP’ project, carried out by the Oxfam branches in Brazil, 
India, and Hong Kong until 2018 in partnership with national CSOs in rising powers, is an example of this kind of 
collaboration to shape SSC transparency and accountability policies and practices, with a particular attention to Southern 
development cooperation agencies and development finance practices. Oxfam work also included countries like Mexico, 
South Africa, and Turkey (INT-OSS-5; INT-OSS-5). Among its expected outcomes, the Oxfam-Gates LEAP project featured 
the following goals: ‘Government development cooperation agencies in target BRICSAMIT countries have put in place 
policies on transparency and are governed by them’ and ‘Improved accountability policies and practices have been put in 
place and are implemented by the governmental development cooperation agencies of target BRICSAMIT countries’. The 
referred project outcomes are available in internal Oxfam-Gates LEAP documents the author had access to. 
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stances regarding global SSC measurement debates (Chapter 4) and the negotiations over accountability 
and over experimenting with SSC transparency and accountability at the domestic level in Brazil, China and 
India (Chapters 5 and 6).      
 
Contrasting with the explicit interest of traditional development actors and civil society groups on SSC 
accountability, the topic took longer to become (or be perceived as) problematic for governments in the 
South. During the early 2000s, the issue was largely absent from the main Southern-led development-related 
policy and dialogue spaces (including UNCTAD, The South Centre or the G77+China coalition at the 
UN). As mentioned, SSC was also a blind-spot in the OECD-led ‘Effectiveness Agenda’, which received 
the (critical) support of several Southern countries, as ‘aid recipients’, perhaps because the ‘accountability 
problem’ there was framed as a North-South ‘aid-related’ issue.  
 
The first formal mention of accountability in a SSC intergovernmental document is found in the 2009 
Nairobi Outcome Document, agreed upon during the First High-Level UN Conference on South-South 
Cooperation (see Chapter 4).142 Yet at the time many within SSC-land perceived the accountability issue as 
either ‘undesirable’ or ‘too sensitive’. Diplomatic and para-diplomatic reluctance, or even resistance, relied 
on a set of reasonings such as: ‘Accountability is a Northern-aid problem’, ‘SSC is horizontal and demand-
driven and thus automatically (more) accountable to partners’, ‘SSC is a solidarity-based endeavour and 
does not rely on obligations, such as conditionalities or mutual accountability’ and/or ‘OECD-led 
accountability mechanisms cannot be operationalised in SSC’.  
 
These defensive narratives were, and remain, omnipresent in SSC-land debates on accountability. I illustrate 
this point with a short vignette from a 2017 multi-stakeholder policy dialogue on monitoring and evaluation 
organised by two Brazilian think-tanks, BRICS Policy Centre (BPC) and Articulação SUL, together with the 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC).143 The meeting fed into ongoing internal reflexions within ABC that 
led to a publication of a road map to support further institutional developments on SSC measurement in 
Brazil (BPC/ASUL 2017; also Chapter 5).144 At one point, one Southern expert intervened stating that SSC 
was ‘extremely accountable and transparent’, clarifying that these were, nonetheless, ‘OECD concepts’. The 
expert carried on and engaged with a previous provocation from a CSO representative in the room about 
whose demands counts in SSC stating that: ‘We should respect elected governments demands’. He further 
emphasised that SSC accountability: ‘Is already there’ when Southern countries accept to engage in SSC 
efforts. Adding: ‘If we were not helping, they would be throwing us out’, making sure to state that his 
 
142 The Nairobi conference was held to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the 1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA). 
Esteves (2018) highlight, however, that BAPA recommendations numbers 3 to 5 did emphasise the need for evidence, even 
if had no mention of ‘accountability’ per se. 
143 For an overview on BPC-led Dialogues on South-South Cooperation, see 
https://bricspolicycenter.org/en/projetos/south-south-cooperation-dialogues/ (last access: 04/09/2020). This Dialogue and 
the following one in 2018 were organised with the financial support of the UK, among other sponsors (DFID 2017b). 
144 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-44. 
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country has always been welcomed. He concluded the intervention stating that, in sum, accountability ‘is 
there’ and effectiveness ‘is also there’.  
 
The vignette and the narratives mentioned above illuminate the range of resistance to and engagement with 
the topic by representatives of rising powers and/or their development experts, both embracing and 
rejecting effectiveness and accountability language. On the one hand, these are discursive elements that 
show how accountability was not initially rendered a problem in Southern countries’ diplomatic and para-
diplomatic stances. On the other hand, they further highlight the role played by differentiation claims about 
SSC in underpinning Southern governments (from rising powers and beyond) initial, and in some cases 
persistent, opposition to operationalise accountability in SSC.  
 
Differentiation claims are embedded in (existing, perceived or even performed) normative, conceptual, 
methodological and institutional differences between Southern providers and DAC donors, and between 
SSC and ODA.145 Differentiation applies to SSC as a collective enterprise, portrayed as accountable by the 
virtue of its horizontal and demand-driven nature (e.g., T. Kim and Lim 2017). It also applies to rising 
powers themselves in what they framed as their ‘non-hypocritical’ (Six 2009), ‘responsible’ (Chaturvedi 
2012), or ‘exceptionally benign’ partnerships (Chanana 2009; Dye and Alencastro 2020). Furthermore, 
Southern providers positioned themselves not only as different from traditional donors but also a diverse 
group of countries. Brazil (and other Latin American countries) differentiated themselves from the ‘Asian 
powers’ and both Brazil and India portrayed themselves as different from perceived ‘Chinese model’ and 
‘ways of working’. India, in particular, systematically defined its global identity in opposition to China, often 
emphasising its democratic credentials and rule-based global development engagements.146 This is visible 
in an official press release by India’s MEA on country’s no-participation in China’s-led BRI, which reads:  
 
We are of firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally recognized international norms, good 
governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality. Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of 
financial responsibility to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities; balanced 
ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards; transparent assessment of project costs; and skill 
and technology transfer to help long term running and maintenance of the assets created by local communities. 
Connectivity projects must be pursued in a manner that respects sovereignty and territorial integrity. (GoI/MEA 
2017). 
  
India’s positioning as a ‘responsible connectivity partner/builder’—implicitly distancing itself from 
China—is increasingly present in official discourses, including during the UN BAPA+40 Conference (see 
 
145 As mentioned in Chapter 1, differentiation claims have been widely studied in SSC scholarship, in both conceptually and 
empirically-rich ways (see, inter alia, Cesarino 2013; Milani and Duarte 2015; Laporte 2017; Taela 2017; Zoccal and Esteves 
2018; Doucette 2020; Cheng 2020). 
146 INT-IN-1; INT-IN-7; INT-IN-20. 
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Chapter 4).147 Differentiation vis-à-vis China, and eventually ‘Othering China from the South’ (Mawdsley 
2014b, 974), brings additional elements into the (geo)politics of SSC accountability, particularly in the Indian 
case. Experts and diplomats’ allusion to India’s democratic and international law-abiding credentials serves, 
therefore, as an instrumental diplomatic tool to position a ‘democratic’/‘responsible’ India as different from 
(and better than) the neighbouring ‘authoritarian’/‘irresponsible’ China, while investing little at home to 
put in place accountability instruments in its own SSC compact, as shown in Chapter 6.    
 
How to understand differentiation-based reluctance and/or resistance stances in SSC-land to engage with 
accountability issues? Here I suggest four dimensions to be taken into consideration. First, stances are to 
be located in Southern countries’ (rising powers or not) historical distrust of the ‘aid accountability agenda’ 
and its many contradictions, as discussed above. Second, stances reflect rising powers’ own unwillingness 
to abide by norms and practices they were not invited to draft; their growing global reformist ambitions; 
and unwillingness to adopt standards that generate extra justification pressures on their conduct or limit 
their autonomy to use SSC as a multidimensional policy instrument (one that fosters soft power, foreign 
policy, trade, strategic goals and beyond). 
  
Third, as mentioned in Chapter 1, large SSC providers’ diplomatic stances are strongly informed by the 
dilemmas and anxieties of their position in international social rankings—simultaneously renegotiating their 
own rising power status and subalternity—and by the fragility of their ‘dual position’148 as developing-and-
rising and providers-while-still-recipients (van der Westhuizen and Milani 2019; Santos, Siman and 
Fernández 2019). According to one Brazilian development expert, the very idea of reporting on SSC flows 
was initially received with caution by the highest Brazilian authorities who feared that showcasing country’s 
role as a ‘provider’ would negatively impact on country’s flows of received cooperation.149   
 
Fourth, reluctance stances rising powers’ multi-layered views and approaches on global responsibilities. 
Rising powers are strong and vocal defenders of the idea of the ‘historical debt’ industrialised countries 
have with poorer nations in the South and the development-related responsibilities they entail (Besharati 
2013; Bracho 2017; Esteves et al. 2019). They have equally avoided portraying themselves as ‘fully 
developed’ and completely ‘mature’ or ‘ready’ to take on greater global responsibilities, what Santos, Siman 
 
147 In the BAPA+40 statement, the Indian ambassador to the conference stated that: ‘All [Indian] projects follow universally 
recognized norms. They do not create unsustainable debt burdens’ (GoI/MEA 2019). Similar arguments are found in the 
Indian Foreign Secretary address in the 2018 Regional Connectivity Conference: South Asia in the Indo-Pacific Context 
where he stated that ‘connectivity efforts in the region must be based on principles of economic viability and financial 
responsibility. They should promote economic activity and not place nations under irredeemable debt burden. All 
connectivity initiatives must follow universally recognized international norms, rule of law, openness, transparency and 
equality. Incorporation of ecological and environmental standards and skill and technology transfer makes connectivity and 
infrastructure sustainable in the long term’. (GoI/MEA 2018). 
148 On the dual position in the Latin American context, see Medina and Muñoz (2019). 
149 INT-BR-44. A discussion on the tensions of Brazilian dual recipient-provider role in the early 2000s, can be found in Leite 
et al. (2014). 
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and Fernández (2019) called a ‘Peter Pan Syndrome’.150 Across different policy issues, rising powers have 
carefully selected the responsibilities they wished to take on and those they would rather relegate to 
developed countries. This is backed by a strict adherence to the Common But Differentiated Responsibility 
(CBDR) principle in environmental intergovernmental negotiations, brought to the development realm by 
the G77+China (Bukovansky et al. 2012; G77 2019b), and a reluctance to update it to what Esteves et al. 
(2019) call a ‘CBDR 2.0’ based on ‘concentric responsibilities’ where differentiation within the South would 
also apply. I will return to this issue in Chapter 8.   
 
For a long time, rising powers’ defensive stances found resonance among other Southern partners, as 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have also kept ‘accountability issues’ outside the global tables 
or behind closed doors. While the decision on the part of the other partner to problematise, or not, certain 
accountability issues is unique to each South-South partnership, here I indicate two important common 
factors. First, as mentioned earlier, low(er) income countries had their own critiques to the ‘aid 
accountability agenda’. Second, from a governmental perspective, both sides publicly upheld the official 
SSC narratives of solidarity and horizontality and the promises of non-conditional development 
cooperation and more equitable ‘win-win relationships’ that, at least to some elite groups brokering the 
agreements, could deliver mutual material and political gains (Mohan 2014; Horn 2018). Rather than calling 
for accountability in SSC, several Southern partners denounced the ‘double standards’ used against rising 
powers arguing the debate about them was often ‘partisan and paternalistic’ (Chenoy and Joshi 2016, 107) 
and that rising powers’ involvement (and ‘aid competition’ more broadly) was actually welcome (Kagame 
2009; S. Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2019).  
 
These dynamics help explaining why the topic was largely kept outside formal global diplomatic tables. It 
remained absent from the G77+China stances at the UN, strongly populated with ‘litigious’ language of 
‘tort and reparation’ (J. Ferguson 2002, 563).151 It also remained largely absent from UNDCF discussions 
and monitoring systems, since the focus of debates remained North-South mutual accountability (Ocampo 
and Arteaga 2014; Bracho 2017). Unlike DAC’s and GPEDC’s monitoring mechanisms—that include 
disaggregated, country-specific, data—UNDCF surveys on mutual accountability and transparency did not 




150 In a similar metaphorical way, Kenkel and Destradi (2019) characterise the issues as rising powers’ ‘ambivalent 
responses’ to the so-called Spiderman ethic that with great power comes great responsibilities. 
151 Here I use Ferguson’s discussions of African citizens’ individual calls for extended ‘membership’ in global society and 
apply it to African and other G77+China countries diplomatic language as well.  
152 At the time of this writing, it seems like the GPEDC is moving forward with its first ‘country-led pilots to assess the 
effectiveness of South-South Cooperation’. The countries that volunteered to take this exercise forward are Colombia, El 
Salvador, Rwanda, Indonesia and Myanmar. The researcher was given access to an unpublished, still under negotiation, 
version of the Concept Note for this exercise being led by the government of Colombia.  
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Notwithstanding its importance, this apparent acquiescence should not be overstated. Rather there are at 
least three ways to complexify the current notion of a ‘common Southern aversion’ to SSC accountability 
issues. First, the absence of explicit debates should be seen against the backdrop of (hidden) power dynamics 
within the South and the ways rising powers tended to speak ‘on behalf of the South’ in global arenas and 
set the agendas and the terms of the debate of their ‘benign/beneficial’ presence. Second, one has to 
consider the often overlooked but decisive agency in national governments and subnational actors in the 
other Southern partner and their own political calculations of whether/when to enter the public global 
blaming-game with their ‘brothers and sisters’ and whether/when to make large Southern providers comply 
with local regulations and/or international standards (Laporte 2017; Yeophantong 2020).153 Representatives 
from other Southern partners I encountered during fieldwork had many thoughts on ‘effectiveness’,  
‘mutual accountability’ or ‘reporting’ in SSC, which they shared, albeit cautiously and preferably in smaller 
‘discussion tables’, such as in the course of policy dialogues.154  
 
Second, while recognising the ‘performative function’ of SSC principles in obscuring power asymmetries 
within and across the South (Aneja 2018, 150), there are also signs that this tacit agreement might be 
changing in the more recent years. This is visible in policy spaces other than the more formal and/or larger 
global ‘tables’. In Africa, the African Union has made explicit its will to bring ‘emerging donors/partners’ 
and their actions into greater alignment with Africa’s Agenda 2063 (Six 2009; Alden 2019).155 Certain 
accountability-related debates also became more frequent at the national level with the increasing domestic 
politicisation of South-South relations with rising powers, mainly China but also Brazil in the case of 
Mozambique and Angola. In Zambia, Kenya and Nigeria, for instance, incumbents and opponents have, in 
the past years,  increasingly discussed their relations with China in political and electoral debates, something 
that became even more visible in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic (The China Africa Project 2019a; 
2019b; 2020).156  
 
 
153 In the case of China’s loans, for instance, Grimm et al. (2011, 22) argued that ‘information could be provided by 
borrowing governments, who, it seems, prefer not to publish the details of their Chinese deals’. Recent research on Indian 
dam-building in Africa, through Exim Bank LOCs, and other development finance arrangements in neighbouring countries, 
like Nepal, provide initial insights (and a fertile ground for further exploration) into the increased agency by national and 
local governments in negotiating with Indian SSC bureaucracies and contractors the adoption of certain socio-
environmental international standards (personal communication with Udisha Saklani, 2020). 
154 In one of these ‘tables’ I attended, a Mozambican diplomat framed the issue as follows: “From a Mozambican 
perspective there are both global and national accountability challenges. At the global level, lack of data on SSC and lack of 
reporting SSC flows in a systematic way. This engenders a risk of not considering lessons learned with traditional aid. 
Nationally, Mozambique has a database with aid flows, fed by traditional partners. But Southern partners do not contribute 
to those same databases”. These views are also present in interviews done with a range of SSC practitioners in the context 
of project evaluations I took part in the last years (ASUL/Move 2017; ASUL 2020). 
155 The UN Office of the Special Adviser on Africa has also been active in promoting this debate, issuing publications and 
hosting meetings on alignment of ‘new and emerging development partners’ to SDGs in Africa and to Africa’s Agenda 2063 
(OSAA 2010; OSSA and NEPAD 2015; INT-OSS-11). 
156 Covid-19 provides a recent example of more assertive diplomatic stances by African government leaders and politicians, 
with renewed demonstrations of public discontent with China’s treatment of African nationals during the outbreak and 
calls for renegotiation of African public debts with Beijing. Some analysts even referred to the current unprecedent 
successive diplomatic friction as ‘the end of the China-Africa honeymoon’ (Marks 2020; The China Africa Project 2020). 
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Third, going deeper into subnational politics, breaches ‘from within’ in the initial consensus can be seen in 
the growing civil society activism taking place across Southern countries. Examples include the cross-
regional civil society campaign ‘No to ProSavana campaign’ to halt this triangular agriculture development 
programme involving Brazil, Japan and Mozambique or the less impactful transnational mobilisation against 
land-grabbing by Indian companies in Ethiopia. Transnational social mobilisation, with variable rates of 
success including some stalled projects, also took place around Chinese infrastructure building, including 
anti-dam mobilisation in the Mekong region and legal/para-legal activism around a logistical-development 
corridor in Lamu, Kenya, as I will discuss in Chapter 7.157 All together these examples contribute to 
nuancing the diplomatic ‘silence or acquiescence’ in global arenas and point to other forms of accountability 
politics that can expand in the years to come.  
 
As accountability was de facto inserted in the agenda, either against the will or with little support of rising 
powers, their defensive positions slowly started to coexist with an openness to engage with certain aspects 
of the topic, notably its counting and managerial dimensions, in critical yet innovative ways. Relying once 
more on differentiation arguments, a set of knowledge, policy and institutional accountability innovations 
started to populate SSC policy and academic circles. The paper by T. Kim and Lim (2017) on ‘soft 
accountability’ for ‘unlikely SSC settings’, discussed in Chapter 1, coincides with this surge in policy debates, 
experimentations and customisations of accountability mechanisms to SSC in a clear sign of Southern 
academics’ participation in the construction of differentiation narratives around SSC accountability (as they 
did with SSC differentiation narratives in the early days).  
 
At the diplomatic and para-diplomatic level, oppositional narratives were joined by more conciliatory 
discourses and strategies. The year of 2013 is a landmark in the creation of new policy spaces where 
Southern governmental and knowledge actors could meet and discuss SSC norms, institutions and 
practices.158 Among the new fora one finds the Core Group of Southern Partners within ECOSOC, the 
first Delhi Process (a political-academic dialogue on SSC hosted by the Indian quasi-governmental think 
 
157 Digital activism is another growing form of social mobilisation and subnational politics happening in and around SSC. A 
very recent example is found in the public outrage over mistreatment of Africans in China during the Covid-19 pandemic 
and its unprecedent (and still unfolding) ramifications in terms of transnational civil society, parliamentary and diplomatic 
mobilisation across Africa to denounce a perceived unfairness and exploitation in China-Africa relations (Change.org 2020; 
The China Africa Project 2020). 
158 The surge in initiatives around 2013 can be also see as a response from certain large SSC providers, including Brazil, 
China and India (and a sign of their discomfort) to the growing attempts from the OECD to create an ‘equator-less’ 
universal partnership for global development, the GPEDC, formally constituted in 2012.  
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tank RIS),159 and the creation of the Network of Southern Think Tanks (NeST), gathering scholars from 
Brazil, India, China, South Africa and Mexico.160 
  
These new spaces contributed to a shift during the course of the 2010s whereby differentiation as a 
defensive strategy started to coexist with another approach: differentiated integration.161 Similar to what 
Leveringhaus and Estrada (2018) characterised as India and China’s ‘innovation strategies’ in the nuclear 
regime, this approach seeks a compromise between harmonisation and resistance and echoes recognition, 
autonomy and status-seeking strategies by rising powers. Through differentiated integration, I contend, 
Brazil, China and India sought for a certain degree of convergence with the DAC-led normative order 
while, at the same time, projected their alternative identities both as Southern partners and as rising powers. 
Characterising rising powers’ behaviour as manifestations of their will to integrate differently helps 
understanding rising powers’ subsequent engagement and active promotion of diplomatic and knowledge 
battles over accountability, and notably over measurement, and their shift from openly stated blockages to 
alternative forms of contestation based on a set of ‘doing our way’ practices. 
 
Several development actors within Aidland, through participating in these same battles and negotiating SSC 
accountability with Southern actors, have also come to accept that SSC accountability could be thought and 
done differently. Mutual socialisation, as observed by IR scholars across several international policy 
domains, is happening within triangular development cooperation where Southern providers and 
‘traditional’ donors have been experimenting other ways of doing and evaluating SSC (see Chapters 4 and 
5). Mutual socialisation, and even ‘Southernisation’, is also occurring within the OECD-DAC reporting 
system, for instance when new and/or smaller European donors (whose ‘donor identity’ is often closer to 
Latin Americans than to major DAC donors) chose to report technical cooperation along Southern 
providers’ lines.162 However, despite a growing shared recognition of the need to practice accountability in 
a ‘SSC-appropriate way’, the debate remained fractured over lines of accountability to be prioritised, the 
nature of certain SSC providers and their cooperation modalities, and over common and differentiated 
norms and tools to do/perform accountability, making measurement, among all coexisting 
problematisations, a major global battlefield, as I will show in the next chapter. 
 
159 The Delhi Process was set-up in 2013 as a ‘track-two’ diplomacy space, hosted by RIS, for Southern knowledge and 
policy actors to exchange views on SSC. Since its inception, representatives from certain international organisations and 
from ‘like-minded’ institutions based in Northern donors (including the German DiE, UNOSSC and the OECD Development 
Centre) have been invited, albeit they remained a minority. After six editions, the Delhi Process has become one of the 
major global para-diplomatic spaces for debates around SSC, while being one convened and curated by one country: India. 
For more on the Delhi Process, see Chapters 4 and 6.  
160 Mexico representatives had initially no seat in global NeST steering committee although Mexican scholars have been 
active in the network since the beginning. This can be explained by the reservations expressed by other scholars during the 
founding negotiations regarding Mexican government own hybrid identities as a ‘Southern partner’ and its proximity with 
the OECD-DAC. Mexican scholars, together with Argentinian scholars, have, however, full visibility in the NeST LATAM 
chapter, created more recently in 2019 to host debates among countries from Latin America. 
161 The concept has been widely utilised in the context of the Europe Union integration. For a discussion on integration and 




Conclusion    
 
 
This chapter provided an historical and analytical account of how accountability became a substantial 
concern within Aidland and the ways different actors (donors, recipients, transnational civil society and 
domestic stakeholders) have understood and disputed the concept and how to practice it. In this account, 
I described how the rise of accountability—as a multi-layered and contested issue—has led throughout the 
2000s to multiple and overlapping reforms to improve aid practices and ‘fix’ aid relations that progressively 
converged into a managerial and efficiency understanding of ‘aid accountability’. In this prevailing 
construction, perceptions of accountability deficits in Southern recipients and aid organisations, and the 
global and domestic reforms they have entailed, have strongly responded to broader neoliberal policy 
management changes in donor countries. Reforms tried to ‘fix’ accountability through building mechanisms 
and tools to show or perform accountability to certain publics within donor countries, trumping 
accountability towards Southern partners, and often reducing accountability to counting aid flows and/or 
creating transparency infrastructures. However, and despite the prevalent technocratic-managerial 
approaches, I have also suggested the re-politicising effects of debates, reforms and tools, through creating 
openings and new political arenas to discuss and contest aid relations and their outcomes.  
 
Still on aid accountability, the chapter highlighted importance of the OECD-DAC and its institutional 
robustness for accountability norms and behaviour-setting in the field. While this backbone was historically 
backed by the US hegemony, and by the active role of large donors, such as the UK, it also created a fiction 
of DAC members’ full compliance with ‘donorship’ norms. This fiction is a key element in reinforcing a 
‘North-South divide’ when it comes to practicing development cooperation accountability. This divide 
hardens the boundaries of what accountability means and how is practiced by ‘traditional’ donors and 
creates a powerful discursive tool (for governments within Aidland and for a range of civil society groups 
in the South and elsewhere) to hold SSC practitioners to a set of, still internally contested, standards on 
how development providers should behave and justify their acts.       
 
Concerning the emerging problematisations of accountability in/of SSC, this chapter argued that growing 
concerns with transparency of SSC flows and with SSC providers’ compliance with ‘donorship’ norms are 
situated within broader and ongoing geopolitical disputes and negotiations between DAC donors and rising 
powers over their role, status and responsibilities in global affairs. It further suggested that other 
problematisations—including contestations of SSC initiatives on the ground by domestic actors and ‘aid 
monitoring movements’—have also emerged but remained less visible in global diplomatic arenas than 
issues related to large Southern providers’ harmonisation with ‘donorship’ norms, including measurement. 
Lastly, this chapter also started to unpack how in the last decade rising powers have changed from an open 
opposition to the issue of accountability in/of SSC to a will to discuss it in its own terms. The diplomatic 
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and para-diplomatic shift towards experimenting with conceptualising and practicing accountability in SSC, 
notably on measurement issues, not only challenges simplistic assumptions that rising powers are not 
interested or capable to integrate accountability in their development cooperation, but also reveals a range 
of ongoing geopolitical and domestic politics negotiations happening within and across large SSC providers 
like Brazil, China and India to carve their own differentiated integration in this field.
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4. From accountability to countability: South-South cooperation 




This chapter shows how measurement became a politically salient issue in global disputes over 
accountability in/of SSC. Examining unfolding sociotechnical-political battles over the quantification and 
reporting of SSC flows and over the assessment of SSC impact,163 this chapter locates contemporary SSC 
accountability politics within broader North-South (mutual) socialisation and differentiation dynamics as 
well as within knowledge and power dynamics current playing out in the development field.  
 
Using the 2019 UN BAPA+40 Conference, and the diplomatic and para-diplomatic negotiations taking 
place before and after the conference, I show emerging disputes over SSC accountability in global policy 
spaces as signs of the diplomatic reluctance and resistance of Southern providers—notably rising powers—
to be co-opted into existing ODA measurement norms, standards and practices. Unfolding negotiations, I 
posit, reveal a recent and growing agency by the governments of Brazil, China and India—but also 
knowledge actors in the three countries—to debate SSC measurement, so as to internationally showcase 
and stage ‘success’ and find alternative and more favourable ‘Southern-grown’ ways to practicing 
development cooperation accountability. Finally, I show how measurement debates, and even battles, have 
generated ‘measurement paradoxes’ to Southern providers. 
 
The chapter is divided as follows. The first section discusses how measurement of SSC has progressively 
occupied the centre of global debates, using the example of BAPA+40 as a microcosmos of unfolding 
disputes. The second section examines how rising powers, through differentiation strategies, have resisted, 
experimented and innovated in quantifying, reporting and assessing SSC. This section also shows how 
major SSC partners have created measurement tools with ‘Southern characteristics’ while navigating 
multiple measurement paradoxes. Finally, the third section places existing measurement politics in the 







163 Scholars and practitioners refer to ‘measurement’, ‘quantification’, ‘reporting’ and ‘monitoring and evaluation’ in 
different and often conflicting ways. Analytically, I have decided to use the term measurement as the broader category, as 
to account for this diversity of measuring debates in light of existing scholarship work on social measures, including in 
international development (see Chapter 1). I have also differentiated ‘quantification and reporting’ from ‘monitoring and 
evaluation’, as speaking to two separate but inter-related practices and debates currently unfolding in SSC.   
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From Nairobi to BAPA+40: how measurement entered the room   
 
 
As examined in Chapter 3, measuring aid is a defining feature of how accountability is practiced within 
Aidland. In the 2010s, as many Southern countries kept ‘moving up the development ladder’ and the Agenda 
2030 for ‘universal development’ was adopted, new measurement politics emerged: How to shift from 
‘income per capita’ and the ‘graduation models’ for measuring development and define who could/should 
benefit from development cooperation? How to reform the ODA concept and its metrics? How to account 
for private development finance? And, of particularly interest here, how to count development cooperation 
flows coming from ‘Non-DAC’ countries like Brazil, China and India? 
 
Nairobi and the birth of the measurement paradox 
 
The 2009 Nairobi outcome document is a useful starting point to investigate emerging SSC measurement 
politics. Far from just another UN ‘anodyne event’ (Gosovic 2009), the first UN High-Level Conference 
on South-South Cooperation, held in the Kenya in 2009, marks an important step in the consolidation of 
SSC agenda within the UN. In Nairobi, SSC narratives were updated to a (post) post-Cold War setting and 
to a global landscape marked by the MDGs agenda and by OECD-led agreements on effectiveness.164 
Nairobi reflected therefore these changes and the historically possible compromise between different 
constituencies, whose divergent views were quickly widening. 
 
The Nairobi agreement contains several of G77+China differentiation claims around SSC, stressing that 
SSC is ‘not a substitute for, but rather a complement to, North-South cooperation’ (UNGA 2009, para. 14). 
It introduces, nonetheless, an intra-South differentiation that echoed the increasingly self-evident gap 
between ‘small and large’ Southern partners and between ‘small and big SSC’ (Bracho 2017). In Nairobi, 
UN members ‘recognize[d] the solidarity of middle-income countries with other developing countries with 
a view to supporting their development efforts, including in the context of South-South and triangular 
cooperation’ (para. 7). As mentioned in Chapter 3, the document also featured for the first time issues of 
‘accountability’ and ‘development effectiveness’ in SSC (para. 18). This was followed by a paragraph on 






164 Anecdotally, it was only in 2003 that the UN General Assembly decided to replace the term ‘Technical Cooperation 
among Developing Countries – TCDC’ (used during throughout the Cold War) in favour of the broader concept of ‘South-
South Cooperation’ in all the UN system. 
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With the formal entry of accountability, effectiveness and measurement concerns in SSC inter-
governmental negotiations, Nairobi marks the first successful ‘attempt to introduce SSC partnerships into 
the “donorship doxa”’ (Zoccal and Esteves 2018, 135). This was, nonetheless, a modest attempt both in 
the language adopted (Pino 2014) and in light of the subsequent failure to unequivocally bring rising powers 
under the ‘Effectiveness Agenda’ tent. Rising powers never formally joined the ‘equator-less’ GPEDC, 
refrained from committing to any financial target for their SSC efforts, and remained sceptical about the 
efforts to devise new ‘universal’ metrics, such as TOSSD (Bracho 2017; Besharati 2017).  
 
Nonetheless, having ‘effectiveness language’ in Nairobi’s outcome document contributed to engender a 
measurement paradox that would accompany SSC in the next decade. The paradox goes as follows: on the one 
hand, measuring development cooperation can enable Southern providers to reduce the information gap 
around SSC and substantiate their claims that SSC is generating the development impact that traditional aid 
had largely failed to achieve.165 On the other, the need to measure creates a ‘trap’, a term I borrow from one 
interviewee, putting on Southern providers the burden to proof that SSC was not only different but also more 
 
165 Exemplifying this rationale, the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) portrays measurement of SSC as an 
opportunity to ‘validate the political discourse that proposes this method as a low-cost, direct-impact, effective, efficient 
and beneficial way for cooperation’ (PIFCSS 2016a cited in Escallón 2019). SEGIB is neither a purely Latin American nor a 
Southern international organisation since it includes the 22 countries that make up the ‘Ibero-American community’ (the 
19 Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries in Latin America and those of the Iberian Peninsula, Spain, Portugal and 
Andorra). See https://www.segib.org/en/who-we-are/ (last access: 21/10/2020).   
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effective than aid.166 As a trap, measurement also opens the very SSC political project to challenge, questioning 
the validity of its claims. As I heard from another development expert: ‘As a new modality and to be taken 
seriously, SSC needs to show evidence’.167 Ultimately, the measurement paradox not only inserts SSC into 
existing development evidence politics but does so in particular ways: adding an additional geopolitical 
layer. As framed by Besharati and MacFeely (2019, 4) in a UNCTAD policy brief: ‘SSC is no longer a side-
show. Better data is now required to accurately tell the story of South-South cooperation. If the global 
South doesn’t come up with its own definitions and measures, others (most likely in the North) will continue 
to produce most of the analysis around SSC’.  
 
The tensions generated by the measurement paradox only grew in the aftermath of Nairobi and as the 
debates on the Agenda 2030 progressed. Some practitioners in large Southern providers talked about ‘SSC 
contributions to the SDGs’ (Corrêa 2017; Waisbich, Silva and Suyama 2017), seeing SSC measurement in 
the context of SDGs’ total accounting as an opportunity to boost SSC ‘doxic battles’ (Esteves and Assunção 
2014). In this script, measurement served rising powers’ status-seeking and reputation-building strategies 
by showcasing their efforts, generosity and successes to international audiences. Concurrently, several in 
SSC-land also vocalised discomfort with the agenda, illustrated in narratives such as: ‘It makes no sense to 
discuss evaluation of SSC with ODA standards and tools’; ‘One cannot evaluate all dimensions of SSC, 
since SSC goes beyond grants and monetary transfers’; ‘Monitoring and evaluating SSC is burdensome to 
national bureaucracies, including in partners countries’; or ‘Monitoring and evaluating SSC is very expensive 
to small technical cooperation projects’ (see, for instance, Corrêa 2017; M. Chakrabarti 2018; Li 2018; 
UNESCAP 2019).  
 
These discourses highlight diplomats, practitioners and experts’ anxieties on at least four levels. First, with 
the need to measure and a fear measurement could underplay, and even undermine, the political dimension 
of SSC. Second, with applying ODA metrics and tools to measure a different form of development 
exchange: SSC. Third, with overly relying on financial quantification methodologies that could rank SSC 
providers ‘too low’ among development providers while revealing ‘too much’ information thus generating 
unwanted domestic pressure. Fourth, with the fact that, among all institutionalisation reforms, 
measurement was seldom a priority for often overburden and understaffed SSC bureaucracies.168  
 
Incentives and concerns with measurement played out simultaneously for Brazil, China and India. While 
the particular domestic manifestations will be examined in Chapters 5 and 6, here I engage with distinct 




168 INT-OSS-3; INT-IN-8; INT-IN-9; INT-CH-4. 
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In the next sub-section, I discuss the BAPA+40 Conference as a microcosmos and a ‘diagnosis event’169 
for these stances and for unfolding global disputes around measuring SSC.170 
 
‘It takes two to tango’: measurement battles in BAPA+40   
 
Between 2018-2019, eyes in SSC-land turned to the Second UN High-Level Conference on South-South 
Cooperation (or BAPA+40), held in Buenos Aires, in March 2019, to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the 
1978 Buenos Aires Plan of Action. In the road to BAPA+40, the convening UN body—the UNDP-
managed Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC)—presented as key conference goals the need to 
‘institutionalise’ and ‘revitalise’ SSC within the UN and to decisively link it to the SDGs agenda (UNGA 
2018). Aligned with these goals, the UN preparatory note highlighted the need to enhance ‘reporting on 
South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation on the national and regional levels on a voluntary basis 
and in accordance with their national capacities’ (ibid).  
 
In light of the broader North-South politics and the fragile state of UN multilateralism of the last decade 
(Zoccal 2020), the BAPA+40 outcome document was pre-negotiated in New York ahead of the actual 
high-level conference.171 The Argentinian government and UNOSSC led the negotiations in a cautious way, 
proposing a Zero Draft containing what was perceived as ‘non-controversial topics’, as framed by one 
interviewee: SSC scaling-up, institutionalisation and ‘best practices’.172 Measurement issues were explicitly 
left out from the initial draft. Having agreed on the document in New York, made the official meeting in 
Buenos Aires a celebration event and a networking space for those in SSC-land to showcase their interest 
and achievements with South-South and triangular cooperation.173 Alongside the official closed 3-day 
meeting, BAPA+40 featured 140 side-events open to the general public.174  
 
 
169 Similar analytical efforts have been conducted in other landmark global development meetings, namely the 2011 Busan 
Conference (Eyben and Savage 2013; Mawdsley, Savage and Sung-Mi 2014). For more of aid-related ‘diagnosis events’, see 
Jensen and Winthereik (2013).  
170 The reflections are based on discursive analysis of the ‘road towards BAPA+40’, with the preparatory events and 
meetings hosted from 2017 to 2019, the UN-documentation and other commentaries published on the matter, the 
conduct and debates at the meeting itself, the official outcome document (the BAPA+40 outcome document) and other 
meetings and analysis produced immediately after the BAPA+40, during the year of 2019. 
171 Negotiations took place within the UN General Assembly, in New York, between December 2018 and February 2019, 
thus ahead of the formal conference in March 2019, in Buenos Aires. They produced a Zero Draft (dated from January 22nd 
2019), a second draft (dated from February 11th 2019),and a third and final agreed upon draft, transmitted in March 6th 
2019 to the President of the General Assembly two weeks before the actual conference in Buenos Aires (UN 2019a; 2019b; 
2019c). 
172 INT-OSS-2. 
173 BAPA+40 conference was at the same time a ‘high-level’ but ‘low-profile’ event: with 145 member states attending, but 
only 8 heads of states, 2 deputy-prime-ministers and 61 ministers. BAPA+40 also gathered representatives of 23 IOs, 13 
specialised agencies and representatives of NGOs, the private sector and academia (UNGA 2019b). 
174 Side events were hosted by states, UN agencies, NGOs and knowledge organisations (think-thanks, research centres, 
universities) and covered a range of topics: from agriculture and health to peace operations and counter-terrorism, digging 
into practical and conceptual discussions, unpacking past and future dimensions of bilateral, regional, sub-regional, South-
South and trilateral cooperation. See the final side-event list at https://www.unsouthsouth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/BAPA40-Side-Event-Schedule-19_mar_2019.pdf  (last access 04.04.2019). 
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Many traditional development actors and some Southern experts (notably from Brazil, Mexico and South 
Africa) hoped that the BAPA+40 process would generate the right conditions for Southern providers to 
agree on a unambiguous definition of SSC and on goals, targets and means to financially commit to achieve 
the Agenda 2030 (Esteves and Klingebiel 2018; EU 2019). They also expected a commonly agreed 
definition to finally enable more systematic efforts of quantification of cooperation flows between 
developing countries (Besharati and MacFeely 2019). Such agreements were, nonetheless, not achieved.  
 
Despite the high hopes, BAPA+40 only secured the minimum-common possible. This resulted not only 
from the document being agreed upon among Northern and Southern countries, but also from the lack of 
firm political leadership by large SSC providers, including Brazil, China and India, to advance on more 
ambitious normative frameworks for SSC.175 There was, one the one hand, a widespread (comforting) 
recognition of the diversity within the South and the constrains that a ‘multiplex world’ impose on 
multilateral negotiations (Acharya 2017). On the other hand, several ‘SSC champions’ were too busy with 
domestic turmoil (e.g., Brazil, South Africa and Venezuela), too uncertain of the strategic value of investing 
additional diplomatic efforts in negotiating SSC at the UN (e.g., China), or too wary of a ‘dilution’ of SSC 
essence, including through UN pushes for ‘mainstreaming’ triangular cooperation (e.g., India).176 Most 
countries seemed satisfied with a thin consensus and the prolongation of ambiguous policy discourses at 
the UN, one that ‘facilitates and helps maintain consensus, and conceals ideological differences, setting 
limits to the struggles over meaning’ (Mosse 2005, 36). 
 
A discursive analysis of the final outcome document alongside its earlier drafts offers insights into the 
current political agreements and divergences on measuring SSC. If Nairobi can be thought, borrowing 
Mawdsley’s (2019) chronology,  as the crystallisation of ‘SSC 2.0’ dynamics at the UN, BAPA+40 embodied 
‘SSC 3.0’. BAPA+40 aligned SSC to the SDGs-lingo and inserted it into major 21st century global 
development consensus around infrastructure building, the role of private sector in development 
cooperation and triangular cooperation. Yet, when it comes to language on commitments, responsibilities 
and accountability, BAPA+40 offered yet another illustration of what observers had been calling a 
normative ‘race to the bottom’ (Mawdsley 2014a; Alexander and Kornegay 2014). Northern donors were 
successful in securing no explicit mention to the 0.7% ODA/GNI target in the final document.177 At the 
 
175 China sent a high-profile delegation, with the vice-prime minister and the deputy-minister of Agriculture. CIDCA 
Chairman, Wang Xiaotao, also attended the conference. The Indian delegation was headed by the Indian ambassador to 
the UN and the Brazilian delegation by MRE’s Undersecretary General for International Cooperation, Trade Promotion and 
Cultural Themes. ABC’s director, Ruy Perreira, was also present. Brazilian participation was particularly low-profile, due to 
the unfolding crisis and fears of reprisals by the newly elected Bolsonaro government. The Brazilian delegation was decided 
in the last minute and acted in a low-profile manner. MRE did very little dissemination around the event in its own 
communication channels. Most Brazilian delegates were from ABC itself and almost none from Brazilian traditional 
implementing agencies. Insiders to the process indicated MRE had initially planned a smaller delegation, but increased its 
participation after being insistently asked by the Argentinians.  
176 An example of concerns within India over triangular cooperation at the time of BAPA+40 can be found in RIS-published 
piece by Milindo Chakrabarti (2019). 




same time, Southern providers ensured that paragraphs 25 and 29 on ‘mutual accountability’ and ‘impact 
assessments’ were an ipsis literis copy of paragraphs 18 and 20 from Nairobi (quoted above), showing no 
diplomatic conceptual-normative advances in a decade. 
 
While responsibilities were off the negotiations table, the terms ‘methodology/methodologies’ featured in 
the document. In Buenos Aires, countries acknowledged the importance of measuring, reporting and 
assessing the impact of SSC while noting this would not be done through a common framework, but rather 
through ‘voluntary’, ‘non-binding’ and ‘country-led systems’: 
 
In this regard, we invite interested developing countries to engage in consultations, within the regional commissions of 
the United Nations, relevant intergovernmental fora on South-South and triangular cooperation, or regional 
organizations, as appropriate, on non-binding voluntary methodologies, building upon existing experiences, taking 
into account the specificities and different modalities of South-South cooperation and respecting the diversity within 
South-South cooperation and within national approaches. In this regard, we take note of the efforts of certain 
developing countries that have developed methodologies for planning, monitoring, measuring and evaluating South-
South and triangular cooperation in their regions on a voluntary basis and acknowledge the interest of some developing 
countries in order to establish a methodology for accounting and evaluating South-South and triangular cooperation. 
(UNGA 2019a, para.26). 
 
This paragraph encapsulates several of the ongoing epistemic and geopolitical battles around measuring 
SSC. The invitation wording, combined with the stress on ‘non-binding voluntary methodologies’ respectful 
of the ‘diversity of SSC approaches’, are clear markers of persistent unease with the topic. The paragraph 
reiterates relatively stable diplomatic stances by Southern providers on the matter from the past decade, 
emphasising: (i) the autonomy of Southern countries to develop SSC-specific evaluation and assessment 
systems; (ii) the respect of the uniqueness, plurality and diversity of SSC and SSC partners; and (iii) the 
demand-driven, Southern-led, flexible nature of these accounting and reflection exercises. Key-terms, such 
as ‘autonomy’, ‘plurality’, ‘diversity’ and ‘flexibility’, are easily traced in other diplomatic statements and 
scholarly reflections on the topic. For instance, in an opinion piece published by the South African Institute 
of International Affairs, a NeST member, Turiansky (2017) argued that: ‘the North calls for increased 
transparency, improved indicators and reliable statistics, but the South asks to respect its diversity of 
approaches’. Brazil, China and India’s official statements during the Conference also feature these terms, 









































1 The excerpts from the original statement delivered in Spanish, reads: ‘Necesitábamos evaluar lo que se ha logrado en las últimas décadas 
y definir, de manera consensuada, las orientaciones para los próximos años. (…) Por otra parte, Brasil es consciente de la sensibilidad que 
suscitan las cuestiones de medición y evaluación de la cooperación Sur-Sur. Entendemos que los países en desarrollo tienen la prerrogativa 
de diseñar y validar, de forma voluntaria, metodologías armonizadas para la cuantificación y evaluación de la cooperación Sur-Sur (…)  
También observamos con gran satisfacción el énfasis puesto por la conferencia en la cooperación triangular. Hemos sido y seguiremos siendo 
favorables al mantenimiento de estructuras conceptuales y operativas flexibles para esta modalidad, cuyo enorme potencial sigue sin 
explorarse. Queremos mejorar aún más las enormes ventajas comparativas de cada uno de los socios.  Por lo tanto, debemos evitar adoptar 
marcos conceptuales y de gestión rígidos para la cooperación trilateral’.  
 
Brazil – ‘We needed to evaluate 
what has been achieved in the last 
decades and define, by consensus, 
the guidelines for the coming years. 
(…) Brazil is aware of the sensitivity 
raised by issues of measurement 
and evaluation of South-South 
cooperation. We understand that 
developing countries have the 
prerogative to voluntarily design and 
validate harmonised methodologies 
for the quantification and 
evaluation of South-South 
cooperation (...) We also note with 
great satisfaction the emphasis 
placed by the conference on 
triangular cooperation. We have 
been and will continue to be 
favourable to maintaining flexible 
conceptual and operational 
structures for this modality, whose 
enormous potential remains 
unexplored. We want to further 
enhance the enormous comparative 
advantages of each of the partners. 
Therefore, we must avoid adopting 
rigid conceptual and management 
frameworks for trilateral 
cooperation’. [Our translation and 
our emphasis]1 
  
(Ambassador Ruy Pereira, Director, 
Brazilian Cooperation Agency)  
China – ‘South-South Cooperation is there to 
complement, not to substitute, North-South 
Cooperation. In the grand scheme of international 
development cooperation, North-South 
Cooperation remains the primary channel. That 
being the case, developed countries should honour 
their ODA commitments in good faith with more 
tangible actions. As a useful complement to North-
South Cooperation, South-South Cooperation does 
also have an active role to play. But instead of 
replicating the principles and criteria of North-
South Cooperation, it should be grounded in reality 
and pushed ahead in an independent and flexible 
manner (…) Like the rest of the developing world, 
China is also confronted with daunting 
development related challenges. China’s 
development has benefited from the support and 
cooperation of the international community. We are 
also ready to do what we can, to the best of our 
ability, to shoulder such responsibilities as 
commensurate with our stage of development and 
our actual capacity by working hand in hand with 
other countries to build a community of shared 
future for humankind (…) We shall optimize the 
modalities of assistance to make it more effective. 
In order to further step up international assistance, 
the China International Development Cooperation 
Agency was established last year. Leveraging our 
advantages, we shall remain focused on such 
priority sectors as poverty reduction, agriculture, 
health, infrastructure, skills training and education, 
and help ensure that assistance funds are better 
spent, with due attention to financial sustainability. 
We are happy to share our development experience 
with the recipient countries, help them improve 
their people’s livelihood and enhancetheir self-
reliant development capacity in a tangible way’ [Our 
emphasis]  
 
(H.E. Mr. Hu Chunhua Vice Premier, State Council, 
P.R.China, at the Second High-Level United 
Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation)  
India – ‘The cardinal principle that 
underpins South-South cooperation 
has been and remains that sharing 
valuable capacities, experience and 
knowledge amongst developing 
countries can be a catalyst for 
development. It does not substitute 
or supplant but only supplements 
North-South cooperation. (…) 
Over the last decade, India has 
extended Lines of Credit of about 
US $ 25 billion to more than 60 
countries of the South. All projects 
follow universally recognized 
norms. They do not create 
unsustainable debt burdens and 
ensure skill & technology transfer to 
help local communities maintain 
and sustain assets created. (…) More 
and better South-South 
Cooperation now is on account of 
the global South enjoying more 
rapid and sustained economic 
growth. Yet, South-South 
Cooperation retains its distinct 
nature and values, as well as diversity 
of forms and flows. It defies easy 
categorization. (…) The trajectory 
of global growth and the declining 
share of ODA during the last decade 
or so has seen attempts to subsume 
South-South cooperation in the 
international aid architecture. Such 
efforts are not helpful. They do no 
justice to either its historical heritage 
or its future potential. Let us not 
venture to strait jacket South-South 
cooperation into a format that it 
cannot fit into’. [Our emphasis] 
 
(Ambassador Syed Akbaruddin 
Permanent Representative of India 
to the United Nations, Second 
High-Level United Nations 
Conference on South-South 




Paragraph 26 strongly echoes abovementioned concerns from larger Southern providers about being 
measured by others and with others’ tools and standards. Indeed, in the past decade, OECD reports started 
to include estimates on flows of ‘Non-DAC’ providers including Brazil, China and India (OECD 2015).178 
The OECD used Brazil’ official statistics and have added other ODA-like flows. Consequently, its estimates 
differed from the figures Brazil published in what is known as the Cobradi report (see Chapter 5). Likewise, 
AidData estimates of China’s development cooperation also differed from China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM) figures, prompting responses from Beijing. MOFCOM’s spokesperson, following the release 
of AidData’s Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, in 2017, stated that: ‘The report probably has 
confused Chinese foreign aid funds with all kinds of other funds, including commercial funds’ (cited in 
Rudyak 2017).  
 
Marcio Côrrea, senior expert at ABC, expressed a similar discomfort arguing that: ‘Developing countries 
have been witnessing other international actors trying to quantify horizontal/South-South flows based on 
criteria conceived for other realities and purposes. The consequences of this process are: under-accounting, 
unilateral segregation of data, or inaccurate classification of horizontal/South-South cooperation’ (ABC 
2015; Corrêa 2017). Concerns have been also vocalised by Indian experts, such as Milindo Chakrabarti 
(2019, 49) from RIS, when arguing for: ‘The idea [of SSC] not be caged into some defined templates and 
lead to potential death by strangulation’.  
 
Importantly, paragraph 26 did not close-off the discussions on measurement methodologies or common 
frameworks. The final lines refer to ‘ongoing national and regional experimentation’, recognising (without 
naming) efforts such as those taking place in Latin America, in countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia and 
Mexico, and under the umbrella of international organisations such as the UN Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) (Silva et 
al. 2016; Esteves 2018; Chaturvedi 2018).  
 
Insiders to BAPA+40 negotiations largely credit Indian diplomacy for resisting stronger commitments to 
measurement. The second draft included, for instance, an entire section on ‘monitoring and reporting’ that 
received wide support from traditional donors but was dropped during the negotiations (EU 2019b).179 
 
178 The OECD also estimates flows from: Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Qatar, South Africa, some of 
which send their data voluntary to the OECD. See https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/non-dac-reporting.htm.   
179 Paragraphs 32 and 33 from this draft read: ‘32. We invite Member States to consider voluntary reporting on the South-
South and triangular cooperation activities, during the regular sessions of the High-level Committee on South-South 
Cooperation, that will facilitate peer-learning and the exchange of experiences and good practices, including lessons 
learned and challenges, as well as the promotion of South-South and triangular partnerships. 33. We request the Secretary-
General with the support of UNOSSC to develop methodologies and other relevant tools that would enable Member States, 
United Nations organizations and other relevant stakeholders to gather and provide data and information on the 
implementation of these Outcome Documents and to report such information on a voluntary basis to the biennial sessions 
of the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, to the General Assembly via the annual report on the state of 
South-South cooperation and to the High-level Political Forum as appropriate’.  
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India’s blocking does not come as a surprise considering its historical intellectual leadership within the 
G77+China and the language employed in country’s statement during BAPA+40 (see Box 3, above).  
 
Indian-sponsored side-events in Buenos Aires, all led by RIS, also clearly echoed these concerns. While 
presenting itself as an independent think tank, RIS sits in a para-statal capacity and its thinking has 
historically backed Indian governmental stances on development cooperation (Chaturvedi et al. 2014). RIS 
has also been a major source of critical-resistant stances on SSC accountability and measurement, although 
in a pragmatic and adaptative way. During BAPA+40, RIS hosted a parallel event on ‘The Plurality of 
South-South Cooperation’ and another on ‘Exploring Asian Narratives on South-South Cooperation’.180 
The notions of ‘plurality’ and ‘diversity’ the have been strategically mobilised by RIS scholars to justify 
Indian’s opposition to common standards for SSC and a single metric to count SSC flows (M. Chakrabarti 
2018; Chaturvedi 2019).  
 
A few months after BAPA+40, a renewed open demonstration of resistance appeared in a communiqué by 
the G77 and China, in a clear move away from the ‘conflict-avoiding language’181 found in the outcome 
document. In its statement, the Group reiterated its firm will to ‘defend’ SSC principles (G77 2019a, para. 
2) and opposed to the adoption of DAC-tools or any UN top-down measurement of SSC.182 It also 
denounced what it perceived as ‘double standards’, since ODA measuring frameworks were never agreed 
on wider UN forums.183  
 
Based on these accounts of BAPA+40 and its immediate aftermath, one could assume that Southern 
providers were ‘just not interested’ in measurement or accountability issues, an expression I once heard 
from a senior Aidland practitioner. However, such a conclusion overlooks several other diplomatic and 
para-diplomatic moves in the past years in other informal ‘global tables’, where Southern experts 
(governmental and non-governmental) have been critically engaging with existing metrics and ways of doing 
accountability and proposing ‘Southern-grown’ alternatives. This includes alternative policy debates and 
experimentations by intergovernmental, governmental and quasi-governmental entities like ABC in Brazil, 
 
180 The first side-event was co-hosted with the Brazilian BRICS Policy Centre and the NeST, while the second one with the 
China Institute for South-South Cooperation in Agriculture (CISSCA) (RIS 2019). 
181 Here I borrow an expression developed by Swyngedouw (2013) when talking about UN water-related documents.  
182 Arguments against the ‘top down’ measurement and a defence of national ‘bottom-up’ processes of experimentation 
with measurement can be also seen in the discussion held in the High-level Forum of Directors General for Development 
Cooperation in December the same year (UNOSSC 2019). Likewise, the statement openly regretted that the BAPA+40 
process somehow marginalised UNCTAD, in yet another illustration of the persisting institutional competition within the 
UN development system. 
183 An extract of the statement reads: “The Group of 77 and China remains concerned and strongly oppose attempts to 
measure, monitor or harmonize with the ODA frameworks, which will not bring more resources for development; but, on 
the contrary, it will jeopardize the existing diversity of flows. Demands of measurement, monitoring and reporting on South-
South Cooperation, will only divert and waste treasured resources for development and the achievement of the 17 
Sustainable Development Goals. The Southern countries shall detect and define their own needs regarding monitoring with 
the aim of improving and learning from their actual experiences. Any attempt to create conceptual frameworks on this field 
shall derive from the initiative of the involved parties.” (para. 4). 
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RIS in India or UNDP China, and by transnational knowledge actors like NeST, to be explored in the 
following section.  
 
 ‘Doing it our way’: the politics and the tensions of measuring from the South 
 
‘The feeling of we having to be accountable in our own ways is there.   
It is not a pressure; it is a [self] realisation’  
(Indian development expert, New Delhi, 2018, parenthesis added) 
 
 ‘It is true that SSC projects are different, but this do not make them un-assessable.  
Numerous Brazilian projects are done with public resources (…) We are trying’  
(Brazilian development expert, Brasilia, 2018)  
 
 
As SSC practitioners and experts started to discuss measurement, they did so not only by engaging existing 
standards, metrics and mechanisms but also disputing their meanings and proposing alternative 
constructions. The following sub-sections unpack two large sets of geopolitical and epistemic disputes over 
measuring SSC, the first around quantification and the second around impact assessment, showing how 
Southern actors have generated and navigated them.   
 
The politics of quantifying and reporting South-South cooperation and Southern-led development finance  
 
In what ways have Southern governments and experts challenged existing quantification standards and 
practices and what have they proposed instead? Here I explore two quantification-related measurement 
battles: first, on whether and how to financially quantify SSC flows; and second, on how to count Southern 
development finance flows.  
 
A first quantification battle is seen in Southern providers and experts’ challenges to Aidland’s efforts to 
financially (or monetarily) quantify SSC. At the heart of their opposition lies a critique of financial quantification 
as ‘straitjacketing’ SSC into being only about financial contributions to development or an additional source 
of development finance. Brazil and other Latin American countries—to whom technical cooperation (e.g., 
capacity-building, knowledge-sharing and technology transfer) and in-country support (e.g., scholarships 
for foreign students and refugee support) are emblematic cooperation modalities—have long championed 
this critique. They opposed a perceived Aidland’s ‘obsession’ with counting financial flows and/or collecting 
data exclusively on SSC financial resources.184 Such a move, they argue, oversimplifies SSC nature and 
 
184 In the context of TOSSD, Besharati (2017) raised a similar concern and denounced what he called the existing ‘devils of 




undervalues its developmental impact: it ‘diverts our attention from pursuing development in structural185 
terms (better policies, better capacities and better means) to only look at accessing sources of funding’ (ABC 
2015). This argument is further developed by Côrrea (2017) to whom ‘SSC operational costs’ (that can be 
monetised and thus counted) do not fully account for what is done in South-South knowledge and political 
exchanges. Furthermore, he argues, the monetary accounting is incomplete and methodologically 
problematic. To experts like Corrêa, because South-South technical exchanges are mostly done by civil 
servants (rather than consultants), any financial appraisal of the ‘development effort’ of Southern providers 
should account for the opportunity cost of not doing work domestically, the embedded investments in the 
technology being transferred free from cost, and the proportional cost of wages and daily fees in soft 
currencies.  
 
While confronting these technical-political challenges, governments and experts in Latin America have 
advocated for complementary measures capable of attributing value to SSC, termed ‘non-monetary 
quantification’ or ‘value-adding/valuation’186 (ABC 2015; SEGIB 2016; Corrêa 2017; Escallón 2019). The 
‘valuation’ methodology is used by SEGIB, since 2007, to document SSC flows in Latin America through 
the lenses of ‘SSC projects’ rather than ‘SSC budgets’,187 while also assessing for their ‘cost of intervention’ 
and ‘economic value’.188 Brazilian Cobradi reports also critically engaged with this issue and decided not to 
adopt the metrics of ‘development effort/GNI ratio’ (developed by the DAC), which would make Brazilian 
SSC ‘invisible’ in the national budget. Cobradi reports focus instead on mapping Brazilian ‘governmental 
spending’ with international cooperation189 and feature additional qualitative descriptions of Brazilian 
cooperation practices to explain what cooperating agencies do rather than merely accounting for financial 
flows using OECD-DAC modalities considered ‘foreign to the Brazilian reality’ (J. B. B. Lima and Pereira 
Jr. 2019, 19).190 According to Cobradi researchers, this was a compromise solution: Brazil kept its official 
SSC metrics within the overall established boundaries of international cooperation development regime, 
while looking for ‘practical solutions’ that fitted Brazil’s own budgetary reality (ibid). 
 
185 The word ‘structural’ here is of particular importance. First, it has been a major feature of Latin American SSC capacity 
building efforts, what Brazilian health practitioners branded ‘structuring cooperation’, which later became an important 
feature of Brazilian technical cooperation under the PT government (Leite et al. 2014). Structural here also connects to a 
longer history of development thinking in the region, particularly the Dependency Theory developed in the region and 
notably promoted by ECLAC in the 1970s. This current critique thus echoes an older divide in developmental thinking 
between ECLAC structuralists and the mainstream liberal developmental thinking, embodied by the OECD, even if the 
OECD-affiliated heterodox Development Centre has been a strong partner of ECLAC and has been increasingly active in 
promoting alternative debates on SSC and triangular cooperation (ECLAC/OECD 2018). 
186 Valoración, in Spanish. 
187 In 2015, SEGIB and the Ibero-American PIFCSS replaced the primary tool, the questionnaire, used to collect the data for 
drafting the reports with an online data platform: the Ibero-American Integrated Data System on South-South and 
Triangular Cooperation. 
188 SEGIB understands the former as ‘direct expenses incurred to execute the cooperation (such as air tickets, travel 
allowance, and materials)’ and the latter as ‘the equivalent to the value assigned to the technical and professional 
resources mobilised to execute the cooperation, adding to the “technical hour” value’ (PIFCSS 2016a cited in Escallón 
2019). Valuation is also employed by countries like Chile, since 2013, and Colombia, since 2017. 
189 Levantamento de gastos, in Portuguese. Such methodology was considered ‘unorthodox’ also within IPEA, a well-known 





Rather than a Latin American-specific issue, these critiques are at the heart of the politics of devising new 
metrics, like the TOSSD, and of current debates on financing for development.191 Similar critiques and 
experimentations have also reverberated among other Southern providers. Turkey, for instance, which 
reports its development cooperation flows to the DAC, has recast its ‘development effort’ to fully capture 
its humanitarian disbursements in the Syrian crisis. This adaptation, or even ‘subversion from within’, puts 
Turkey among the largest ODA contributors in terms of share of national income in the recent years (Haug 
2020; I. Mitchell, Ritchie and Rogerson 2020).192 Scholars have also suggested that Indian development 
efforts would be better appreciated if adjusted to the purchasing power parity (PPP) standard193 and 
reported China’s unease with the lack of recognition for nonmonetary and in-kind aid (Sears 2019). Lastly, 
the UNDP and the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) recently partnered with SEGIB to map South-South 
and triangular cooperation projects in Africa (UNDP/NEPAD 2019). Experts involved in this first exercise 
explained that mapping technical cooperation (rather than blended modalities or development finance) was 
a pragmatic choice: ‘the simplest to do’ and a way to avoid ‘opening the pandora box’.194 No similar mapping 
has taken place in Asia, where scholars like Chaturvedi (2018) have argued that ‘Asian ways of doing SSC’ 
(which includes greater emphasis on economic than on technical cooperation) make measuring and 
reporting of South-South exchanges less possible or desirable. 
 
Critiques of financial quantification are, nonetheless, far from consensual, even in Latin America. Some 
countries, like Mexico, and individual experts, including in Brazil,195 have showed more willingness to 
monetise SSC contributions: either harmonising with DAC’s ODA counting methodology; embracing new 
universal metrics, like the TOSSD; or creating alternative metrics based on a political agreement reached 
among Southern governments. Mexico, a country that puts statistics at the heart of its SSC system,196 has 
 
191 Attention to the financing dimension of development cooperation is certainly not new but it has gained different 
contours in the past years in the context of the so-called ‘financialization’ of international development. The 
financialization agenda is a broad, complex, and contested one. It refers to what many experts and practitioners see as an 
ongoing shift from classic ‘foreign aid’ towards ‘development finance’. Financialization of development cooperation, as a 
phenomenon, includes, for instance, a push for greater participation of the private sector and market instruments in 
development cooperation and the use of ODA to catalyse private sector investments in ODA-recipient countries. 
Underlying these dynamics there is the assumption of the need to deepen and expand financial markets in the name of 
development. (Mawdsley 2018c; Järvelä and Solitander 2020). 
192 As explained in Chapter 3, DAC metrics have a very specific, and still contested internally, standard for reporting in-
country refugee support as ODA, namely that the reported amount refers to the first 12 months only. Turkey reporting 
subverts this logic because it accounts for all its humanitarian and refugee-related support.  
193 This observation was made by Rani Mullen, expert on Indian development cooperation, in a public event at the 
Brookings India (New Delhi, 2018). 
194 The 11 countries that volunteered to report on South-South technical development cooperation activities for the year 
of 2017 were Benin, Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda. 
A total of 300 technical SSC and triangular initiatives were mapped. According to first-hand accounts by experts involved in 
this first exercise, the idea was to develop methodologies that would resonate to those countries that volunteered. UNDP 
and partners developed an Excel based SSC reporting template and had all countries agreeing on the template. 
195 See Chapter 5 for more on domestic measurement politics and institutional ‘duelling’ in Brazil. 
196 This is unique among SSC providers but not surprising considering Mexico’s proximity to the OECD, of which it is a 
member (Haug 2020). Mexico’s Cooperation Law, for instance, makes no direct mention to SSC principles as enshrined in 
BAPA or Nairobi but has integrated OECD five effectiveness principles (Zea 2016). 
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already tried to account for the monetary value of experts’ work through cost-opportunity and cost of 
mobility methodologies (AMEXCID 2018).197 Likewise, ECLAC has a statistics-heavy Working Group on 
quantification of SSC since 2013. No consensus has been reached on a final methodology there, but since 
2016 the organisation works with its members on ways to adapt its ‘satellite/national accounts’ 
methodology to counting SSC (ECLAC 2016; 2018).198 ECLAC attempts echo other adaptations, including 
the Mexican one, to apply the PPP factor or adjust Southern experts’ work values to standard international 
salary tables,199 as to have a better sense of the ‘development effort’ made by those in the South who 
contribute financially with less dollars because their cooperation efforts and experts are cheaper.200  
 
Altogether, the debates and experimentations mentioned above assist SSC providers in distinguishing their 
contribution from other development cooperation flows, giving visibility and differentiating SSC’s ‘unique’ 
(financial) contribution to the SDGs. Rather than purely technical discussions these counterpoints re-
politicise measurement and create openings to question the politics of ‘aid generosity’, asking what counts 
as generosity and challenging the kinds of generosity being counted.201 Disputes and experimentations 
further illustrate one facet of SSC measurement paradox. They reveal, on the one hand, agency from 
Southern providers to negotiate ways of counting SSC that are seen as fairer and/or more beneficial to 
them, fighting a perceived ‘epistemic violence’202 and substantiating claims related to SSC cost-
effectiveness.203 On the other, they reveal the tensions policy and knowledge entrepreneurs face when 
navigating the need to find suitable ways to become members of the community of development 
cooperation providers and the anxieties of being caught in unfavourable logics and metrics.  
 
The second set of battles relates to counting South-South development finance. Here traditional DAC metrics have 
been criticised for either overestimating or underestimating SSC contributions, through applying ODA’s 
‘concessional/grant element’ golden rule to existing ‘hybrid’ SSC instruments. This is the case of Indian 
trade promotion and development assistance-related Exim Bank-LOCs scheme that applies different 
degrees of softness while requiring the import of goods and services from India up to a minimum of 75% 
 
197 These quantification pilots were considered insufficient by Mexican bureaucrats and civil society (INT-OSS-3; INT-OSS-6; 
INT-OSS-4; INT-OSS-5). 
198 ECLAC is a historically strong knowledge producer around development and also relies on a robust statistics component. 
ECLAC, together with SEGIB in Latin America, has been one of the first international bodies studying how to measure SSC 
and developing tools to report on SSC (Silva et al. 2016). SEGIB started its reporting in 2007 and ECLAC started theirs in 
2012. Whereas SEGIB has worked with development cooperation agencies in the region, ECLAC has mostly worked with the 
national statistical agencies. SEGIB and ECLAC measurement methodologies have significantly diverged. 
199 Including the ones utilised by the United Nations or the World Bank. 
200 The need to adjust prices and wages is also recognised by proponents of post-aid metrics (e.g. Mitchell, Ritchie and 
Rogerson 2020). 
201 INT-BR-6. 
202 This term, and its correlated notions (such as ‘epistemic oppression’ or ‘epistemic injustice’) advanced by feminist and 
decolonial thinkers, including Gayatari Spivak, Walter Mignolo, Paulo Freire, Partha Chaterjee and many others, have been 
progressively explored within critical SSC. For a conceptual discussion on Southern epistemologies in SSC, see Caixeta 
(2015). For an application in the case of Brazil-Angola relations, see Santos, Siman, and Fernández (2019). 
203 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-43. 
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of the contracted amount (GoI 2015).204 This is also the case for Chinese concessional loans that operate 
with variable concessional rates. For China’s Exim Bank loans, no less than 50% of materials and equipment 
are required to be purchased from China (Zhang 2020).  
 
Brazil, China and India have uncomfortably navigated this counting due to how it translated into 
international rankings and to how it interacted with other domestic bureaucratic and citizenship politics. 
Brazil’s official Cobradi reports feature financial contributions to multilateral development banks like the 
World Bank or the BRICS-led NDB under the category of ‘contributions to multilateral organisations’, 
while the BNDES Exim Bank operations—through which the Brazilian Development Bank acts as an 
export credit agency and provides loans under variable rates—have been excluded from the calculations 
(Cabral 2011; Leite et al. 2014). Cobradi researchers reported having attempted to include accounts of 
BNDES international infrastructure building operations but, due to the inter-institutional technical-political 
controversies over whether BNDES operations should be considered ‘South-South development finance’ 
and whether the loans were made under ‘ODA-like’ concessional terms, data on BNDES was excluded.205  
 
The controversies and thus the ongoing invisibility of BNDES flows in Brazilian official SSC statistics is 
explained not only because BNDES never framed its Exim operations as ‘development finance’ or 
‘development cooperation’206 but also because, so far, Brasília preferred a narrow and less ‘business-friendly’ 
definition of SSC, thus excluding export credit operations from its core development cooperation 
modalities.207 The debate in India and China was exactly the opposite. Several experts opposed separating 
commercial from concessional loans arguing this was inconsistent with the very logic of SSC, which for 
them includes economic and financial cooperation regardless of a grant component (Tan-Mullins, Mohan 
and Power 2010; Chaturvedi 2016). This stance is not unrelated to the claim that measuring the ‘grant 
element’ is necessary for ODA in order to hold DAC donors accountable for their 0.7% ODA/GNI target, 
a responsibility that is absent from SSC partnerships (Besharati 2017; Bracho 2017; also Chapter 8). 
 
Overall, there has been no agreement between Southern practitioners and scholars, including within NeST, 
on whether SSC financial quantification should be restricted to what can be verified as ‘concessional’ flows. 
While some agree this is the only way to produce comparability among SSC providers and between SSC 
and ODA flows, others prefer more flexible, self-defined, approaches where countries would choose what 
they would report as flows, with no intention to produce comparisons. Such a flexible approach, they say, 
 
204 This percentage was higher in the past, but was formally fixed in 75% after the 2015 reforms. In practice, however, 
countries, like Bangladesh, have managed to negotiate and secure more favourable deals in some cases (Bhattacharya, 
Rahman, and Muhtasim 2019). 
205 INT-BR-35; INT-BR-36. 
206 See BNDES Questions & Answers on ‘export support’ (BNDES 2018). For a critical discussion on BNDES framing, see 
(Conectas 2018). 
207 The traditional ‘allergy’ to private sector that has been changing in the last few years due to budgetary restrictions, and, 
particularly since 2016, when a new coalition came into power more inclined to work along the private sector (Suyama, 
Waisbich and Leite 2016; D. Marcondes and Mawdsley 2017). 
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is coherent with the very ‘spirit of SSC’ (Turianskyi 2017; Chaturvedi et al. 2019). Behind the country-led 
flexible approach, I contend, also lies the unresolved political consensus around a commonly accepted 
definition for SSC.  
 
Technical-political issues explain why statistical information on SSC remains fragmented: limited to the 
circumscribed ad hoc tools developed by the OECD, academics or by multilaterals, like SEGIB. Early 
attempts to produce cross-regional accounts of SSC flows were made by UNDESA in its 2010 development 
cooperation report, but these efforts stalled. Another attempt came from the Brazilian government, in 2015, 
when ABC presented to the Core Group of Southern Partners at the UN an initial proposition on a 
‘Reference Platform’ for the collection of monetary and non-monetary information on development-related 
exchange flows between developing countries.208 In ABC’s proposition, each country would decide what 
to report according to their own practices. The Platform was the first concrete proposal for a common 
framework, but had little political buy-in from other key Southern partners and Brazil itself did not use its 
diplomatic capital to push it further in the following years.209 Though UNCTAD and UNOSSC have 
maintained discussions on the topic, no other UN body has been officially mandated to develop tools and 
metrics to count SSC, not even after BAPA+40. 
 
With or without an intergovernmental consensus, Southern providers still have to manage others (in Aidland 
and in civil society) counting SSC flows and the numerous domestic implications of these external 
estimations. These include intra-and inter-bureaucratic conflicts but also dealing with the domestic costs of 
inconsistencies between stated priorities and budget allocation.210 The increased visibility of development 
finance flows and of financial quantification of SSC more broadly also fuelled public perceptions that ‘too 
much is being spent abroad’, instigating domestic debates about official lack of transparency and/or raising 
expectations from other Southern partners to receive more.211 I will return to these tensions in the coming 
chapters.  
 
The politics of assessing impact and growing experimentations with SSC evaluation 
 
Measuring the quality of SSC and its results is another arena where Southern providers have challenged 
existing practices and started to experiment and innovate. There are numerous contextual drivers for the 
 
208 For an official account of ABC Platform proposition, see ABC (2015) and Côrrea (2017). Also see Silva et al. (2016), for a 
critical and comparative discussion of the Platform alongside other existing propositions.  
209 Mostly due to extreme political volatility in the country, which marginalised ABC within the federal government and 
made development experts more cautious to lead on any ambitious initiative. A similar profile was adopted in BAPA+40, 
discussed above, despite Brazilian leadership in SSC throughout the previous decade. Likewise, the Platform was never 
operationalised inside Brazil. Its set-up has been hindered, technically, by the fact that it requires disaggregated data from 
different sources that are not readily available, but also politically by the persistent disagreements among Brazilian 
bureaucracies on the subject of SSC quantification and reporting, as shown in Chapter 5. 




growing attention to this issue and great variance among countries and within countries (across sectors and 
modalities). Yet, as SSC entered its consolidation phase, evaluations and impact assessments became 
increasingly important, if not a necessity, for certain actors in SSC-land. This growing need to understand 
and show results has prompted a series of policy and operational reforms as well as a greater global activism 
by knowledge actors to craft Southern/SSC-specific ways to evaluate development cooperation efforts.  
 
As stated in Chapter 3, evaluations are tools to create visible proofs to justify the ‘aid enterprise’ and tools 
perceived by practitioners as simultaneously burdensome and useful to improve management and learning 
(Rottenburg 2009; Jensen and Winthereik 2013; Eyben and Guijt 2015). Evaluations are now appearing in 
SSC-land driven by and embedded in a combination of status-seeking, strategic and management concerns. 
Evaluations, reviews and assessments are increasingly valued for assisting in policy learning (NeST 2019)212 
but also for reputation stakes: serving both as ‘wake-up calls’ to prevent things to go wrong in the future 
(Jiang 2019) and as tools to communicate and internationally market SSC innovations and successful 
experiences (Constantine and Shankland 2017).213 
 
Experimentation is mostly taking place at the conceptual level, where a range of Southern actors have 
engaged in lexical-semantic and methodological battles over SSC evaluation. Knowledge actors have been 
at the forefront in forging new tools and—in some countries more than others—applying them in internal 
or independent assessments of SSC initiatives. An early example is NeST proposal for a common 
conceptual and evaluation framework for SSC. The NeST ‘Framework for South-South Cooperation’, first 
agreed in 2015 as a draft proposal, operationalises SSC principles into workable evaluation criteria and 
methodologies (NeST 2015; 2017). The Framework was since applied to particular case studies by NeST 
scholars from Brazil, Mexico and South Africa,214 and used as inspiration for further conceptualisations in 
the course of SSC evaluations, notably in Brazil and China.215  
 
The proposition was, nonetheless, never formally embraced by Southern governments. It also failed to 
receive full support from all NeST members.216 For a short-period, the framework kept being debated and 
updated internally, strongly led by South African experts in the network (NeST 2017). Yet, from 2017 
onwards, with stronger leadership from the India-based RIS, NeST stopped advocating for the adoption 
of that framework, advocating instead against any common framework and in favour of each country 
 
212 INT-IN-8; INT-CH-4; INT-CH-14; INT-BR-41; INT-BR-2; INT-BR-64; INT-BR-52; INT-BR-16. 
213 INT-BR-6; INT-CH-3. 
214 For studies that applied the NeST evaluation framework, see Besharati and Rawhani (2016); Vazquez and Lucey (2016); 
Garelli (2018).The framework was also applied by the German development think-tank DiE to assess the China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor (Ali 2018). 
215 For conceptual discussions on evaluating Brazilian SSC, see BPC/ASUL (2017); Waisbich, Silva and Suyama (2017); Costa 
(2018). For examples of external evaluations of Brazilian SSTC that sought to operationalised SSC principles into evaluation 
criteria and methodologies, see ASUL/PLAN (2015); ASUL/Move (2017); ASUL (2020). For an adaptation done in China, see 
(CISSCA 2018). For a more recent crosscutting discussion by NeST scholars, see NeST (2019). 
216 INT-OSS-2; INT-BR-5; INT-BR-40. 
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adopting its own operationalisation of SSC principles into evaluation practices (NeST 2019, 8; also M. 
Chakrabarti 2019).217  
 
RIS knowledge entrepreneur role is also seen in its calls for replacing the term ‘evaluation’ by the term 
‘assessment’. RIS scholar Milindo Chakrabarti (2018) insisted, for instance, that, unlike aid, SSC is not a 
contractual relation and thus should not be judged against external benchmarks and through OECD 
evaluation criteria.218 In his view, SSC partners should jointly conduct assessments as a reflective diagnosis 
and learning exercise.219 RIS director-general, Sachin Chaturvedi (2018), further explains the preference for 
the term ‘assessment’ as resulting from the need to explore the ‘nuances’ of SSC and he adds: ‘It is not mere 
semantics that we call it impact assessment and not monitoring and evaluation on which there is huge 
emphasis from our Northern partners’. RIS proposition, however, had so far little traction, even among 
other development experts in India, some of which characterise this move as a ‘language game’ or a ‘RIS 
thing’.220  
 
While unsuccessful in shifting the SSC-lingo on evaluation,221 RIS’s proposition remains clear 
demonstrations of ongoing epistemic battles over evaluation and of Indian epistemic activism in this 
front,222 in a sign of Indian identity projection efforts (Leveringhaus and Sullivan de Estrada 2018). As put 
by one interviewee: ‘India is trying to find home-grown solutions to measuring, Southern solutions to 
accountability mechanisms. They are not willing to be rule-takers’.223 RIS’s role has expanded in recent years 
and reached an almost ironic point where after having rejected common frameworks proposed by others 
RIS is now leading on a new round of efforts, enabled by a UNOSSC research grant, to work on a ‘synthesis 
framework’ (UNOSSC 2020). In the project: ‘Experiences from partner countries will be used to create a 
synthesis of the “assessment” tools which would be comprehensive but not a “standardized” model for 
assessing SSC’ (ibid).224 Altogether, these moves show RIS (and India more broadly) intent to be the voice 
to present the solution, in its terms, in a gesture of both pragmatism but also leadership-seeking. 
 
217 This shift is clear in a recent UNOSSC-commissioned NeST paper, edited by RIS scholars. The paper provides examples of 
Southern-led evaluation frameworks and in their introduction the editors state that their objective is to ‘argue against a 
common assessment framework, even though there may be some common elements’ among the assessment practices 
they have gathered.  
218 The five OECD evaluation criteria for project and programme evaluation are: Relevance, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact 
and Sustainability (OECD 2009). Several UN agencies also follow similar lines, as discussed in Chapter 5. 
219 According to Chaturvedi (2012), India has conducted joint political reviews in the past, which included discussions on 
development assistance. Both ABC and AMEXCID also conduct joint reviews of their development cooperation initiatives 
with their partners. For Brazil, an example of this joint construction can be seen in the lengthy process of designing the 
evaluation of the Cotton-4 initiative, in which the evaluation framework was co-constructed with all partners (ENAP 2013; 
ASUL/PLAN 2015). Joint evaluation meetings conducted by ABC with partners are also examples of this kind of effort, see 
ABC (2018). 
220 INT-IN-18; INT-IN-8; INT-IN-9. 
221 As almost no other country has joined Brazilian battle to use ‘trilateral’ rather than ‘triangular’ cooperation.   
222 INT-BR-4; INT-BR-18; INT-BR-43. 
223 INT-IN-18. 
224 A similar ambivalent stance is found on RIS scholars both wary and critical stances towards triangular cooperation (see 
M. Chakrabarti 2019) and RIS decision to mainstreaming it in its own SSC dialogue event – the Delhi Process - in 2019, just 
after the BAPA+40. 
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Experimentation is also happening at the operational level, although evaluations remain an incipient and ad 
hoc practice in all large SSC providers (Esteves 2018; Rizzo 2019a). Besides contributing to the 
institutionalisation of SSC in-country, evaluations fulfil a role in backing diplomatic activism. They assist in 
the reiteration of SSC principles and differentiated cooperation approaches—including the Brazilian 
propositions of ‘structuring’ and ‘trilateral’ cooperation, or the Indian ‘development compact’—providing 
intelligible and/or legitimising evidence to back-up Southern development and policy innovations. In this 
context, I contend, the will to evaluate is not exclusively coming from an external imposition but rather a 
collection of individual and institutional wills to show results of SSC. Evaluations are mostly about proving 
Southern ‘models’ and ‘wisdoms’ were effective, and worth being shared and adopted by others. As such, 
SSC evaluations serve as a tool to enhance credibility and legitimacy and boost policy,225 institutional and 
personal agendas along the domestic-international continuum.  
 
The review ‘China-Tanzania cooperation in agriculture’ (see CISSCA 2018) offers an illustration of evaluations 
bridging international and domestic policy-institutional dynamics. This study has circulated widely 
internationally and was given visibility by the UNOSSC, including during BAPA+40 (UNOSSC 2018). Not 
only scholars from the NeST-affiliated China Agricultural University (CAU) were eager to showcase their 
study but also the Chinese Vice-Minister of Agriculture and Rural Affairs at the time, Qu Dongyu, who 
attended the conference in person and was elected, a few months later, the new FAO’s Director General.226 
Similarly, the evaluation of Brazil’s ‘Supporting the Development of the Cotton Sector in the C4 countries’ (hereafter 
Cotton-4 project) (see ASUL/PLAN 2015) has also been showcased by Brazilian diplomats including at the 
Cotton Committee of the World Trade Organisation to consolidate Brazil’s reputation as a ‘Southern hub’ 
for cotton expertise (Moreira 2020).227 
 
Among Southern providers, Brazil has been the country that has most extensively experimented with 
evaluating SSC, notably its technical cooperation initiatives (bilateral, multi-country and 
triangular/trilateral228 with international organisations). The first major publicly available ex post 
independent evaluation, on the Cotton-4 project, was published in 2015. Since then, the Brazilian 
government has evaluated several of its trilateral initiatives with bilateral donors (like the Germany and the 
UK) as well as with UN agencies, including FAO, UNICEF and WFP (see Chapter 5 and Appendix 5 for 
a non-exhaustive compilation). 
 
225 On the ways SSC interacts with policy battles, see inter alia Cabral et al. (2013); Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou (2017); 
Stone, Porto de Oliveira and Pal (2019).  
226 For some of my Chinese interlocuters, Dongyu’s presence in BAPA+40, contrasting with the absence of other high-level 
figures working on development issues within China (for instance those involved in BRI issues) indicates both the ways in 
which the SSC policy field is currently structured in China, but also the importance of BAPA+40 as a networking space for 
cultivating personal and diplomatic ambitions within global development arenas (INT-CH-16; INT-CH-17). 
227 An argument also raised by my research participants (INT-BR-64; INT-BR-10).  
228 Brazil calls its triangular cooperation ‘trilateral’ to emphasise the horizontal nature of this relationship between two 
Southern countries and either an UN agency or a bilateral donor or both, what ABC calls ‘Trilateral Development 




The case of Brazil is unique not only for the number of external and publicly available evaluations 
conducted but also to extent of its engagement in triangular cooperation. Triangular cooperation currently 
responds for an important slice of Brazilian SSC (Milani 2017; Almino and S. E. M. Lima 2017).229 
Compared to China and India, Brazil has a more consolidated experience of partnering with both bilateral 
donors and UN agencies in triangular cooperation arrangements on a range of issues, notably agricultural 
development and social protection (D. Zhang 2017; Paulo 2018; Zoccal 2020b).230 Initiatives are structured 
around policy and political dialogue and knowledge and technology sharing. Brazilian triangular cooperation 
with UN agencies moved from small pilot projects in the early 2000s to more structured initiatives, 
including through new arrangements (full-fledged programmes, multi-donor trilateral arrangements, 
Centres of Excellence, etc.).231 Partnering with Brazil on SSC has been a pilot for many UN agencies and 
bilateral donors, many of which have developed their SSC corporate strategies based on their learnings 
from doing SSC with Brazil.232 For their longevity and consolidation levels, partnerships with Brazil also 
inaugurated evaluation pilots under this ever-expanding cooperation modality (UNFPA/ABC 2012; 
ASUL/Move 2017; ASUL 2020).  
 
When the development evaluation apparatus meets South-South cooperation  
 
The importance of triangular cooperation in fostering SSC evaluations in Brazil and beyond is worth 
unpacking. Considering the role aid evaluations play in Aidland, it comes with no surprise that major 
development actors, such as the UK, Germany and the UNDP, started to fund ‘knowledge-related’ 
activities, including policy dialogues, research and M&E components within existing SSC and triangular 
initiatives. Funding from the UK, for instance, supported knowledge-related activities within Brazilian 
flagship initiatives such as the Brazil-FAO-WFP Purchase from Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) or the 
Brazil-WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger (CEAH). It also included support to knowledge actors 
and policy dialogues like the BPC-led Dialogues on International Cooperation, mentioned in Chapter 3, 
 
229 According to Milani (2019), in USD, trilateral cooperation with international organisations went from 2.7 million in 2010 
to 16.9 million in 2014. In 2015, more than 70% of the total executed budget for technical cooperation under ABC 
coordination was channelled trilaterally in partnerships with international organisations. This number represented only 1,9% 
in 2009. It is important, however, to highlight that the budget under ABC coordination does not accounts for all technical 
cooperation provided by Brazil, since some public agencies develop their cooperation autonomously.  
230 Brazil entered the business of trilateral partnerships in the 1980s, with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency - 
JICA, as a follow-up of decades of bilateral technical cooperation in the sectors of agriculture and environment, among 
others. Yet it was from the mid-2000s onwards that this modality took off, with bilateral agencies (including JICA, the 
German GIZ, USAID, and the Canadian CIDA), other Southern providers (like the IBSA Fund for Poverty Alleviation co-
managed with India and South Africa) and most notably with UN agencies. UNFPA started its work on SSC with Brazil in 
2002, ILO’s in 2007, while FAO’s formal TSSC programme with Brazil started in 2008. UNICEF works with Brazil on SSC since 
2004 and a formal TSSC programme was established in 2011. As for WFP, the Brazil-WFP CEAH was set up in 2011. Brazilian 
cooperation also has a special relationship with and an operational dependence of UNDP since the 1980s (Cabral and 
Weinstock 2010; Milani 2017; also Chapter 5).  
231 A brief discussion on these different arrangements for operationalising and delivering triangular/trilateral cooperation 
can be found in Waisbich (2020a).  
232 INT-BR-65; also ASUL (2020).  
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whose first edition was devoted to measuring SSC.233 The UK has also adopted a similar strategy in China, 
seeking to support knowledge actors and development knowledge-related initiatives (DFID 2017a; DFID 
2017b; also Chapter 6).  
 
Besides stating the importance of ‘traditional development partners’ as enablers of SSC evaluations, in the 
coming paragraphs I start unpacking the making of these evaluations (a topic I will return to in Chapters 5 
and 6). By understanding how they came to be, I provide insights into how ‘traditional/Northern’ ways of 
practicing accountability and ‘Southern’ emerging conceptions are being negotiated. Using the Brazilian 
case, I emphasise the agency of Southern providers in shaping these processes rather than being passively 
co-opted into existing standards and practices. My main point is that, while each evaluation has its own 
particularities and drivers, in the most paradigmatic cases of externally-conducted independent evaluations 
Brazilian actors had a central role. Undoubtedly UN agencies’ social conformity pressures and own 
accountability logics (i.e., the importance given to accounting, reporting and evaluation of projects, and the 
criteria and methodologies mostly employed) do influence how evaluations are negotiated. Yet the agency 
in the Brazilian side and the ways in which ABC, the different national agencies, and independent experts 
tried to experiment and innovate when conducting evaluations should not be underestimated.  
 
The first assessment of the Brazil-WFP CEAH provides an illustration of these mutually constitutive 
dynamics. Created in 2011 as the first WFP Centre of Excellence,234 this Brasília-based organisation 
advocates and disseminates Brazilian policy solutions to fight hunger through home-grown school feeding, 
among other social policies.235 In 2016, CEAH decided to conduct a review of its first five years of 
operation, which they called an ‘impact evaluation’,236 not without internal epistemic controversies, as I will 
discuss shortly. The evaluation was conceived as a learning and a communication tool to show Brazilian 
alternative models of doing school feeding and doing cooperation (through high-level policy dialogues and 
horizontal technical exchanges).237  
 
 
233 INT-BR-10; INT-ODP-5; INT-ODP-7; INT-ODP-8. 
234 Since then, WFP has opened a Centre in China (in 2016) and Cote D’Ivoire (in 2018), the latter framed as a regional 
centre that ‘seeks to replicate the successful South-South cooperation experience of the WFP Centre of Excellence based in 
Brazil that has assisted governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America in the fight against hunger, while promoting 
sustainable school feeding models and other food and nutrition safety nets’. See https://www.wfp.org/news/wfp-and-
cote-divoire-create-centre-excellence-against-hunger (last access: 21/10/2020). 
235 ‘Home-grown school feeding’ consists of a set of inter-related social and agricultural development policies that create a 
supply chain connecting small-farming producers to schools at the local level. This integrated set of policies include 
public/institutional purchase schemes and public support to local small-holder farmers as well as food and nutritional 
security guidelines. See https://www.wfp.org/home-grown-school-meals (last access: 21/10/2020). This multidimensional 
hunger alleviation policy was the first Brazilian ‘best practice’ disseminated by the Centre, which has since become a hub 
for other policy solutions in the field of food security and nutrition (G. Marcondes and De Bruyn 2015). 
236 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-59; INT-BR-72.  
237 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-16; INT-BR-19; INT-BR-52. 
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The will to show came strongly from CEAH management, which was eager to forge new partnerships and 
find alternative sources of funding beyond the Brazilian government238 in a context of political-economic 
uncertainty.239 According to an interviewee, this evaluation resulted from the combined interest within the 
Centre on ‘knowledge management’ and the evaluation pressures it received from: (i) the WFP/UN system, 
(ii) from diffuse peer-pressure, and (iii) the pressure it self-imposed to demonstrate ‘first, that they were 
different and, second, that they were having an impact’.240 A similar set of drivers—combining prestige and 
legitimacy-seeking with development knowledges and policies’ battles—is also found in the case of the 
short-lived PAA Africa, a Brazil-FAO-WFP partnership running between 2012-2016.241 There, an ad hoc 
insertion of a DFID-funded ‘knowledge component’ to implement a M&E system for the programme was 
conceived to prove that the Brazilian model of family farming worked and boost internal paradigm battles 
within the national and global food security and agricultural development policy communities (Milhorance 
2014; Cabral et al. 2016).242  
 
Evaluations offered opportunities to renegotiate with the development apparatus conceptions of 
accountability as well as methodologies to assess results and impact. The review of China-Tanzania 
cooperation offers an illustration of the former. In a UNOSSC-supported paper describing the evaluation—
first published in English, and thus tailored to international audiences243—CAU scholars presented their 
effort within China’s SSC differentiated approach, or ‘China’s SSC model’ (CPC 2020), whereby not only 
‘issues of accountability and transparency [would be] less pertinent to providers’ domestic political and 
economic sphere’ (CISSCA 2018, 3) but also ‘approaches to improving development effectiveness and 
efficiency at present are more focused on the purpose of mutual learning’ (ibid).  
 
As for negotiations over methodologies, these are visible both in the Brazilian case but also in the incipient, 
but growing, evaluation efforts happening in China. Development experts from UN agencies (located in 
country offices in rising powers or within the still marginal ‘SSC hubs’ in headquarters) have shown 
increasing willingness to accept alternative ways to conceive results, impact and social/policy change, 
acknowledging SSC impacts on ‘final beneficiaries’ can be long term, intangible and/or unmeasurable 
(BPC/ASUL 2017; Esteves 2018; Mazaro 2019). The use of Theory of Change-based contribution analysis 
to assess South-South/triangular cooperation capacity building initiatives, focusing on the processes of 
cooperation as much as on the results, exemplifies these epistemic changes entering the daily practices of 
programmers and evaluators. Some of these debates echo calls from counter-hegemonic actors within 
 
238 Namely from the Ministry of Education-affiliated Fund for Educational Development (FNDE), which since its creation has 
been the major contributor to the CEAH. 
239 INT-BR-72; INT-BR-37; INT-BR-41. 
240 INT-BR-10. 
241 The original PAA Africa included the following countries: Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger and Senegal. From the 
Brazilian side, PAA Africa was led by the then CGFome and the Ministry of Agrarian Development, both extinguished in 
2016. For more on PAA Africa, see Nehring and Hoffmann (2017). 




Aidland, who had been long advocating for a shift from the golden standard of experimental and quasi-
experimental studies244 and from creating success through the ‘generation of sausage numbers’ (Eyben and 
Guijt 2015; also Mosse 2005). Rather, they argue, evaluations should recognise the complexity, uncertainty 
and the longue durée of development processes.  
 
Along similar lines, NeST experts strongly advocate for the use of qualitative methods in SSC evaluation, 
including case studies, reviews, documentations, systematisations, lessons learned, comparative studies, 
ethnographies, contribution analysis and others (NeST 2015; BPC/ASUL 2017; CISSCA 2018).245 
Qualitative methods were also favoured by SSC programmers based on their acute awareness of the lack 
of baseline and monitoring data on SSC projects, the intangible policy-knowledge exchange nature of 
several technical cooperation initiatives, and the limited budget available for M&E activities. Programmers 
and experts within large Southern providers are also politically aware of the ‘attribution’ and ‘responsibility’ 
sensitivities in evaluating SSC initiatives where the other partner is the one in charge of policies and service 
delivery and should be the one collecting data on impacts.246 The quotes from Brazilian and Chinese 
evaluators, below, illustrate these points:  
 
The evaluation tools we could use are ‘significant case studies’. The success and failure ones. We have applied these 
to China’s own programmes and could apply them to cooperation as well. We need something easy.247  
 
Not even with a budget of a million Brazilian reais we could have gathered the quantitative basis to allow for any 
quasi-experimental or randomised study.248  
 
Yet advocating for qualitative methods has not been free from tensions. In Brazil, this is materialised in 
numerous debates within ABC and other national implementation institutions over whether to rely on 
qualitative methods or on more ‘powerful’ quantitative methods that would pass as clear evidence of success 
rather than possible contributions to outcomes in partners countries.249 As put by one senior ABC expert:  
 
We want to go beyond narrating what we did. We had X number of projects and Y was spent. So what? What 
have we actually done? We have 30 years. We are in a position to be a grown-up and demonstrate. We want to have 
a clear set of evidence. This is crucial to our agency.250  
 
 
244 As discussed in Chapter 3, there is a long list of academic and policy studies pointing in this direction and emphasising 
the need for the sector to embrace complexity and uncertainty. For recent iterations, see Honing (2020); Davey (2020); 
Kvangraven (2020). 
245 INT-CH-5; INT-CH-3 
246 INT-BR-37; INT-OSS-3. 
247 INT-CH-5. 
248 INT-BR-72. 




The aforementioned CEAH evaluation offers an additional illustration. While ‘testing waters’ of how to 
evaluate the first five years of its operations, both the Centre’s staff and their ABC counterparts felt the 
need to present ‘telling numbers’ to demonstrate isolated, direct, impact of CEAH actions. Both institutions 
had to balance high hopes of commissioning an evaluation that could come up with clear evidence on the 
impact of the Brazil-led CEAH and the recognition that this was technically difficult. Obstacles included 
the fact that CEAH actions were dispersed across more than 30 countries and primarily advocacy-related.251 
It also included the fact that ‘telling numbers’ would hardly come out of a first general evaluation conducted 
without baselines or robust monitoring systems and with little resources for field missions to collect data 
on the ground.252 The Centre made clear its concerns to evaluators when affirming not being interested in 
‘Tupiniquim evaluations’.253 Tupiniquim is the name of an ancient indigenous people in Brazil and used 
colloquially as a derogatory term to express ‘made in Brazil’. The fear to be assessed through what the 
Centre perceived as less-valued/valuable forms of knowing is revealing of the anxieties within Southern 
providers and a reflection of the continuous epistemic violence in the field. In this case, this violence is 
carried on by one of the new players in town, against itself, in a sign of internalised stigma.  
 
Porter’s (1995) discussion on the ‘power of numbers’ and Espeland and Sauder’s (2007) insights on social 
measures are useful lenses to unpack these anxieties. Both highlight the historical move towards making 
things commensurable, based on quantification and numbers’ power to create objectivity and credibility, 
something undoubtedly valid to development cooperation (Fukuda‐Parr and McNeill 2019). Yet Espeland 
and Sauder also posit that social measures generate critical ‘reflexivity’ on those using them.254 Reflexivity 
was visible in the CEAH evaluation when practitioners both regretted not having ‘powerful numbers’ to 
show but also critically reflected on what numerical evidence (of newly approved school feeding laws, newly 
adopted school feeding programmes, and of the numbers of pupils receiving school meals) represented to 
their own development cooperation and evaluation practices.  
 
Their reflections are indicators of the many tensions embedded in assessing South-South technical 
cooperation/capacity development interventions: first, the existence of intangible and unmeasurable results 
in development partnerships promoting advocacy and high-level policy dialogue activities to build ‘domestic 
coalitions of change’ rather than acting at the operational level with hands-on exchanges or service 
delivery.255 Second, the uncertainty about who is accountable for the results and who is interested or in 
charge of evaluations (the large Southern provider? the other Southern partner? UN agencies?) particularly 
in the cases where implementation is co-shared or de facto led by UN agencies.256 Third, the difficulties in 
 
251 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-14. 
252 INT-BR-59; INT-BR-72. 
253 INT-BR-72. 
254 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-14; INT-BR-16; INT-BR-19; INT-BR-52; INT-BR-72; INT-BR-59; INT-BR-41. 
255 INT-BR-37; INT-BR-58. 
256 INT-BR-50; also ASUL (2020). 
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telling ‘stories of change’ without particular kinds of data, considering that the first evaluations in the 2010s 
had to reconstruct processes and outcomes with insufficient project documentation, thus reinforcing some 
of the transparency and reform debates from within.  
 
 
Measurement politics and global negotiations over South-South cooperation  
 
  
Considering the multiple measurement politics examined so far, is possible to identify three streams of 
negotiations currently shaping global SSC accountability politics. First, at the diplomatic level, between 
rising powers and the rest of the development community. Here Brazil, China and India’s growing openness 
to discussing SSC measurement has led to particular forms of convergence with existing normative and 
operational frameworks for measuring ODA while simultaneously generating friction between Northern 
and Southern providers as well as within the South.  
 
In the North-South axis, no universal normative and epistemic agreement on frameworks and on how to 
count (and account for) all development cooperation flows has been reached. Social pressure from Aidland 
for Southern providers to measure (quantify and evaluate) SSC include a range of influencing strategies 
whereby multilateral and bilateral donors negotiate with Southern providers ways to mainstream 
accountability and measurement issues while accepting that Southern countries, and particularly rising 
powers, will lead on efforts and come with their own solutions to the ‘accountability problem’. In what 
could be seen as a win-win situation, certain UN bodies and Northern knowledge actors, such as the 
German Development Institute (DIE) or the Oxfam confederation, commissioned and published papers 
giving voice to Southern experts and CSOs to present ‘Southern-ways’ to measure SSC.257 UN agencies in 
particular have reinforced the trend towards measuring in joint triangular projects, acting as brokers of 
intergovernmental exchange processes, and/or offering technical support for Southern partners (Esteves 
2018). This has been accompanied and reinforced by bilateral traditional donors (notably the UK, Germany, 
Japan and Australia)258 own diplomatic efforts to enhance the ‘management’ and/or ‘knowledge’ areas 
within ‘SSC bureaucracies’, through funding studies, policy dialogues, institutional strengthening activities, 
and M&E of SSC initiatives.  
 
Southern providers, in their turn, have consistently emphasised their autonomy in deciding how to measure 
SSC, showing greater preference for ‘country-led’/‘non-binding’ measures and a lack of urgency in forging 
cross-regional consensus on the matter. There is, nonetheless, variance in the ways rising powers have 
projected their preferences. Brazil has shown a critical-conciliatory diplomacy; China a more pragmatic (if 
 
257 Examples include Esteves (2018); Ali (2018); ASUL/Oxfam (2018); Mitra (2018); Besharati and MacFeely (2019). 
258 While the UK and Japan have worked with Brazil, China and India. Germany has mostly worked at the global level and 
bilaterally with Brazil and India, while Australia has mostly worked with China.  
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not disinterested) one; and India has adopted more critical-resistance stances. Diplomatic behaviour also 
translated into Brazil and China featuring a wider range of domestic experimentations with measuring than 
India (Esteves 2018; Rizzo 2019a; Milani 2019; also Chapters 5 and 6). Finally, rather than co-optation, 
North-South negotiations reveal complex processes of mutual socialisation, with both an increased 
politicisation of measurement debates (in some cases leading to dead-ends at the multilateral level) and at 
the same time conceptual and methodological experimentation and innovation at the operational level both 
in rising powers and in multilaterals. 
 
At the same time, agreement has not been reached along the South-South axis due to the plurality of SSC 
partnerships and the unwillingness of some large providers, quietly China and vocally India, to devise 
common frameworks for measuring SSC. Indian opposition is marked by a will to assert country’s identity 
in opposition to a ‘Northern/Western’ paradigm and to alleged ‘Chinese or Latin American models’, in a 
demonstration of symbolic and material competition. Indian diplomatic and para-diplomatic stances are 
also increasingly pragmatic, in the ways suggested by Miller and Sullivan de Estrada (2017, 28) of 
‘pragmatism as bricolage’: acting less to transform the world than to carve a more favourable space in it, 
through ‘the selection and fusion of different—and sometimes competing—ideas and ideological 
commitments in order to improvise new policy positions’.259 
 
Lack of advances at the inter-state level on norms and tools result from the fragmentation and competition 
dynamics unfolding in the field, but also to the current shaky state of global governance. Unwilling or 
unable to create their own autonomous negotiation table, as demonstrated by the short-lived Core Group 
of Southern Partners,260 little progress has happened at formal large multilateral forums like the UNDCF 
or the BAPA+40 process. After more than a decade of debates, the South still asks for more time and space 
to lead on discussions and move them forward (Corrêa 2017; Li 2018; Escallón 2019), while remaining 
strongly divided on the matter. Whereas for some countries more time means a commitment to keep 
building a consensus, for others this is a useful strategy to achieve an indefinite postponement.  
 
The second set of negotiations is happening within the global development epistemic community. On the 
one hand, experts within Aidland continue to devise new ‘universal’ accountability tools to account for 
development flows, embracing a ‘equator-less’/‘beyond aid’ era where flows from ‘traditional’ and ‘new’ 
public and non-public actors are counted together (I. Mitchell, Ritchie and Rogerson 2020; Sumner et al. 
2020). On the other hand, Southern experts, including inside NeST, remain attached to their ‘Southern-
based contributions’ to these debates but divided over whether and how to count SSC. Southern experts 
have helped setting the agenda around SSC measurement while acting along what Walter Mignolo once 
 
259 An illustration of this contemporary identity-quest can be seen in Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar (2020) 
new book ‘The Indian Way’.   
260 The Group met briefly from 2013 to 2015. 
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called ‘epistemic disobedience’ (Caixeta 2015; Rizzo 2019a). Numerous debates were hosted in a range of 
Southern providers and at the margins of international forums. Yet little agreement was achieved, indicating 
that both intergovernmental and epistemic consensus are unlikely considering the ongoing macro-
geopolitical divides, the various degrees of foreign policy autonomist stances, and the individual and 
institutional micro-disputes among and within the Southern expert/policy communities.261 
 
Finally, a third set of SSC measurement negotiations is taking place within rising powers. These internal 
divergences between knowledge and policy actors, and within these groups, have had an influence on Brazil, 
China and India diplomatic behaviour across time. Domestic negotiations not only sustained international 
activism but also created more (or less) unified diplomatic stances. The active gatekeeping by a few actors 
in the Indian case and the plurality of voices in the Brazilian case clearly show two opposing dynamics, as 
I will show in Chapters 5 and 6. Internal negotiations—present in all three countries despite their greater 
salience in Brazil—reveal fractures over foreign policy and international roles, over development 
cooperation, and over how to produce knowledge about it. They also reveal policy management and 
bureaucratic/institutional competition, in which actors (development practitioners, knowledge actors and 
civil society groups) jump scales and use transnational arenas to disseminate their own views and 
preferences. Arguably, the types of domestic actors participating in global arenas, or their diversity, remains 
bounded by context-specific policy styles and state-society relations. Yet, across the three countries, 
domestic actors have expanded their transnational activism and participated in several tables at the same 
time, aligned or challenging official governmental stances, as I will discuss in subsequent chapters.  
 
Importantly, domestic disputes also re-politicise global problematisations of SSC measurement, questioning 
the purpose or usefulness of differentiation-driven diplomatic measurement battles. At the operational 
level, programmers are increasingly questioning the predominance of measurement debates and how the 
agenda grew out of diplomats and knowledge actors’ will to foster geopolitical and/or knowledge disputes. 
As put by a Mexican programmer at AMEXCID: ‘What is the use of knowing the amounts, if we do not 
know what we do?’.262 This somewhat echoes the ponderings of a South African researcher to whom ‘the 
whole preoccupation with measurement is maybe too narrow. Researchers are not asking government what 
their needs are’.263 Ultimately, for practitioners looking at global controversies from their own frail ‘SSC 
bureaucracies’, the most pressing problems might be less about disputing how to count cooperation efforts 





261 INT-BR-4; INT-BR-5; INT-OSS-2.  







This chapter examined how measurement became a prevalent SSC accountability issue at the global level. 
It did so out of a several emerging understandings of accountability in/of SSC (accountability to SSC 
principles, accountability between Southern partners, domestic democratic accountability, and 
accountability towards peoples of the South) and of several competing issues (transparency of flows, 
compliance with ‘donorship’ norms, and attention to developmental impacts on local populations).  
 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the growing calls for accountability in/of SSC been met with both resistance and 
differentiated integration strategies by rising powers. This chapter unpacked how, from 2013 onwards, 
Brazil, China and India showed signs of discursive accommodation, of normative, policy and epistemic 
entrepreneurship, as well as attempts to conduct internal ‘pro-accountability’ measurement-related reforms. 
Rather than full compliance with existing standards, this shift has generated a multitude of controversies. 
‘Measurement battles’, as I have called them, result from Southern governments and knowledge actors 
disputing meanings, concepts and ways to operationalise SSC measurement tools, based on differentiation 
claims vis-à-vis ODA and vis-à-vis each other: Brazil as ‘non-Asian’, India and Brazil as ‘non-China’, China 
as a large donor ‘still learning’ how to be a donor.     
 
Against this backdrop, I claimed that negotiations over accountability and measurement observed around 
BAPA+40 are the product of three inter-related dynamics: first, external social pressure and demands on 
rising powers to measure their cooperation as ways to justify internationally what they do. Second, the 
responses by Southern providers and the epistemic battles and innovations they put forward. Third, the 
two-way socialisation happening across Aidland and SSC-land around how to practice measurement and 
accountability.  
 
The exact balance between resistance, compliance, experimentation and innovation varied across rising 
powers. While Brazil (and others in Latin America) advanced the public spending-transparency nexus in 
their SSC, India kept both the strong resistance non-interference and defensive differentiation claims to 
dismiss the appropriateness or utility of engaging in SSC accountability debates in formal global arenas. 
However, India used (and crafted) other ‘tables’ to show Southern ways to think and do accountability, 
emphasising the plurality of SSC and an opposition to stronger and binding common frameworks. China 
kept a more pragmatic and selective approach. While less interested in forging epistemic battles globally 
Beijing joined others in opposing stronger normative advances on SSC and engaged in cautious 
experimentations to internationally justify some of its SSC-related engagements.  
 
These negotiations are also revealing of the ‘measurement paradox’ faced by large SSC providers. The 
paradox consists of navigating prevailing forms of development ‘measurementality’ and specific foreign 
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policy dilemmas that create opportunities to showcase rising powers’ contributions to global development 
and boost international status quests while fostering numerous geopolitical, epistemic and domestic 
tensions. Rather than purely methodological debates, Southern responses and alternative propositions are 
unquestionably political. Conceptual and operational innovation by Southern providers in practicing 
measurement reveal different degrees of discomfort with current ODA metrics and with being measured 
by others but also Southern actors’ willingness to reinvent methodologies and produce new standards that 
might rank them higher. At the same time, through their activism, rising powers unavoidably fall in patterns 
of rendering the accountability discussion technical. By doing so, SSC providers (starting with the larger 
ones) risk being caught in the same shortcomings of managerial accountability and the ‘results agenda’ of 
North-South cooperation, that is, of reducing knowing to quantification, of overly focusing on 
technocratic/managerial understandings of accountability as counting, and ultimately working to showcase 
performance and generosity rather than for transformational change.  
 
Finally, the chapter highlighted the importance of internal factors in shaping transnational disputes. As SSC 
became more materially and politically important not only were the win-win and solidarity discourses 
questioned in the name of clearer mutual benefits on the ground, but also the separation between 
governments demands/priorities and domestic constituencies’ demands/priorities became difficult to be 
sustained, creating multiple tensions, contradictions, disjunctions and new calls for accountability that were 
also brought to the transnational arena. These calls have remained relatively marginalised at the global level 
by the omnipresence of geopolitical and epistemic measurement politics. For much of the early days, SSC 
was too small in domestic budgets and politics to be noticed, but already too big in global development 
flows and geopolitics to be ignored. This has changed from 2010 onwards creating not only new global 
dynamics but also a set of domestic accountability politics to be examined in the next chapters. 
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Late in 2010, Brazil published the first edition of its Cobradi report: a comprehensive survey of country’s 
contribution to international development. In his foreword, then President Lula da Silva said:    
 
The Brazilian government believes that cooperation for development is not limited to the interaction between donors 
and recipients: we understand it as an exchange between equals, with mutual benefits and responsibilities. It is a 
model still under construction, which despite revealing a few of its features, still lacks greater systematization and 
debate. Accordingly, this survey represents the first step towards building a policy of international cooperation for 
development, integrated into Brazilian foreign policy goals, which is not subject to the priorities of each government, 
but may also count on the strong support of the State and civil society. (IPEA/ABC 2011).264 
 
Lula’s words convey the then reformist intents of Brazilian development cooperation, a field that was—
and remains so—in-the-making. As a measurement tool, Cobradi was conceived to show the world that its 
‘alternative model’ was possible, to assist the federal government in showcasing country’s role as a 
‘development partner’, and to help consolidating development cooperation as a state policy in Brazil. It was 
also about ‘practicing transparency’ in a Southern way.  
 
Southern ways of conceiving and practicing accountability and the domestic disputes around it are the focus 
of this chapter on Brazil and the following chapter on China and India. The two chapters examine unfolding 
problematisations and negotiations of accountability in SSC in Brazil, China and India, exploring (i) how has 
SSC accountability been problematised domestically; (ii) the actors driving and engaging with these 
problematisations and the kinds of accountability issues they have raised; and (iii) the kinds of negotiations 
and reforms unfolding.  
 
In this chapter, I show three types of accountability politics currently playing out in Brazil. The first is 
political and relates to ‘meta’ foreign policy debates over the appropriateness of the South-South axis and 
state-developmentalism to Brazilian international identity and ambitions. The second one is managerial and 
revolves around bureaucratic disputes over development cooperation budgets, management and 
measurement. The third one is social and relates to state-society disputes over transparency, the right to 
participate in development cooperation policymaking, and over development models being ‘exported’ 
through SSC initiatives (further discussed in Chapter 7). 
 
 
264 Original translation. The first edition of Cobradi was published in Portuguese, in 2010, and in English, in 2011.  
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In other to make sense of the Brazilian landscape, I draw on Rennes (2016) distinction between expert 
political controversies and public political controversies. In particular, I argue that public debates (and even 
controversies) over accountability in/of Brazilian SSC have revolved mostly around country’s broader and 
strategic foreign policy options and around few politically visible dimensions (or modalities) of the ‘Brazilian 
SSC compact’, namely the BNDES export credit operations and public-private investments in Africa. These 
debates have developed in tandem with growing politicisation of Brazilian foreign policy in the past decade. 
The remaining dimensions, including technical cooperation—Brazil’s flagship SSC modality—remained 
largely invisible in the public arena except for a few debates on Brazil-Africa agricultural exchanges. Public 
invisibility, I posit, is explained by the relative lack of materiality of technical cooperation exchanges in 
public budgets and in public imaginaries. Lack of materiality also shaped the low salience of SSC issues to 
Brazilian audit and control systems, excepting again for the case of BNDES.   
 
Lastly, while looking at epistemic (or expert) debates and negotiations I argue that emerging experimentation 
in quantifying and evaluating SSC responds to the activism by internal champions within the Brazilian ‘SSC 
ecosystem’265 in government and civil society, in dialogue with international partners. Materiality and 
visibility dilemmas explain both the search for alternative ways to count and showcase Brazilian SSC but 
also the tensions generated between and within ‘SSC bureaucracies’ in Brazil in times of political crisis and 
austerity.    
 
In the rest of the chapter, I first set the broader sociopolitical context in which SSC accountability politics 
have emerged. Next, I discuss measurement and audit politics. In each section, I have utilised paradigmatic 
examples of SSC modalities and/or initiatives where different domestic SSC accountability politics 
(bureaucratic, epistemic and state-society relations) interact.   
 
 
Problematising South-South relations: ‘noisy’ politicisation and growing audit 
cultures   
 
 
Days after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff, in May 2016, cutting short a cycle of four electoral victories 
from the Workers’ Party (PT), José Serra, the new Chancellor and well-known opposition figure,266 
 
265 Here again, I borrow the term ‘SSC ecosystem’ from the work done by the Islamic Development Bank on the ‘national 
ecosystems for South-South and Triangular Cooperation’ (IsDB 2019). 
266 President Dilma Rousseff (affiliated with the PT) was outset in a controversial and highly divisive impeachment process. 
Her vice-President, Michel Temer (affiliated with the right-wing party Brazilian Democratic Movement - MDB) took power 
in May 2016. Serra is affiliated with the centre-right Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB). He was Temer’s first Minister 
of Foreign Affairs between 2016 and 2017. Between 1998-2002, Serra was also Minister of Health under Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso’s (1995-2002) presidency.    
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promised to reform Brazilian foreign policy as to adopt a more pragmatic South-South strategy based on 
concrete results. In his inaugural address, Serra stated that:  
 
Contrary to what was disseminated among us, modern Africa does not ask for compassion, but expects effective 
economic, technological, and investment exchanges. (…) This is the correct South-South strategy, not the one that 
came to be practiced for advertising purposes, scarce economic benefits and large diplomatic investments. (MRE 
2016).267                                               
 
His address contains important elements of the broader political context in which SSC has evolved in Brazil 
throughout the 2010s. Looking at this context, I contend that Brazilian domestic SSC accountability politics 
have been largely shaped by three interlocking factors. First, the intense and ‘noisy’268 politicisation of 
Brazilian foreign policy during the PT era—under  Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-
2016)—and after Rousseff’s impeachment until the election of Jair Bolsonaro, in 2018 (Faria 2008; Cason 
and Power 2009; D. B. Lopes 2011; Faria and Lopes 2019). This politicisation produced fault lines across 
domestic stakeholders on the appropriateness of the Brazilian national/international developmental state 
and along the South-South axis of Brazilian foreign policy (Waisbich 2020b). Second, the growing audit and 
evidence-based policymaking wave silently penetrating Brazilian public management, particularly at the 
federal level, accelerated by austerity measures since 2016 (Faria 2005; Filgueiras 2018; Donadelli 2020).269 
Last, the complex political-institutional consequences of the mega anti-corruption Lava Jato Operation, 
initiated in 2014, on Brazilian public affairs, public accountability dynamics, Brazilian foreign policy, and 
on the work of development organisations like BNDES (Avritzer and Marona 2017; E. Mello and Spektor 
2018; Dye and Alencastro 2020).  
 
These three factors affected the Brazilian ‘SSC compact’ in uneven ways, exposing some areas to scrutiny 
more than others and contributing, unevenly, to generate public accountability debates and calls for the 
executive to justify its policy actions on certain aspects of its global development engagements. While both 
the Brazil-Africa agenda and Brazil’s relations with left-wing governments in Latin America (notably, Cuba 
and Venezuela) have been particularly targeted in the broader ‘meta-accountability politics’ over Brazilian 
foreign policy options, specific SSC projects or initiatives received less attention, notable exceptions include 
the ProSavana initiative with Mozambique (see Chapters 1 and 7), Brazilian leadership in the UN peace 
 
267 The original extract in Portuguese reads: ‘Ao contrário do que se procurou difundir entre nós, a África moderna não pede 
compaixão, mas espera um efetivo intercâmbio econômico, tecnológico e de investimentos. (...) Essa é a estratégia Sul-Sul 
correta, não a que chegou a ser praticada com finalidades publicitárias, escassos benefícios econômicos e grandes 
investimentos diplomáticos’. 
268 The expression ‘noisy politicisation’ (politização ruidosa, in Portuguese) was coined by Belém Lopes (2011).  
269 Early 2016, in the final months of Rousseff’s government and already under fiscal austerity, the Federal government has 
also created a new inter-ministerial M&E unit (CMAP - Conselho de Monitoramento e Avaliação de Políticas Públicas, in 
Portuguese). The committee worked for about two years, having reduced its activities since the arrival of Bolsonaro to the 
Presidency. In 2018, IPEA published a new ex-post evaluation guide. Both have a strong results-based management/cost-
effectiveness approach to evaluating public policies (INT-BR-68; INT-BR-72). For a recent discussion on subnational level 
dynamics, see Fernandes et al. (2020). 
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operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (see Waisbich and Pomeroy 2014), and humanitarian assistance toward 
Venezuelans seeking asylum in Brazil (see Charleaux 2018). The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), as 
an institution, remained marginal in public SSC policy and accountability-related debates and away from 
either broad or narrow accountability calls, although not from experts’ and CSOs’ calls, as I will discuss 
shortly. Alternatively, BNDES so-called ‘international operations’ have been object of political, civil society, 
experts’ and judicial scrutiny. Operations were also object of multiple political, management and social 
accountability disputes throughout PT’s rule and beyond, having generated their own forms of 
accountability reforms, as I show in the last section. 
 
 




Brazil’s diplomatic stances on measuring SSC, as examined in Chapter 4, have been critical yet cognisant of 
the importance of the agenda for both policy management and country’s global status-seeking ambitions. 
In this section, I show how this critical-conciliatory diplomatic approach has been accompanied by a wide, 
albeit dispersed, range of experimentations inside and outside the government to measure (quantify, report 
and evaluate) Brazil’s South-South technical cooperation. I also show how SSC practitioners and experts 
have navigated the politics of evidence but also the politics of visibility embedded in these counting and 
accounting exercises.        
 
Finding ways to quantify and report: Cobradi and its discontents 
 
[Cobradi] is about practicing transparency and proving the usefulness of efforts at promoting cooperation, both for Brazilian 
citizens, who will have means for analysis, and also for the governments of other developing countries willing to better evaluate 
cooperation opportunities abroad. (Antonio Patriota, Foreign Minister’s foreword to Cobradi’s second edition)270 
 
‘Marketing success’ and finding ways to tell country’s developmental success stories has been a major 
feature of Brazil’s identity as a rising power in international development (Constantine and Shankland 2017). 
Already in the early 2000s, Brasília decided to ‘tropicalise the MDGs’,271 as framed by one interviewee, 
finding nationally-relevant ways to report on its positive progress on each goal.272 This will to tropicalise is 
 
270 The second edition was published in Portuguese, in 2013. The English translation came out in 2014 (IPEA/ABC 2014).  
271 INT-BR-44. 
272 Between 2004-2014, published five National Implementation Reports and hosted five editions of the Brazil MDGs 
Award to encourage national innovation along the goals. Brazil has also championed the transition from a ‘donors-led’ 
MDGs agenda (Fukuda-Parr 2016) to a more ambitious SDGs agenda, leading on a significantly part of the initial steps in 
the road to the SDGs when hosting Rio+20 Conference, in 2012. 
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also at the origin of the Brazilian Cooperation for International Development report (hereafter, Cobradi 
report),273 led by the governmental think-tank IPEA in partnership with ABC.274  
 
Through Cobradi, Brazil has been surveying and publicising its development cooperation flows since 2010.275 
Cobradi reverberated among the global development community because, as indicated by former Foreign 
Minister Patriota: ‘It was the first time a developing country disclosed information on its development 
cooperation based on a methodology that reflected the particular characteristics of its South-South 
cooperation model’ (IPEA/ABC 2014, foreword).276 This systematic reporting of SSC flows outside the 
DAC reporting framework remains unique among rising powers (Milani 2019).  
 
Cobradi’s methodology combines quantitative information on Brazilian international development 
expenditures and qualitative descriptions of its cooperation praxis. It refers not only to the development 
flows between Southern/developing countries but also to contributions to the so-called ‘global 
development public goods’ (including contributions to multilateral organisations, peacekeeping operations, 
humanitarian assistance, and refugees’ protection, etc.). As such, while reflecting ‘Brazilian practices’ (J. B. 
B. Lima and Pereira Jr. 2019), Cobradi’s 10-year old methodology is surprisingly in line with contemporary 
debates on ‘universal development’/‘beyond ODA’ metrics (see Horner and Hulme 2017; Sumner et al. 
2020). Lacking a formal and more robust legal framework for development cooperation—and  despite 
IPEA’s reiterated claims that Cobradi’s operational concepts should not be interpreted as Brazilian 
government official position on modalities and definitions (Campos, J. B. B. Lima and Gonzalez 2012)— 
Brazil’s official working definition of SSC became the one set in Cobradi reports. IPEA’s disclaimer reflects 
a widespread recognition among Brazilian development experts and practitioners that definitions needed 
to be politically—rather than technically—agreed upon as part of a larger, and unfinished, consolidation 
effort to build a national cooperation system (Beghin 2014; Milani 2018). 
 
To date, five editions of Cobradi were published, surveying flows from 2005 to 2018.277 The last report came 
out in December 2020. Cobradi accounting remained, nonetheless, limited to ‘federal expenses’, leaving out 
information on subnational governments, public enterprises, autarchies or the judiciary.278 Cobradi 
 
273 In Portuguese, Cobradi is the acronym for Cooperação Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento Internacional.  
274 IPEA is the most important governmental think-thank in Brazil. The Institute has been historically nested within the 
Ministry of Planning, which since the last ministerial reform, in January 2019, was merged with the Ministry of Economy. 
275 According to national experts, other quantification exercises were conducted before, but they were very preliminary 
and remained internal to ABC (INT-BR-44).  
276 Other than the Brazilian government, research participants from other countries referred to Cobradi as a source of 
inspiration and/or learning for their own quantification efforts (INT-IN-11; INT-OSS-11; INT-OSS-10; INT-OSS-12; INT-CH-5). 
277 The first edition, published in 2010, covers the years of 2005-2009. The second one, published in 2013, includes data 
from 2010. The third edition, published in 2016, refers to the period between 2011-2013. The fourth one, published in 
2018, contains data for 2014-2016. The last edition came out in December 2020 and contains data from 2017 and 2018. 
278 For instance, IPEA’s own technical cooperation, which includes flagship initiatives such the Brazil-UNDP International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) and the SocioProtection.Org platform, is not fully accounted. Neither are the full 
operational costs associated with the Brazil-Africa and Brazil-Latin America Integration Universities, UNILAB and UNILA, 
respectively (INT-BR-26; INT-BR-44; INT-BR-34; INT-BR-6). 
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methodology also left out development finance-like flows from BNDES, another longstanding demand 
from the Brazilian SSC policy community (Leite et al. 2014). This narrow focus made several experts affirm 
that Cobradi was not properly measuring Brazilian cooperation. According to one interviewee: ‘Cobradi 
probably only captures 25-30% of the cooperation provided by Brazil, on an optimistic projection’.279 
 
Aware of these limitations, Cobradi researchers often described their tool as an ‘ever changing effort’, ‘always 
in-the-making’, and a ‘learning journey’.280 In 2010, SSC was high on the presidential agenda and showcasing 
Brazilian efforts was politically important.281 Lula himself authored the preface to the first edition. After 
him, however, Cobradi’s journey closely mirrored the ‘ebbs and flows’ of Brazilian SSC (Cesarino 2019; also 
Appendix 3). Cobradi was intended as an annual effort but this was never the case and none of the following 
editions had a foreword signed by the President. Table 1, below, shows this journey across time.  
 
Practicing transparency, therefore, has not been easy. Like ODA metrics, Cobradi’s methodology was the 
object of successive reforms and multiple debates. The Cobradi team has faced political, methodological and 
technical challenges to count Brazilian cooperation, resulting from divergences on what should be counted 
as SSC and from the fragmentation of Brazil’s SSC system. This included disagreements on what 
cooperation modalities to include (i.e., BNDES export credit operations) and on how to name them. It also 
included definitional issues such as whether to account for ‘fully concessional expenditures’ (as stated in 
the first report) or ‘public expenditures that are neither investments nor grants, except in the case of official 
donations’ (as stated in the second report). Cobradi researchers also faced political challenges to mobilise 
support within IPEA and among Brazilian implementing agencies. Collating data on development 
operation-related expenditure and practices was challenging since Presidents after Lula (Rousseff, Temer 
and Bolsonaro) showed less and less interest in the agenda and many implementing agencies were entering 
their own ‘cooperation fatigue’ (Farias 2018; Cesarino 2019; Waisbich 2020b). Furthermore, several 
institutions had no proper records of their past cooperation initiatives or lacked a comprehensive overview 
of who was engaging in SSC, with whom and on what, mirroring the very fragmentation of SSC within 








280 INT-BR-36; INT-BR-35. 
281 Insiders suggested that President Lula wanted to present the first Cobradi to the world in his speech at the UN General 
Assembly of that year (Campos, Lima, and Gonzalez 2012). The report could only be finalised a few months later, in 
December, the last month of Lula’s government. 
282 INT-BR-34; INT-BR-55. 
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Table 1 - Cobradi’s journey (2010-2020) 
 
 
Source: IPEA/ABC 2011; 2014; 2017; 2018; IPEA 2020 
 
Cobradi and other measurement initiatives across the Brazilian SSC ecosystem generated, moreover, their 
own forms of inter-bureaucratic competition, tensions and anxieties.283 ‘Cobradi focal points’—many of 
them acting as ‘ambassadors of SSC’284 within SSC implementing institutions—reported challenges to 
justify internally (to their peers and superiors) the need to devote time to managing information on 
something that was deemed marginal to their overall mandates.285 Cobradi-driven transparency was also 
challenging for ‘SSC bureaucracies’ in what it revealed of internal thematic priorities and/or management 
disfunctions, including pay gaps.286 Anxieties are also found in ABC and IPEA’s back-and-forth of Cobradi’s 
excel sheets with figures on SSC flows per country based on a fear that rankings would diverge from the 
official commitment to geographically focus its technical cooperation in Latin America and Portuguese-
 
283 A similar point was made about ‘aid transparency’ by Honig and Weaver (2019). 
284 Here use the term ‘ambassadors’ in the sense employed by Porto de Oliveira (2017) to describe the role of particular 
individuals as champions of certain policies and issues in the context of policy diffusion.  
285 INT-BR-34; INT-BR-47. João Brigido, researcher at IPEA and Cobradi’s coordinator, made a similar point in an 
International Measurement event hosted by ABC, in 2018, I attended, when commenting on Cobradi’s learnings of the 
strategic importance of having senior political staff within implementing agencies as ‘Cobradi focal points’, rather than 
technical-level ones.  
286 INT-BR-55.  
Edition Publication 
year 




at the time of 
publication 
Foreword author 
1st 2010 2005-2009 66 Luiz Inácio Lula da 
Silva  
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,  
Brazil’s President 
2nd 2013 2010 91 Dilma Rousseff Antonio de Aguiar 
Patriota, Brazil’s Foreign 
Minister 
3rd 2016 2011-2013 95 Michel Temer Ernesto Lozardo, IPEA’s 
President 
4th 2018 2014-2016 126 Michel Temer Ernesto Lozardo, IPEA’s 
President 
5th  2020 2017-2018 243/262 Jair Bolsonaro  Ivan T. M. Oliveira, 
Director of International 






speaking countries in Africa.287  Transparency-related anxieties can also be seen in IPEA’s resistance to 
publish Cobradi’s microdata in an open format, despite a longstanding demand from academia and civil 
society for open-access (ASUL 2017), which it end up doing only for the 2014-2016 survey. 288 289 
   
Against the odds, Cobradi has resisted the political turbulence by adapting and changing itself. After releasing 
the fourth edition, in 2018, the Cobradi team announced their intention to change the reporting 
methodology and move to a two-track model of continuous online publishing of expenditures, based on 
budgetary analysis, and periodic narrative reports on cooperation practices (J. B. B. Lima and Pereira Jr. 
2019).290 That said, whether Cobradi researchers will be able to move forward with their plans under 
Bolsonaro’s government remains uncertain.291  
 
Retrospectively, is clear that the ways Cobradi’s metrics were designed and evolved impacted on SSC 
accountability dynamics within Brazil. By limiting the definition of development cooperation, excluding 
development finance and subnational initiatives, the Brazilian government has only committed to be 
(internationally) accountable for the modalities included in the report (Milani and Carvalho 2013), rendering 
the remaining ones officially invisible. Certainly, IPEA’s Cobradi team worked as convening actor, and as 
an internal accountability pressure point within the Esplanada,292 inciting implementing agencies to publicise 
and thus open their activities to scrutiny.293 However, limited to its transparency functions, Cobradi remained 
a ‘toothless’ accountability tool (Fox 2007b). This reflects the fact that neither IPEA nor ABC had the 
political power to promote cross-agency transparency reforms and the necessary political support at the 
Presidential level, backed by a strategic view on SSC and a national law to implement it (Westmann 2017; 
Milani 2018).294 The ways other stakeholders, within and outside the state, perceived these limitations and 
 
287 INT-BR-35; INT-BR-36. 
288 Cobradi 2014-2016 micro-data (microdados, in Portuguese) can be found at 
https://www.ipea.gov.br/portal/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=34507&Itemid=433 (last access: 
20/12/2020). 
289 Beyond Cobradi, transparency-related anxieties also surfaced when the former CGFome—a unit created within Itamaraty, 
in 2004, to help Brazil globally diffusing the knowledge of the Zero Hunger Strategy and responsible for Brazilian food 
assistance and some food security-related technical cooperation including PAA Africa—decided in 2013 to launch its own 
transparency portal, SIGMA (see https://prezi.com/4b4-w0cvrwj5/funcionamento-do-sigma-cgfome/ (last access: 
28/07/2020). The move made ABC wary about other institutions ‘oversharing’ and creating extra-pressure on them to 
publicise more. After the impeachment, CGFome was dismantled and ABC became officially responsible for coordinating 
Brazilian humanitarian cooperation (see Suyama, Waisbich and Leite 2016) and SIGMA was never completed (INT-BR-50). 
290 INT-BR-35; INT-BR-36.  
291 During my fieldwork period, in 2019, Cobradi researchers were working to publish 2017-2018 data, already in the new 
format. At that time, Cobradi was already losing support inside IPEA and with ABC. This data was finally released by IPEA in 
December 2020, a few days before the submission of this thesis.  
292 Esplanada is a widely used term to refer to the Brazilian Federal Executive. Esplanada dos Ministérios, the Ministries 
Promenade, refers to the location in Brasilia where most line-ministries buildings are located.  
293 INT-BR-2.  
294 There is little evidence, for instance, that SSC-related knowledge management within implementing agencies has 
significantly changed to either feed Cobradi or achieve harmonisation across the Brazilian federal executive (INT-BR-35; 
INT-BR-36; INT-BR-33; INT-BR-44; INT-BR-55; INT-BR-41). 
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challenged them is not only at the origins of Cobradi’s successive reforms but also of SSC measurement 
‘duelling’ inside Brazil, to which I turn now.  
 
Measurement ‘duelling’  
 
The fragmentation of and competition between accountability tools and/or infrastructures found in Aidland 
is also observable in Brazil. Despite its innovative character, Cobradi had many discontents and was 
countered by other governmental and non-governmental ‘SSC counting initiatives’. Their emergence shows 
the degree of measurement ‘duelling’ inside Brazil.295   
 
A first competing initiative was the proposal for a Brazilian International Development Platform, led by 
the Strategic Affairs division within the Presidency in partnership with ABC.296 The Platform started to be 
designed in 2016, under Temer’s presidency, under the same public transparency rationale found in Cobradi, 
namely that development cooperation is a public policy subjected to transparency requirements under 
Brazil’s Access to Information Law. Yet the Platform differs from Cobradi by being more ‘quantification-
centred’ and more attentive to capturing development cooperation inflows and outflows (known in Brazil 
as ‘received’ and ‘provided’ cooperation), including from/to the federal government and from/to state-
enterprises, subnational and non-state actors.297 Moreover, the Platform is being conceived in a post-PT 
era by an alternative ‘Paris-philo’ policy-epistemic community within the Brazilian state,298 comprised of 
development experts within IPEA not currently leading on Cobradi and ABC experts that now seek (or have 
come to accept) a harmonisation with OECD methodologies and greater dialogue with TOSSD after 
Brazil’s bid to join the organisation in 2016.299 The shift towards OECD is at the core of the new proposal, 
even if not always admitted by Brazilian diplomats or ABC representatives.300 Experts leading on the effort 
have a clear intent for the Platform to replace Cobradi in a near future as the Brazil’s official quantification 
and reporting tool. Its future is, nonetheless, dependent on the ability of those leading on this effort to keep 
the ‘bureaucratic momentum’301 considering Bolsonaro’s government lack of interest in the SSC agenda 
 
295 The term ‘duelling’ was first utilised by PWYF (2017) to characterise the measurement and reporting landscape in the 
US and the competition between ‘aid tracking tools’.  
296 The Platform was inserted under the umbrella of a long-term development thinking strategic initiative named ‘Brasil 3 
Tempos’, conducted in partnership with UNDP. See ‘Projeto Brasil 3 Tempos: 2007, 2015 e 2022’, available at 
http://www.iea.usp.br/pesquisa/projetos-institucionais/projetos-especias-anteriores/brasil-3-tempos-1 (last access: 
23/10/2020).  
297 INT-BR-33; INT-BR-44; INT-BR-47. 
298 A similar finding was described by Zea (2016) in Mexico’s diplomatic body, to which he named the ‘Paris and New York 
courants’ to differentiate those within Mexican diplomacy closer to traditional donors and those closer to the G77+China.  
299 INT-BR-44. This is clearly stated in the narrative justifying and describing the Platform (Draft Platform ToR, from 
February 2018), to which the researcher had access. 
300 INT-BR-33; INT-BR-44; INT-BR-47. 
301 This expression was first introduced to me by Michelle Morais de Sá e Silva as referring to the set of bureaucratic 
dynamics that have sustained Brazilian SSC amidst the presidential retreat phase.   
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and ABC’s current cautious, low-profile, ‘below-the-radar survival approach’ (Waisbich 2021; also 
Appendix 3).302  
 
Around the same time, a different infrastructure was proposed by a group of non-governmental knowledge 
actors led by the independent think-tank Articulação SUL in partnership with Oxfam Brazil.303 Their 
proposal consisted of an open-data methodology to count Brazilian SSC using public budget information 
systems.304 Their quantification efforts ‘from below’ aimed at countering perceived shortcomings of 
governmental transparency initiatives (including Cobradi and ABC’s project database).305 Civil society groups 
have long criticised official efforts for their limited scope, predictability and frequency (Beghin 2014; 
Waisbich, Silva and Suyama 2017). Their methodology was presented as ‘complementary’ to Cobradi while 
also ‘more appropriate’ than IPEA’s surveys to capture what is planned and spent by the Brazilian state 
over a longer time span and on an ongoing basis.306 Besides circumventing Cobradi’s publication delays, they 
also emphasised the public accountability and participation gains of using publicly available open-data 
budgetary tools (L. Lopes and Costa 2018). While echoing budget transparency arguments from ‘aid 
monitoring movements’, this civil society-led initiative strongly relied on previous activism on budgetary 
open-data in Brazil from national CSOs like the Brasília-based INESC.307 
 
Despite failing to consolidate itself into a full-fledged ‘tracking tool’, this civil society-led pilot has, 
nonetheless, unveiled a complementary set of measurement politics around Brazilian SSC.308 First, counting 
‘from below’ revealed a certain degree of invisibility of Brazilian SSC within the federal budget. Not only 
existing budget information systems worked according to budgetary-administrative logics that do not 
allowed for development cooperation to be tracked as an unified set of expenditures, but also certain 
modalities, such as BNDES export credits, were accounted separately from the rest of federal expenses 
 
302 Though the original plans were to have the new infrastructure finished in 2019, the Platform and the online 
Observatory of International Cooperation for Development to accompany it are not yet in place. 
303 This was developed under a project named ‘Looking for South-South Cooperation in the Federal Budget’. See 
(ASUL/Oxfam Brasil 2017; 2018). Other organisations involved include: Ação Educativa, the BRICS Policy Centre, the 
Brazilian Network for Peoples’ Integration - REBRIP, Conectas Human Rights, MSF Brasil, among others. The project had an 
Oversight Group comprised of representatives of IPEA/NeST Brazil, Conectas Human Rights, BRICS Policy Centre, 
Development Initiatives, LABMUNDO/UERJ and Oxfam Brasil (ASUL/Oxfam Brasil 2017). 
304 Namely the federal government financial management systems (SIAFI and its public interface SIOP), the Pluri-Annual 
Plans (known as PPA), and the Transparency Portal. Available at 
https://www.siop.planejamento.gov.br/modulo/login/index.html#/, https://www.gov.br/economia/pt-
br/assuntos/planejamento-e-orcamento/plano-plurianual-ppa, and http://www.portaltransparencia.gov.br/, respectively.  
305 Available at http://www.abc.gov.br/Projetos/pesquisa (last access: 29/092020). 
306 ASUL-Oxfam historical series started in 2000, rather than 2005 as in Cobradi, and was intended to be continuous, 
allowing for data to be automatically retrieved annually, according to the Brazilian fiscal year calendar. Interestingly, the 
survey/questionnaire methods have been also used, criticised and eventually superseded within Aidland (ASUL/Oxfam 
Brasil 2017). 
307 INECS has actively participated in SSC debates, notably on food security and BRICS/NDB issues, strongly advocating for 
transparency and participation issues (Beghin 2014; Poskitt, Shankland and Taela 2016; INT-BR-63). 
308 The reasons for that include lack of funding since the original Oxfam grant was only for a pilot project. Shortly after the 
end of this project, in 2018, Oxfam Brasil went through a programmatic restructuring and Brazilian international 
development cooperation was considered less of a priority when compared to other domestic agendas (INT-BR-1; INT-BR-
43; INT-BR-63).   
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(ASUL/Oxfam Brasil 2018). Trilateral cooperation, in-kind cooperation, or national experts’ time devoted 
to technical cooperation were also invisible due to levels of data aggregation in existing budget lines. This 
partial (in)visibility corroborates Brazilian diplomatic discomfort that a purely monetary quantification can 
render SSC ‘development effort’ invisible. Showing this can be the case also domestically. More broadly, 
the partial (in)visibility further reflects the lack of institutionalisation of SSC within Brazil and dispersed 
footprint in budgetary planning and accounting tools. Nonetheless, while searching for SSC expenses in 
the national budget, CSOs have found other forms of SSC-related spending overlooked in Cobradi, such as 
expenditures with regional integration (e.g., schools and health clinics in frontier areas and cross-border 
regional infrastructure projects). These ‘lost and found’ dynamics—in the words of ASUL and Oxfam 
Brasil—reveal not only the levels of measurement ‘duelling’ inside Brazil but also the always constructed 
and still disputed nature of what fits inside the ‘SSC box’. 
 
Third, this attempt to devise alternative measurement tools, ‘from below’, illustrates a certain type of civil 
society mobilisation that uses budget transparency to dispute SSC priorities. In their own terms: ‘Opening 
the black box of SSC policymaking visible in budget allocation can guide constructive engagement, 
encourage and strengthen existing initiatives, unveil contradictions and ruptures and rethink Brazilian SSC 
priorities’ (ASUL/Oxfam Brasil 2017). This discourse firmly positions knowledge groups and CSOs 
involved in the project as ‘critical collaborators’ of the Brazilian state (Berrón and Brant 2015; Milhorance 
and Bursztyn 2017; also Chapter 7). Acting as ‘SSC constituencies’, echoing Lancaster’s (2007) notion of 
‘aid constituencies’, their disputes over priorities and figures were also intended to reinforce the argument 
that spending on SSC was ‘still low’, thus helping to make the case for increasing cooperation flows.309  
 
In sum, the multiplication of quantification initiatives—and intra-state and state-society ‘duelling’—are 
signs of the political, institutional and epistemic battles over SSC measurement in Brazil. Disagreements 
illustrate ongoing intra and inter-institutional competition, as much as political disputes over how to count 
Brazilian ‘development effort’, over the best methodological tools and their purposes, and over whether 
and how to use these instruments. Moreover, the ‘duelling’ is also a sign of Brazilian shifting SSC landscapes 
and ongoing negotiations—within IPEA; between the Cobradi team, ABC and the Presidency; or between 
those leading on official efforts and other practitioners inside and outside the state—over country’s 
international role as a provider. 
 
Experimenting with evaluating technical cooperation: (in)visibility and mutual gains dilemmas  
 
Visibility issues are also at the core of growing SSC evaluation efforts in Brazil, which are taking place in 
tandem with increasing national efforts to reform the national SSC system. In the early 2010s, Brazilian 
 
309 In the year of 2010, the peak year according to Cobradi’s historical series the ratio was approximately 0,04% of Brazilian 
GDP in 2010 (IPEA/ABC 2018). This same argument was equally used by rights-based NGOs regarding refugee flows when 
calling for Brazilian government to ‘do more’ (Charleaux 2018). 
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SSC entered a consolidation phase (Ramanzini Jr., Mariano and Almeida 2015; Milani 2017),310 and several 
national institutions started to invest in strengthening the management and/or governance of their SSC 
initiatives. At ABC, there were changes in the organogram, new arrangements to deliver SSC (including 
through trilateral cooperation), and new management instruments, notably the 2010 internal project 
management system and the 2013 Manual of South-South Technical Cooperation Management.311 ABC also 
introduced new ways of working (based on scoping missions to design/co-construct cooperation projects, 
joint monitoring committees with partners312 and evaluation missions). Experimenting with evaluating SSC, 
I contend, was an integral part of these (still unfinished) institutional strengthening efforts.313   
 
The motivations behind ABC and implementing agencies’ will to evaluate Brazilian technical cooperation 
initiatives, came from three main sources. First, their own internal management and learning concerns to 
know what was ‘working’ on the ground after the expansionary wave of the previous decade. Second, their 
national and international reputation and policy struggles. Third, their interaction with the highly assessed 
and audited development apparatus, mainly through triangular cooperation. These pushes also converged 
with mobilisation by domestic policy communities and knowledge actors wanting to strengthen SSC 
measurement (and the broader ‘SSC industry’) and their will and expertise to serve as ‘partners’ in 
constructing these accountability tools (Berrón and Brant 2015; Waisbich 2021).314 
 
The political-institutional importance of producing evaluations grew continuously within ABC throughout 
the decade. Support among ABC leadership increased steadily, albeit not always assertively, since the 
publication of ABC 2013 Manual, where the Agency presents in detail its approach to evaluation.315 With 
time, new institutional layers were added: in 2015, ABC adopted specific governance instruments to guide 
its trilateral partnerships with Germany and UNICEF and released, in 2017, its Guidelines on Trilateral 
Cooperation (MRE/GIZ 2015; ABC/UNICEF 2015; ABC 2019).316 Around the same time, ABC has also 
 
310 In the Brazilian case, and for ABC in particular, Milani (2017) describes an institutional building phase (1994-2008) 
followed by a period of tentative reforms and modernisation, since 2008.   
311 Named Sistema de Informações Gerenciais de Acompanhamento de Projetos - SIGAP, in Portuguese. See 
http://www.abc.gov.br/sigap/ (last access: 23/10/2020).  
312 In Portuguese, Missão de Prospecção and Comitê de Acompanhamento de Projetos - CAP, respectively. 
313 During Rousseff’s second term, there were internal debates around reforming ABC. One of the major proposals was to 
create an independent agency combining development cooperation and investment promotion The proposal was never 
pursued due to, among other things, strong opposition within MRE, which saw the value of keeping the 
technical/humanitarian development cooperation separated from the trade/investment portfolio (Leite et al. 2014). Since 
then, no major intent to reform ABC was pursued.  
314 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-72. 
315 Former ABC Director, Marcos Farani (2008-2012) was the first one that attempted to establish a direct dialogue with 
traditional development actors like the UNDP and the UK on enhancing ABC’s capacity to monitor and evaluate Brazilian 
SSC. The topic remained in the agenda of subsequent Directors, João Almino (2015-2017) and Ruy Pereira (since 2018). 
(INT-BR-6; INT-BR-39; INT-BR-58; INT-BR-44). 
316 ABC-UNICEF and ABC-GIZ guidelines were revised and updated in 2017 and 2019, respectively. 
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established a Planning Department,317 which led to the creation of the informal working group on 
evaluation (Milani 2017).318   
 
This was also the time that ABC and implementing agencies, including the Ministry of Health and its public 
health institute Fiocruz,319 the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (Embrapa) and the National 
Service for Industrial Training (SENAI) started to experiment with SSC evaluations (Costa 2018). In the 
beginning these were mostly internal reviews and short-evaluation missions, but this was followed, from 
2015 onwards, by more robust external and independent ex-post evaluations and a greater willingness to 
publicise them.320 
 
Communicating results had become important to Brazilian ‘SSC bureaucracies’. Following the expansionary 
years, several felt the need to ‘professionalise’ and (re)gain control over the narratives about their SSC work 
to both domestic and global audiences.321 In different ways, institutions like ABC, the Brazil-WFP Centre 
of Excellence, or BNDES invested in strengthening communications and outreach efforts,322 including 
through M&E. The Health Ministry, for instance, ran an internal evaluation working group between 2010-
2011, years before ABC set up its own working group, in 2017, to develop a national SSC evaluation 
strategy; a work that remains unfinished.323 Besides the diplomatic drivers, their will to evaluate and 
communicate SSC responded to a general perception—shared by other Southern providers—of having to 
internally justify working abroad despite having numerous domestic development problems at home 
(UNDP China 2017; van der Westhuizen and Milani 2019; Cárdenas 2019).  
 
Experimenting with evaluation has, nonetheless, expanded unevenly both within ABC and across the vast 
landscape of Brazilian technical SSC initiatives and implementing agencies (Costa 2018).324 In light of ABC’s 
internal diversity (what my participants often referred as ‘the many ABCs inside ABC’325), some 
departments have engaged more in experimenting with ex-post external evaluations than others. This was 
the case of technical agricultural cooperation on cotton (hereafter, the ‘cotton portfolio’) and trilateral 
cooperation with international organisations on a range of social policies (hereafter, TSSC). Embrapa and 
 
317 Coordenação-Geral de Planejamento e Comunicação, in Portuguese.  
318 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-39. 
319 Fiocruz stands for Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, Fundação Oswaldo Cruz, in Portuguese. 
320 INT-BR-2; INT-BR-3; INT-BR-58; INT-BR-40. Embrapa, for instance, conducted in 2013-2014 an internal evaluation of its 
flagship technical cooperation project Cotton-4 (Bueno 2018). According to one interviewee, later Embrapa also internally 
evaluated other smaller SSC projects, including a project on dairy cattle (with Burkina Faso) and on manioc (with Togo) 
(INT-BR-2). For a discussion on ABC internal evaluations, in the case of bilateral technical cooperation projects with Guinea 
Bissau, see Andrade (2014). 
321 INT-BR-55; INT-BR-2; INT-BR-3; INT-BR-40. 
322 The Ministry of Health enhanced its publicity efforts by releasing multilingual newsletters targeting colleagues within 
the ministry, Brazilian society and international partners (INT-BR-55). A similar ‘internal convincing effort’ was reported by 
a cooperation expert within Embrapa (INT-BR-2). 
323 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-6; INT-BR-55. 
324 INT-BR-64; INT-BR-14; INT-BR-39; INT-BR-6. 
325 INT-BR-64; INT-BR-10; INT-BR-6. 
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ABC have been particularly invested in publicising external evaluations of Brazil’s cotton portfolio: first, 
the external evaluation of Cotton-4, published in 2015, in a pioneer joint effort between both institutions 
(see Chapter 4), and then the evaluations of subsequent cotton projects, including the Cotton Vitoria and the 
Shire Zambeze.326 After Cotton-4, ABC co-coordinated or participated in other publicly available external 
assessment efforts of Brazil’s TSSC including the Brazil-FAO South-South Trilateral Cooperation Programme 
(2016-2018), the Brazil-WFP Centre of Excellence Against Hunger (2016-2017) and the Brazil-UNICEF South-
South Trilateral Cooperation Programme (2019-2020) (see Appendix 5). 
 
Other public institutions, however, showed less interest in and/or capacity to assess their own SSC efforts. 
The former Ministry of Social Development (MDS) is a case in point.327 Since the early 2000s, Brazilian 
social policy expertise and policy solutions, like the Conditional Cash Transfer programme Bolsa Família, 
has been object of numerous technical cooperation demands (Leite, Pomeroy and Suyama 2015; Porto de 
Oliveira 2020). Yet development cooperation has remained a fragile, understaffed, and never fully 
institutionalised agenda within the Ministry. As an operational strategy, from 2010 onwards, MDS has 
strongly relied on multilaterals (including the World Bank, UNDP and UNICEF) to document its policies 
and channel technical exchanges with partners in the Global South (Pomeroy, Suyama and Waisbich 2019). 
Under these circumstances, the Ministry has not developed a will or need to evaluate its SSC. Struggling to 
secure social spending at home amidst growing fiscal restraint, MDS evaluation unit328 was rather concerned 
with creating robust knowledge to prove Bolsa Familia’s positive outcomes inside Brazil and protect it from 
the threats it received from political opposition (Tomazini 2018). According to a former MDS staffer:  
 
Hardly we would have suggested to evaluate SSC because we were not even managing to conduct the implementation 
and/or design evaluations we wanted [for the national programmes] (…) Had we done an assessment, the 
major finding would be that we had no cooperation. What I think we needed was an assessment to show the 
implementation of this policy. To show the problems and bottlenecks we had: lack of staff, lack of manual, lack of 
strategic guidance. What we needed was an assessment that could have systematised the perception, that several people 
had at the time, of how little prepared we were to cooperate.329  
  
Ultimately, evaluations of South-South technical cooperation increased in numbers since the mid-2010s, 
but efforts remain incipient and unevenly distributed across the Esplanada. Reasons for that include 
individual activism from those leading and working on certain areas (as opposed to uninterest or resistance 
 
326 See ABC (2020). For more on the Cotton portfolio, see Moreira (2020). 
327 MDS was downgraded in 2016, once Temer became the president, and was merged with the then Ministry of Agrarian 
Development under the new Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (MDSA). In 2019, under Bolsonaro, MDSA was 
split and the parts of the bureaucracy dealing with social development were once again downgraded and integrated into 
another large arrangement, the Citizenship Ministry, which merged the former MDS, the Ministry of Culture and the 
Human Rights Secretariat.  
328 Named Secretaria de Avaliação e Gestão da Informação - SAGI, in Portuguese. For more on SAGI’s work, see Natalino, 




in others),330 but also sector or modality-specific dynamics. Some pioneering implementing institutions had 
either private sector results-based mindset, like SENAI, or evidence-based scientific organisational cultures, 
like the Ministry of Health, or both, like Embrapa (Costa 2018).331 Others, like the former MDS and the 
National Fund for Educational Development (FNDE), were increasingly reliant on ‘outsourcing 
development cooperation arrangements’ with UN agencies and thus relying on their documenting and 
reporting procedures.  
 
Overall, my findings show little internal pressure, from within public institutions also working as ‘SSC 
bureaucracies’ and even from policy communities outside the state and civil society, for SSC initiatives to 
be evaluated.332 Interviewees also indicated little or no demands from their Southern counterparts for this 
kind of justification. Rather the will to evaluate came, therefore, mostly from an intention by ABC and/or 
specific implementing actors (both national agencies and UN organisations) to use evidence gathered in 
evaluations to back domestic policy disputes and showcase successes with Brazilian SSC in equally disputed 
global policy arenas. Unsurprisingly then the political nature of policy evaluation efforts has led assessments 
of Brazilian SSC to different forms of intra and inter-bureaucratic disputes, as I will explore next. 
 
When bureaucratic politics meets the politics of evaluation 
 
Brazil’s cotton portfolio and trilateral cooperation initiatives offer insights into bureaucratic and evidence 
politics shaping SSC evaluations and the (in)visibility and mutual gains dilemmas large SSC providers face 
when assessing their actions on the ground. The cotton portfolio is a financially stable and prestigious area 
for ABC, Itamaraty and for other governmental institutions. In the words of one Brazilian development 
expert: ‘Cotton has political visibility’.333 According to both practitioners’ and academic accounts, the 
successive external assessments of cotton projects illustrate the continued use of evaluations not only for 
management purposes (to adjust and expand the programme) but also to assist the country to build an 
image around this portfolio and attract new partnerships (Bueno 2018; Moreira 2020; also Chapter 4).334 
The 2015 Cotton-4 evaluation was also the first external evaluation in Brazil where SSC principles where 
assessed,335 reflecting practitioners’ and knowledge actors’ (like the NeST-affiliated Articulação SUL and the 
BRICS Policy Centre) will to operationalise ‘Southern-ways’ to conceive SSC results and contribute to the 
emerging global debates around measuring SSC (BPC/ASUL 2017; Rizzo 2019b).  
 
 
330 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-59; INT-BR-2. 
331 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-58. 
332 In the rare cases where development cooperation was embedded in well-established national policies or plans, as in the 
case of National Plan on Food and Nutritional Security, more incentives existed for SSC initiatives to be assessed. But this 
was the exception rather than the rule. For a discussion on how cooperation was embedded in national efforts in the case 
of food and nutrition security, see Beghin (2014). For a discussion of embeddedness in the case of health, see Esteves, 
Gomes and Fonseca (2016).  
333 INT-BR-10. 
334 INT-BR-2; INT-BR-64. 
335 INT-BR-64; INT-BR-17. 
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ABC was the leading actor in Cotton-4’s external evaluation effort and its enthusiasm found great echo at 
the time in Embrapa’s International Relations Secretariat336 and in the National Management School 
(ENAP).337 Enthusiasm became less assured, however, for assessments of other cotton projects in light of 
Embrapa’s progressive retreat from the broader SSC agenda. Embrapa’s ‘cooperation fatigue’ grew out of 
a mounting unease with the lack of clarity on what the company was gaining from cooperating with least 
developed countries in Africa (Cesarino 2013; Farias 2018; Waisbich 2020b). According to one interviewee, 
disengagement was also influenced by the negative public repercussion of the ‘ProSavana crisis’ (see 
Chapters 1 and 7), which contributed to make Embrapa’s leadership more averse to South-South technical 
cooperation.338  
 
Embrapa is a telling case of support to the evaluation agenda being shaped by fluctuating levels of internal 
agreement on the value of SSC within implementing institutions. Once a poster-child of Brazilian SSC, and 
despite having conducted internal and external evaluations of its SSC initiatives, the agenda inside Embrapa 
is far from consolidated. Not only the overall SSC portfolio lost its political relevance within Embrapa since 
2013, but also specific incentives to expand SSC M&E efforts have not been institutionalised. A similar 
story could be told about the former MDS and its own unease with the SSC agenda. Both Embrapa and 
MDS illustrate how years of expanded international activism have either strained implementing partners or 
simply failed to consolidate organisational cultures to sustain more stabilised SSC routines.  
 
Brazilian TSSC reveals a different set of evaluation politics. As stated in Chapter 4, triangular cooperation 
initiatives have been the major modality and the channel through which Aidland’s M&E standards and 
practices have infused Brazilian SSC. This has happened through more or less direct pressure or incentives 
on the Brazilian government, namely ABC but also the then CGFome in the case of PAA Africa or the 
Brazil-WFP CEAH, to expand the M&E component of existing initiatives. As mentioned, these first 
external evaluations of TSSC were used, by both Brazilian SSC bureaucracies and Brazil-based offices of 
UN agencies, to convince others within Aidland that SSC was working. As explained by one interviewee:  
 
Some people inside our organisation are convinced of the value-added of SSC, but we have decided to pilot with Brazil 
because SSC is still a small unit within our headquarters. We are doing that to generate evidence from what works 
with Brazil to be able to scale up regionally and globally. It is about showing that is possible to own donors and to 
be able to tell them we are improving.339 
 
336 The Secretariat was the division within Embrapa responsible for coordinating the company’s technical cooperation with 
developing countries. The division was dismantled in 2018 and part of Embrapa’s technical cooperation became part of 
what is today called Strategic Relations Secretariat, under the Multilateral Relations Unit.   
337 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-2; INT-BR-64; INT-BR-62. 
338 Importantly, Embrapa’s official position was, and remained throughout the crisis, that the company’s involvement with 
ProSavana was limited to the ‘technical exchanges’ not the more ‘contested aspects’ of the initiative related to private sector-





Yet using evaluations to enhance the external visibility of Brazilian SSC meant for ABC and other national 
implementing agencies to negotiate their own engagement and visibility in these multi-partner 
arrangements.340 Political visibility in TSSC is an important issue for Brasília341 and ABC has grown 
increasingly ‘distressed’, as framed by one participant342, with what it perceived as an ‘undue invisibility’ of 
Brazil to partners on the ground when activities are implemented by large UN agencies.343 Invisibility was 
‘unfair’, in the words of an ABC expert, not only because Brazil is actually funding the exchanges but also 
because ‘erasing Brazil’ could compromise SSC praxis by diluting horizontality principles in the ways of 
working and delivering cooperation.344 These multiple negotiations resulted, for instance, in ABC’s role in 
evaluations not being always one of leadership. ABC did not lead on the first exercises, including the 
monitoring of PAA Africa in 2015-2016 and Brazil-WFP Centre of Excellence evaluation, in 2016.345 An 
important shift was observed, nonetheless, in the evaluation of the Brazil-UNICEF TSSC Programme, in 
2019, when both parties agreed on combining ABC’s desire to conduct an evaluation sensitive to SSC 
principles and UNICEF’s own strong M&E culture.346  
 
Evaluation dynamics equally overlapped with broader negotiations between Brazilian ‘SSC bureaucracies’ 
and UN agencies over ‘mutual accountability’ in triangular cooperation. For several interviewees, the kinds 
of accountability pressures and incentives multilaterals exerted on the Brazilian government to comply with 
the multidirectional accountability regimes that rule the UN development system have yet to be translated 
into accountability from them to Brazilian counterparts. UN agencies were often perceived as ‘black box’ 
themselves: failing to justify how they managed and employed the resources received from Brazil to 
operationalise South-South technical cooperation.347 On the one hand, these concerns echo a ‘mistrust’ 
found between DAC members and the multilaterals they fund (Macdonald and Miller-Dawkins 2015; 
 
340 INT-BR-6; INT-BR-14; INT-BR-41; INT-BR-16; INT-BR-52; INT-BR-65. 
341 INT-BR-16; INT-BR-52; INT-BR-6; INT-BR-14; INT-BR-41; INT-BR-37. 
342 INT-BR-41. 
343 There is evidence for backing this perception in recent Brazilian SSC evaluations (ASUL/Move 2017; ASUL 2020). Kasia 
Baran also reports a similar finding in her doctoral research on Haiti (personal communication with Kasia Baran, 2020). 
Chenoy and Joshi (2016, 97) report a similar concern by India on cooperation with multilaterals reducing the ‘public-
relations edge’ that countries seek and making policy makers wary of dominance by traditional donors. 
344 These views were expressed in an international seminar on measurement, organised by ABC, in 2018, I attended.  
345 INT-BR-26; INT-BR-73; INT-BR-50; INT-BR-6; INT-BR-14. In the case of PAA Africa, this Brazil-FAO-WFP programme was 
coordinated by the then CGFome and its knowledge activities led by the Brazil-UNDP International Policy Centre for 
Inclusive Growth. As for the Centre of Excellence, the external evaluation was led by the Centre’s team with little inputs 
from ABC on the initial evaluation design. 
346 The methodological compromise found by the external evaluators was to follow UNICEF’s Results-Based Evaluation 
standards (comprised of OECD-classic evaluation criteria: relevance of the intervention; effectiveness; efficient use of 
resources; and sustainability of the intervention’s benefits) combined with an operationalisation of SSC principles in 
different evaluation indicators (INT-BR-65; also see Chapter 3). According to the evaluation report, a key assumption 
backing the assessment was that SSC principles where ‘enablers of quality and effectiveness’ and that assessing how SSC 
principles were operationalised in the Brazil-UNICEF Program and how they worked in practice would help to ‘understand 
how this particular TSSC Programme unfolded’ (ASUL 2020, 29). 
347 INT-BR-55; INT-BR-37; INT-BR-50; INT-BR-52; INT-BR-49. 
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Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-Mullins 2019).348 On the other, they reflect broader negotiations taking 
place around lines of responsibility and horizontality in and around triangular cooperation (OECD 2016; 
Zoccal 2020a).  
 
Power asymmetries also contributed to make evaluations co-managed by ABC and UN agencies only 
marginally valued, incorporated and/or appropriated by Brazilian implementing agencies and by the other 
Southern partner.349 Frequently, evaluations have exacerbated existing dynamics and tensions, including the 
fact that Brazilian implementing agencies (i.e., FNDE in the case of cooperation on school feeding 
implemented by WFP or FAO) had little capacity to closely follow projects on the ground and end up 
delegating implementation to UN agencies, becoming the ‘principals’ in their accountability relations with 
the UN and with ABC.350 In this ‘outsourced’ modality, Brazilian civil servants are far remote from the 
overall cooperation cycle and thus cut from many of the ‘accountability lines’ to both domestic publics and 
Southern partners. The more the managing of SSC evolved further away from national implementing 
agencies the more they became invisible in the complex SSC accountability chains.  
 
Lastly, TSSC evaluations have also contributed to reinforce power dynamics within development 
partnerships in which evaluations are used as a tool to assure ‘value-for-money’ in a complex chain that 
includes UN agencies having to report on their results of doing SSC to their sceptical Northern ‘principals’ 
at the headquarters’ level rather than a learning tool for all parties involved. In the words of one evaluator, 
thought having advanced in ‘being truthful to the ethical requirement of assessing interventions through 
SSC’s own logics’351, there is more to be done in terms of operationalising horizontality in the evaluation 
design and methodologies, including through co-constructing evaluation criteria and indicators with the 
other Southern partner.352 When it comes to assessments, South-South mutual accountability remains so 
far more a discourse than an evaluation practice.          
 
SSC evaluation ‘politics in time’ 
 
How to understand the growing experimentation with SSC evaluations that took place in Brazil in the 
2010s, at a time Brazilian SSC was losing political and material support within the Esplanada? Such rather 
unlikely moment, I argue, has simultaneously enabled and constrained the potentialities of Brazilian 
experimentation with evaluation.  
 
 
348 A similar concern was reported, by one SSC expert, to be emerging in China, and particularly within CIDCA, as the new 
agency navigates the challenges of consolidating its work while the country enhances its cooperation with the UN system 
(INT-BR-43).  
349 INT-BR-37; INT-BR-41. 
350 INT-BR-41. See ASUL (2020) for a discussion of the marginalisation of national implementing agencies in the context of 
the Brazil-UNICEF partnership.  
351 INT-BR-72. 
352 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-72; INT-BR-55. 
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On the one hand, experimentation happened despite the deep instability that characterised Brazilian SSC 
in the period. Accountability reforms, including experimenting with SSC evaluations, were actually fostered 
during this period because several national cooperating institutions decided to use publicity and visibility to 
sustain what they believed to be well-deserving initiatives or at least to create institutional memory in case 
of loss of support in their own ministries or in the Esplanada.353 The ‘retreat moment’, as commonly 
characterised (e.g. Suyama, Waisbich and Leite 2016; D. Marcondes and Mawdsley 2017; Abdenur 2018), 
also made some programmers less busy implementing SSC initiatives and thus capable to invest time in 
knowledge activities.354 On the other hand, political-economic turbulences pushed evaluation further away 
from the priorities of certain institutions. Despite being major contributors to Brazil’s global policy sharing 
and despite the importance evidence-based policymaking had in their policy work domestically, institutions 
like the former MDS were already under pressure in the domestic arena. As such, their international teams 
were trying to focus on finding additional resources to carry on SSC exchanges rather than evaluating 
them.355 
  
Although most Brazilian technical cooperation initiatives remained financially modest and lacked specific 
funding for M&E (Milani 2017),356 a number of landmark evaluations were conducted because they became 
politically important for SSC immediate constituencies: ABC, internal champions within SSC bureaucracies, 
UN agencies working on SSC in Brazil and experts. In order to operationalise them, ABC set aside some 
funds, even while facing successive budget cuts. Brazilian external evaluators were willing to work for lower 
fees and adjust their methodologies hoping to show that evaluating SSC ‘from the South’ was possible.357 
Both the government and non-state knowledge actors also fundraised with ‘traditional’ development actors, 
like the UK, Germany or Oxfam, who wanted to support enhancing the ‘knowledge dimensions’ of 
Brazilian SSC.  
 
Plurality remains, nonetheless, the defining feature of this landscape. Largely shaped by the broader political 
context, this first cycle of SSC evaluations is seen as having promoted ‘only the first loop not a learning 
cycle yet’, as framed by one interviewee.358 More importantly, perhaps, modest reforms reflect the multiple 
 
353 INT-BR-41. 
354 INT-BR-3; INT-BR-72; INT-BR-41; INT-BR-10. 
355 In health, this work has been carried out by Fiocruz and the Science and Technology Department. In education, policy-
relevant data was produced by the National Institute for Educational Studies and Research "Anísio Teixeira" (INEP). In 
social policy, the institution in charge of this kind of work was the information management unit (SAGI) within the former 
MDS. Crosscutting different sectors and a key player in the Brazilian policy-data ecosystem there is also IPEA. Interviewees 
attributed the consolidation of a results-based-management culture to the technical cooperation and capacity building 
projects Brazil has received from traditional donors and international organisations, since the 1980s, as well as Brazilian 
participation in international UN conferences and efforts with MDGs that strengthened Brazilian evidence production (INT-
BR-44; INT-BR-68; INT-BR-58; NT-BR-41; INT-BR-34). 
356 INT-BR-10; INT-BR-6. 




crises that not only weakened many SSC institutional structures in the period but also led to evaluations 
generating responses to policy, managerial and diplomatic problems that eventually were no longer there.  
 
 
Uneven South-South cooperation audit dynamics  
 
 
The will to measure Brazilian SSC contrasts with the relatively low importance auditing Brazilian SSC— 
excepting BNDES operations—gained in the last decade. This section depicts this landscape and analyses 
the cases of auditing technical cooperation and BNDES international operations as illustrative of existing 
uneven audit dynamics.   
 
Auditing the entire gamut of Brazilian SSC did not become a public problem to be acted upon. Other than 
BNDES Exim Bank scheme, mismanagement and corruption in Brazilian SSC attracted little public 
attention, including in the media or in legislative debates (Waisbich 2019). This contrasts with the 
importance corruption historically had in framing national ‘aid debates’ in countries like the UK (Yanguas 
2018a), and the central role corruption scandals played in public imaginaries in Brazil during the same period 
due to Lava Jato (Senters, Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2018). As put by one staffer from a UN agency in-
country: ‘In Brazil, where the corruption issue has become so ubiquitous in the current days, one could 
imagine that, in theory, this would have come up. But it did not’.359 This also contrasts with the growing 
presence of corruption concerns in public and expert debates in countries like South Africa (in the context 
of its African Renaissance Fund) and India (regarding the LOCs scheme) (Mawdsley 2014b; van der 
Westhuizen 2017; Waisbich 2019; also Chapter 6).360 Yet because BNDES international operations were 
not officially and unequivocally framed as ‘development cooperation’ (see Chapter 4), the hyper public 
visibility of ‘financial accountability deficits’ in the case of BNDES international operations did not 
necessarily contribute to raising domestic audience pressure for auditing the entire Brazilian SSC portfolio.  
 
SSC also remained largely ‘under-the-radar’ of the Brazilian internal and external control institutions, despite 
the expansion in the total flows invested by Brazil since the early 2000s. This is not to say that there is no 
audit system in place. The internal Federal Office of the Comptroller General (CGU)361 has its own 
procedures to audit MRE and ABC activities. These can be subjected to the external control of the Federal 
Court of Accounts (TCU), a central institution in the broader legislative budgetary oversight, in case of 
 
359 INT-BR-17. 
360 INT-OSS-15; INT-OSS-14. 
361 In line with Brazilian Federal Constitution (art. 70), while the TCU, linked to the Brazilian Congress, works as an 
accounting court and an external control for the Federal Executive, CGU is an internal control and the agency in charge of 
policies for promoting transparency and fighting corruption within the federal executive. CGU is also in charge of 
promoting the open government agenda at the federal level and is credited to have promoted organisational learning in 
Brazilian federal agencies (Olivieri et al. 2013). 
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need.362 UNDP and other UN agencies also have their own procedures to financially account for all projects 
with Brazil. This extra UN-layer is explained by Brazil’s long-running operational agreement with the UN 
to enable direct procurement, contracting and donating overseas (Cabral and Weinstock 2010; Leite et al. 
2014; Milani 2017).363  
 
For both TCU and CGU, auditing international cooperation—including auditing UNDP umbrella-projects 
and other projects with other multilateral and bilateral donors, ABC operations, and MRE’s diplomatic 
missions—meant controlling conformity and legality of expenditures.364 Against the existing standards, 
auditors have not encountered major ‘audit issues’ with Brazilian SSC and felt no technical need or political 
pressure to treat SSC holistically in all its modalities or as a crosscutting policy issue.365 SSC financial 
accountability was not yet a problem to be acted upon. When inquired why, my interlocutors’ unison 
response was: ‘lack of materiality’. This audit-risk jargon means that public resources invested in SSC remain 
below a threshold that would require more tailored attention from audit bodies beyond the existing 
procedures. For TCU, only BNDES international operations has been object of Congressional audit 
proceedings.366 While for CGU, most of its encounters with SSC activities has occurred through ordinary 
reviewing of ABC and MRE operations and of the technical cooperation projects with international 
organisations (both ‘received’ and ‘provided’).367This reduced concern is not inconsistent with the fact that 
few foreign policy issues become audit issues.368  
 
Hence, unlike in certain DAC members, like Denmark, where national auditors choose aid as an audit object 
because it is seen as politically important (Jensen and Winthereik 2013). In Brazil, development cooperation 
has not reached the ‘materiality’ (money-wise) to become politically important to the audit system. As a 
 
362 TCU has in the past to rule on ABC-related cases, but those were mostly related to ‘received cooperation’ when public 
agencies celebrated technical cooperation contracts with UN bodies to circumvent legal obligations in Brazil (including 
related to hiring and procurement). See Labour Prosecution Service Non-Prosecution Agreement (Termo de Ajustamento 
de Conduta) 1.044/2001 and TCU Decision (acórdão) 1339/2009.  
363 The lack of a specific legislation for international development cooperation hinders the execution of Brazilian SSC by 
limiting public agencies’ international payments, hiring, donations, among others. Legal obstacles are hence operational 
obstacles for Brazilian SSC. The umbrella partnership with UNDP, often referred as a ‘triangulation of resources’, through 
which the Brazilian government transfer money to UNDP so the UN agency can perform those functions mentioned above, 
makes Brazilian cooperation logistically possible. Brazilian SSC uses UNDP systems (procurement, financial accountability) 
but also using offices and thus reducing administrative costs for Brazilian cooperation, it reduces indirect costs of having 
offices in other countries and thus makes Brazilian cooperation ‘cost-effective’ (INT-BR-17; INT-BR-49).  
364 Auditing procedures abide by Federal Law 8666 on public tendering and contracting, see 
http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l8666cons.htm (last access: 19/08/2020). 
365 INT-BR-13; INT-BR-15; INT-BR-17; INT-BR-49; INT-BR-67; INT-BR-69; INT-BR-71. 
366 INT-BR-67; INT-BR-69; INT-BR-71. In 2020, TCU still had at least seven proceedings under exam on BNDES loans to 
export engineering services (Camarotto 2020). 
367 INT-BR-15; INT-BR-4. 
368 A notable exception, however, is the cost-benefits analysis recently done by TCU on the opening of new diplomatic 
representations during under the PT era (Pinto 2020). TCU proceedings on the new diplomatic missions in Africa reflect the 
increased politicisation of Brazilian foreign policy (Waisbich 2020b), with the opposition raising cost-efficiency arguments 
to claim that the new diplomatic missions were not ‘useful’ or ‘cost-effective’ (P. C. Mello and Nublat 2016; SAE 2017). 
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consequence, the financial accountability landscape remained fragmented and characterised by diverse audit 




The workings of CGU provide insights into the ‘materiality’ issue and its implications for Brazilian uneven 
SSC financial accountability dynamics. As mentioned, the federal comptroller office does not examine SSC 
as a policy realm or as an audit issue per se. CGU sees the issue through the logic of controlling what is 
conceived in Brazil as ‘international technical cooperation’, which initially meant ‘received’ cooperation 
initiatives but nowadays encompasses both ‘received’ and ‘provided’ initiatives.369 Currently, there are 
multiple divisions within CGU auditing fragments of the Brazilian ‘SSC compact’. The main two dealing 
with South-South technical cooperation are: CGU’s External Resources Division (located in its 
headquarters) and MRE’s internal control system (named CISET).370 While the External Resources 
Division audits technical cooperation contracts between Brazil and external entities, CISET audits MRE 
spending, including ABC’s budget. Other development-related engagements (i.e., refugee support, 
contributions to UN peace operations or export credit operations) are audited by other divisions within 
CGU.371 Auditing Brazilian SSC is, therefore, where CGU’s fragmented audit approach meets Brazilian SSC 
fragmentation. As I was told by one auditor: ‘The truth is that I find difficult to grasp the full universe. I 
just cannot. Not even ABC is fully aware of everything’.372 This is not to say that SSC spending is unchecked. 
Rather, and similar to the ‘lost and found’ dynamics in the national budget described previously, it means 
that SSC expenditures are not seen and accounted for by the state as SSC-related expenditures but rather as 
other things: ‘external resources’, ‘international actions’, ‘technical cooperation’, etc.  
 
CGU does not audit the totality of Brazilian provided technical cooperation either. Its control operates on 
the basis of sampling through a set of criteria such as expenses’ social impact, value/materiality or risk due 
to decentralised service provision. Currently, neither inflows nor outflows of technical cooperation are 
considered risky or materially relevant. ‘Auditing ABC would be too much work for too little money 
involved’, argued a Brazilian ambassador.373 From a project perspective, considering Brazil’s outsourcing 
of its South-South technical cooperation contracts to international organisations, CGU audits contracts 
mostly when requested by the other party (either by an UN agency or a bilateral donor), based on the 
 
369 CGU ruled on issues such as reducing overheads to international organisations in technical cooperation contracts and 
limiting the use of technical cooperation with international organisations to internal hiring for the Federal Administration 
(INT-BR-13). 
370 A few Brazilian bodies (Presidency, Defence and MRE) have their own internal control structures (named CISET, which 
stands for Secretaria de Controle Interno, in Portuguese) separated from the general federal internal auditing system 
(Secretaria Federal de Controle Interno, in Portuguese), under CGU.  
371 This is done according to the public institution in charge of these modalities. For instance, the Ministry of Justice for 





sampling criteria coming from them.374 Between 2008 and 2019, the number of provided and received 
technical cooperation projects audited by CGU went from approximately 40 to 21.375 Numbers were higher 
in the past because execution was higher during the ‘golden years’ of Brazilian cooperation.376  
 
There are currently no procedures for CGU to audit SSC projects on the ground. Absence of auditing in 
loco relates to the perceived low-levels of risk of technical cooperation initiatives but also to CGU’s limiting 
its work to controlling the conformity and legality of expenditures. There is growing interest but very little 
capacity within CGU to go beyond what is reported by bureaucrats as activities and outputs as to audit 
‘efficiency’ and/or ‘value-for-money’.377 ‘Results’ or ‘finality’ auditing, as they are referred in Brazil, became 
in 2017 the standard for CGU.378 Yet CGU’s External Division has yet to fully embrace this new and still 
grey area, currently expanding across the world (Peters 2002; also Chapter 3). As put by one auditor: ‘We 
have to try. At least from a “contribution analysis” point of view and maybe in the future go for “cost-
benefit analysis”’.379 Moreover, so far CGU has not been part of the larger group of Brazilian institutions 
debating SSC measurement and has exchanged very little with ABC on this matter.380 
 
At the same time, audit cultures are very present on the ground, at a project-level. In a recent study, Moreira 
(2020), analysed an incident under the C-4+Togo cotton project where cost-sharing responsibilities for 
building a fence in the project site became an ‘audit imbroglio’ (due to the non-conformity of the paperwork 
sent by ABC to Brasília), which compromised the project flow in Benin. Alongside impasses, my findings 
indicate other audit dynamics, including ABC’s political-diplomatic use of audit procedures to negotiate 
South-South partnerships and the strategies employed by Brazilian frontline SSC practitioners (cooperantes)381 
to negotiate audit rules. The next paragraphs unpack these dynamics through three short vignettes based 
on first-hand stories from my research participants.382  
 
374 UNDP, for instance, includes projects of a minimum value of 450 thousand USD or 600 thousand USD executed 
annually, depending on how it assesses Brazil’ corruption risk for that particular year. Brazil normally oscillates between 
high and medium-high risk. Every project has to be audit at least once during its life-time, once having achieved a minimum 
of 300 thousand USD of execution. (INT-BR-15; INT-BR-49). 
375 INT-BR-15. 
376 In 2019, received cooperation contracts were the majority and CGU’s External Division was only auditing three 
contracts related to provided cooperation, including the contract with the Brazilian Cotton Institute (Instituto Brasileiro do 
Algodão - IBA, in Portuguese), under which cotton-related projects are developed. The Institute was created in 2007 after 
Brazil won a WTO dispute over cotton subsidies by the US. Brazil decided to reinvest 10% of the resources in technical 
cooperation with low-income cotton producers (ASUL/PLAN 2015; Moreira 2020). CISET had another three UNDP contracts 
to audit, including one related to cotton and another to police training and capacity building. (INT-BR-15; INT-BR-24). 
377 INT-BR-24; INT-BR-49. 
378 See https://www.gov.br/cgu/pt-br/assuntos/noticias/2019/03/cgu-publica-novo-padrao-de-relatorios-de-auditoria (last 
access: 29/07/2020). 
379 INT-BR-15. 
380 Namely ABC, MRE, IPEA, IBGE and many of the individual focal points within implementing agencies that have joined 
Cobradi efforts. 
381 Cooperantes are Brazilian experts, career or appointed civil servants, that also work implementing South-South 
technical cooperation on the ground. 






Navigating audit rules (1). Circa 2010. Maria, who works for a Brazilian line-ministry, is organising a large 
event for school children with her peers in a West African country. As a frontline cooperante she has to 
navigate the many legal restrictions faced by her Ministry to implement projects abroad and decides to 
transfer ‘suitcases of money’ via the financial services company Western Union to local partners in the 
capital for the logistics of the event. She feels embarrassed for having to highlight that she needed everyone 
to bring receipts for every single expense. She is also anxious as her team, back in Brasília, was distrustful of 
the move and under pressure to comply with strict institutional auditing guidelines. As the event finished, 
her local counterparts brought her hundreds of little paper receipts, signed by the pupils that attended the 
event, and even small change in coins: she was so disconcertedly moved that she cried.383   
 
Navigating audit rules (2). Circa 2016. João, an expert at ABC drives towards one project site, in a rural area 
of a country in the Sahel region, hundreds of miles away from the capital. He suddenly realises he will need 
to replace the tyres of his car and find himself having to ask for a paper receipt in order to comply with 
Brazilian official auditing requirements. The repairman had no other paper than a brown-bag where he kept 
his bread, on which he writes down the service and the cost. Unsure of whether CGU would accept this 
kind of receipt, João is now even more conceived that micro-financial auditing of Brazilian SSC was counter-
productive and that CGU auditors had to see projects in action through their own eyes.384  
 
Learning audit missions. Circa 2018. Felipe is an auditor sent to a country in Sub-Saharan Africa to visit 
Brazilian SSC projects and meet national counterparts in loco. His visit integrates a new initiative, by ABC, 
to invite auditors to ‘learning field-site missions’ to better understand SSC implementation on the ground.385 
Missions are a two-fold strategy for ABC. First, to show auditors the difficulties of executing abroad and 
sensitise auditors ‘to the reality of financially executing in Africa’.386 Second, to show partner governments 
that it is ‘hard’ for ABC to secure public funds for cooperation. Felipe meets a state minister and tells him:  
 
Listen, I am an auditor and I know we do not have endless resources. They can actually decrease. This is why is 
important for you to help us. To help Brazil helping you. You must prepare yourselves better to receive this structure 
[referring to a training centre] and give visibility to Brazil as well. Treat us better. Because our resources are 





384 INT-BR-49; INT-BR-24. 
385 INT-BR-24; INT-BR-49; INT-BR-15; INT-BR-64. 
386 INT-BR-24. 
387 INT-BR-24; INT-BR-49. 
133 
 
The imbroglios, missions and the ‘working around’ by cooperantes on the ground388 illustrate certain types of 
audit pressures on Brazilian SSC practitioners as well as ongoing negotiations to keep SSC running. On the 
one hand, the lack of adequate legal framework for SSC creates audit hurdles at the implementation level 
for line-ministries operationalising their activities without the intermediation of an UN agency (as in the 
first vignette). It also creates the need for ABC to convince diplomats heading Brazilian foreign missions 
to sign-off costs related to technical projects (sometimes risking personal liability) and to convince audit 
bodies in Brasília to accept alternative forms of project cost reporting (as in the second vignette).389  
 
On the other hand, the third vignette anecdotally illustrates of a particular use of audit to help convincing 
partners, in times of austerity, of the value of Brazilian SSC, whereby auditors become frontline 
practitioners, negotiating project implementation on the ground. Audit missions to partner countries also 
indicate what could be a first step in an organisational ‘learning journey’ for both CGU and ABC on 
controlling this type of public policy (Olivieri et al. 2013) to make auditors more aware of the particularities 
of SSC projects and make omnipresent audit procedures more adapted to the realities of Brazilian SSC. 
Together the vignettes illustrate SSC audit landscapes in-the-making and the multiple negotiations between 
‘SSC bureaucracies’ and audit bureaucracies and between Brazilian cooperantes and their counterparts on the 
ground. This growing but fragmented approach to auditing SSC is unlikely to change in the next years 
unless development cooperation flows increase dramatically and become a ‘risky’ or ‘thematically important 
issue-area’ for the Brazilian audit system to act upon.390  
 
The accountability problem in BNDES international operations  
 
Unlike most of Brazil’s SSC, BNDES international operations have materiality and thus political visibility 
in the eyes of control systems and the public. Between 2007 and 2015, BNDES Exim Bank scheme, an 
export credit facility, funded 542 projects and lent approximately 12 billion USD to Brazilian civil 
engineering multinationals like Odebrecht, OAS, Andrade Gutierrez and Queiroz Galvão for the 
engineering services they offered to infrastructure projects in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa (Garcia 
and Kato 2020). This expanded role generated different sorts of public and expert accountability debates.  
 
The case of BNDES depicts combined multiple accountability regimes—political, legal, managerial and 
social—pushing for transparency and compliance reforms. Facing intense scrutiny during the PT era by the 
political opposition and Brazilian civil society (Lazzarini et al. 2015; Sierra and Hochstetler 2017; Cruz 
2020), BNDES has developed a more pro-active communication and public relations strategy.391 In 2008, 
 
388 For an application of the concept of ‘working around’ or ‘hacking strategies’ in the context of sustainability projects, see 
Savaget (2019).  
389 INT-BR-64. 




BNDES put in place press releases,392 many of which on what the bank called its ‘international operations’. 
Some aimed at explaining the Exim scheme, others at clarifying details or the status of specific projects. 
Others still were direct responses to articles in the press. Releases repeatedly challenged what BNDES called 
‘misrepresentations/misconceptions’, ‘omissions’ and/or ‘inferring’ by the media, emphasising instead the 
‘technical nature’ of BNDES funding decisions and the importance of the scheme to ‘generate jobs and 
revenue in Brazil’ (BNDES 2015).393 In the aftermath of Lava Jato, many releases also clarified the 
procedures adopted by the bank to prevent ‘exporting corruption’ through its export credit scheme.  
 
External pressure on BNDES and pushes for transparency reforms kept coming from numerous Brazilian 
and international actors. In 2015, two different cases on transparency reached the Supreme Court, which 
then clarified the limits of BNDES use of ‘bank secrecy’ provisions under the Brazil’s Access to Information 
Law, prompting the bank to start releasing more information publicly.394 Later, and as a response to the 
broader Lava Jato context, BNDES updated its website and launched a Transparency Portal, which included 
explanations on international operations among other alleged ‘controversial issues’.395 The Portal was 
conceived as a communication tool for the bank to navigate what many insiders qualified as an increasingly 
‘polluted’ public debate,396 in particular on its international operations, and a ‘hostile’ and ‘overly politicised 
environment’397. These transparency reforms also responded to pressure from CSOs, which managed to 
consolidate a short-lived BNDES-Civil Society Dialogue Forum (2014-2016), in which transparency was a major 
concern (Sierra and Hochstetler 2017; Conectas 2018a; also Chapter 7).398 Around the same time, BNDES 
and UNDP signed an agreement to strengthen BNDES Amazonia Fund operations and to increase 
BNDES overall transparency and synergies with Agenda 2030, including through SSC (ONU Brasil 
2015).399  
 
Although transparency is often portraited as an ‘easy-pick’ or ‘low-hanging fruit’400 for BNDES among the 
many accountability issues on the table, in the mid-2010s, the bank also created a Social Responsibility 
Policy, multi-annual Sustainability Plans, and an Institutional Relations Department to improve relations 
 
392 Comunicados, in Portuguese. All releases are available online at 
https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/imprensa/noticias (last access: 29/07/2020) 
393 For a sociological discussion on the opposition between the technical and the political in the discourses of BNDES 
bureaucratic elite, see Klüger (2015).  
394 The Supreme Court case followed a law-case by the newspaper Folha de São Paulo and a requirement by the TCU. 
395 BNDES Transparência, in Portuguese, available at 
https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/transparencia/politica-de-transparencia-e-divulgacao/Guia-de-Praticas-
de-Transparencia-do-Sistema-BNDES (last access: 29/07/2020). 
396 INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70. 
397 INT-BR-45. 
398 INT-BR-51; INT-BR-12; INT-BR-1. 
399 BNDES is the manager of the Amazon Fund (Fundo Amazônia), created in 2008 to raise donations earmarked for non-
refundable investments in fighting deforestation in addition to the conservation and sustainable use of its natural and 
biodiversity resources. Since 2019, under Bolsonaro, the Fund has stopped working and no new project was approved. 
Brazilian Supreme Court is currently judging a petition by opposition parties against the federal government for omission 
(ISA 2020). This is the first climate change-related litigation that reaches the Brazilian Supreme Court (Setzer 2020).  
400 INT-BR-12; INT-BR-51. 
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with its diverse set of stakeholders. Responding to Lava Jato, BNDES also enhanced its compliance 
mechanisms.401 Already in 2015, BNDES suspended export credit contracts with companies—at that time 
only allegedly—involved in corruption and issued new and more stringent compliance rules to resume 
them. BNDES also established a formal partnership with TCU to improve its internal and external 
transparency and accountability practices. As part of the partnership, both institutions co-hosted, in 2018, 
a public hearing to present an enhanced version of the Transparency Portal.402 This new version of the Portal 
included interactive open-data tools on ‘key issues to the public’, including on export operations.403 By the 
time the new Portal was launched, BNDES internationalisation was already non-existent (Conectas 2018a; 
Hochstetler and Inoue 2019)404 but the debates around transparency and accountability were still alive in 
the public sphere, and very much connected to Lava Jato. 
 
As the Lava Jato operation evolved not only have BNDES support to infrastructure building abroad became 
associated, in public imagination, with the corruption scandals under investigation but also other oversight 
bodies have started to act upon it. BNDES international operations from 2003-2015 were object of three 
legislative investigations that ran parallel to the judicial anti-corruption operation. While the first two have 
not resulted in concrete charges, the third parliamentary inquire, completed in October 2019, recommended 
a judicial inquiry on former BNDES staff, representatives of the private sector and former PT government 
officials.405 The latter refuted the charges claiming they constituted an instrument for ‘criminalising BNDES 
activities’ in order to privatise the bank (Poder360 2019). Former and current BNDES political and career 
staff interviewed expressed a somehow similar frustration with a perceived ‘excessive politicisation’ of the 
corruption issue, under Lava Jato, and its negative consequences on BNDES ability to carry its work, as 
illustrated in the two quotes below:406 
  
Having the possibility to explain our work to the society was important. But the debate was initiated by others and 
this was bad. We had no time to react. BNDES export promotion is justifiable, but it became polluted. We did 
 
401 As a precautionary measure, already in 2015, BNDES suspended Exim Bank scheme contracts with companies—at that 
time only allegedly—involved in corruption and has only resume a few of them after assuring the companies signed to the 
more stringent compliance in place (INT-BR-13; INT-BR-45; INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70). 
402 As part of my fieldwork in Brazil I attended the public hearing, hosted at BNDES headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, in 
August 2018. For an official account from BNDES on the hearing see:  
https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/transparencia/audiencia-transparencia (last access: 15/12/2020). 
403 BNDES account on the partnership and its results so far can be seen at  
https://www.bndes.gov.br/wps/portal/site/home/transparencia/iniciativas (last access: 26/10/2020). 
404 Already by 2016 little had left from BNDES internationalisation: international offices were shut, and the Exim Bank 
scheme was de facto halted out of what BNDES staffer called ‘a perfect storm’ combining the partial or full suspension of 
international contracts due to Lava Jato and the US Department of Justice pressures and a decrease in oil and commodity 
prices in partner countries (such as Venezuela and Mozambique) making them less willing to move forward with projects. 
(INT-BR-45; INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70; INT-BR-23).  
405 In Portuguese, a Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito – CPI. This particular inquiry on BNDES became informally known 
as ‘CPI do BNDES’. See https://www2.camara.leg.br/atividade-legislativa/comissoes/comissoes-temporarias/parlamentar-
de-inquerito/56a-legislatura/cpi-praticas-ilicitas-no-ambito-do-bndes (last access: 28/11/2020).  
406 INT-BR-45; INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70. 
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not initiate this debate and so there were many myths and misconstructions. Society had no idea about the scheme 
and now is completely biased.407  
 
Politicisation erodes the possibility of a consequential policy dialogue. It hinders discussions on strategies. Neither the 
media nor Congress wanted to debate whether we should focus or diversify our investments geographically (…) I can 
no longer talk about these things in public debates because there is a ‘demonisation’ of Brazilian foreign policy and 
its investments (…) The internationalisation is a public policy and a governmental strategy: an internal and external 
industrial development policy. We became a textbook case for politicisation and yet we still lack the set of institutions 
to properly compete internationally.408  
 
Presently, there are neither signs that the Federal Prosecution Office (MPF) will open an anti-corruption 
dossier on BNDES nor that the thesis that BNDES was ‘exporting corruption’ will became the line of 
argument of Lava Jato task-force in the near future.409 While the bribery charges against multinationals like 
Odebrecht in Peru and Mexico indicate that corruption was indeed transnational, the direct involvement 
of BNDES remains unproven (Conectas 2018a; Simon 2019). TCU ministers, however, have yet to give 
their final verdict on the issue of misuse in BNDES export credit loans to engineering companies between 
2006-2012 (Camarotto 2020).  
 
While unclear from a judicial and audit perspective, the association of BNDES international operations 
with highly visible ‘horizontal corruption’ scandals (A. Gupta 2017)410 under scrutiny has already generated 
important effects. On the one hand, it has, since 2015, fostered transparency, accountability, and 
compliance reforms within BNDES.411 On the other, the political charges on a potential BNDES-
corruption nexus remained in the public sphere and the bank’s international footprint became indissociable 
from discourses of accountability deficits and corruption. In 2018, the then candidate Jair Bolsonaro 
promised, if elected, ‘to solve the BNDES black box problem created under the PT rule’ and ‘audit all 
BNDES contracts’ (J. R. Castro 2019; Cruz 2020). This time however, BNDES ‘transparency problem’ 
found little echo among other social actors. Some even criticised Bolsonaro’s obsession with the so-called 
‘BNDES black box’ (A. Fernandes 2020; Bolle 2019). The renewed electoral salience of the topic illustrates, 
nonetheless, how discourses of accountability fitted the larger political and policy disputes over Brazil’s 
developmental state and over the role foreign policy and SSC played in it (Waisbich 2020b).    
 
 
407 INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70. 
408 INT-BR-45. 
409 INT-BR-13. 
410 According to Gupta, horizontal corruption is the one in which politicians and government officers extract rents from 
elites in business and commercial sectors. Moreover, when horizontal corruption is unveiled in India is often because of 
elite in-fighting, or ‘structural antagonism among the elite’ and ‘competition between fractions of capital’, accusing each 
other of state capture. 






This chapter examined how SSC accountability has been problematised and negotiated inside Brazil in 
recent years. The panorama depicted is one where domestic SSC accountability politics were shaped by the 
particular consolidation dynamics of development cooperation as a policy and political field in the country. 
In Brazil, SSC-specific domestic accountability dynamics are deeply interwoven with growing political, 
managerial and social pressures on foreign policy actors to justify their policy options and outcomes due to 
mounting political polarisation and ever-expanding evaluation and audit cultures across the state. SSC 
accountability dynamics are also intimately related to the plural and shifting views on Brazilian international 
‘Southern’ identity and its role as a development cooperation ‘provider’.   
 
Looking at ‘accountability politics in time’, this chapter discussed how broader domestic dynamics affected 
the formation of ‘meta-arenas of conflict’ over SSC accountability and over SSC as a policy realm, in tandem 
with internal questioning of SSC as a strategic foreign policy agenda and tool for the Presidency, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and/or specialised public institutions that acted as SSC implementing agencies during 
the 2010s. Political, inter-/intra-bureaucratic and social questioning were both about the broad policy 
option to engage in South-South exchanges and on its financial implications, particularly as political and 
economic turmoil took over the country and Brazil entered an austerity phase. Noisy politicisation and the 
multidimensional effects of the Lava Jato anti-corruption operation further complicated the prospects of 
agreeing on a common narrative for why SSC mattered to Brazil and why was important to invest state 
resources in international development. Absence of agreement on the value of SSC has fuelled political 
accountability debates and prolonged Brazilian SSC consolidation phase throughout the decade, generating 
uncertainty and friction not only over its ‘effectiveness’ but rather over its raison d’être. 
 
Despite the macro-political instability, but also in response to it, several ‘SSC bureaucracies’, civil society 
and UN agencies have decided to invest in experimenting with a range of accountability tools. 
Transparency, quantification and evaluation artefacts were mobilised as means to support Brazil’s 
differentiation efforts as a ‘Southern partner’, to learn and improve cooperation practices, and to keep 
building this policy field internally, if not safeguard it. While the Brazilian government did not face strong 
internal and external pressure to produce ‘ritual aid evaluations’ (Rottenburg 2009, 71) or to systematically 
quantify and report on flows, combined external and internal incentives to experiment with measuring have 
emerged within the Brazilian ‘SSC ecosystem’ (ABC, Embrapa, IPEA and the small but active group of 
development experts). These actors and institutions have acted, often in interaction with the global 
development apparatus, as ‘SSC champions’ and as ‘accountability reformers’.  
 
Existing SSC quantification, reporting and evaluation dynamics within Brazil—and the multiple tensions 
they generate—highlight the complexities of consolidating SSC measurement practices in a policy field that 
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was under broader political questioning and where showcasing success was at the same important and risky. 
Showcasing success was not only about proving generosity or seeking status within ‘a club of grown-ups’ 
but also a survival strategy for domestic ‘SSC bureaucracies’ that needed recognition and external support 
to remain active and counter the noise that came after particular crises, be that Lava Jato or ProSavana. In 
the Brazilian version of the ‘SSC measurement paradox’, institutions and practitioners had to navigate 
between the need to show results to sustain their engagements, and expand internal constituencies, and the 
fear that increased visibility could raise political and/or financial questioning on the purposes of doing 
development abroad. 
 
As for audit dynamics, this chapter shows how the materiality and visibility of public resources spent in 
development cooperation-related initiatives shaped the ways auditing SSC was constituted, or not, as a 
problem in the eyes of the public, the legislative branch and audit experts. While in the case of BNDES 
auditing SSC reflected a potential misuse problem to be acted upon, technical cooperation remained very 
much unimportant. Still on audit dynamics, I have suggested that the absence of a formal development 
cooperation policy in Brazil explains the fragmented way existing internal and external control systems see 
and deal with SSC as a (non)audit issue and it they remained subjected to the financial accountability logics 
coming from UN agencies and other ‘traditional’ donors Brazil relies on to operationalise its cooperation.  
 
Permeating these foreign policy, measurement and audit dynamics, bureaucratic politics stands out as an 
important element in the Brazilian landscape. As a multifaceted foreign policy instrument, SSC serves 
different national public agencies in their domestic and international policy and institutional battles and is 
hence subject to multi-layered accountability systems and competing expectations. Bureaucratic politics also 
matters because the Brazilian state is not uniform and different bodies have different internal evaluation 
cultures, different civil society participation dynamics, and different political dynamics and ideologies.412 
This variation can explain why the Ministry of Health and the former CGFome have sought to create tools 
to publicise their SSC engagements, with or without ABC. It also helps situating how ‘SSC bureaucracies’ 
have unevenly responded to IPEA data appeals for the Cobradi quantification project, making Cobradi reliant 
on the good will of each institution to be able to count and report Brazilian development cooperation 
efforts.413 
 
412 This is important because Brazilian coalition presidentialism makes ministries an object of political bargain withing the 
ruling coalition. For a comprehensive view on Brazilian coalition system, see Limongi and Figueiredo (1998). Alden and 
Brummer (2019) suggest that coalition politics, a feature of Indian landscape since the 1980s, is also an important element 
in Indian foreign policy analysis.  
413 In the case of Brazilian SSC, bureaucratic politics is also an important lens to understanding why actors like the former 
Ministry of Agrarian Development and Embrapa have more actively participated in SSC exchanges during the PT era sharing 
their policies and expertise than the Ministry of Agriculture. Since 2019, the Ministry of Agricultural Development was 
integrated as a secretary within the Ministry of Agriculture, in an institutional downgrading and a sign of de-priorisation of 
the small-farming agenda, watering the previous duality in Brazilian SSC agriculture cooperation that tried to conciliate 
sharing agrobusiness and small-farming experiences (Pierri 2013; Cabral 2016), in benefit of the latter.   
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Going back to the relation between accountability politics and SSC institutionalisation dynamics, this 
chapter shows that SSC consolidation phase in Brazil has been inseparable from the politicisation of SSC 
in the country and thus marked by numerous disputes and negotiations around SSC and around whether 
and how to justify it to competing domestic constituencies. I have also made the case for looking at SSC 
consolidation reforms and accountability reforms as two processes closely entangled. In the case of 
technical cooperation, consolidation reforms have created opportunities for different domestic 
constituencies to negotiate incremental accountability reforms within ABC or in public institutions 
implementing SSC initiatives and, through that, to dispute SSC policy priorities. The dynamic at BNDES 
was the other way-round, with multidimensional accountability dynamics generating a series of incremental 
institutional reforms.  
 
It became evident, moreover, that the relationship between these two processes is far from straightforward. 
Lacking consistent political support at the Presidency-level since 2010, incremental reforms have 
contributed only marginally to establish a coherent narrative for SSC and a set of policy spaces for domestic 
stakeholders to formally negotiate its purposes, practices and results. The more comprehensive set of 
reforms—found in the case of BNDES—owns a lot to the combined political, legal and social pressure 
received from different domestic publics, even though most of the new procedures could not be fully tested 
since BNDES international operations have de facto stalled since 2016.414 Additionally, reforms have not 
solved all pending SSC institutional bottlenecks. Certainly, the expansion of Brazilian SSC in the 2000s set 
the conditions for the rise of reformist demands (on narrowly-defined management issues and on broader 
policymaking dynamics) and for the emergence of accountability tools (Beghin 2014; Westmann 2017; 
Farias 2018). Yet, amidst a loss of political impetus, reforms left untouched several institutional bottlenecks, 
including the absence of a legal framework, insufficient human resources and budget and lack of formal 
arrangements for partnering with the private sector and CSOs (Cabral and Weinstock 2010; Almino and J. 
B. B. Lima 2017; Milani and Klein 2020).  
 
Ultimately, this kaleidoscopic panorama within Brazil, with present and absent SSC accountability systems 
and dynamics, challenges simplistic assumptions of ‘SSC accountability deficits’ or foreign policy 
‘democratic deficits’. Accountability debates, both public and expert debates, and the unfolding 
accountability negotiations are above all signs of a policy field in-the-making, evolving in a controversial 
environment and amid both consolidation and dismantling pressures.  
 
414 This includes the pilot for a new socio-environmental safeguard approach to high-risk infrastructure projects based on 
the revised socio-environmental policy. (INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70).  
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6. Negotiating South-South cooperation accountability at home: 
India and China  
 
 
After examining the domestic SSC accountability politics in Brazil, this chapter offers an account of the 
domestic landscape in India and China. While less comprehensive (a choice I methodologically justified in 
Chapter 2), the panorama depicted here provides a basis for comparing and contrasting domestic and 
intermestic processes and for identifying dynamics cutting across large SSC providers. Two questions guide 
the analysis in this chapter. First, how measurement, a key and contested accountability issue in North-
South cooperation and increasingly present in SSC global debates and in Brazil, has been discussed in India 
and China? Second, what other accountability issues have become politically salient in these countries and 
why?   
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The first section explores the landscape in India while the second one 
investigates China. In both cases the analysis brings together the context-specific manifestations of SSC 
measurement politics and the broader internal political and policy debates around India and China’s global 
roles and identities as development cooperation providers. By doing so, it highlights the interplay between 
geopolitics, development knowledge politics and state-society relations in shaping domestic SSC 
accountability dynamics in both countries.  
 
 
India: when accountability is not quite a problem   
 
 
Unlike the noisy landscape in Brazil, SSC accountability dynamics inside India have been marked by their 
low public and political salience, or its ‘little politics’.415 This can come as a surprise in many ways. First, 
due to the importance accountability discourses and ‘measurementalities’ have for the numerous Indian 
state institutions dealing with development programmes (A. Gupta 2012) and the many social accountability 
mechanisms devised in India since the 1990s in the context of these programmes (Goetz and Jenkins 2001; 
Blair 2018). Second, due to the multiple forms Indian civil (and political) society416 have employed 
accountability discourses, including when contesting, ‘from below’, state and state-backed private 
development projects (Roy 2003; Prashant Sharma 2014; Mohanty 2018). Vibrant anti-dam social 
movements are a widely known example, but others include the social mobilisation leading to the approval 
of the Right to Information Act (RTI) in the early 2000s and the 2011 anti-corruption movement led by 
Anna Hazare.  
 
415 Here I echo the expression used by Macauley (2014) to characterise Brazilian foreign policy landscape before the PT era.  
416 The differentiation between ‘civil’ and ‘political’ society in the case of India was first suggested by (Chatterjee 2004). I 




Third, low domestic salience is even more surprising when contrasted with Indian global diplomatic and 
para-diplomatic outspoken activism on SSC measurement, discussed in Chapter 4. One could then expect 
a disputed landscape inside India. But this has not happened. Not only Indian championing of alternative 
ways to measure SSC has not materialised into politically salient SSC national and subnational measurement 
disputes or experimentations, but also the ubiquitous ‘measurementality’ ruling other areas, branches and 
levels of the Indian state have not yet entered the realm of foreign policy and development cooperation. 
Why? 
 
Following a ‘domestic politics of foreign policy’ analytical approach, my response to this puzzle is that SSC 
accountability (including in its classic management and audit understandings) has only exceptionally (most 
notably in Indian LOCs) or inconsistently become a problem to Indian domestic publics and to other parts 
of the Indian state. Indian development cooperation, and accountability in/of Indian development 
cooperation, were rarely rendered a public problem because Indian foreign policy elites have been largely 
insulated from the pressures to explain themselves to a range of domestic constituencies, and because 
Indian SSC portfolio is still invisible, and even unconceivable, in Indian public and state’s imaginaries. This 
has led to the government and the various parts of the SSC bureaucracy not needing to ‘walk the talk’, an 
expression I often heard in Indian activists’ circles, and experiment practicing SSC accountability at home. 
Concurrently, external factors, including Aidland’s socialising pressures and incentives have played a less 
significant role in India, when compared to Brazil or China. This can be explained by an interplay of strong 
diplomatic resistance to include accountability issues in the partnerships with ‘traditional’ donors and the 
limited penetration external actors have on Indian ‘development assistance’ system417 (through triangular 
cooperation or partnering with knowledge actors and civil society) (Paulo 2018). 
 
Foreign policy debates: the national consensus on ‘doing better and doing more’ 
 
Understanding the current low salience of domestic problematisations of accountability in Indian 
development cooperation requires considering the ways foreign policy is made in India and how 
development cooperation has been perceived as a foreign policy tool among domestic publics, particularly 
under Narendra Modi’s BJP rule (2014-). Scholars posit that, despite the economic liberalisation and the 
advent of political competition and coalition politics in the 1990s, Indian foreign policy remains a product 
of relative insulated elites: a limited number of political actors within the MEA, the Prime Minister Office 
and the National Security Council, bureaucrats within those bodies and some policy advisors, notably 
former ambassadors (Sullivan de Estrada 2015). Certainly, foreign policy elites’ interaction with a small but 
 
417 Development Assistance has been traditionally the official designation adopted by the Government of India to refer to 
its development cooperation, including in flagship initiatives such as the Indian Development and Economic Assistance 
Scheme (IDEAS). Though the term South-South Cooperation is increasingly more present in official discourses, there is no 
internal consensus within India on its political appropriateness and/or usefulness, and, so far, SSC has not fully replaced 
other designations, including ‘development assistance’ or ‘development cooperation’. 
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growing foreign policy community—comprised of think tanks,418 academics, CSOs, journalists in major 
urban centres and, increasingly so, subnational political authorities419—has expanded in the last decade. Yet, 
Indian foreign policy still enjoys a de facto pan-partisan realist consensus and overall little questioning on 
India’s quest for greater power status and use of development cooperation to secure reputational, policy 
and economic goals (Chaturvedi et al. 2014; Mawdsley 2014b; Sullivan de Estrada 2015; Chenoy and Joshi 
2016; Ganguly, Hellwig and Thompson 2016; Michael and Baumann 2016).420 This also means few disputes 
around the role and workings of key Indian ‘SSC bureaucracies’, like the Development Partnership 
Administration (DPA), and other implementing actors (including Indian companies operating abroad). 
 
Scholars equally concur on a general ‘public apathy’ related to most foreign policy issues (Mawdsley 2014b; 
Aneja 2015; Ganguly, Hellwig and Thompson 2016).421 Previous research suggested that development 
cooperation attracted little attention among the masses and among middle-classes and elites, whose 
thoughts on India’s SSC have ranged between unawareness, indifference and support (Henson 2013; 
Mawdsley 2014b).422 Chenoy and Joshi (2016, 110) clearly posited that while embedded in an endorsing 
‘nationalistic discourse’, the topic has not received enough attention in domestic debates. My own findings 
show that not much has changed. Indian scholars and practitioners interviewed agreed that there is—at 
least on the surface—wide support for India’s role in global development and little questionings from 
domestic constituencies. Unlike Brazil, calls for halting development assistance on the lines of a (fighting 
poverty within) ‘India first’ or questioning the policy and strategic rationale of ‘assisting’ countries like 
Afghanistan or Nepal remain marginal.423 As put by one Indian scholar: ‘These things have appeal. No one 
ever opposed the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC),424 not even when India 
was poor. No one opposes SSC’.425  
 
Increasing diversity within the still small, mostly Delhi-based, foreign policy community has allowed, 
nonetheless, for some dissensus to emerge, strongly fuelled by growing geopolitical anxieties over Indian 
 
418 In the field of foreign policy and development cooperation there is a growing diversity of think tanks, most of them 
Delhi-based. Some are classic Indian foreign policy think tanks, led by former ambassadors some are India branches of US 
think tanks like Brookings and Carnegie. Among the national ones, some are liberal (like Observer Research Foundation - 
ORF), other more left-leaning (Centre for Policy Research - CPR) and others more nationalists (like RIS). On Indian think 
tanks, see Saran and Mohan (2018). 
419 For a discussion on the role of states in Indian foreign policy, see Asthana and Jacob (2019). 
420 INT-IN-20; INT-IN-16. 
421 Often mentioned exceptions include, excepting Sri Lanka issues in Tamil Nadu or Bangladesh issues for Bengali people 
or, more broadly, Indian relations with Pakistan, the US and China. 
422 This is not unrelated, to a broader traditional uninterest in or even denigration of the ‘soft power’ agenda more 
generally (which includes development cooperation) by Indian foreign policy elites. There are signs of changes in the last 
years, with the growing interest by the Modi administration in certain aspects of this agenda (particularly with respect to 
the use of cultural resources to meet foreign policy goals), such as in the so-called `Yoga Diplomacy’ (personal 
communication with Supriya Roychoudhury, 2020).  
423 INT-IN-5; INT-IN-16. 
424 ITEC is a governmental-funded training and capacity building scheme for individuals from Global South countries 
established in the 1960s. The Program has run ever since despite the fact that India was until the 1990s one of the largest 




global identity in the 21st century and growing competition with China (Khilnani et al. 2012). Dissensus has 
brought to the table specific accountability issues, either driven by concerns with making India a 
‘responsible global power’ (Saran and Mohan 2018; Leveringhaus and Sullivan de Estrada 2018) or, more 
frequently, by management and ‘delivery/implementation’ concerns along the lines of ‘India could do more’ 
and/or ‘could do better’.426  
 
According to Mawdsley (2014b), criticism from elites and CSOs, when present, were less about conduct, 
purpose, effectiveness and/or morality and more about state-led initiatives, focusing on issues of corruption 
and mismanagement. Additionally, even for the more dissenting voices, moderation or ‘shy’ and ‘friendly 
criticism’ have been the preferred modes of critical engagement (Mawdsley 2014b; Mawdsley and 
Roychoudhury 2016). Moderation, I find, results from both exogenous and self-imposed appeals to 
restraint. On the one hand, numerous research participants described instances where the space for critique 
and critical knowledge production had been limited. Representatives of non-governmental knowledge 
institutions reported difficulties researching Indian SSC. Instances of both backlash after publications and 
self-censorship were mentioned.427 On the other hand, CSOs representatives strongly felt a ‘shrinking civic 
space’ under Modi.428 This includes the supressing and dismantling of participatory spaces, public 
consultations, and access to information provisions, including in the context of environmental impact 
assessments (Chandhoke 2018; Jha 2018; Behar 2020).429 It also includes government pressure on the 
voluntary sector through legal instruments such as the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) and 
labelling criticism and dissent as ‘anti-national’ (also Chapter 7).430  
 
The Indian Parliament and the media have been, nonetheless, two important spaces where certain 
accountability issues, notably related to audit and the overall efficiency of Indian development cooperation 
emerged, albeit in a limited form. Lok Sabha’s Standing Committee on External Affairs, which formally 
oversees MEA’s budget, has since 2015 devoted an entire chapter of its annual reports to India’s 
development engagements, which feature descriptions of some bilateral partnerships and/or projects. Yet, 
besides formal oversight, the Committee—until 2019 chaired by the opposition Congress Party—has 
seldom engaged in debates on the performance, quality and/or results of Indian development assistance 
 
426 The framing of ‘could do more’ was suggested to me by one interviewee in India (INT-ODP-5). Elsewhere I have 
analysed Parliamentary debates to show these two particular stances (‘do more’ and ‘do better’) towards Indian 
development cooperation by the country’s legislative (Waisbich 2019).  
427 INT-IN-5; INT-IN-18. 
428 INT-IN-14; INT-IN-10; INT-IN-8; INT-IN-19.  
429 For a summary of the debates and criticisms around the proposed changes to the current environmental impact 
assessment regime in India, see Adhya (2020). 
430 This tendency is seen as having accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic, with further backlash against critical voices 
within civil society as well as against INGOs. An example of tighter control has been the 2020 FCRA Amendment that has 




(Chenoy and Joshi 2016; Tharoor 2020).431 Unlike the more polarised Brazilian legislative, the Indian 
Parliament remains largely supportive of the expansion of India’s development cooperation and showed 
no signs of challenging the broad establishment agreement on the ‘win-win’ nature of Indian SSC and the 
benefits India gets from it. Rather the Committee has called for the expansion MEA’s cooperation budget, 
challenging the gaps between Indian’s global ambitions and MEA’s budget and the gaps between 
commitments to the region and actual fund allocations (Mullen and Arora 2016; Lok Sabha 2017; 2018).432 
Furthermore, unlike in South Africa where civil society groups have used parliamentarian oversight in their 
advocacy with the executive on SSC issues (van der Westhuizen 2017; Waisbich 2019), CSOs in India have 
found a less receptive environment among national legislators.433  
 
As for the media, Modi’s South-South diplomacy, particularly his promises to extend loans to neighbouring 
countries—in an almost obsessive move to counter China (Chenoy and Joshi 2016)—has been an issue 
frequently reported in the press. Indian LOCs received media attention due to the mutual gains promises 
of creating jobs in India (e.g., S. Gupta 2015) but also due to allegations of corruption in the selection of 
Indian firms (e.g., Pranay Sharma 2011; Iyer 2015; Kapoor 2017; D. Mitra 2017). Attention among 
investigative journalists and CSOs peaked around certain key-moments, such as at time of the third India-
Africa Summit in 2015, but was not sustained and few have found the ways to consistently dig into the local 
workings and impacts of Indian development cooperation on the ground. An exception is the cross-regional 
coalition BRICS Feminist Watch,434 strongly led by Indian activists, which monitors India’s participation in 
Southern-led multilateral development banks, like the AIIB and the BRICS-led NDB (BFW 2019; also 
Chapter 7).435  
 
Reluctance to practice measurement   
 
Relatively insulated from the masses and from provocations by the foreign policy/development epistemic 
and policy communities, SSC measurement dynamics in India have been strongly shaped by governmental 
(and quasi-governmental) actors’ unwillingness to experiment with SSC accountability at home or to 
develop Indian specific accountability tools. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, at the global level, Indian 
actors like senior MEA diplomats from the DPA, the Indian missions to the UN in New York or Geneva, 
 
431 From 2014 to 2019 the Committee was chaired by Shashi Tharoor (Congress party), one of the major opposition voices 
to Modi’s government and also former State Minister of External Affairs. In 2020, the BJP government has decided to end 
the tradition of the leading opposition to chair the External Affairs Committee, it what was considered by Tharoor himself 
as blow to democratic accountability on foreign policy issues (The Hindu 2019). 
432 In 2018, the Committee even suggested that the Ministry consider granting the DPA the financial autonomy of a fully-
fledged development agency (Lok Sabha 2018). 
433 INT-IN-20; INT-IN-10; INT-OSS-15. 
434 The BRICS Feminist Watch defines itself as an ‘alliance comprised of members working in BRICS countries and towards 
influencing policy cross-regionally as they pertain to BRICS activities. BFW brings the collective strength of feminist analysis 
and activism to promote gender-responsive inclusive sustainable development and to make visible the linkages between 
gender justice, environmental and economic justice as critical to sustain people, movements and actions’ (BFW 2020).  
435 INT-IN-5; INT-IN-7; INT-IN-20. 
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and, above all, the MEA-affiliated think-tank RIS, have all played a major role in promoting differential 
narratives around accountability in SSC, oscillating between open diplomatic resistance and a policy-
normative and knowledge entrepreneurship. RIS, who intellectually leads on the development cooperation 
agenda within India, has come with new lexicons and new spaces—or ‘tables’, as practitioners in the field 
often call it—such as the Delhi Process, in which Southern actors can sit together to discuss development 
cooperation ‘from the South’. At the same time, both Indian diplomats and RIS scholars have not only 
watered down initial propositions on common measurement frameworks (such as the 2015 NeST 
framework) but also repeatedly argued that neither evaluation of SSC initiatives nor common standardised 
templates for reporting development cooperation flows were ‘relevant or desirable’ (M. Chakrabarti 2018, 
28). RIS has used its reputation and resources to convey policy debates and trainings (such as the ITEC 
Programme and the IBSA Fellowship), and to publish Southern critical voices towards existing aid 
accountability frameworks, disseminating alternative views on how SSC accountability, and SSC 
measurement, should look like.436  
 
Domestically, however, RIS have not employed consistent efforts to operationalise a ‘Southern’, ‘Asian’ or 
‘Indian’ way to practice accountability. Besides numerous opinion pieces on quantification and evaluation, 
RIS scholars have done little to test out these views or made them public to domestic and international 
audiences. Diplomatic unease with the topic is at the heart of the absence of measurement experimentation 
domestically and reflects not only a long tradition of asserting India’s global reformist stances but also the 
ways in which foreign policy is produced, debated and contested within India.  
 
Neither the ‘public policy/public spending’ nature of international development efforts (an understanding 
underpinning Brazilian diplomatic narratives and Cobradi reports) nor the ‘taxpayers’ money’ argument 
(found in several Northern donors) are consistently mobilised by Indian governmental and quasi-
governmental actors. Rather these were often rebuked as a ‘Northern ODA logic not an SSC or Indian 
concern’. One RIS scholar interviewed argued that SSC horizontality/demand-driven approach required 
no assessment efforts from India as a provider, since partner countries themselves ensure satisfactory 
implementation and should be the one leading on assessment efforts.437  
 
 
436 A recent vehicle for that is RIS own journal, the Development Cooperation Review. Published since 2018, the journal 
aims to ‘fill an important knowledge gap’ and contribute to global development debates with knowledges and voices from 
scholars and practitioners from the South.  In the Editorial of its first edition, RIS editorial team further clarified the 
journal’s identity stating that ‘the necessity of a publication that analyses development cooperation landscape through a 
Southern lens cannot be over emphasised, given the prevailing practice of looking at SSC with a typical Northern 
perspective’ (RIS 2018, 1). 
437 INT-IN-11. A slightly modified rendition can be found in M. Chakrabarti (2019, 46), when he states that:  
‘Notwithstanding the need for impact assessment, it is to be clearly understood that such demand for accountability and 
assessment should also emerge from the partner that asked for support and not from any third party that is not a party 
engaged in cooperation’. 
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Hence, RIS analysts’ calls for the development of ‘Southern-grown’ methodologies to show results and 
‘empirically validate’ the ‘nature and extent of mutual benefits generated out of Indian’s development 
cooperation’ (M. Chakrabarti 2016, 12), remained declaratory abstract considerations. Backed by a 
traditional realist vision that foreign policy should/could not be subjected to planning or evaluation438 and 
by the ongoing geopolitical discomfort with the agenda, RIS kept generating global measurement battles 
while carrying out ‘business and usual’ at home.439 This contrasts with the Brazilian landscape characterised 
by a series of epistemic and policy-applied debates within the foreign policy/SSC community on how to 
evaluate foreign policy gains and within the ecosystem of cooperation implementing agencies about mutual 
benefits.  
 
As a consequence, India has to date no official public guidelines and methodologies to quantify, report 
and/or evaluate its development cooperation. Considering quantification, New Delhi has not yet formally 
defined the exact ‘boundaries around the kind of activities that should be counted as development 
cooperation’ (Aneja 2015, 2), although RIS itself has been advancing the idea of an ‘Indian development 
compact’ comprised of five components: trade and investment; technology; skills upgrade; LOCs; and 
grants (Chaturvedi 2016). Official data on development assistance is not completely absent, but remains 
fragmented and not necessarily publicly accessible: ‘One can be lost in data’, I was once told by an Indian 
researcher.440 While the Exim Bank has its own statistics on the LOCs scheme, information on the overall 
portfolio (past and present) or a detailed breakdown of MEA’s budgetary allocations for development 
cooperation are not publicly available. In the recent years, India’s high-level planning body NITI Aayog has 
put forward the SDG India Index spanning most SDGs but leaving Goal 17 (concerning countries’ 
international cooperation in support of the agenda) outside the monitoring framework.441 While the 
decision reflects the widely acknowledge data challenges to monitor the implementation of certain goals 
(K. Kumar and Anand 2019), it also illustrates a political decision not to engage with the technicalities and 
come up with measurable indicators, even if imperfect.442 
  
 
438 A rich discussion on how different diplomatic apparatus across the world perceive the issue of diplomatic planning and 
evaluation can be seen in Belli and Nasser (2018). 
439 INT-IN-7; INT-BR-40. 
440 INT-IN-21. A similar assessment was shared by Indian SSC researcher Dr. Renu Modi, from the University of Mumbai, in 
a recent interview to the India-UK Development Partnership Forum, available at https://www.iukdpf.com/interview-
professor-renu-modi-on-india-africa-partnerships/ (last access: 15/12/2020). 
441 See https://niti.gov.in/sdg-india-index (last access: 30/07/2020). 
442 According to Kumar and Anand (2019), NITI Aayog recognised the data challenges and explained their decision to 
prioritise indicators where there was ‘state-wise data’. In the Latin American context, ECLAC has also highlighted the data-
challenges countries in the region encountered to monitor SDG number 17 (ECLAC 2018). The same challenges have also 
been discussed by the UN Statistical Commission, which leads on the Inter-Agency and Expert Group on the Sustainable 
Development Goal Indicators. In 2020, the Commission has decided to establish a Working Group on Measurement of 
Development Support, in line with Agenda 2030 target 17.3 (‘Mobilize additional financial resources for developing 
countries from multiple sources’). This work will feed into ongoing debates about devising new measures for the different 
components of development support (ODA, SSC, triangular cooperation, and other public and private flows).  
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Formal democratic checks-and-balances, including parliamentary budgetary reviews, have allowed for 
outsiders to externally estimate Indian flows, based on budget allocations (Chanana 2009; Mullen and Arora 
2016; I. Mitchell, Ritchie and Rogerson 2020). However, estimations are deemed methodologically 
unsatisfactory. This is due, first, to the breaks between commitments and actual disbursement/project 
implementation, which expanded in the last years as a resulting of the increasing ‘assertive’ or even ‘populist’ 
diplomatic moves, as framed by some experts.443 Second, because in the case of LOCs what gets reported 
in budgets are the governmental subsidies (guarantees and interest equalisation) rather than the total value 
of the loans, for which India borrows from global capital markets and then lends to its Southern partners 
countries with lower-interests rates and longer repayment schedules (GoI/MoF 2015).444 
 
RIS has in the past tried out to create a comprehensive database of past and present SSC flows, an effort 
that was considered not only technically challenging but also politically sensitive. According to a research 
participant, besides the difficulties to retrieve data from national institutions implementing SSC initiatives 
and the methodological dilemmas (including the ones found in Brazil regarding how to define modalities 
and how to monetisation past investments in technologies), political tensions were a major factor: ‘India is 
not ready for scrutiny’, he stated.445 In the end, the estimate was neither finalised nor published. Discomfort 
with measurement is also clearly visible when others, such as independent think tanks, tried to count Indian 
development cooperation autonomously. Both the MEA and RIS not only made difficult for external 
researchers to access relevant data446 but also tried to either minimise or openly rebuked findings that 
showed inconsistencies or mismatches between budget allocation and stated geographical policy priorities, 
such as in the case of granting more loans to African governments than following its ‘Neighbourhood First’ 
policy (Mullen and Arora 2016). 
 
As for evaluation, Indian efforts remain incipient, as highlighted by SSC scholars (e.g., Esteves 2018; Rizzo 
2019a; Milani 2019). RIS has conducted assessments of certain initiatives, including India’s Small Grant 
Development Projects in Nepal, India-Mozambique collaboration on solar technology, the ITEC 
programme, and India-Ethiopia agricultural investments partnerships. Yet these were largely internal 
assessments, inaccessible to outsiders, even if some findings have been shared by RIS scholars as discussion 
papers or in NeST-related international events and/or publications (e.g. S. Kumar 2015; NeST 2019).447 
Unlike Brazil, until very recently there was no notice of MEA commissioning external/independent 
assessment studies. In 2019, however, the Indian NGO PRIA received funding from the Ministry to do a 
‘civil society assessment’ of LOCs in Bangladesh.448 While an innovation from a state-society relations 
 
443 INT-IN-7; INT-ODP-5. 
444 INT-IN-7; INT-IN-16. 
445 INT-IN-21. 
446 INT-IN-16; INT-IN-7; INT-BR-18. 
447 INT-IN-11; INT-IN-9; INT-IN-16. 
448 The final report not publicly available and could not be retrieved.  
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perspective, this collaboration made visible the embedded tensions of the ‘insiders-collaboration’ and 
‘friendly critique’,449 a constitutive element in social mobilisation dynamics around ‘Global India’, I will 
explore below and in Chapter 7. 
 
Another recent dynamic relates to the role of the ‘traditional’ development apparatus. In 2019, two Indian 
think tanks (the Public Affairs Centre and RIS) received UNOSSC research grants to assess Indian SSC 
initiatives, including the ITEC programme (UNOSSC 2020). While international incentives can create 
opportunities for the government to experiment measuring SSC and foster greater publicity in the 
knowledge production around SSC, as discussed in Chapter 4, they bring along their own logics and 
contradictions. This includes the traps of measuring to perform success to international audiences trumping 
the use of measurement to understand and learn from past experiences (Eyben and Guijt 2015; Honig 
2020) and the democratic tensions embedded in reinforcing a historical pattern of ‘Indian elites justifying 
its initiatives to external audiences than to its own’ (Kaviraj 2010, 34). 
 
Measuring ‘from below’ 
 
Against the backdrop of MEA and RIS reluctant approaches, measurements of Indian SSC strongly relied 
on efforts ‘from below’: by non-governmental knowledge actors and the Indian voluntary sector in 
partnership with a range of international peers. Civil society-led efforts, including studies and policy debates 
on quantification or independent studies on the performance of Indian SSC initiatives on the ground, came 
from autonomous think tanks (such as the Centre for Policy Research - CPR and Observer Research 
Foundation - ORF), national NGOs (such as Participatory Research in Asia – PRIA, Vasudha Foundation, 
the NGO-umbrella Voluntary Action Network India – VANI and Praxis Institute), or from Indian activists 
in the BRICS Feminist Watch. These actors have often acted in partnership with international entities such 
as Oxfam India, Action Aid India, The Asia Foundation or the Heinrich Böll Foundation, and relied on 
their resources to watchdog ‘Global India’. Oxfam, in particular, has been a major knowledge producer and 
a convening actor; enabling national CSOs to scrutinize SSC ‘from below’ and sharing those with 
organisations in other Southern providers like Brazil, China, Mexico and South Africa.450 Table 2, below, 
gives a panorama of these knowledge outputs on Indian SSC developed by Indian civil society.  
 
449 INT-IN-8; INT-IN-6; INT-IN-1. 
450 As mentioned in Chapter 3, most of this work has been done in the context of Oxfam BRICSAM and LEAP initiatives, 
which ran until 2018 and received funding from the European Union and the Gates Foundation to strengthen civil society 
voices within ‘rising powers’ (Stephen and Zürn 2019). 
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Source: Author’s compilation 
Knowledge Output Leading organisations Partnership/Support Publication year
India’s Global Footprints Voluntary Action Network India -VANI  Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2013
Indian Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) project Centre for Policy Research - CPR Asia Foundation 
                             
2014-2017
Development Finance and Cooperation in SSC with Special Focus on India Voluntary Action Network India -VANI  Bread for the World 2015
India-Africa Partnership: A Civil Society Perspective Voluntary Action Network India -VANI  Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2015
A Study of the India-Bhutan Energy Cooperation Agreements and the 
Implementation of Hydropower Projects in Bhutan
Vasudha Foundation Oxfam India 2016
Future of Development Cooperation: Policy Priorities for an Emerging India
Institute for Sustainable Development and 
Governance 
Oxfam India 2016
India’s Development Cooperation: Case of Four Countries Voluntary Action Network India -VANI  Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2016
Engagement of Indian CSOs in South-South Cooperation. A compilation of 
case studies
Participatory Research in Asia - PRIA  Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2016
India’s Development Cooperation with Bangladesh. A focus on Lines of 
Credit
Participatory Research in Asia - PRIA  Oxfam India 2017
Development and Approach of BRICS New Development Bank Voluntary Action Network India -VANI  Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2017
India’s Grants and Investments in Africa  Voluntary Action Network India -VANI  Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2017
India's Development Assistance to Nepal: Case of the Education Sector
Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations - 
ICRIER
Oxfam India 2018
India-Sri Lanka Development Cooperation with a Special Focus on Indian 
Housing Project for Internally Displaced Persons 
Institute for Sustainable Development and 
Governance - ISDG
Oxfam India 2018
Methodology for Tracking Development Assistance from India
Centre for Budget and Governance 
Accountability
2018
India’s Development Assistance and Connectivity Projects in Nepal
Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations - 
ICRIER
Oxfam India 2018
Gender Monitoring of the New Development Bank. Major District Roads, 
Madhya Pradesh, India. Key Findings	 BRICS Feminist Watch Heinrich Böll Foundation India 2018
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Consequently, and unlike the Brazilian case, there has been no open measurement ‘duelling’ taking place. 
Rather civil society measurement has largely filled a knowledge gap, from ‘from below’. Independent 
evaluation-like studies have excavated specific country case studies, sometimes with field-based research, 
thus contributing to the overall policy debate with data from the ground and with partners’ voices. PRIA-
Oxfam’s study on Indian LOCs to Bangladesh, for instance, was conceived as an ‘independent and truthful 
assessment of the mutual benefits of such ties between countries’ (K. Chakrabarti and Bandyopadhyay 
2017, iv). The study explicitly adopts an ‘effectiveness lens’ to the subject, problematising what they called 
an ‘Indian bias’ in the LOCs scheme, lack of transparency at the project level and lack of civil society 
participation in monitoring and assessing projects’ impacts. 
 
Despite being modest research efforts, civil society-led publicly available assessments contrast with the lack 
of publicity in the government side, further politicising, ‘from below’, the ‘transparency problem’ in official 
bodies. As framed by an Indian CSO representative:  
 
There is an academic interest and an industry in the Western world because documents are available there. The 
Indian government could promote Southern scholarship if they wanted, but for that documents must be put into 
circulation. If not, how then do you counter…How do you say you are “better than the OECD”? How do you go 
beyond the talking-show?451 
 
Autonomous efforts were met with a mix of selective openness, indifference and resistance from the 
MEA.452 RIS itself played an important mediator role both as a gatekeeper and as an enabler.453 RIS has, on 
the one hand, filtered who had access to information, in what ways, and how external measurement 
could/should influence official policy.454 At the same time, RIS had oversight of the ‘invited spaces for 
participation’ (Gaventa 2006) constructed around Indian SSC. One way this selective opening up was done 
was through the Indian Forum for International Development Cooperation (FIDC). The Forum is a multi-
stakeholder space hosted by RIS that gathers invited Indian CSOs, think tanks, academics and 
representatives of MEA ‘to research and create public consciousness’ of Indian development cooperation 
(Chaturvedi et al. 2014, 24).  
 
The origins of the Forum respond to a demand by Indian CSOs for participation in development 
cooperation policymaking, which was met with openness by the MEA around the time DPA was also being 
set-up. Growing participation claims inside India were enabled by favourable opportunity structures 
(political, material and symbolic) in transnational networks (of development researchers and INGOs from 
Aidland and from other emerging powers, like Brazil and South Africa) interested in strengthening Indian 
 
451 INT-IN-8. 
452 INT-IN-8; INT-IN-20; INT-IN-4; INT-BR-18. 
453 For a discussion on the concept of mediation and mediators, see Von Lieres and Piper (2014). 
454 INT-IN-6; INT-IN-4; INT-IN-18; INT-IN-1; INT-IN-14.   
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actors to monitor country’s global footprint.455 In what later became an increasingly restrictive environment 
for social mobilisation, the Forum is perceived by insiders as a valuable, and almost unique, multi-
stakeholder space.456  
 
FIDC has been a leading voice in the measurement debate within India, but has done so in a conflict-
avoiding way. According to one interviewee, for certain Forum members it was important to challenge 
MEA’s general view that measuring was ‘a waste of time and money’ or that ‘there was no need’ for this 
kind of effort. In order to do so, they decided to push the agenda from within based on the assumption 
that, as I was told: ‘even if the MEA is apathic to accountability they cannot afford not to learn’.457 Still 
according to an insider, ‘learning’ has been a more palatable framing than ‘accountability’ or ‘M&E’ and 
one that makes sense to MEA and Exim Bank bureaucrats, a comment resonating across different 
stakeholders in India but also in China (see below).  
 
The accountability problem with Indian Lines of Credit  
 
While public scrutiny and formal oversight of Indian development cooperation have been of low intensity, 
a notable exception is Indian development finance and in particular India’s Exim Bank operations. As with 
BNDES in Brazil, the materiality of India’s LOCs/IDEAS made it an object of scrutiny. LOCs constitute 
the bulk of Indian development cooperation expenditure (Chaturvedi 2012; Chenoy and Joshi 2016). As of 
December 2019, 257 LOCs covering 61 countries had been signed, with credit commitments aggregating 
25.15 billion USD (The Economic Times 2020).458 According to India’s Exim Bank, African countries are 
the major beneficiaries of the scheme (Exim Bank 2014).459  
 
During its first phase, until 2015, the initiative was caught in a series of ‘implementation issues’, as my 
Indian participants would often frame, including slow and/or poor project implementation and corruption 
scandals involving the tendering process to Indian firms.460 LOCs implementation rates decreased and both 
the delays and the poor quality of completed projects became object of complaints by borrowing countries 
in the neighbourhood and in Africa (Dye 2016; D. Mitra 2017).461 As a consequence, Exim Bank became 
 
455 According to internal accounts, the Forum itself was born of a discussion forum held at RIS in January 2013 as part of 
the inception workshop for the ‘State of the Debate of Indian Development Cooperation’ study; in collaboration with 
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) and the UK-based IDS Rising Powers in International Development programme, funded 
by DFID. This information was confirmed by IDS researchers leading on the project at the time. 
456 INT-IN-8; INT-IN-1. 
457 INT-IN-8. 
458 When described in terms of India’s GDP, this amount of loaned capital would amount to nearly 1%, in 2017 (D. Mitra 
2017). Yet, if one considers only the ‘interest equalisation support’ allotted by GoI through the Budget this was, until 2015, 
approximately 252 million USD, or Rs 1,904 crore (Iyer 2015). 
459 Importantly, a single project can receive more than one LOC. For example, the Nyabarongo Dam, in Rwanda, was built 
with funding from two different LOCs (Dye 2018). 
460 As mentioned, these got media coverage. See, for instance, Iyer (2015); The Economic Times (2015); D. Mitra (2017). 
461 INT-IN-13; INT-IN-17. 
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vulnerable to financial and reputational risks.462 To counter these, in 2015, the scheme underwent a 
comprehensive review, described by the MEA as: ‘Try[ing] and improv[ing] the process so that projects are 
better conceived, prepared, appraised and implemented. Greater transparency and accountability are also 
sought to be engendered’ (Iyer 2015).  
 
Reforming India’s South-South development finance 
 
The 2015 reforms promoted changes in how LOCs were managed. Administered by the MEA’s territorial 
divisions in the first decade, the scheme started to be administered by DPA, in closer dialogue with the 
Exim Bank. There were also transparency-related changes whereby the Exim Bank expanded public 
information on its operations. Transparency was, on the one hand, pursued through outreach efforts to 
explain the new guidelines to different stakeholders, including Indian companies, industry/trade 
associations, partner governments in Africa and the general public in India.463 Exim also made LOCs 
statistics from 2002 onwards available on its website,464 which made many Indian SSC experts cognisant of 
Exim transparency (particularly when compared to MEA records).465 Some, however, remained critical of 
existing statistics only describing broad bilateral loans flows, with no disaggregated data by project, builders 
and/or sector. Besides the ‘clubbing’ of multiple projects on a same bilateral loan, critics also pointed to 
the persistent lack of disclosure on project implementation and assessments (K. Chakrabarti and 
Bandyopadhyay 2017).466  
 
Alongside transparency issues, the 2015 reforms have also led to more stringent guidelines on the tendering 
process and on post-sanction by the Exim Bank, opening the way for closer alignment to international 
standards on procurement and to the establishment of a Project Preparation Fund (PPF).467 The Fund seeks 
to articulate, refine and consolidate partner’s demands to improve the financial and physical feasibility of 
projects, including assessment of country systems and debt concerns (Viswanathan and Mishra 2019).468 
Having to fix delivery and implementation, the Exim Bank has moved away from its initial fairly ‘hands-
off’ approach (Dye 2016; Mawdsley 2019), at least in the project design and preparation phases. This 
 
462 Already present in 2015, these risks have not dissipated. Because the Exim kept lending, until 2013, to companies that 
are currently undergoing insolvency proceedings, their loans became non-performing assets for the Bank. As a 
consequence, and due to the explicit credit guarantee from the government embedded in LOCs, by 2019 the bank needed 
capital infusion. See https://www.bloombergquint.com/business/why-the-government-had-to-step-in-to-support-indias-
exim-bank (last access 28/06/2020). 
463 This was done for instance through the Confederation of Indian Industry-Exim Bank Conclaves on India Africa Project 
Partnership, held since 2005. The initiative was launched by CII in partnership with the Exim Bank of India and with the 
support of the Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. See 
https://www.ciieximafricaconclave.com/ (last access: 21/09/2020). 
464 See Government of India - Lines of Credit Statistics, available at https://www.eximbankindia.in/lines-of-credit-
GOILOC.aspx (last access: 29/06/2020). 
465 INT-IN-7; INT-IN-16; INT-ODP-5; INT-ODP-2.  
466 INT-IN-5; INT-IN-7; INT-IN-16. I thank Udisha Saklani for the expression of ‘clubbing’.  
467 INT-IN-13. 
468 INT-IN-15; INT-ODP-5; INT-IN-17. 
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includes not only the PPF but also enhanced compliance and due-diligence in the biding process by Indian 
companies and throughout execution.  
 
The reforms also formally gave an enhanced monitoring role for Indian actors (Exim Bank, DPA and 
Indian diplomats in-country) during the project cycle.469 Despite the new provisions, M&E at the project-
level remains feeble. Currently, the government mostly assesses the delivery by the Indian contractor, 
monitors the repayment, and conducts missions to monitor execution. In theory, the Exim Bank conducts 
post-project monitoring to assure due-diligence and mitigate eventual complaints about quality. In practice, 
however, India relies on partner governments to send reports after completion, which they do not always 
do according to an Indian MEA staffer.470 From an Indian point of view, follow-up up is deemed important 
also to prevent a ‘bad contractor’ to bid again and prevent further harm to India’s image and relationships 
with partners.471 Corruption was also mentioned by governmental interviewees as a concern taken seriously. 
Their framing was elusive when referring to Indian contractors (an ‘implementation issue’), but more 
explicit when mentioning the borrowing countries: ‘We are very sensitive to money being used for good 
purposes. We know there is a lot of corruption issues in Africa…’, I was told by one senior Exim Bank 
representative.472 
 
The uneasy ‘development effectiveness’ issue  
 
Primarily conceived as an instrument of economic diplomacy (Saxena 2016), concerns with ‘development 
effectiveness’ are not yet fully at (although not completely off) the table now that India has advanced on 
strengthening and streamlining internal management processes.473 According to one MEA representative:  
 
The sustainability issue, the business model, the green component of it: we are starting to ask ourselves these questions. 
Maybe in five years from now, in our next review, this might be there. Steps towards that are the Project Preparation 
Facility and the consultants. We are now doing the pre-project plugging. Projects are still struggling, some operating 
below their capacity.474  
 
A RIS scholar concurred on the incipient nature of effectiveness-related reflections, both in the case of the 
Exim Bank and in other SSC bureaucracies.475 When inquired about how the government assesses the 
development impact of LOCs-funded projects, one Exim Bank representative responded that 
 
469 INT-IN-15; INT-IN-17; INT-IN-13. 
470 INT-IN-17. 
471 In 2015, Modi has also promised to create a Joint Monitoring Mechanism with the African Union to improve India’s 
delivery, which so far has remained on paper. 
472 INT-IN-15. 






‘development impact is what partner governments say to us’.476 The representative also stated that the Bank 
has no written socio-environmental safeguards and that socio-environmental risks assessments are under 
partners’ responsibilities, as well as eventual rehabilitations and/or compensations resulting from funded 
projects.477 One interlocutor in the MEA framed this as a ‘respectful approach’,478 whereby the 
responsibility is on the host government: ‘We can raise these concerns and hope they will be dealt in the 
beginning of the project cycle. But it is their responsibility’, added another MEA representative.479 Yet, 
according to an Exim Bank staffer, these considerations are ‘kept in mind’ when assessing demands from 
partners, mentioning an ‘a priori objection’ to funding projects related to mining and other projects ‘that 
could lead to displacement’.480  
 
This same interviewee affirmed that, since 2003, no socio-environmental harm has ever happened in the 
context of a LOC-funded project, a claim challenged by other interviewees in academia and civil society.481 
An emblematic instance where the official benign rhetoric clashed with other stakeholders’ perspectives on 
the negative impacts of LOC-funded initiatives is the case of the short-lived grassroots transnational 
campaign against a growing number of large scale land acquisitions (‘land grabbing’, in the campaigners’ 
words) by Indian companies in Ethiopia. According to activists and scholars, part of these investments 
relied on loans opened by the Exim Bank to the Ethiopian government to expand country’s sugar sector 
(Mawdsley 2014b; Chenoy and Joshi 2016; Michael and Baumann 2016; Mawdsley and Roychoudhury 2016; 
Jain and Marcondes 2017; S. Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2019).482  
 
The UK has also expanded its technical dialogue with the Exim Bank on issues of development 
effectiveness. In 2016, the then DFID India Office and the Bank agreed to discuss project design and 
evaluation and jointly work to establish Exim’s monitoring systems (DFID 2018b). DFID procured a 
consultancy with the private firm KPMG to provide training for the Exim Bank staff and streamline existing 
monitoring processes and standardising tools and templates for the LOCs. This partnership also included 
a technology transfer component, with DFID assisting the bank to adopt ‘an integrated IT system on the 
lines of DFID’s own Aid Management Programme AMP’ (ibid).   
 
Talking about development impacts was seen by one DFID staffer as ‘a practical and helpful approach to 
accountability’ and one that works best with rising powers than lecturing or stepping into ‘OECD language’ 
 
476 INT-IN-15. 
477 INT-IN-15; INT-IN-17. 
478 INT-IN-13. 
479 INT-IN-17.  
480 INT-IN-15. 
481 INT-IN-20; INT-IN-16; INT-IN-5; INT-IN-10. 
482 The campaign sought to give voice to general fear of ‘land grabbing’ by Indian companies as well as specific unheard 
complaints by local groups, including indigenous peoples in the Gambella region of Ethiopia, of land expropriation, 
displacement, as well as other human rights abuses against those who resisted or failed to comply with the relocation 
policies (Business and Human Rights 2013).  
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like socio-environmental safeguards.483 Being ‘useful’ to institutions like the Exim, which DFID considered 
to be ‘open’, ‘less-political’ and ‘committed to change’, meant sharing management tools (including the 
software used by DFID) but also conducting joint project monitoring missions.484 While in an initial stage, 
the exchanges between DFID and Exim Bank illustrate a possible arrangement for future negotiations on 
accountability and effectiveness issues between DAC-members and India around so-called ‘technical’ 
and/or ‘management’ dimensions of development cooperation accountability, at the country-level (Paulo 
and Reisen 2010; Bracho 2015).  
 
Re-thinking accountability in and beyond India’s Lines of Credit   
 
India’s Exim Bank is not only, materially-wise, the largest instrument within India’s ‘SSC compact’ but also 
the most domestically salient one. The problematisation of accountability in the context of LOCs responded 
to a combination of private sector dynamics (both incentives and pressures),485 domestic accountability 
mechanisms (oversight mechanisms and media scrutiny), and management concerns with weak 
performance and ‘things going wrong’ (corruption, slow delivery, complaints by partners on the quality of 
projects). Considering the dual—export promotion and development cooperation—nature of LOCs, 
reforms responded to New Delhi’s geopolitical, geo-economic and reputational concerns to deliver on 
Southern partners’ expectations and to balance China’s disbursements in South Asia and Africa. Disputes 
between the MEA and the Ministry of Finance on how to better proceed illustrate, however, the challenges 
to find the right balance between a ‘hands-off approach’ and mounting management and reputation 
considerations pushing in the opposite direction. As Indian disbursements continue to grow, these new 
concerns tend to override previous ‘Indian ways of doing cooperation’ that might have served the country 
well when the amounts and stakes were smaller.486 As framed by one MEA representative: ‘Reputation 
concerns relate to both pride and liabilities. (…) At the end of the day, is an Indian company, Indian name, 
Indian bilateral relations. (…) Governments have to feel that India is a good partner’.487  
 
Overall, concerns with ‘India’s good international image’488 and with protecting country’s image as a reliable 
partner and its diplomatic relations, rather than concerns with public accountability within India, have been 
a major driver for the pro-accountability reforms unfolding within Indian LOCs scheme.489 Besides 
improving project delivery and performance to serve India’s geopolitical and geo-economic ambitions,  
reforms also included a renegotiation of what mutual accountability means in this South-South 
 
483 INT-ODP-5. 
484 These so-called ‘technical dialogues’ were considered, nonetheless, an advancement for DFID in light of the inherent 
tensions and political sensitivities of building a dialogue among equals between a former metropole and its former colony 
and India’s preference to look at Japan, as its role model within the DAC, not the UK. (INT-IN-13; INT-ODP-5). 
485 INT-IN-1; INT-IN-14; INT-IN-16; INT-IN-2; INT-IN-3. 
486 For a more detailed discussion on the reforms, see Saxena (2016).   
487 INT-IN-17. 
488 INT-IN-15. 
489 INT-IN-15; INT-IN-20. 
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development finance scheme, since better performance by Indian contractors means accountability to 
partners’ developmental needs or at least greater responsivity to their stated preferences. As such, reforming 
LOCs/IDEAS to ‘fix’ diplomatic relations created, regardless of India’s initial intention, an opening for 
these same relations to meet the promises of a ‘win-win’—at least from a government-to-government 
perspective—South-South relationship.  
 
However, while reforms might have ‘fixed’ some accountability issues, they also left other dimensions of 
the broader agenda untouched. First, LOCs reforms provided yet another example of the inherent risks of 
‘accountability gaps’ under the country systems approach adopted by India’s Exim Bank, as well as by other 
development banks from/led by Brazil and China, an issue examined in the next chapter. Second, the 
public-private nature of India’s LOCs complexifies the notion of state responsibility. As argued by Jain and 
Marcondes (2017, 45): ‘It is difficult to speak about defined contours of accountability and at times even 
motivations when interfacing in cooperation occurs through actors with mixed identities and purposes’. 
While the debate around business responsibility is not a new one,490 is clear that India’s ‘business-friendly’ 
SSC approach (Chenoy and Joshi 2016, 99) adds another layer of complexity into the politics of 
accountability in Southern development finance.  
 
From an audit perspective, the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) is not involved in 
overseeing the implementation of LOCs. The CAG can only scrutinise the payment of interest equalisation 
and guarantees from the MEA to the Exim Bank, as the loan itself is technically not money being spent 
from the exchequer (rather is money borrowed from international markets and supposedly repaid) (D. Mitra 
2017). The particularities of such export credit tool also affect SSC measurement issues. From an evaluation 
perspective, several Southern scholars validate India’s official justification of LOCs’ ‘tied procurement’ as 
being about ‘mutual gains’ not ‘conditionalities’ and that assessment methodologies should reflect that 
(Aneja 2015; Chenoy and Joshi 2016; Besharati 2018). Others, however, argued that this model could de 
facto work as ‘process conditionalities’ and reduce development outcomes for partners (K. Chakrabarti and 
Bandyopadhyay 2017; Bhattacharya, Rahman and Muhtasim 2019).491 Bhattacharya and colleagues (ibid, 
42) further argued that ‘the service-tie conditionality limits the scope of capacity development and 
improvement of expertise of Bangladeshi officials in the management and implementation of major 
infrastructure projects. This could potentially make Bangladesh dependent on Indian firms in implementing 
major infrastructure projects’.  
 
Regarding quantification, no agreement has been reached on how to account for the ‘development 
contribution’ of LOCs. While considering the Indian contribution to be the difference between the rate 
 
490 At the UN-level this has been for long championed both in the human rights pillar, with the business and human rights 
framework (see UN 2008) and in the context of the Global Compact.  
491 INT-IN-7; INT-IN-8. 
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India borrowed from international markets and the rate is lending, there is still debate on whether to 
consider the rate India is borrowing or the rate the partner country would have paid if borrowing directly 
from commercial banks in the market.492 This apparently arithmetic issue bears, nonetheless, implications 
for Indian ranking in the ‘generosity contest’ and (potentially) for how domestic publics perceive this 
instrument. Some development practitioners within India agree that LOCs pose conceptual accountability 
challenges that require debates to go beyond the usual ‘taxpayers’ argument’, found in ODA, since the 
amounts disbursed through LOCs are a combination of money borrowed from the market and 
government’s subsidies offered to Indian companies to export services. Purely importing the taxpayers’ 
logic without translating it to the Indian context could, as many of my Indian interlocutors pointed out,493 
not only be technically inappropriate and politically misleading but also strategically unhelpful considering 
the low tax-base in India (A. Gupta 2017).  
 
Equally absent from mainstream debates is the relationship between state capture and private sector 
collusion, or what Gupta (ibid) calls ‘horizontal corruption’, and negative development impacts on the 
ground.494 These linkages—relevant to India domestic development as to its development cooperation—
have received comparatively less media and civil society attention than performance and taxpayers’ issues. 
This nexus is, nonetheless, at the core of how certain radical grassroots groups see the SSC accountability 
problem. As put by a self-identified Indian grassroot activist:  
 
Accountability is where they put Indian public money, is disclosure and financial transparency, is adhering to 
standards, is to respect peoples’ movements and not to unduly subsidise Indian corporates. The same human rights 
and socio-environmental standards that apply domestically, the Exim has to adhere.495    
 
Having historically fought and resisted as civil society from a ‘borrower/recipient’ country where projects 
sometimes ‘went wrong’, representatives from grassroots groups further emphasised the need to foster 
solidarity between critical voices in India and those based in countries where India-funded projects happen. 
They also stressed the need to discursively link the debates on ‘Global India’ with domestic issues within 
India, as to forge the connections between groups working and fighting marginalisation and accountability 
issues within the country and those monitoring India’s global footprint. It is clear, nonetheless, that 
domestic publics are still navigating ways to understand and engage with ‘Global India’ (and to dispute it). 
This makes the domestic landscape in India one of more or less visible and more or less publicly and 
politically salient problematisations of and negotiations over accountability in/of SSC, which might evolve 









China: cautiously practicing development cooperation accountability   
 
 
China is currently the second largest economy in the world and yet defines itself as the ‘world’s largest 
developing country’: one ‘still facing a raft of severe challenges’ (PRC SCIO 2019) while ‘forging ahead and 
leading the way’ (CPC 2020). China is also the most iconic Southern development cooperation provider, 
the one most people in Aidland have examined to understand what SSC looks like and where is heading to. 
China’s development cooperation and the politics of accountability around it are, nonetheless, in many ways 
unique due to the volume of its development initiatives, the level of international scrutiny they receive, and 
the particularities of China’s political and policy systems. 
 
This section investigates SSC accountability debates and dynamics within China, the ways the ‘SSC 
accountability problem’ has been understood and dealt by the Chinese development cooperation/foreign 
aid496 system, and the kinds of ‘accountability reforms’ it has generated. Chapter 7 will deal with another 
aspect of Chinese domestic landscape, namely pro-accountability social mobilisation. As explained in 
Chapter 2, my analysis of domestic dynamics within China is non-exhaustive and aims at complementing 
the findings coming from Brazil and India and expanding our understanding of the politics of accountability 
in development cooperation beyond Western and/or liberal democratic settings.  
 
Looking at the Chinese domestic landscape, I posit that accountability in/of SSC has also become a problem 
for the Chinese Communist Party leadership as well as for aid/SSC bureaucrats and development experts. 
Having the former as a background, my analysis focuses mostly on the latter, arguing three things. First, 
China’s critical, yet pragmatic, diplomatic stances on SSC accountability issues, chiefly on measurement (see 
Chapter 4), have generated their own manifestations within China. While holding critical stances towards 
the OECD-led ‘Aid Effectiveness Agenda’, those within the rapidly growing international development 
field in China497 are vocalising their willingness to engage with existing aid accountability practices as to 
improve China’s SSC and thus consolidate this field within China. Second, reputational concerns around 
SSC, which is a foreign policy and (geo)political-economic tool for China, have prompted management 
reforms to the existing ‘foreign aid system’ in China, including accountability-related reforms. Third, the 
Chinese government approach to accountability reforms is mostly managerial, carefully exploring ways to 
report and publicise flows in a controlled safe manner as well as to pilot evaluation tools.    
 
 
496 China historically referred to its international development cooperation as ‘foreign aid’. China’s major development 
cooperation bureaucracy has been for decades the Department of Foreign Aid within China’s Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM). The term ‘foreign aid’ has been progressively complemented in the more recent years in both the policy and 
academic worlds by the use of the terms ‘development cooperation’ and ‘South-South Cooperation’ (CPC 2020) but not fully 
replaced. This section contains all three terms, which in my understanding are different sociopolitical and historical ways to 
refer to the same phenomenon. 
497 For a detailed analysis of this growing field within China, see Cheng (2020). 
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The reputational problem and China’s development cooperation management reforms 
 
Back in 2016, Chinese scholars Gu, Chen and Haibin (2016, 23) argued that China’s foreign aid has been 
historically ‘more political than developmental in nature’. They also characterised China’s approach as one 
balancing an increasingly assertive development cooperation role while ‘constantly appraising’ what this 
empowered role should be (ibid, 31). Whereas the political and ever-changing nature of development 
cooperation is certainly not unique to China, one has to recognise the renewed political importance this 
tool has acquired for Beijing in the last two decades. In this context, I found that the Chinese government 
willingness to experiment with practicing accountability responds to a broader foreign policy concern with 
China’s reputation—or ‘country’s image’ as referred in China—as a distinctive but ‘responsible power’ and 
‘a good global citizen’ (Shirk 2007; Leveringhaus and Sullivan de Estrada 2018). This translates into a will 
to be seen as a ‘responsible development partner’ and establishing good dialogue with existing development 
actors and norms (D. Zhang 2020).  
 
Beyond global status, reputation also translates into specific development cooperation management and 
delivery concerns. Reputation and delivery meet, for instance, in the acute awareness Chinese officials and 
bureaucrats have of the financial, diplomatic and geopolitical implications of development projects ‘going 
wrong’ abroad (Jiang 2019; Yeophantong 2020). As framed by a Chinese scholar: ‘The image of the project 
is the image of the country. As they say, there is no small issue in international relations (…) In the end, is 
one brand: China’.498 
 
The amount of exposure of China’s current portfolio makes the country particularly sensitive to external 
criticism, not only by traditional donors but also by partner governments and local actors in host countries 
including the media (Mawdsley 2008; van Staden and Wu 2018). Increasing self-awareness has driven the 
Party, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to pay more 
attention to a set of accountability issues in SSC projects. The Party is also cognisant of the potential 
negative repercussions this global exposure might generate internally, fuelling existing anxieties among 
Chinese citizens (several of them expressed online) around development and growth in the New Era (Shirk 
2007; Ma 2019; Cheng 2020).499 Mohan (2014) suggests that this ‘self-awareness’ also translates into a 
growing sense of ‘social responsibility’ within the state for its development and investment projects leading 
to what scholars named an ‘internal reflexive analytical move’ and a ‘sharp learning curve’ (Bräutigam 2009; 




499 The New Era is a term used by Xi Jinping, in 2017, to refer to the particular juncture of domestic and world change in 
China’s developmental history. When proclaiming the New Era, Xi has announced his intention to lead China towards a 
range of economic reforms and to make China a more active player in international affairs for the good of humankind. 
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Although deeply political, these emerging reputational-related accountability problems have been perceived 
and dealt with by Beijing mostly through the broad lens of policy management, having prompted a set of 
managerial reforms that have culminated among other things in the creation, in 2018, of CIDCA, China’s 
cooperation agency. CICDA has an explicit mandate to strengthen the planning, coordination and M&E 
China’s development cooperation. Other accountability-related reforms include new guidelines on overseas 
investments on socio-environmental risks, including for specific sectors, such as mining, alongside new 
project-level risk assessment and impact mechanisms (Garzón 2014; Chun Zhang 2017).500 Reforms also 
include new consultation mechanisms with other development partners and new partnerships with 
multilateral organisations to strengthen China’s aid management system, including the socio-environmental 
dimensions of initiatives like the BRI and the China-initiated AIIB (D. Zhang 2017).501 UNDP has, for 
instance, an area of work with Chinese governmental counterparts called ‘experience sharing on foreign aid 
systems’ and another with Chinese companies operating in other developing countries to enhance their 
regulatory frameworks and sustainable business practices, through studying and disseminating international 
and national ‘best practices’ (UNDP China 2016). Albeit different in their nature and scope, these reforms 
respond to a will to consolidate China’s development cooperation management and practices, often framed 
by Chinese stakeholders in terms of ‘improvement’, ‘betterment’ and ‘professionalisation’.502 
 
China’s relatively open, while still cautious, approach to an array of development accountability and 
management reforms stands between crafting its own ‘uniquely Chinese’ developmental knowledges and 
tools and pragmatically learning from others. At the same time, this approach is deeply shaped by Chinese 
hierarchical, performance-based and experimentation-guided policy styles (Qian 2018). The ways the ‘SSC 
community’ in China has navigated these tensions can be seen in issues of SSC measurement, to which I 
turn next.   
 
Cautiously learning and piloting evaluations   
 
We want to produce new development knowledge. We still do not know how.  
We used to be the objects, now we want to be subjects. 
(Chinese scholar, Beijing, 2018)  
 
For years now, internal assessments and reporting of development cooperation projects have been a 
standard management practice inside China’s MOFCOM, led by the Chinese Academy of International 
Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC). These efforts have mostly focused on evaluating 
 
500 This include the 2012 China Banking Regulatory Commission’s Green Lending Guidelines; the 2012 China International 
Contractors Association’s Social Responsibility Guide for Chinese Contractors; the 2013 Ministry of Commerce and Ministry 
of Environmental Protection’s Environmental Protection Guidelines for Overseas Investment Partnerships; and the two 
documents from the China Chamber of Commerce for Minerals, Metals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters (Chun 
Zhang 2017). It also includes new Green Finance regulation (IIGF/UNE 2017). 
501 INT-CH-15; INT-CH-12. 
502 The same framing is found in the former DAC-China study group, which had a work stream on M&E run by the 
MOFCOM-affiliated institute CAITEC. 
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performance at the project activities-level (Esteves 2018; D. Zhang 2020).503 To my interlocutors in China 
the current logic guiding country’s accountability efforts is managerial: monitoring, evaluating and reporting 
serve as bureaucratic performance control. Assessment efforts, therefore, seek to capture ‘micro-level’ 
implementation issues rather than evaluating broader questions of development impact.504 China’s aid 
documentation tools and reporting templates, I was told by an UN worker, are mostly input-focused. In 
his words: ‘They provide more fields with words to fill-in for describing implementation than for 
sustainability or development effectiveness issues’.505  
 
However, standard managerial practices have started to coexist in recent years with a new discourse that 
combines classic OECD-DAC concerns with ‘development effectiveness’ with attempts to respond to 
China’s own conceptions of what ‘success’ looks like in SSC. Esteves (2018) argues that since 2014, debates 
on M&E have gained a new momentum when MOFCOM issued its Measures for the Administration of Foreign 
Aid, announcing the implementation of an evaluation system. In 2018, the new Agency was explicitly 
mandated by the Draft Foreign Aid Management Methods with new enhanced M&E roles (Sun 2019). 
Commentators in China agree, nonetheless, that neither CIDCA’s M&E role nor the evaluation system are 
fully consolidated: ‘We are not there yet’, as stated by one scholar.506  
 
Parallel to the unfolding institutional changes, SSC practitioners and scholars have been experimenting and, 
more specifically, piloting M&E. Piloting is an emblematic feature of China’s policy style of experimentation 
through ‘directed improvisation’ (Qian 2018). In development cooperation, this approach is found in the 
Special Economic Zones, in China’s Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centres in Africa, and in the 
context of triangular cooperation (Xu et al. 2016; D. Zhang 2017; Chuanhong Zhang et al. 2019). The 
notion of piloting also features the discourses of high political officials, as shown in this quote by Liu 
Yongfu, director of the China State Council Leading Group Office of Poverty Alleviation and 
Development:  
 
China is a developing country and also a responsible great power … While doing our own things well, we are 
supporting other [developing] countries by sharing our experiences even piloting poverty reduction within our capacity. 
We believe it is the right thing to do as we are a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the second largest 
economy in the world and a responsible great power. (cited in D. Zhang 2020, 244).  
 
Another important notion shaping Chinese emerging evaluation practices and accountability debates, more 
broadly, is learning. Learning was a term I often heard in my encounters with Chinese or China-based 
development practitioners. The idea of learning in the context of China’s development cooperation 
 
503 INT-CH-4.  
504 INT-CH-5. 
505 INT-CH-15 
506 INT-CH-5; also INT-CH-4; INT-CH-3. 
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policymaking takes on a caution-related meaning that contrasts both with the assertive rhetoric of ‘learning 
from China’ (and from Chinese development ‘models’ and ‘wisdoms’ embedding the very expansion of 
China’s SSC) and with the well-recognised historical development strategy for China of ‘learning from the 
West’ (Christensen, Lisheng and Painter 2008).507 Examples of this restrained, humble and/or in-progress 
learning are found in expressions like: ‘still learning’, ‘testing waters’, ‘not quite there’, or even in the 
narrative of a powerhouse ‘under a learning curve’. Development scholars have referred to China’s ‘cautious 
learning approach’ adopted in the case of China-led multilateral banks (Serrano Oswald 2019), in triangular 
cooperation (D. Zhang 2020), and regarding Chinese state-owned enterprises going global (Jiang 2019; 
Yeophantong 2020). The framing is so prevalent that everyone seems to be ‘learning how to cooperate’ 
in/with China: businesses are learning how to operate globally, the government is learning how to provide 
development cooperation, academics are learning how to study ‘Global China’, UN agencies and traditional 
donors are learning how to work with China, the Chinese government is learning how to practice 
accountability.  
 
The use of learning and piloting discourses are not only a reflection of the current triumph-anxiety feelings 
dominating China’s development cooperation landscape in the current era (Cheng 2020) but also a strategic 
tool for Beijing. On the one hand, it allows China to keep its autonomy as a Southern partner, to screen for 
‘best practices’ in a selective policy and normative borrowing and internalisation. On the other hand, these 
discursive strategies are also coherent with a broader strategy adopted by rising powers to navigate and 
sometimes downplay accountability calls. Such strategy fits rising powers’ ‘ambivalent responses’ to global 
responsibility calls, as discussed in previous chapters, metaphorically named by Santos, Siman and 
Fernández (2019) as a ‘Peter Pan Syndrome’. 
 
Assessing agricultural cooperation  
 
An example where learning and piloting discourses interact with growing efforts to measure SSC initiatives 
on the ground is found in the field of agriculture cooperation with Africa. Emerging evaluation studies on 
China’s agricultural cooperation illustrate both Chinese knowledge actors’ efforts to craft their differential 
approach to evaluation as well as their anxieties about it.  
 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, in 2019, scholars from CAU, which is also the most active (if not the sole) 
Chinese institution in the NeST network, released one of the few (and possibly the first) publicly available 
external ex post evaluation of a Chinese SSC initiative. The study assesses China-Tanzania collaboration in 
agriculture through an evaluation framework that relied on the discussions held within NeST (see NeST 
 
507 According to the Chinese scholar Cheng Han, in the triumph narrative, ‘learning’ is also deemed by many to be the key 
to Chinese success, thus Chinese development knowledge becomes about teaching how Chinese learnt (from the West, 
itself, and less so, the South) (personal communication with Cheng Han, 2020). 
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2019). CAU—mainly its leading scholar, Li Xiaoyun508—is particularly connected to global development 
networks (Cheng 2020), both traditional development actors like DFID, GIZ and UNESCAP but also 
Southern ones, like NeST and UNOSSC.509 Li and other CAU scholars have often worked as partners of 
the state, namely the Ministry of Agriculture and the International Poverty Reduction Center in China, in 
implementing agricultural development projects in Chinese rural villages and then sharing these solutions 
through SSC projects, notably in Africa (J. Huang 2017). CAU have also assessed some of these SSC 
initiatives, conducting mid-reviews of flagship projects such as the Agricultural Demonstration Centres.510  
 
CAU’s evaluation of China-Tanzania agricultural cooperation generated several knowledge outputs, some 
internal to the Chinese government and several others to external audiences, primarily international ones. 
As showed in Chapter 4, CAU partnered with UNOSSC to produce a paper where scholars explained their 
‘differentiated’ evaluation approach to Chinese SSC. The paper highlights the purpose of this evaluation 
being ‘to contribute to the knowledge base on SSC and provide an alternative evaluation framework for 
other partners to utilize’ (CISSCA 2018, 7). This alternative way to evaluate, it is argued, responds to the 
‘initial’ and ‘uncertain stage’ of China’s SSC collaboration. In their words: ‘Under the unguided 
circumstance, it is difficult to evaluate such dynamic and diversified cooperation activities using a 
predetermined rational framework’ (ibid, 8).511 To back that, CAU scholars bring a quote from one Chinese 
entrepreneur operating a business in Africa, which reads: ‘We are all feeling the stones while crossing the 
river. There is no ready-made theoretical guidance or a clear path for us to follow. We can only rely on 
ourselves’ (ibid, 8). 
 
As stressed in Chapter 4, conceiving SSC initiatives as an ‘emergent’ and/or ‘complex’ enterprise has 
implications for the evaluation methods Southern scholars adopt when assessing them. Alike their Brazilian 
counterparts, and challenging mainstream development thinking on the use of (quasi-)experimental 
methods, CAU scholars defended their methodological choice to conduct a qualitative case study not only 
to better understand SSC ‘successes and failures’ but also due the insufficient data availability on SSC at a 
country level (NeST 2019).512  
 
On and on, CAU scholars explicitly framed their work as ‘tentative’ or ‘exploratory’ evaluation efforts, 
arguing that ‘how to establish a SSC framework suitable for China’s own context is still a new area in China’ 
(NeST 2019, 26). CAU scholar Xu Xiuli equally emphasised this learning dimension in her presentations at 
 
508 Li was once described by China’s English-language state-media outlet Global Times as the ‘Warrior against poverty’(J. 
Huang 2017). 
509 INT-CH-3. 
510 INT-CH-4; INT-BR-43. 
511 For a similar characterisation of Brazilian agricultural cooperation as ‘emergent’, see Cesarino (2013).  
512 INT-CH-5. In their words, case studies provide an opportunity to put ‘SSC against a macroscopic historical background’ 
as to ‘better understand the cooperation process and impact’ (NeST 2019, 29). A similar argument was presented to me 
when discussing a growing interest, albeit still relatively marginal, within China to apply ethnographic methods to study 
China’s development cooperation (INT-CH-3; INT-CH-6). 
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BAPA+40 side events. According to Xu, China is sensitive to international development lingo and to what 
other consultants and researchers do: ‘We pay attention. Try to understand’, she added, by also clarifying 
that ‘rather than convergence-divergence debate, we need a cross-vergence, a learning from each other’ (Xu 
2019a). During one of NeST-led events in Buenos Aires on SSC impact assessment and M&E, Xu conveyed 
to the audience her account of how those issues play out in China. Below I reproduce an extract of her 
intervention, which contains numerous elements discussed above:  
 
We need the data. Data is also important for the international level, to compare. So, how are we doing? We are 
learning. It is complicated with the ATDCs in Africa, so we are learning from the African Development Bank, the 
World Bank. The new Agency [CIDCA] has its first mission to establish an evaluation system. Last year we did 
a pilot with UNOSSC. But we are still working on that. To improve it. It is still in progress. These evaluations 
are not only for accountability but also for learning. These studies are more qualitative: they bring empirical data 
from the field. We are learning from the practice. The Chinese government is interested on this topic. But there is still 
lack of evaluation capacity in China. (Xu 2019b).  
 
A combined analysis of the CAU’s report on China-Tanzanian cooperation, CAU scholars’ contribution to 
the NeST (2019) report on M&E SSC, and Xu’s description of the landscape during BAPA+40 provides a 
sample of China’s own version of the ‘SSC measurement paradox’ and of the current tensions between the 
will to showcase China’s SSC successes and the risks of playing the scrutiny game with ‘traditional’ scrutiny 
tools. This is complemented with an observation by another Chinese scholar on measuring and assessing 
achievements becoming important (or showing ‘China-grown’ efforts to measure SSC becoming 
important). According to her, China’s solution has been to do it in ‘a simple way, with simple indicators’ 
and so far mostly through ‘loose assessments’ rather than ‘strict evaluations’. In her words:  
 
Has the cooperation increased the production? How many extensionists went to rural areas? (…) We do not care 
about gender issues. This is not our style. (…) We do not care about participation either. We do not need to think 
or talk about that. Because is already there. Development is anyway for the communities. But we need to see some 
changes. The evaluation is about general things (total production, selling, etc). The most important is the real 
performance in the field.513 
 
Encountering the global development apparatus  
 
The quote above not only illustrates how North-South dynamics shape China’s oppositional and 
differentiation claims vis-à-vis Aidland measurement practices but also offers an entry door to reflect on 
the role played by ‘traditional’ development actors in fostering this field within China. INGOs such as 





their own evaluation studies on specific countries and issues.514 Likewise, ‘traditional’ donors have also 
fostered external evaluations of China’s SSC, such as in the case of the external assessment of China-
Pakistan Development Corridor published by the German DIE using the NeST framework (Ali 2018; see 
Chapter 4). As mentioned, DAC donors have also engaged with the Chinese government and development 
experts on fostering the ‘knowledge dimension’ of China’s development cooperation, and its impacts on 
the ground, notably in Africa. The UK, for instance, supported the creation of the China International 
Development Research Network (CIDRN), chaired by Li Xiaoyun from CAU and gathering around 20 
other institutions (DFID 2018a). The UK has also initiated the China-UK Global Health Support 
Programme, which funds policy-relevant academic assessments of China’s Global health development 
assistance (e.g., H. Yang, Liu and Guo 2018; H. M. Li et al. 2019; Y. Wang et al. 2019).515 
 
Yet, unlike Brazil, partnerships with the traditional development apparatus have so far not played a strong 
role in creating opportunities to practice M&E. This can be explained by the fact that Beijing has been 
largely more ‘cautious’ (D. Zhang 2020) or ‘careful’ (Gu, Chen and Haibin 2016) with these partnerships 
and less open to experimenting with both triangular cooperation and M&E.516  While the aforementioned 
joint initiatives have generated policy and research contributions on China’s global development footprint 
(DFID 2018a),517 its continuity after the original DFID grant ended in 2018 and its overall political 
relevance to the Chinese SSC system and developmental thinking is unclear.518 Ultimately, unless higher-
positioned and more influential Chinese bureaucrats and knowledge actors explicitly see the value of trying 
out and practicing measuring China’s SSC with existing development actors, including traditional bilateral 
donors and UN agencies, their influence will remain marginal.519   
 
Meanwhile, partnerships with UN agencies have already offered some venues for joint experimentation. 
China slowly but steadily expanded its triangular cooperation with UN agencies in the past decade. 
Compared to Brazil, China’s partnerships with the UN took longer to take-off. The key UN partner for 
China remains UNDP, however, FAO, UNFPA and WFP have all expanded triangular cooperation 
 
514 This includes, for instance, the 2015 Oxfam-led ‘Perceptions on China-Lao Agricultural Investments’, a joint partnership 
between Oxfam Hong Kong and the School of Economics and Management of Yunnan Agricultural University. It also 
includes the 2016 The Asia Foundation-led ‘A Civil Perspective on China’s Aid to Cambodia’, final report of one-year joint 
programme sponsored by the China Office of the Asia Foundation and undertaken by Shanghai Institutes for International 
Studies, College of Humanities and Development Studies and the East China Normal University. 
515 China-UK Global Health Support Programme (GHSP) was launched in 2012 with about 12 million pounds funded by the 
United Kingdom. Between 2012 and 2019, the programme held five rounds of China-UK high-level dialogues, conducted 
studies on China Global Health Strategies to provide robust evidence for developing and issuing relevant national policies 
and supported the establishment of the China Global Health Network, in China. Though mostly academic assessments, the 
growing numbers of studies on Chinese global health engagements with Africa and along the BRI point to a growing 
interest of this area, which only tends to grow in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
516 INT-CH-4; INT-BR-43. 
517 Besides the health-related studies, mentioned above, another example of academic assessment developed by CAU 
scholars under the umbrella of CIDRN is Chuanhong Zhang et al. (2019) ethnographic analysis of China’s Agricultural 
Centres in Mozambique. 
518 Personal communication with a senior Chinese scholar who participated in the Network (2019). 
519 INT-CH-5; INT-CH-17.  
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initiatives with China in the last 5 years (D. Zhang 2020; Mao 2020). Much of the new push has come from 
China itself, including under the umbrella of the BRI and through the South-South Cooperation Assistance 
Fund, announced in 2015 by Xi with an initial commitment of 2 billion USD (Xinhua 2015).520 With a first 
batch of triangular projects coming to an end, certain UN agencies have started to craft ways to review the 
collaboration with China and its outcomes.521 UNFPA China, for instance, has recently finalised an internal 
review of its pilot 2016-2019 triangular cooperation programme with China.522  
 
As with India, ‘technical dialogues’ seem to be Aidland’s preferred modality to engage Beijing in 
accountability-related conversations (DFID 2016; D. Zhang 2017).523 This is not only true for partnerships 
with UN agencies but also with other ‘traditional’ donors, like the UK or Australia. Examples of this mode 
of engagement includes the 2009-2011 China-DAC Study Group and the more recent UK-funded trainings 
for Chinese officials in leading UK development centres, like the Sussex-based Institute of Development 
Studies, ‘focussing on aspects of aid practice (sectoral or general)’ (DFID 2017a).524 Another example is the 
recent partnership, in operation since 2016, between China and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to 
expand the work of the China-Zambia Agricultural Demonstration Centre. The Foundation has since 
opened an office in China expecting, according to Daisy Kambandu, the country program manager for the 
Centre in Zambia, to ‘contribute to China’s learnings’ by ‘providing indirect guidance on how aid is 
implemented at a local level’ (The China Africa Project n.d.).525   
 
These so-called technical exchanges illustrate ongoing mutual socialisation efforts happening between 
China and ‘traditional’ development organisations when it comes to doing and assessing SSC. Dialogues 
are seen by many in Aidland as capable to strengthen China’s capacity to ‘manage and deliver’ development 
cooperation and socialise China into certain ‘donorship’ norms and behaviours.526 At the same time, seen 
from China, the exchanges can also provide opportunities for ‘mutual learning’ or rather for ‘the West to 
learn with China’ (Gu, Chen and Haibin 2016, 132–33), finding, for instance, evaluation standards that are 
‘specific and relevant to Chinese foreign policy priorities, believes and values, but also to apply them to 
Western donors’ (ibid). This new rendition of the ‘development dance’, borrowing from Swedlund (2017), 
is therefore far from over.  
 
 
520 INT-CH-12; INT-CH-15. 
521 INT-CH-4. 
522 INT-BR-43.  
523 INT-CH-12; INT-CH-15; INT-CH-4. 
524 IDS has been a longstanding partner of the UK government in producing aid-related studies that inform aid 
policymaking as well as in the so-called ‘monitoring and learning’ component of UK aid.  
525 Previous to working with China, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has partnered with the Brazilian government to 
expand the work of the WFP-Brazil CEAH. The partnership started to be negotiated in 2013 and has allowed the Centre to 
expand its ‘knowledge-component’ work as well as its work on malnutrition, between 2015-2018 (WFP 2014; CEAH 2020). 
The work with China on global development is available at https://www.gatesfoundation.org/Where-We-Work/China-
Office/Supporting-Global-Development (last access: 30/11/2020). 
526 INT-ODP-5; INT-ODP-7; INT-OSS-4; INT-OSS-16; INT-OSS-6. 
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Navigating and controlling transparency  
 
While the problem of assessing cooperation has been acted upon by the Chinese government through 
cautious bottom-up piloting, an alternative top-down controlled and curated approach is found on issues 
of quantification and reporting. As mentioned in Chapter 4, the ‘transparency deficit’ in China’s SSC has 
been widely problematised globally due to data availability issues, to a miscomprehension of the nature of 
Chinese development cooperation and its instruments, and to anxieties from OECD-DAC members to 
socialise China (above any other Southern provider) into existing measurement standards and metrics. In 
response to these conformity pressures, but also in a strategic way, Beijing has more decisively acted on the 
matter, progressively expanding the availability of data on its cooperation flows, while still controlling the 
narrative that comes with it.  
 
Despite not having a systematic and comprehensive reporting system in place—like Brazil’s Cobradi, 
Mexico’s RENCID or Colombia’s Accountability Strategy527—China has released foreign aid-related data 
periodically. This has been done, first, through successive official policy documents: the two White Papers 
on Foreign Aid (2011, 2014) and more recently the white paper ‘China and the World in the New Era’ 
(2019). Data has been also published by MOFCOM, through its overall annual foreign aid budget and 
statistical yearbooks with data on flows of FDI, concessional and non-concessional loans, etc. (Grimm et 
al. 2011; Sears 2019; I. Mitchell, Ritchie and Rogerson 2020). In the context of the BRI, information on 
loans (committed and disbursed) became more frequent (and also more scrutinised by outsiders). CIDCA 
budget for 2019 (around 29 million USD), a tiny fraction of China’s development cooperation spending, 
was also made public (Sun 2019).528  
 
These multiple sources have allowed outsiders, including non-Chinese academics (e.g. Bräutigam 2009; 
Kitano 2018; also AidData)529 and transparency groups (e.g., PWYF) to then attempt estimating China’s 
development flows, in an effort described by Grimm et al. (2011, 22) ‘putting together a jigsaw puzzle’.530 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, Chinese flows have generated heated debates and speculations, depending on 
 
527 For Colombia, see https://www.apccolombia.gov.co/rendicion-de-cuentas. For Mexico, see 
https://infoamexcid.sre.gob.mx/amexcid/ccid2013/home.html (last access: 22/08/2020). 
528 Sun’s (2019) op-ed substantiate this point by showing that in China’s 2014 White paper the amount spent between 
2010-2012 was around 4.6 billion USD per year. MOFCOM foreign aid budget for 2019 was approximately US$2.63 billion. 
The online document with CIDCA budget for 2019, originally available at http://www.cidca.gov.cn/2019-
04/02/2019bmys.pdf, was not available in September 2020. 
529 Kitano’s (2018, 50) estimate ‘draws on budget data from the websites of 50 departments and from other relevant 
organisations within China, as well as from other relevant sources of information’. According to the Japanese scholar, this 
estimate varies from the Chinese government’s official figures and other estimates due to its ‘practical definition of China’s 
foreign aid’, introducing the concept of net and gross disbursements of foreign aid (net and gross foreign aid), ‘in a way 
that is as comparable as possible to that for the net and gross disbursements of ODA. Secondly, the estimate includes 
multilateral aid within the total aid; and thirdly, disaggregated department-level budget data sets are used to estimate 
grants and interest-free loans as well as multilateral aid’ (ibid). 
530 Similarly, the German Sinologist Marina Rudyak in her blog China Aid describes her effort as ‘peering into the black box 
of Chinese aid’. See http://china-aid-blog.com/ (last access: 27/10/2020). 
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the definition (what counts as IDC/SSC) and on the counting methodology used.531 At times, as in the 
2014 White Paper, Chinese official figures for flows between 2001-2013 were significantly larger than what 
some externals were able to count, leading to a question about China’s potentially strategic use of figures 
to ‘assert dominance’ in the aid system (Sears 2019, 141) or simply not releasing parts of its data to the 
public, thus making external measures to underestimate the total flows.532 In others, official figures have 
been smaller than external estimations, prompting scholars like D. Zhang (2017, 751) to argue that 
understating is driven by an intent by the Chinese state ‘to pacify domestic concerns’.  
 
Assessments on the available data also vary. In its Aid Transparency Index, PWYF has constantly ranked 
MOFCOM’s disclosure as ‘very poor’ since the data was not published in the IATI Standard.533 The 
American Sinologist Jonathan Hillman, echoing many Western commentators, is also convinced that 
‘opaqueness is an in-built feature of the BRI’ (The China Africa Project n.d.). Others, including my Chinese 
interlocutors, have alternatively indicated that data availability increased in the last years and that China’s 
development banks have progressively aligned with overall international standards on disclosure (I. 
Mitchell, Ritchie and Rogerson 2020), though remaining ‘too general’534 and in an aggregated format that 
does not offer, for instance, annual country-based data.535 
 
Many experts believe that greater official reporting on flows could strategically benefit China. Many also 
agree that the ‘lack of transparency on the part of China’s authorities has encouraged “China bashing”’ 
(Paulo and Reisen 2010, 538) and that greater transparency could benefit China’s diplomatic efforts, 
debunking some of the myths surrounding its development cooperation (Bräutigam 2009; Sears 2019). For 
Jiang (2019, 54): ‘In light of the existing bias, and in order to change this grim portrayal of Chinese 
companies, more evidence-based study is needed’. Others highlight the benefits of communicating what 
China does globally to domestic audiences (UNDP China 2017) and its instrumental value for relations 
with ‘borrowing countries’ (de Oliveira and Jing 2020).  
 
Though agreeing with certain potential benefits, my Chinese participants have signalled numerous 
uncertainties and challenges that expanding SSC quantification and/reporting exercises face in China. First, 
the technical challenges of China’s aid system fragmentation; with several ministries and companies acting 
as implementing actors and competition between them on whether and how to report (Grimm et al. 2011; 
 
531 AidData, for instance, has developed a methodology in which it categorises China aid flows in three categories: a) 
Official Development Assistance – ODA (concessional in terms, respecting the minimum of 25% grant element, and 
primarily intended for development and welfare); b) Other Official Flows – OOF (non-concessional in terms and primarily 
intended for commercial or representational purposes); and c) Vague Official Finance - Vague OF (clearly official finance, 
but insufficient information to assign to either ODA or OOF). See https://www.aiddata.org/china-official-finance (last 
access: 08/09/2020).  
532 For a discussions on the politics of counting China’s aid, see Sears (2019) and I. Mitchell, Ritchie and Rogerson (2020). 
533 According to the last PWYF Index (2020, 19), ‘China made very little information available about its aid activities or 
policies, and so was ranked at the bottom of the Index for the second time running’. For more on the Index, see Chapter 3.  
534 INT-CH-5. 
535 An observation that had been made by Grimm et al. (2011) almost a decade ago. 
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Sears 2019). As examined previously, bureaucratic politics shape quantification efforts in Brazil and India, 
as much as it does in DAC-donors like the US and the UK. Second, and this time more China-specific, the 
political and geopolitical challenges. These include the structural limitations of China’s political system to 
such transparency exercise, as well as the risks of increased publicity generating new pressures from partner 
countries that compare the share, rates and deals they negotiate to those got by other countries (The China 
Africa Project n.d.).536 Development experts in China believe that data-gathering for management will 
continue to happen but, unlike their Brazilian peers, they are not convinced that publicity is important or 
useful. According to one scholar:  
 
At a macro-level, analysis is important to know how much cooperation goes where. But publication is another matter 
(…) The Agency [CIDCA] has some data, but I am not sure they will expand the data collection. And I am even 
less sure about the publication. The government will decide whether this is necessary or not. There is no consensus 
even within our own team about the need to be public. We have different views.537  
 
It is clear, nonetheless, that the government is already strategically practicing transparency and using its own 
kind of reporting to further advance an autonomous Chinese narrative over its flows (and outcomes) and 
thus dispute global narratives around its SSC practices.538 Communicating SSC is also increasingly important 
to create a domestic constituency for China’s Going Out (UNDP China 2017; Custer et al. 2019), even if 
social pressure will remain bounded by the characteristics of China’s non-electoral democracy setting. Such 
a growing domestic constituency within academia and civil society has showed not only interest in the topic 
but also willingness to work ‘constructively’ to provide knowledge for the state to plan the expansion of 
BRI and assist the state in improving existing policy, legal and/or regulatory frameworks and ‘bettering’ 
Chinese projects delivery (Ma 2018; Yeophantong 2020; also Chapter 7).539  
 
China’s strategic collaboration with traditional donors, as discussed above, is another important factor in 
explaining the growing, yet still controlled, use of certain development cooperation reporting practices. One 
scholar summarised China’s approach to the issue as follows: ‘If it thinks it can get more from the 
partnerships with developed countries by being transparent, it will do’.540 Such pragmatism is coherent with 
China’s broader aid policymaking dynamics in the past years, one that ‘gradually learns from and cooperates 
with the international norms to become more transparent and more modernized, while it reiterates and 




538 The recent Covid-19 pandemic outbreak provides an additional example of Chinese state willingness to deploy 
diplomatic efforts to counter narratives that denounce China’s lack of transparency, in this case related to its management 
of the outbreak, and at the same time to showcase China’s commitment to fulfilling its responsibilities towards global 
development and expanding its SSC (Tian 2020). 




Such a strategic take on transparency—a publicity that can operate favourably to debunk myths, show 
compliance with certain international standards and expectations, or improve performance on the 
ground—might not translate into full normative commitment to ‘aid transparency’ under the open 
government paradigm that infused Aidland in the past decades but show ways in which transparency can 
be claimed, disputed and practiced in China’s development engagements in its own terms.    
 
Lastly, it is important to locate the current SSC transparency dynamics in the broader context of domestic 
accountability politics in China. Governance, participation and transparency reforms have significantly 
shifted the Chinese landscape in the past decade, most notably at the local level and in legislative matters 
(Stromseth, Malesky and Gueorguiev 2017). Alongside Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, notably targeting 
local authorities, growing environmental activism, the surge in online activism by ‘netizens’, and the reforms 
on administrative accountability in the aftermath of particular health crisis (including the 2003 SARS 
outbreak)541 are also important features of the domestic public sphere. Together they have fostered new 
forms of ‘publicity-driven accountability dynamics’ (Distelhorst 2012; X. Wang et al. 2020) and pressured 
for accountability ‘from below’, even if bounded by the limits afforded to political participation in 
contemporary China (G. Yang 2006; Ho and Edmonds 2008; Chatelard, Audin and Daniel 2018).  
 
Governance reforms will continue to affect the prospects of this agenda in the future. Some form of 
participatory policymaking in China is already happening within the foreign aid sector, though limited to a 
very small group of development experts and practitioners. The government hosted a round-table with a 
dozen of selected aid experts, in 2019, on the new Agency and also virtual consultations on certain aspects 
of CIDCA’s legal framework (Sun 2019).542 These ‘invited participation dynamics’, borrowing from 
Gaventa’s (2006) typology, are incipient but important signs of China’s development cooperation evolving 
in and responding to more domestically competitive settings and greater interest in the agenda, not only 
from state institutions but also from experts outside the state. 
 
While the ways these multi-layered governance reforms affected the dynamics examined here are not 
straightforward, they certainly contribute to the intermestic dynamics that shape the accountability politics 
and reforms observed in the sub-field of SSC. Similar to Brazil and India, external factors, including the 
nature of the interaction between China’s ‘SSC policy communities’ and a range of international 
stakeholders have played an important role not only in exposing Chinese stakeholders to existing norms 
and ways of working but also opening venues for a broader range of actors in China to critically engage 
with official SSC practices and formulate their own solutions to the accountability problem.  
 
541 SARS stands for Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome and is viral respiratory disease, associated with a type of 
coronavirus. The outbreak hit China and other four countries in 2003 and was considered by the World Health Organisation 
the first severe and readily transmissible new disease to emerge in the 21st century. See https://www.who.int/health-
topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome#tab=tab_1 (last access: 30/11/2020). 
542 INT-CH-5; INT-CH-4; INT-CH-16; INT-CH-17. Documents made available for consultation include the Draft Foreign Aid 





This chapter examined how SSC accountability has been problematised and negotiated within India and 
China. The analysis sought to unpack two main aspects: first, how the need to measure and publicise SSC 
flows and results became a problem to be acted upon and how domestic publics negotiated domestic 
solutions to it. Second, what other SSC accountability issues have emerged as public and/or expert debates 
in each country. While doing so, I have paid attention to the interplay between domestic politics of foreign 
policy in India and China (including bureaucratic politics and state-society relations) and emerging 
understandings, disputes and negotiations over measurement and other SSC-related accountability as 
public/policy problems. 
 
Examining the Indian landscape, I argued that accountability dimensions of Indian SSC engagements have 
been object of little domestic problematisation. An exception is the case of India’s Exim Bank, which has 
generated interest and pro-accountability mobilisation from different domestic constituencies. Reflecting 
on the recent changes to India’s LOCs scheme, I argued that, alike in the Brazilian BNDES case, the 
materiality of South-South development finance (in terms of resources invested and potential impacts on 
the ground) matters: it galvanises domestic attention, creates opportunities for wider policy debates and 
contributes to generating accountability reforms. In the case of LOCs, reforms have been driven mostly by 
a combination of market-driven accountability dynamics and concerns with the reputation and diplomatic 
costs of poor delivery on the ground.543  
 
Contrasting with the will to reform LOCs, and with India’s own knowledge entrepreneur role on SSC 
measurement issues globally, I found that measurement has generated few domestic disputes, negotiations 
and policy-institutional experimentation. Unlike in Brazil and China, Indian governmental and quasi-
governmental actors, like RIS, found little need to translate its diplomatic activism in experimenting with 
measuring SSC within India. There are signs of growing engagement with the topic, both within RIS and 
the MEA, but still in an incipient and controlled manner. Citizens, media and CSOs’ demands for the Indian 
government to explain or justify its development cooperation remained small enough for the MEA to keep 
an indefinite postponement strategy at home.544 Hence, measuring ‘from below’, by civil society, has 
partially filled this role of experimenting with measuring SSC. Efforts remain, nonetheless, bounded by the 
mediation of RIS and by the limited interest (or capacity) among national groups to mobilise around the 
‘Global India’ agenda or around perceived technical issues such as measurement. These dynamics are not 
unrelated to an increasingly restrictive public space for critical engagement on state policies within India, 
which includes new restrictions for the voluntary sector to operate, growing media censorship, and lack of 







To understand the Indian landscape, therefore, is important to locate SSC within contemporary domestic 
politics of foreign policymaking. Shaping these dynamics, and the very possibilities to request explanations 
and dispute policy priorities, there are: India’s strong sovereignty government-to-government arguments 
framing and justifying its SSC; a resilient pan-partisan agreement on the role development cooperation can 
play in Indian rise as a great power; growing assertiveness by the BJP-led coalition to forge an Indian great 
power identity in opposition to the West and to China; the lack of infrastructure and personnel in the 
MEA/DPA to advance consolidation reforms; the nature of Indian SSC implementers leaning towards 
private companies rather than state agencies; and the limited—and often-mediated spaces—for policy 
dialogue and participation in foreign policymaking.   
 
The Chinese case shows a different domestic landscape. Greater politicisation of China’s development 
cooperation at home and abroad, and growing pressure on powerholders to explain and justify policies and 
practices to both external and domestic publics, has led to increased internal bureaucratic and academic 
thinking on what accountability means to China’s development footprint, how to practice it and to whom. 
On the one hand, international social pressure came from the ‘traditional’ development apparatus, from 
Southern partners and their societies, and from lingering ‘bad press’. On the other, growing domestic 
mobilisation within the political system and ‘aid/SSC bureaucracies’ have generated particular responses 
from the Chinese side. These include more assertive diplomacy to counter negative narratives of Chinese 
global development initiatives and build a responsible global image, as well as policy and managerial changes 
to make China’s overall global footprint ‘greener’ and to ‘modernise’ development initiatives, including 
through management (accountability) reforms.  
 
China has increased its dialogue with international actors, to selective and pragmatically draw-lessons and 
borrow from existing global practices. At the same time, management pressures, from within, for improving 
the performance of ‘aid/SSC bureaucracies’ contributed to the shifting institutional landscape within China. 
While also not subjected to classic Aidland’s pressures to document the development cooperation enterprise 
to justify it, the exposure of the Chinese SSC portfolio, tighter hierarchical managerial dynamics and 
growing domestic anxieties with Chinese development have, nonetheless, created the will to engage with 
issues of accountability and measurement. From increasing publicity around SSC flows to piloting SSC 
evaluations, cautious experimentation has been China’s main strategy to negotiate its own ways of doing 
and practicing accountability and responding to the mounting competing expectations, both internal and 
external, on its global development engagements.  
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7. Mobilising for accountability: politicising South-South 
cooperation ‘from below’  
 
This last empirical chapter discusses the dynamics of social mobilisation and accountability claim-making 
‘from below’ in the context of South-South cooperation.545 It complements the kaleidoscopic panorama of 
problematisations of and negotiations over SSC accountability depicted so far by bringing to the forefront 
questions of social accountability and state-society relations in the context of SSC policymaking in Brazil, 
China and India.546  
 
Social accountability refers to the ways citizens demand and forge alternative citizen-led forms of 
participation and political control over state action, policies and/or practices (Newell and Wheeler 2006; 
Fox 2007a; Fontaine et al. 2016). My focus in this chapter is the SSC accountability-related mobilisation by 
Brazilian, Chinese and Indian civil society actors in domestic and transnational arenas, the framings and 
repertoires used, and the issues citizen-led action brings to the forefront.547 In this chapter I investigate, 
first, the problematisations of SSC accountability ‘from below’ by what Hill (2003) categorised as ‘interest’ or 
‘pressure groups’ in civil society (including social movements, NGOs and knowledge actors) engaged in 
SSC-related political and/or policy work in Brazil, China and India.548 Second, I examine how accountability 
in/of SSC has been negotiated along the state-society axis in the three contexts. 
 
This chapter advances three sets of contributions. First, I find that different civil society groups inside 
Brazil, India and China have engaged in accountability-based mobilisation—in a series of context-specific 
issues and with more or less explicit use of the polymorphous term ‘accountability’—as a tool to engage 
state development cooperation policies and practices. While doing so, they constructed new sets of 
expectations on the role and responsibilities of SSC providers and on what ‘good’, ‘just’ and/or ‘appropriate’ 
development cooperation behaviour and policymaking are. Through mobilisation, moreover, civil society 
groups have contributed, in different forms and degrees depending on the country and the issue, to re-
 
545 The term ‘from below’ is used, echoing a vast scholarship on state-society relations, to characterise actions from actors 
in civil society. My use of the term draws on Della Porta et al. (2006) analytical proposition to study transnational social 
movements reimagining globalisation ‘from below’ and on Bond and Garcia’s (2015) characterisation of citizen and popular 
action in the context of BRICS countries as ‘the BRICS-from-below’.  
546 Several of the reflections in this chapter have been also published elsewhere. See Waisbich (2021) for an analysis of 
Brazilian civil society activism along the Brazil-Africa agenda; Waisbich (forthcoming a) for an analysis of civil society 
mobilisation from BRICS countries on the issue of the BRICS-led New Development Bank; and Waisbich (forthcoming b) on 
Chinese civil society mobilisation on Global China issues.  
547 This focus on mobilisation dynamics departs from other more policy-oriented ‘pathways to accountability’ studies that 
seek to understand the conditions under which citizen-led efforts increase or improve aid accountability (e.g. Gaventa and 
McGee 2013; Fox 2020). My approach here differ from these more evaluative studies and focuses instead on the intricacies 
and the sociopolitical dynamics of pro-accountability national and transnational mobilisation by civil society actors in Brazil, 
China and India (e.g. Fox and Brown 1998; Newell and Wheeler 2006; Joshi and Houtzager 2012).  
548 I am cognisant that this focus on organised groups in civil society is not exhaustive of the variety of state-society 
relations in the three countries, which also include other forms of popular politics and individual manifestations. These 
other forms, particularly citizens’ online activism, are an important element in the Chinese landscape (Ma 2019; Waisbich 
forthcoming b), although not in Brazil or India, and will not be treated here. 
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politicising SSC inside the three countries while feeding into ongoing debates over SSC accountability taking 
place in global arenas.  
 
Second, based on a range of mobilisation instances across the three countries, I find that problematisations 
of SSC accountability ‘from below’ have revolved around procedural and substantial issues, namely: (i) 
transparency of SSC engagements; (ii) participation in SSC policymaking and project-related decision 
making; and (iii) SSC providers’ development cooperation models and their impacts on the ground, in 
particular how to make them greener and/or people-centred. While the first two were more frequent in 
Brazil and India, the third one is found in all three countries.  
 
Third, as for the issues of contention and the civil society repertoires, my empirics show that mobilisation 
has been stronger in dimensions of the ‘SSC compact’ related to development finance for infrastructure 
building (in all three countries) and South-South agricultural cooperation (in Brazil and to a lesser extent in 
India). This thematic concentration responds to the materiality and political visibility of development banks 
and state-business alliances inside SSC providers, the contentious nature of land issues in the Global South, 
and the pre-existing domestic and transnational networks of activism around these topics. In the case of 
China, the environmental impact of country’s global development engagements has been the most salient 
contentious issue, enabled by the importance of environmental activism inside China, the expanding 
‘Ecological Civilisation’ rhetoric under Xi Jinping, and growing transnational networks monitoring China’s 
‘ecological footprint’ in infrastructure projects.  
 
I also find that while some specific projects have generated cross-regional campaigns, intense mobilisation 
has taken place at the policy-level, at home, in an attempt to shape and/or contest rising powers’ identities 
as ‘development cooperation providers’ and to influence policy priorities and guidelines ahead of 
paradigmatic ‘problematic projects’. Campaign-like mobilisation to challenge particular initiatives therefore 
coexisted with attempts to reform state SSC policies and advocate for greater accountability in more 
institutionalised ways. As a consequence, civil society repertoires varied across a continuum of ‘insider-
outsider’ mobilisation strategies and ‘collaboration-confrontation’ modes of engagement with ‘SSC 
bureaucracies’ and implementing actors, while having to reinvent strategies to engage Southern providers 
in the terms of their SSC initiatives. Both the collaboration and confrontation modes were clearly present 
in the Brazilian and Indian cases, but less so in China, where civil society actors mostly adopted non-
adversarial, constructive, approaches.   
 
The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows. The first section examines selected instances of pro-
accountability mobilisations around South-South agricultural cooperation, the environmental footprint of 
Southern-led infrastructure building and Southern-led international development finance. Drawing upon 
these cases, in the second section I take a step back to characterise the emergence of ‘SSC monitoring 
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movements’ and the ways civil society groups have negotiated accountability and participation in the 
context of Brazilian, Chinese and Indian SSC.  
 
 
Problematising accountability ‘from below’  
 
 
I start this section with a few words on my use of the term ‘civil society’. Civil society—included alongside 
accountability in Cornwall’s (2007) list of ‘development buzzwords’—is commonly used as a proxy for a 
collection of non-state and non-market actors. According to Banks, Hulme and Edwards (2015, 708) civil 
society is ‘the space in which people mobilize to bargain, negotiate, or coerce other actors in order to 
advance and promote their interests’. While the term is extensively present in Brazilian political and social 
thought since re-democratisation (e.g., Danigno 2002; Avritzer 2012; Lavalle et al. 2019), the concept has 
been more cautiously applied in the case of China (e.g., P. Huang 1993; Ho and Edmonds 2008; Gu, Chen 
and Haibin 2016) and more critically operationalised in India, for its inadequacy to describe the ‘popular 
politics’ (Chatterjee 2004)549 and its overuse as a panacea for ‘local and people-centred’ development (I. 
Roy 2003; Narayanaswamy 2015). While referring to civil society here I am not oblivious to these debates 
and to the diversity of state-society relations across the three countries due to variations in political regimes 
and historical sociopolitical trajectories. I have nonetheless kept the term due to its wide use in development 
cooperation literature as well as for comparative purposes.550  
 
I am also not oblivious to the rapidly shifting state-society dynamics across my research sites and its 
implications to mobilisation on the SSC agenda. This includes the ongoing re-configuration of the civic 
space, with Brazil and India moving towards more ‘illiberal democratic’ settings (Chacko 2018; Hunter and 
Power 2019). It also includes renewed forms of state control of society in China under Xi Jinping (Kuhn 
2018), while allowing for a niche of non-for-profit groups to expand their work around China’s Going Out 
agenda and to ‘go out’ and internationalise themselves (CDB 2015; Hsu, Hildebrandt and Hasmath 2016; 
Qiang 2019; Yeophantong 2020). In what follows, I discuss three selected instances of pro-accountability 
mobilisations by civil society groups in Brazil, China and India alongside their peers in other Southern 
countries and beyond.  
 
549 Chatterjee suggests the use of a third term, ‘political society’, which to him would be more consistent with the politics 
of the poor and applicable to understand claim-making and negotiation dynamics between marginalised groups and 
governmental agencies. The notion of ‘civil society’ is also illustrative of the kind of citizenship politics observed around 
Indian foreign policy, which remains at large the realm of what Chatterjee (2004, 67) described as ‘modern elite groups’, 
‘bourgeois society or bourgeois public sphere’ or the ‘small section of proper citizens’.  
550 Even in the Indian context, the term ‘civil society’ has been widely used in scholarly work to refer to the voluntary 
sector, social movements and/or non-state knowledge actors engaging with Indian development cooperation (e.g. 





Challenging agricultural cooperation: The ‘No to ProSavana Campaign’  
 
The ‘No to ProSavana Campaign’ is one of the most widely studied cases of civil society contestation of a 
South-South development cooperation initiative (see Chapter 1). ProSavana is a triangular agricultural 
development cooperation initiative between Mozambique, Brazil and Japan that ran between 2009-2020.551 
ProSavana aimed at transforming Northern Mozambique savanna into a large-scale public-private 
agricultural productive zone (Santarelli 2016; Funada-Classen 2019),552 with Brazil acting as provider of an 
‘appropriate’, ‘better-fit’, subaltern technical tropical agriculture expertise and a source of foreign 
investment (Ferrando 2015; Shankland and Gonçalves 2016).   
 
Not much after its official launch, ProSavana started to face opposition by civil society actors, starting with 
Mozambican peasants and activists. The mobilisation rapidly expanded from the local and national 
peasants’ movements in Nampula and Maputo, led by the Mozambican National Union of Peasants 
(UNAC), to development, environmental and rights NGOs in Mozambique and beyond. Cross-regional 
linkages were forged with organisations in Brazil through the Brazilian NGO FASE, with transnational like-
minded actors like Via Campesina and Friends of the Earth, and with aid watchdogs in Japan. Demands 
initially targeted the Mozambican government but quickly included Japanese and Brazilian governments as 
well (Aguiar and Pacheco 2016; Funada-Classen 2019).  
 
While much of civil society anticipated fear never fully materialised,553 the anti-ProSavana mobilisation 
became an emblematic case of ‘pro-accountability mobilisation’ regarding Brazilian SSC, through which 
cross-regional networks of activists have disputed the very content of a SSC initiative ‘from below’ and 
contested the ways Brasília designed its cooperation projects and justified its policy options to domestic 
constituencies (Cabral and Leite 2015; Durán and Chichava 2017; Horn 2018).  
 
Lack of transparency and participation of affected communities were major issues from the start. Civil 
society groups denounced the absence of official communication on the project to local communities in 
Nampula and the mismatch between the information publicly available and what was being shared with 
potential investors (Shankland and Gonçalves 2016).554 Transparency claims were used to highlight civil 
society, in Mozambique as much as in Brazil and Japan, will to participate in project design but also to 
dispute the meaning of South-South agricultural development cooperation. Lack of transparency 
 
551 On the formal end of ProSavana, see https://www.dw.com/pt-002/fim-do-prosavana-uma-oportunidade-para-o-
desenvolvimento-agr%C3%ADcola-em-mo%C3%A7ambique/a-54339235 (last access: 04/09/2020) 
552 ProSavana drew on a previous Nipo-Brazilian programme in the 1970s, the Proceder, which helped turning the Brazilian 
Cerrado region into one a major agricultural commodities’ production zone. 
553 Indeed the business component of the initiative slowed down before achieving its ‘promised’ outcomes (Baumert et al. 
2019), partially because of the social mobilisation and partially because of changes in Brazilian investors’ appetite amidst a 
financial crisis in Brazil, see Chapter 5. 
554 This mismatch was later confirmed by a leaked version of the Master Plan of ProSavana, rendered public in 2013.  
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reinforced, according to this script, other substantive concerns about ProSavana’s agricultural 
transformation model, based on the fear of land displacement and resettlements. These fed into global 
policy debates on land-grabbing and the Green Revolution in Africa and on conflicting conceptions of 
agricultural development opposing family farming and agrobusiness on both sides of the Atlantic (Pierri 
2013; Cabral et al. 2016; Milhorance and Bursztyn 2017). Claiming transparency was also important for 
activists to unveil a perceived ‘state-capital nexus’ behind the project and behind Brazilian SSC (Milhorance 
and Bursztyn 2017; Durán and Chichava 2017). 
 
Faced with little by way of responses from the three governments, in 2014 activists escalated their demands 
and launched the ‘No to ProSavana’ campaign to end the initiative.555 The campaign made use of a set of 
‘artifacts of contestation’ (Shankland and Gonçalves 2016): public statements, videos, open letters, local 
and tri-continental civil society meetings,556 street-protests in Mozambique, policy advocacy with Brazilian 
and Japanese cooperation agencies and field visits. Demands directed to the Mozambican government were 
largely framed around participatory decision-making, as to challenge governmental choices and dispute 
ProSavana’s ‘rural development goals’. In Japan, mobilisation was championed by aid watchdogs critical of 
JICA’s role in promoting socio-environmental exploitation in Mozambique. Japanese NGOs were 
instrumental to obtaining access to internal documents on the project and share them with the counterparts 
in Brazil and Mozambique (Funada-Classen 2019).  
 
In Brazil, the mobilisation was championed by FASE and other national development NGOs (many of 
which members of the Brazilian Network for Peoples Integration - REBRIP),557 critical scholars, and 
agrarian social movements seeking to contest both the internationalisation of Brazilian agrobusiness and 
foster a debate around Brazilian SSC models more broadly.558 Relying on certain levels of access to 
governmental and state institutions, at least until Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016, Brazilian activists 
 
555 A Facebook community page for the Campaign can be seen at 
https://www.facebook.com/naoprosavana/about/?ref=page_internal (last access: 09/09/2020). 
556 The Triangular Peoples’ Conferences took place in Maputo (in 2013, 2014, and 2017) and in Tokyo (2018). The third one, 
in 2017, for instance, gathered around 200 representatives of Mozambican, Brazilian, and Japanese social movements, 
NGOs and academics (No to ProSavana Campaign 2017).  
557 REBRIP was created in the 1990s as a network gathering NGOs, rural and urban labour unions, and social movements to 
represent people’s voices in international negotiations, initially at the regional level and progressively global negotiations 
as well. REBRIP has worked on issues pertaining to regional blocs (to strengthen the Southern-cone regional bloc 
MERCOSUR and oppose the Free Trade Area of the Americas) as well as to trade and economic negotiations at the World 
Trade Organisation and the G-20. In the mid-2000s, REBRIP became an important Brazilian civil society voice in BRICS-
related issues, leading the construction of people’s summits in Brazil and joining the cross-regional coalition negotiating 
with the BRICS-led New Development Bank.  Together with other self-identified leftist or progressive stakeholders REBRIP 
has championed participation issues within Brazilian foreign policy, in general, and many of its members have been among 
the strongest advocates for participation in development cooperation-related issues. For more on REBRIP and its members 
see  http://www.rebrip.org.br/ (last access: 02/12/2020). 
558 An extended list of Brazilian organisations involved in the campaign can be found in the 2016 joint statement named, in 
Portuguese, ‘Comunicado conjunto e questionamentos da sociedade civil de Moçambique, Brasil e Japão sobre o 






secured meetings with ABC and were able to insert the issue in formal and institutionalised participation 
channels, such as the then National Council on Food and Nutritional Security (CONSEA).559 CONSEA 
played an important role as an internal echo-chamber within the federal government, issuing a critical 
statement in 2013 and assisting CSOs in pressuring the Brazilian government for more information on 
ProSavana and for meaningful changes in the project set-up (Aguiar and Pacheco 2016).560 CONSEA’s 
participation, moreover, offered an institutional channel ‘to take on the consequences of Brazil’s SSC 
activities for poor and marginalized people overseas as a legitimate topic for debate’ (Shankland and 
Gonçalves 2016, 43). While due to its consultative nature CONSEA had little leverage within the Esplanada, 
the mobilisation managed to ‘name and shame’ ABC and Embrapa and contributed to generating internal, 
albeit modest, accountability debates within these major ‘SSC bureaucracies’, as discussed in Chapter 5.561  
 
Social mobilisation on and around ProSavana have brought about uneven, and often unclear, project and 
policy changes in the first years, between 2012 and 2014, but ultimately contributed to render ProSavana 
unsustainable. Some commentators highlighted immediate transparency and participation gains with the 
creation of a Civil Society Coordination Mechanism in Mozambique and of a ABC’s envoy in loco.562 Others 
highlighted broader agenda-setting and visibility gains—at the project level and at the SSC policy level in 
Brazil—on the contested nature of agricultural development cooperation (Cabral and Leite 2015; Horn 
2018). While more optimistic observers credited the social mobilisation for halting the project (Funada-
Classen 2019), in a more critical vein, Shankland and Gonçalves (2016) cautioned to the ‘crisis-management’ 
nature of certain accountability tools put in place and to the remaining tensions in the metamorphosed 
public version of the ProSavana project document that erased without fully replacing the agribusiness-
driven focus of the project.  
 
Understanding this mixed-bag of outcomes requires embedding ProSavana in the divisive nature of 
agricultural development in Brazil and Mozambique and the particular state-society dynamics in all three 
partnering countries. On the one hand, as the mobilisation evolved, collective action became more internally 
fragmented in Mozambique with different groups, in Maputo and Nampula, diverging on what should be 
the main goal and strategies of the collective action (Chichava and Alden 2017).563 On the other, both the 
Brazilian and Mozambican governments adopted strategies to de-legitimise civil society activism. In 
Mozambique, NGOs were portrayed as foreign-driven, spreading public disinformation and/or playing the 
political opposition game (Santarelli 2016; Funada-Classen 2019). In Brazil, governmental reactions 
 
559 CONSEA was formally dismantled by Jair Bolsonaro in his first executive decree, in January 2019. Despite strong 
opposition in the Legislative and civil society, and attempts to revert the Presidential decree, CONSEA was never reinstated 
(I. R. R. de Castro 2019). 
560 INT-BR-27; INT-BR-50; INT-BR-10; INT-BR-53. 
561 INT-BR-64; INT-BR-2. 
562
 At a symbolic level, in 2018, the Administrative Court of Maputo issued a ruling against the ProSavana Coordination Unit 
after a law-suit from the Mozambican Bar Association for violation of the right of information (Funada-Classen 2019). 
563 INT-BR-21; INT-BR-22. 
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included downplaying the political content of the mobilisation and the questioning of official agricultural 
development cooperation models, SSC policymaking dynamics and of Brazilian overall SSC policy 
coherence. Many in Brasília focused instead on the technical realm of the crisis, often referred to as a 
‘miscommunication issue’ that escalated.564 Many also believed the programme was object of a defamation 
campaign by opposing social forces in Brazil and Mozambique backed by ‘traditional’ donors who feared 
Brazil’s competition in Africa.565 
 
Interviewees further underscored the challenges faced in translating the project contestation into changes 
in the Brazilian SSC system and to country’s South-South partnerships as a whole. Beyond a real allergy to 
the word ‘ProSavana’, the crisis has only indirectly contributed to institutional changes, learnings and/or 
accountability reforms within Brazilian ‘SSC bureaucracies’.566 As mentioned previously, both ABC and 
Embrapa were somehow institutionally impacted by the ‘ProSavana crisis’. ABC, in particular, has 
undergone numerous management reforms in the last five years, which led among others, to the 
strengthening of its policy planning unit, the creation of a working group on M&E and to a consultative 
process to draft a Food and Nutritional Security Cooperation Strategy.567 Notwithstanding the multiple 
factors that explain these reforms, is fair to assume that the anti-ProSavana transnational social mobilisation 
was among them, raising the domestic political costs of Brazilian development engagements abroad, at least 
for certain policy communities. 
 
While the linkages between the ‘ProSavana crisis’ and SSC institutional reforms in Brazil are not always 
straightforward, the mobilisation has generated other effects worth highlighting. The first one is described 
by Durán and Chichava (2017) as ‘politicisation effects’, with the mobilisation increasing the visibility of 
the contested nature of agricultural development cooperation and prompting answerability: public figures 
in all three countries had to respond and launch more public consultations. A second effect relates to the 
‘thickening of civil society’ (Fox 2007a) through the activation of transnational linkages around 
development cooperation involving ‘old’ (Japan) and ‘new’ providers (Brazil). In Brazil, scrutiny over 
country’s SSC is deemed to have contributed to dismantling the ‘insulation of cooperation from wider state-
society dynamics’ (Cabral and Leite 2015, 440) and to ongoing debates on the democratisation of Brazilian 
foreign policy and on the need for a fully-fledged national development cooperation policy. Cabral and 
Leite ponder, nonetheless, that the mobilisation lacked a broad basis of stakeholders. For them, even if the 
campaign managed ‘to narrow the gap between Brazilian taxpayers and Mozambicans’ (ibid, 439), 
narrowing the traditional IDC ‘broken-feedback loop’ (see Chapters 1 and 3), it remained small and 
restricted to a group of internationalised social movements and development NGOs. While agreeing with 
 
564 INT-BR-2; INT-BR-20. 
565 INT-BR-64. 
566 INT-BR-2; INT-BR-21; INT-BR-64. 
567 INT-BR-53; INT-BR-6; INT-BR-10. 
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the authors on the rapprochement effects, it is important not to overstate the taxpayers’ dimension in this 
process. Rather, I contend, this transnational mobilisation created a crisis-like situation whereby certain 
CSOs could engage with the contradictions of Brazilian SSC, narrowing the gap between activists in both sides 
of the Atlantic and creating openings for politicising Brazilian SSC at home at a policy level, even if not 
necessarily at the taxpayers’ level.  
 
The problematisation of ProSavana ‘from below’ also made visible conflicting expectations of 
responsibilities in the context of Brazil’s international development engagements. The first relates to 
notions of ‘good’, ‘just’ and/or ‘appropriate’ development cooperation policy and policymaking. As mentioned, fears 
around displacement and other negative socio-environmental impacts on Mozambican peasants have 
served as a mobilising tool for local and transnational civil society. At the same time, right-based framings 
of the problem (the ‘right-to-know’, ‘right-to-participate’ and ‘right-to-food’) were extensively adopted by 
activists because they resonated with existing state-society agreements in Brazil at the time around these 
rights and the role of the state in promoting them.568 Transparency, participation, land and food security 
issues were also conducive to galvanize attention and solidarity from transnational activist networks and 
‘aid monitoring movements’ and claim belonging, open/democratic policymaking and environmental 
justice.  
 
The second expectation refers to developmental models being shared and exported through SSC. As suggested 
by Shankland and Gonçalves (2016), the ProSavana controversy highlighted the shortcomings of ‘mythical 
imaginaries’ of Brazilian agricultural transformation and ‘shared landscapes’ between Brazil and Africa. This 
is why an important dimension of CSOs mobilisation was about disputing evidence around agricultural 
transformation and questioning how much of the mythical narrative around the past successes of Brazil’s 
own agricultural transformation was actually concealing past and present dispossession of Brazilian 
smallholders569 and hence exporting these contradictions to Mozambique (Aguiar and Pacheco 2016; 
Santarelli 2016). When connecting dispossessions across the Atlantic, CSOs also disputed notions of ‘SSC 
effectiveness’, challenging officials to engage on what kind of development partner Brazil wanted to be. 
Critically, the ProSavana controversy gave content to growing perceptions of collusion between Brazilian 
technical cooperation and private interests (Leite et al. 2014; Zanini 2017; Dye and Alencastro 2020). This 
nexus was something Brazilian activists were willing to dispute because, unlike India and China, in the early 
 
568 Brazil developed throughout the 2000s a Food and Nutrition Security policy system backed by a strong legal framework, 
which included having the right to food constitutionalised in 2010. As for the right to information, in 2011 the country 
approved its Access to Information Law and started to champion a range of open government initiatives, both domestically 
and globally.  
569 An important issue already at the time, and even more so in the more recent years, was the continuous agricultural 
expansion of soya production into other Brazilian regions, including in the Cerrado portion of the states of Maranhão, 
Tocantins, Piauí, and Bahia (known as MATOPIBA) and in the Amazonian forest (Catsossa 2019). 
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2010s the Brazilian government was not openly favouring the participation of the private sector in its 
development cooperation, a dimension that remains unsolved until the present days.570    
 
The third expectation relates to appropriate rising powers’ behaviour in development cooperation. In many ways 
Brazil, more than Japan, was at the core of the accountability calls. The global visibility of ProSavana as ‘a 
Brazilian SSC crisis’ leaves open a set of questions on the politics of accountability in/of triangular 
cooperation, on differential responsibilities among partners and on the strategies of contestation chosen by 
different actors. Was Brazil playing a more important role in ProSavana implementation during the initial 
years and thus subjected to greater scrutiny? How much has the official narratives around the ‘shared 
landscapes and trajectories’ between Brazil and Mozambique safeguarded Japan from being the (main) 
target of accountability calls, despite its key role as a funding source? Were calls more strongly directed to 
(or felt in) Brazil because of the emerging divisive expectations across state and societal actors towards the 
country’s rising power status? The next cases shed light onto some of these issues, while bringing new ones 
to the fore.  
 
Challenging China’s global environmental footprint: embedded activism and missing linkages  
 
This sub-section discusses problematisations of accountability ‘from below’ in the context of China’s 
overseas infrastructure building. While scholarship on civil society contestation of China-funded/built 
infrastructure projects in the Global South has flourished in the last decade (e.g Mottet and Lasserre 2017; 
S. Moyo, Jha, and Yeros 2019; Yeophantong 2020), fewer studies have unpacked Chinese and China-based 
activism (exceptions include Poskitt, Shankland and Taela 2016; Hsu, Hildebrandt and Hasmath 2016).571 
My findings contribute to this less explored dimension in three ways. First, I find that ongoing reforms of 
China’s aid system—including greater policy guidance for overseas investments, the creation of CIDCA 
and growing ‘multilateralisation’ of China’s development cooperation (see Chapter 6)—have offered greater 
political, symbolic and material opportunities for activists inside and outside China to mobilise around 
accountability issues. Second, that environmental activism has been the most accessible ‘entry-door’ for 
CSOs to engage the state and Chinese companies and to influence (if not resist) projects. Third, that groups 
within China have engaged the state and companies through what Ho and Edmonds (2008) called 
‘embedded activism’, seeking to partner with Chinese actors acting overseas and co-construct or change 
policies and practices from ‘within’, in a conflict-avoiding manner. 
 
Public debates are mounting inside China on country’s Going Out strategy and its global developmental role 
and footprint. The internationalisation of the Chinese state and companies has multiplied the number of 
 
570 INT-BR-44; INT-BR-3; INT-BR-47. 
571 ‘China-based’ organisations refers here to the range of INGOs that have offices and/or branches in mainland China or 
Hong Kong, including the major environmental NGOs (like WWF, World Resources Institute, Greenpeace, Friends of the 
Earth) and the major development INGOs and foundations (including Oxfam, Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, Bill and 
Melinda Gates, among others).  
182 
 
domestic actors, including CSOs and other interest groups, seeking to influence policies and practices. 
Greater interest is reflected in the growing number of state and non-state media outlets reporting on global 
development issues, particularly around high level events like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) and on high profile initiatives such as the BRI (Xinhua 2018; Ma 2018; 2019). Examples of non-
state reporting include the business-focused Caixin Global, critical independent ‘non-adversarial’ coverage 
of global development issues (Ma 2018)572 as well as civil society initiatives, like the trilingual China 
Dialogue, reporting on China and the environment.573 Social media activism by ‘netizens’ has also expanded 
in the past years, notably around these same high profile events (Ma 2018).574  
 
In her piece on China’s dam-building in the Mekong region, Yeophantong (2020, 87) argued that China’s 
growing role in hydropower development has generated an ‘evolving regional public sphere’ where local 
civil society organisations create their own ‘autonomous spaces’ for participation or ask for the creation of 
‘invited spaces’, along Gaventa’s (2006) typology, to exert influence on China’s government and companies. 
Here I suggest that there are signs of a similar processes taking place within China, in which civil society 
groups (including NGOs, independent communication vehicles, think tanks and academics) are crafting 
ways to discuss and influence country’s global development exchanges. Despite the existing restrictions to 
political activism and public expression, spaces for participation have expanded in the context of China’s 
Going Out and, in different ways, provided local civil society actors with a range of new political, symbolic 
and material opportunities and resources to act (Waisbich forthcoming a).  
 
A noticeable source of SSC-related mobilisation within China has been environmental activism. The 
environment is one of the earliest and most active areas of civil society in modern China (Ho 2008). 
Environmental issues have grown as a relatively politically-safe issue for groups to mobilise around: 
‘acceptable until you hit some boundaries’, as framed by one interviewee.575 Ho and Edmonds (2008) 
defined contemporary environmental activism in China as ‘embedded activism’: a ‘nation-wide, voluntary 
collective action with less risk of social instability and repression at the hand of the governing elite’ (Ho 
2008, 2). Embedded activism is characterised by self-imposed censorship and a conscious de-politicisation 
of environmental politics, as well as by the use of non-confrontational strategies and of partnering and 
informally networking with Party and state officials. According to the authors, not only has embedded 
activism allowed the environmental movement to survive and expand in China but it has also provided the 
basis for incremental political changes in China.  
 
 
572 An example of this reporting on FOCAC can be found in Teng (2018). For more on ‘constructive journalism’ in China, see 
The China Africa Project (n.d.). 
573 China Dialogue project (https://www.chinadialogue.net/) has articles available in Mandarin, English, and Spanish. 
Another source for critical discussion on China’s overseas development initiatives with attentive eyes to environmental 
issues is the English-language Panda Paw Dragon Claw blog (https://pandapawdragonclaw.blog/). 




These changes can be seen in the ways the Chinese Communist Party has made environmental 
sustainability—or at least some aspects of it, such as air pollution and renewable energy—a priority (Barbieri 
2018; H. C. Li 2019). In 2012, Xi erected the ‘Ecological Civilisation’ as one of the pillars of Chinese 
developmental agenda, and, in 2018, the term was included in China’s constitution. In 2020, Xi announced 
China’s commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. There is, therefore, an increasing concern within 
China with transitioning towards a green economy, making the country a world leader on green finance and 
on renewable energy technologies.  
 
The Party desire to pursue a ‘green leadership’ has generated new opportunities for national civil society 
groups to engage state institutions (like the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission), business 
associations (such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and 
Exporters) and companies operating abroad on these issues, on an issue-specific basis or through multi-
stakeholder platforms like the ‘Green BRI’.576According to my research participants, the Party interest in 
and commitment to the agenda further made international environmental norms and standards more 
palatable to the Chinese actors operating abroad than other international issues, related to labour or human 
rights, for instance.577  
 
At the same time, environmental issues have also gained prominence in the international development 
realm, with the Agenda 2030 and the climate emergency, creating new transnational political opportunity 
structures, following Tarrow’s (2001) framework, for independent think tanks, development and 
environmental organisations (like the Beijing-based Greenovation: Hub – GHub, the Global 
Environmental Institute – GEI, or the Yunnan-based Green Watershed), and China-based INGOs 
(including WWF, Greenpeace or Oxfam Hong Kong) to mobilise on environmental and climate change 
issues in a non-confrontational way. 
 
By working with state institutions and business associations to improve overseas investment policies, 
guidelines and the performance of Chinese companies, organisations have found a circumscribed but 
growing space to problematise China’s SSC and the inconsistencies between its ‘green rhetoric’ and 
practices.578 In their influencing endeavours, some groups (like GEI or The Asia Foundation) decided to 
act ‘constructively’, as framed by one interviewee,579 to help Chinese companies with Corporate Social 
Responsibility-like arrangements and engagement with local communities. Others, alternatively, decided to 
do advocacy with the banking sector and with sectoral business associations in Beijing to improve 
regulations on outward investments or help to mitigate financial and reputational risks of overseas projects. 
 
576 See https://green-bri.org/ (last access: 27/08/2020). 





GHub, for instance, has developed, in partnership with the German Böll Foundation, their own 
‘Environmental Risk Management Manual for China Overseas Investment’ (GHub 2019).  
 
Representatives of Chinese and China-based organisations interviewed were well aware of the potentialities 
but also the limits of using conflict-avoiding or even business-friendly environmental activism to partner 
with ‘reformers’ within state institutions and companies. These limits materialise, for instance, in the 
challenges to engage in the required technical financial terms or in insufficiencies of promoting a ‘green 
agenda’ that overlooks social issues, including resettlement and indigenous peoples’ rights.580 CSOs were 
also aware of the incremental nature of their embedded activism. They recognise the new governmental 
regulations are mostly non-compulsory/voluntary recommendations and do not provide local communities 
with access to legal remedies (Garzón 2014; Chun Zhang 2017).  
 
They also recognise, echoing existing critical scholarship on development accountability (e.g. Newell and 
Wheeler 2006; Joshi and Houtzager 2012), their activism as mainly ‘mechanism-driven’ and geared towards 
the adoption of formal policy-legal changes and tools, often overlooking their implementation challenges 
at the project level. Changing power relations on the ground would require Chinese organisations to forge 
more linkages with other activists working outside China and to play a more active role in transnational 
networks, helping others to navigate Chinese systems and actors (Waisbich forthcoming b). However, 
growing these South-South linkages between critics in China and those mobilising at the projects-sites are 
not always assured, as I discuss next while examining the case of the China infrastructure building in Lamu, 
Kenya. 
 
The case of Lamu illustrates a transnational campaign against China-funded infrastructure project without 
the participation of Chinese civil society and thus offers insights on some of the present opportunities and 
limits of collective action in the context of China-funded/built projects. In 2014, the Kenyan government 
launched a project to build Kenya’s first ever coal-powered plant in the Lamu County. The bid was won by 
a consortium of Kenyan and Chinese energy and investment firms, led by Amu Power Company, with 
financing coming from the Industrial Commercial Bank of China. Later, the project also received financial 
support from the African Development Bank (AfDB) and from Amu’s shareholders.581 Planned near a 
UNESCO World Heritage Site, the plant was quickly contested by national and transnational civil society 
activists. Among the many strategies employed, a group of local community and environmental activists, 
led by the Save Lamu and the Kwasasi Mvunjeni Farmers Self-Help Group, together with national and 
international organisations such as Greenpeace and Accountability Counsel, filed a lawsuit with the Kenya’s 
National Environment Tribunal. Their petition challenged the lack of consultations, the quality of the 
 
580 INT-CH-1; INT-CH-7; INT-CH-8. 
581 As the project unfolded, the plant owner, Amu Power Company, became a Kenyan, Omani, US. and Chinese consortium, 
with the US-based General Electric buying 20% stake in the plant, in 2018 (Ochieng and Olingo 2019; Ullman 2019). 
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environmental impact assessment done in the project approval phase, and the environmental risks the 
project would entail if completed (Obura 2019; UNEP 2019).582 In June 2019, Kenyan judges revoked the 
company’s license to build the plant and, in November, following the growing pressure by environmental 
groups, AfDB pulled out, bringing the project to a halt.583 
 
The so far successful mobilisation on the Lamu coal-power plant offers some insights on pro-accountability 
social mobilisation dynamics on and around Chinese infrastructure investments overseas. First, on the so-
called ‘success factors’, the case highlights the role of national actors and institutions in the host country in 
contesting a social-environmentally controversial project and forcing governmental actors to reconsider 
policy priorities.584 It also signals the opportunities given by co-financing arrangements involving Chinese 
and multilateral financers in multiplying pressure points for activism and ultimately help steering China 
away from environmentally damaging projects.585 A second insight is on the multidimensionality of Chinese 
global developmental role and impacts. In the last decade, Lamu has been a site for other forms of social 
contestation over China-Kenyan partnerships in the context of the logistical-development corridor 
connecting the Lamu port to other regions in Eastern Africa (Lesutis 2019; Chome et al. 2020). The port, 
built by Chinese contractors,586 also sparked criticism of local communities and prompted an unsuccessful 
legal action against the Kenyan state due to forced resettlement of local communities and loss of traditional 
fishing rights, among others (Le 2016). Lastly, this case suggests some limits of replicability of the Lamu 
plant mobilisation to other China-funded/built projects. While the transnational mobilisation managed to 
halt the plant without fully engaging Chinese civil society—with Kenyan activists relying on other leverage 
points, including INGOs, multilateral and national courts—this might not be the case with other projects 
exclusively dependent on China’s funding or impacting on issues with less political transnational appeal. 
The fate of the Lamu fishing community affected by the port and still battling for compensation is an 
example close-by (Business and Human Rights 2018).587  
 
 
582 Groups also filed a complaint with the World Bank IFC alerting that Kenyan commercial banks funded by IFC have been 
contributing to the project as well. So far IFC has avoided any responsibility for the damages (Accountability Counsel 2019).   
583 For another setback following court rulings, this time involving Chinese projects in Peru, see Collyns (2019). 
584 The learning from this case, compiled by the multi-stakeholder ‘Green BRI Initiative’ is a sign of how controversies like 
this one can potentially feedback into future project and policy decision-making processes. Among the recommendations 
to Chinese investors, the authors of the report highlight that ‘investors need to ensure that not only the government, but 
also the broader society supports the projects’. They also highlight that investors should adhere to international 
investment due diligence standards and other commitments, including UN SDGs and the Paris Agreement on combating 
climate change. See https://green-bri.org/kenyas-lamu-coal-fired-power-plant-lessons-learnt-for-green-development-and-
investments-in-the-bri?cookie-state-change=1600781575123 (last access: 22/09/2020).  
585 From an environmental perspective, this can contribute to making harder for China to keep investing in coal-based 
solutions, and thus keep externalising its carbon footprint, and to creating more incentives for China to prioritise 
renewables in its overseas investments (Igoe 2018; Ma 2020). 
586 The port is funded by the Development Bank of South Africa and built by the China Communications Construction 
Company (Njunge 2019). 
587 Another example of complex responsibility chains is found in recent debates around China’s investments in agricultural 
commodities, such as in soyabean crop production in countries like Brazil and the linkages with deforestation and climate 
change (Lazzeri 2019).  
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In sum, the ways in which environmental issues gained traction in China’s SSC in the last years have allowed 
for certain accountability issues to be claimed and negotiated ‘from below’. This was certainly the case of 
mobilisation around the ‘ecological footprint’ of China’s development cooperation by some domestic actors 
in China (think-thanks, CSOs, academics). Their activism helps understanding growing debates and 
unfolding reforms in the environmental front rather than in other issues, such as transparency or the 
impacts of China’s infrastructure building on land and livelihood dispossession elsewhere. Environmental 
accountability is a possible door through which civil society in and outside China’s is problematising SSC 
accountability ‘from below’ despite its many challenges and embedded tensions.  
 
Challenging Southern development finance: crafting new ways to mobilise around Southern-led development banks  
 
Alongside China’s overseas investments, Southern-led international development finance, more broadly, 
also became a problem for civil society actors within Brazil, China and India in the last decade. The rise in 
financial flows and projects funded by national development banks (including BNDES; Exim Bank of 
China and other Chinese policy banks; India Exim Bank) and the emergence of new Southern-led 
multilateral banks (the BRICS-led NDB and the China-initiated AIIB) prompted groups within rising 
powers to monitor and try to influence the policy and modus operandi of these financial institutions.   
 
Here I discuss the transnational mobilisation around the New Development Bank, created in 2014 by the 
five BRICS countries, and headquartered in Shanghai, to fund ‘sustainable infrastructure’ in the Global 
South (NDB 2017). Using the case of the NDB, I discuss, first, how civil society actors from Brazil, China 
and India (together with counterparts in South Africa and beyond) attempted to challenge new Southern-
led development banks. Second, how they have navigated the need to reinvent pro-accountability 
mobilisation strategies beyond the more classic approaches employed to engage with and campaign against 
traditional multilaterals, like the World Bank. Third, how, through a mix of contentious politics strategies 
(McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2001) and institutionalised forms of engagement (Lavalle et al. 
2019), activists’ interactions with the NDB and with national development banks, sought not only to resist 
to particular ‘problematic initiatives’ but also to contribute to the production of policies and agendas for 
Southern-led development banks.  
 
In different ways and intensity levels, Southern-led development finance became problematic to national 
development, environmental and rights-groups in Brazil, China and India. National NGOs—particularly 
the more professionalised urban-based ones already mobilised on foreign policy and/or development 
cooperation issues—quickly identified existing and potential negative impacts of Southern development 
finance abroad and sought to forge formal participation channels and (critical) collaboration ‘interfaces’ 




In many ways, mobilisation on the BRICS-led NDB interacted and fed into existing (and emerging) 
advocacy work around the other banks (both the national development banks and multilateral ones, like 
the AIIB). National organisations were joined, and often supported, by INGOs based in the three countries 
and by transnational networks monitoring international financial institutions or the BRICS agenda.588 In 
the case of Brazil, groups included Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Brasília-based development and rights-
groups (like REBRIP, Conectas, Oxfam Brasil and Action Aid Brasil). In India and China, organisations (in 
their majority capital-based) included Oxfam India, Action Aid India, VANI, Centre for Financial 
Accountability, the BRICS Feminist Watch, GHub, WWF China, Oxfam Hong Kong and Greenpeace 
China. Most of these groups got together in loose networks, such as the BRICS Working Group inside the 
Coalition for Human Rights in Development and under the umbrella of existing BRICS-related civil society 
networks like the BRICS-from-Below and People’s Forum on BRICS (Waisbich forthcoming a). 
 
Unlike social contestation of the World Bank in the 1990s, where challenging negative socio-environmental 
impacts of operations on the ground preceded formal policy interactions with the bank (Fox and Brown 
1998; Park 2019), in the case of NDB the opposite took place. The will to engage first as ‘insiders’ and 
‘critical collaborators’ was based on CSOs’ decades-long experience interacting a range of multilateral banks 
and by a growing perception589 by activists of the strategic value of establishing institutionalised channels for 
critical dialogue with development banks led by their own governments in order to influence institutional 
settings and operations.590  
 
To act as critical collaborators, national NGOs had to quickly—and not without tensions—adapt their long 
experience with demanding accountability from traditional multilaterals. This localisation, or ‘appropriation’ 
work (Anderl 2016), was essential in light of rising powers’ transitioning from ‘borrowers’ to ‘donors’ in 
the global development finance realm. Translation meant changes in the mobilisation strategies and 
repertoires of collective action as much as in the issues raised and their framing. For that, groups had to 
reinvent transnational advocacy campaigns away from what most scholars understand as the North-South 
‘boomerang effect’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and the ‘case study campaigning’ (Fox and Brown 1998) to the 
new context of Southern-led finance.  
 
The ‘theory of change’ underpinning the classic model is that activists should create transnational networks 
of Southern and Northern-based organisations to campaign against ‘problematic projects’ funded by 
 
588 Among the INGOs one finds the Oxfam Confederation, Action Aid, Greenpeace, WWF, Friends of the Earth, 
International Rivers, Article 19, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, the International Accountability Project and Accountability 
Counsel. Among the transnational networks, one finds the Coalition for Human Rights in Development, the People’s Forum 
on the Asian Development Bank and the People’s Forum on BRICS.   
589 On civil society perceptions vis-à-vis international organisations opening-up, see Anderl et al. (2019). 
590 INT-BR-51; INT-BR-12; INT-BR-1; INT-IN-14; INT-OSS-10; INT-CH-1. Also Waisbich (2017). In the case of Brazil, an initial 
insider approach was also favoured by the political affinity that mobilised groups had with incumbents during the PT era 
(2003-2016), which faded away from 2016 onwards (Sierra and Hochstetler 2017).   
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multilaterals (and eventually halt them) and then use controversial projects as paradigmatic cases to feed 
their reformist agenda and policy advocacy work at the headquarters level.591 The classic paradigm is also 
one where (often more radical) local voices in the South resisting projects on the ground were amplified 
(and often moderated) by other groups advocating in/from Washington or the European capitals (Covey 
1998). Here, however, both the project and the funding decision-making sites were now located in Southern 
contexts, with no possible use of Western legislatures as pressure points (Babb 2009; Park 2019).  
 
Mobilisation strategies had also to change because official understandings of accountability in Southern-led 
development finance was different. Western-led development banks have in the past decades— and due to 
increased pressure from inside and outside reformists—come to accept the idea of a responsibility to ‘do-
no-harm’ and developed a set of operational guidelines, safeguards and independent accountability 
mechanisms to respond to affected peoples’ concerns (Caitlin et al. 2016; Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-
Mullins 2019; Park 2019). Southern development banks, alternatively, were willing to take a different route. 
Based on their past experiences as ‘borrowers’ and echoing longstanding concerns with sovereignty, 
development ownership, and autonomy in project-finance, both the NDB and the AIIB decided to 
mainstream the so-called country systems’ approach, 592 where multilaterals rely on national legislation from the 
borrowing country in the context of their operations rather than on their own prescribed rules on financial 
management and environmental and social safeguards (Waisbich and Borges 2020; also Vazquez, 
Roychoudhury and Borges 2017; Conectas 2018b ).593  
 
Free from more robust ‘do-no-harm’ institutional frameworks, new Southern-led multilaterals posed 
challenges for civil society groups trying to replicate the classic framing of ‘communities negatively affected 
by projects’ that underpinned much of the transnational mobilisation around the World Bank and other 
anti-dam mobilisation since the 1990s inside Brazil and India (Park 2019; Atkins 2019). Under the country 
systems’ approach, CSOs lacked important pressure points within the NDB and were left with less legal, para-
legal and political entry-doors for challenging policies and operations. As a consequence, while engaging 
with the NDB, activists faced, not without frustration, the challenges of reinventing their own ‘theories of 
change’. As put by an Indian activist:  
 
 
591 This approach was somehow successful, for instance, in shifting the multilateral appetite for funding large dams in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s and has also contributed to important accountability-related institutional reforms in the World 
Bank, including with the creation of the Inspection Panel and the operational policies (information disclosure, sectoral 
policies, socio-environmental safeguards) (Fox and Brown 1998; Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-Mullins 2019). 
592 Since the early 2000s, the country systems’ approach has been tested for procurement and in some ‘less-risky’ projects 
within the major multilateral development banks (OECD 2010; World Bank 2011; NDB 2017).  
593 An important factor in the successive reforms the World Bank Inspection Panel went through since its establishment 
has been the resistance to the Panel’s role and authority by two kinds of stakeholders: management and larger borrowing 
states, including Brazil, China and India, against major donors’ interests to use the Panel to hold management to account. 
Southern governments’ trajectory of ‘resisting’ the Panel was mainly rooted on sovereignty concerns, arguing that the 
body was being used as a tool to investigate (and control) borrowers (Sovacool, Naudé Fourie and Tan-Mullins 2019). 
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Country-systems were a Southern agenda in Accra and Busan. But what have they done to it? They are just hiding 
behind it. They took just the sovereignty thing, but do not want to bear the costs of transparency, accountability, and 
civil society participation (…) They use country systems as an excuse. To shift from their responsibility.594 
 
Ironically, as this new modus operandi became clearer to NDB’s watchdogs, many which had opposed World 
Bank’s top-down approaches towards Southern borrowers, called its safeguards perfunctory, and hailed 
BRICS for their transformative potential suddenly found themselves looking back with some nostalgia.595 
Their calls for the NDB to adhere to a minimum-denominator of existing international standards (e.g., 
Kaushik 2018) hoped to challenge the perceived ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of accountability standards 
and tools. This includes calls on the NDB to make project documents available, set-up civil society liaison 
focal points and consultation procedures, adopt socio-environmental benchmarks and operational 
safeguards to ensure ‘doing-no-harm’, and create accountability mechanisms where affected groups could 
file complaints and seek redress.596   
 
Activists had then to find ways to discuss public responsibilities that would resonate with how BRICS 
countries conceived NDB’s role and responsibilities. A similar effort also took place domestically vis-à-vis 
national development banks. Brazilian groups, for instance, negotiated with BNDES notions of a ‘public 
bank with obligations towards the Brazilian society as well as the international community’, considering 
both BNDES identity as an export credit-like agency activities (rather than a project loan bank) and the 
international legal transparency and socio-environmental standards to which Brazil adhered (Conectas 
2018a).597 This meant challenging BNDES initial use of state and bank secrecy provisions and references 
to the non-interference principle implying that the responsibility for eventual negative socio-environmental 
impacts was on the other Southern partner (Conectas 2014; Sierra and Hochstetler 2017; also Chapter 5), 
an understanding also shared by India’s Exim Bank (see Chapter 6).598 Groups in China also worked to 
localise understandings of global responsibility in the context of China’s growing international development 
finance. Chinese NGOs used, for instance, country’s commitments to fighting climate change as a sign of 
China’s well-established global responsibilities that should guide the funding operations of national banks 
working overseas and the workings of China-led multilateral banks (GHub 2016).  
 
Translation also happened at the tactical level and not without challenges. Since the BRICS countries started 
the preparations to set-up the bank in Shanghai, several CSOs from Brazil, China and India (as well as from 
 
594 INT-IN-14. 
595 INT-BR-12; INT-BR-63. 
596 Examples of documents where CSOs raised these concerns include the Human Right Forum on ADB (2015) statement on 
AIIB’s lack of safeguard, the position paper compiled by the Coalition for Human Rights in Development (2017) on NDB 
2017-2021 Strategy, People’s Forum on BRICS (2017) statement on the NDB, Vasudha Foundation paper on international 
best practices to be followed the NDB (Kaushik 2018), and the International Accountability Project advocacy paper on 
information disclosure (Sampaio 2019). 
597 INT-BR-12. 
598 INT-IN-13; INT-IN-17; INT-IN-15; INT-BR-11; INT-BR-25; INT-BR-38; INT-BR-56; INT-BR-70. 
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South Africa), opted for the ‘insider approach’: trying to create a space for political dialogue with the bank. 
The wrote policy reports and op-eds and tried to communicate and meet with the governmental 
representatives and with NDB management. With time, much of this critical collaboration work end up 
happening under the umbrella of the Coalition for Human Rights in Development. Others, however, 
preferred the ‘outsider approach’ of radical criticism, even hosting street protests against the bank. Some 
organisations, notably from Brazil and India, tried to do both (Waisbich forthcoming a).599   
 
Transparency and participation featured among the issues prioritised by those who sought working with 
the bank during NDB’s set-up phase and first operational cycle, until 2019.600 NDB’s overall transparency 
(i.e., disclosure policies and public availability of project documents) was perceived by activists as a tactical 
‘rally point’ (Gheyle and Ville 2017)601 and a ‘low-hanging fruit’602 to initiate the dialogue and enable other 
procedural and substantial issues, including participation in decision-making and negative impacts on local 
communities, to emerge.603 Transparency was also useful to begin with considering that NDB operations 
and projects would take time to materialise on the ground.  
 
As time progressed, however, and looking back to over five years of mobilisation, activists secured little 
beyond the dialogue channel and some modest transparency gains. Groups in Brazil, China and India could 
not steer the NDB towards establishing robust socio-environmental and gender policies to guide 
investments or operational guidelines to prevent and mitigate negative impacts on the ground. They also 
failed to make the bank explicitly move away from funding fossil fuels, coal and clean coal. Besides the gap 
between CSOs initial hopes and their own capacity to influence the NDB towards what they considered 
not only ‘new’ but also ‘transformational’ and thus ‘better’ development finance practices, activists also had 
to adjust their anticipated fear of damages and disasters on the ground. The reality by 2020 was that NDB 
projects were either inexistent, invisible or performing ‘not that badly’ (Waisbich forthcoming b).604 The 
time-gap between pledges, commitments and disbursements; NDB’s willingness to ‘play safe’ in the first 
years (Waisbich and Borges 2020); the use of financial intermediaries and co-financing; and the lack of 
information on how projects operated and performed on the ground (Kweitel, Toni, and Gordon 2017; 
Coalition 2017), made the bank difficult to track and almost invisible to outsiders.  
 
 
599 INT-BR-1; INT-IN-14; INT-IN-6. For an analysis of this diverging trajectories in the case of civil society mobilisation 
around the BRICS-led NDB, see Waisbich (forthcoming a).  
600 In 2020, the Bank has closed its first cycle, under the presidency of K. V. Kamath, from India, with the election of a new 
rotating president, this time a Brazilian national, for the upcoming cycle. 
601 This expression was coined in the context of transnational mobilisation dynamics in the context of the European Union 
to denote the use of transparency issues by social activists also as a way to express frustration over substance. A similar 
dynamic is also found in the case of ProSavana, discussed earlier.   
602 INT-BR-12; INT-BR-51; INT-BR-1. 
603 As discussed in Chapter 5, a similar dynamic was observed in the mobilisation around the BNDES (Sierra and Hochstetler 
2017). 
604 The gap between the anticipated fear and reality is also highlighted by critical development scholarship in the context 
of emerging powers-Africa relations (Bräutigam 2009; S. Moyo, Jha and Yeros 2019). 
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This set of dynamics contributed to making the classic ‘problematic case study’ campaigning approach 
harder to replicate.605 Low-intensity advocacy work on policy ‘improvement’ and ‘betterment’ exercises 
became the sole repertoire possible in a context where mobilisation was happening without visible ‘crises’, 
‘push-backs’ and/or ‘controversial projects’ (in the words of my participants)606 or without major negative 
impacts (i.e., socio-environmental disaster-like situations, evictions, resettlements and/or large-scale 
corruption). This scenario also made difficult for NDB-related mobilisation to attract support from other 
national groups (namely social movements and grassroots organisations) beyond the niche of professional 
NGOs already working on development finance and connected to transnational networks led by INGOs 
such as Oxfam, Action Aid or the Böll Foundation.607 Absence of visible problems on the ground prompted 
some interlocutors to question whether civil society groups were ‘making a mounting out of a molehill’, as 
put by one interviewee.608 Something another participant countered by stating: ‘There might be no 
controversial projects. But there are things. They [the NDB] must seek abide by the higher standards. It is 
a new institution and there are standards: multilateral development banks’ standards. There is no need to 
reinvent the wheel’.609 
 
India is where these tensions played out more intensely. While candidly reflecting on the challenges to 
render India’s South-South development finance flows visible domestically (both in the case of its LOCs 
and in India’s role in the NDB and the AIIB), one activist pondered that: ‘Unless there is a huge issue there: 
an environmental issue, a human rights violation, fishers in the Sundarbans are not an issue for elites. (…) 
Even the Communist Party sees it as a Bangladesh-India friendship thing’. His comments made a direct 
reference to a short-lived mobilisation to stop a LOC-funded coal-power plant in Rampal, Bangladesh, near 
the Sundarbans mangrove forest.610 His account also highlights the implications of the existing pan-partisan 
nationalistic consensus on Indian South-South relations for grassroots groups trying to forge alliances— or 
‘coalitions of change’ (Fox 2020)—within India to contest the fate of the poor and marginalised in India’s 
partner countries.611  
 
Finally, an additional challenge to increasing awareness around the (potential) downsides of Southern 
finance for infrastructure building. Mobilisation around the NDB was impacted by a decrease in the initial 
international attention (and sometimes even obsession) among ‘traditional’ donors and INGOs to the 
 
605 INT-IN-14; INT-IN-20; INT-IN-6; INT-BR-40. 




610 According to Satish (2019), Indian contribution of US$1.62 billion counted for approximately 70% of the capital needed 
for the project. The project became controversial because the plant was to be located within 14 km of the Sundarbans, a 
UNESCO World Heritage site. Opposition came from local environmental groups and fisher communities as well as from 
experts fearful of India’s financing fossil fuel exposure in times of reimagining carbon neutral futures (Satish 2019). See 
https://www.banktrack.org/rampal/ (last access: 27/08/2020). 
611 This challenge is not unique to the Rampal plant and was observed in the equally short-lived transnational mobilisation 
around Indian agricultural investments in Ethiopia (Mawdsley 2014b; also Chapter 6). 
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Southern BRICS’ (Brazil, India, China and to a lesser extent South Africa) impacts in the field of global 
development (Muhr 2016; Bergamaschi, Moore and Tickner 2017). This is particularly visible in Brazil and 
India, notably since 2018, as a response to the somewhat official slowdown or withdrawal from the agenda 
in both countries. INGOs, such as Oxfam and Action Aid, but also the Böll Foundation—all three central 
nodes in the SSC-related activism—downsized their work on BRICS-related issues. In some cases, attention 
re-routed to China-only and to AIIB-only work.612 Left with less external support to carry on their low 
intensity policy advocacy work around the NDB, watchdogs in Brazil, China and India are now entering a 




Negotiating accountability ‘from below’ 
 
 
What can these instances of pro-accountability mobilisation illuminate in terms of current forms of 
negotiation over accountability in/of SSC taking place in Brazil, China and India? This section attempts to 
answer to this question locating what I labelled emerging ‘SSC monitoring movements’ and their 
negotiations over SSC within broader state-society dynamics in the context of foreign policy in the three 
countries.  
 
Pro-accountability mobilisation and emerging social expectations on Southern providers 
 
As argued in the accountability literature, negotiations between states and citizens over rights and/or 
entitlements to accountability (to explanations, justifications or redress) are necessarily constructed and 
negotiated. They reflect broader constructions of citizenship and the always evolving agreements on the 
contours of the social contract in a particular time and space (Grant and Keohane 2005; Hickey and King 
2016; Waisbich et al. 2019). Negotiations also ‘imply an agenda-setting power and a degree of authority to 
demand accountability from others’ (Newell and Bellour 2002, 2). Development cooperation, and foreign 
policy more broadly, are policy fields with their own citizenship dynamics, their own forms of negotiated 
entitlements to explanations or redress, and their own expectations of ‘good’, ‘just’ and/or ‘appropriate’ state 
behaviour (Hill 2003; Eyben and Ferguson 2004; Rottenburg 2009; Milani and Pinheiro 2013). How these 
entitlements and expectations are currently being built in the context of SSC, reflects, on the one hand, the 
disputed and incomplete institutionalisation of SSC in a range of Southern providers (including Brazil, 
China and India). On the other hand, it also reflects the uneven and contested nature of development in 
 
612 INT-IN-6; INT-IN-10. 
193 
 
these Southern providers and the interconnectedness between expectations about the state role in 
promoting development at home and abroad (Waisbich forthcoming a).613 
 
In the early days of SSC (re-)emergence, rising powers’ global ambitious received strong support from 
several domestic publics, including rights-based and development CSOs, many of which hope rising 
powers’ reformist diplomacies would/could foster global equity or that official claims about ‘justice among 
states’ would also translate into greater ‘justice within states’ (Mawdsley 2014a). However, as official SSC 
engagements increased and tensions and contradictions became more visible, this short-lived tacit 
agreement has started to coexist with more critical engagement, if not open resistance, by certain groups 
within civil society, with CSOs based in (or working on) rising powers being at the forefront of pro-
accountability mobilisation to engage and contest SSC official policies and practices.  
 
Emerging South-South cooperation monitoring movements 
 
As SSC grew as a policy domain inside key Southern providers, civil society groups have come together—
in more or less formal national and transnational networks—to influence SSC initiatives on the ground, 
shape the policy-institutional frameworks for managing and delivering SSC, and participate in policy debates 
around development cooperation and foreign policy. SSC monitoring movements, as I label them, emerged as 
an important actor in problematising accountability in/of SSC. They did so by building spaces for 
participation and spaces for contestation of policies and projects at the national and transnational levels 
(Pomeroy et al. 2016; Milhorance and Bursztyn 2017; Waisbich, Pomeroy and Leite forthcoming). 
 
As shown in the previous section (and in previous chapters), ‘SSC monitoring movements’ across Brazil, 
China and India have made strategic use of ‘jumping scales’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ferguson 2002; Tarrow 
2005). They have joined existing global ‘aid monitoring groups’ as well as used the political opportunities 
provided by transnational networks to boost SSC/foreign policy-related advocacy at home. During the early 
2000s, CSOs in Brazil, China and India have actively participated in global development debates (their role 
in the International CSO Steering Group of the Better Aid Platform in the 2008 Accra High-Level Forum 
being a good example of that).614 Around the same time, some also turned to monitoring their countries’ 
own foreign and development engagements abroad, benefitting from a surge in global attention to the so-
called ‘BRICS effects’. In countries like Brazil or South Africa, monitoring development cooperation also 
fed into growing domestic mobilisation around ‘democratising foreign policy’ (Nel and Van der Westhuizen 
 
613 Development and political theory scholarship have extensively underscored the importance of accountability discourses 
in the Global South and its close relation to development at home (Newell and Wheeler 2006; A. Gupta 2012; Isunza and 
Lavalle 2018). In particular, scholarship has highlighted different forms of social contestation towards development and 
improvement programmes using the language of ‘unkept promises’ and/or the ‘language of rights’ (Fox and Brown 1998; T. 
M. Li 2007; Anciano and Wheeler forthcoming).  
614 As many others in Asia, Africa and Latin America also actively participated in the construction of what would then 
become the ‘Aid Effectiveness’ debates, discussed in Chapter 3.   
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2003; Cabral and Leite 2015; Pomeroy and Waisbich 2019). Their activism, therefore, revolved around 
foreign policy as much as around development cooperation per se. 
   
While monitoring SSC initiatives and their impacts on the ground, advocacy groups in rising powers, 
together with their counterparts in other Southern countries and beyond, have brought to the forefront 
challenges to policymakers of ‘whose demands count’ in the partnership, exposing tensions, factures and 
inconsistencies in SSC ‘win-win’ framings (Pérez 2013; Mawdsley and Roychoudhury 2016; Waisbich, 
Pomeroy and Leite forthcoming).  Across the different mobilisation instances discussed earlier, civil society 
mobilisation has brought politics back to SSC by exposing the limits of what Rottenburg (2009) calls the 
‘official script’ that, in the case of Southern providers, equated the differential nature of SSC vis-à-vis ODA 
with its alleged benign effects on the ground. In some cases, civil society mobilisation made visible the 
tensions between official South-South narratives around ‘horizontality’, ‘cordiality’, ‘transferability’ and 
their practical translations on the ground (Cabral et al. 2013; Shankland and Gonçalves 2016; Santarelli 
2016). In others, society groups openly questioned rising powers’ own domestic and exported 
developmental models, engaging in what Keck and Sikkink (1998) described as information, symbolic, 
leverage and accountability politics to challenge SSC socio-economic and environmental footprint as part 
of an interconnected discussion between development and dispossession at home and abroad.  
 
By amplifying voices of those who defined themselves as ‘negatively affected’ by certain South-South 
initiatives, activists asked for ‘democratic ownership’ of SSC, discursively countering state-centred 
understandings of ‘national ownership’ in development cooperation.615 By doing so, they positioned 
themselves in transnational arenas as critically engaging with both North-South and South-South 
cooperation (e.g., Southern CSO Alliance 2018). Crucially, rather than solely mimicking existing ‘aid 
accountability’ framings, repertoires and tools, Southern-based CSOs acting transnationally have generated 
their own forms of problematisation of SSC accountability. Their pro-accountability mobilisation ‘from the 
South’ and ‘from below’, created new network dynamics within existing global advocacy networks and new 
forms of global accountability politics. Their critique, ‘from within’ and ‘from below’, evoked a way of being 
in the world differently and doing SSC differently (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Daley 2019; Yeophantong 2020). 






615 The call for ‘democratic ownership’ of aid has been a traditional stance of civil society networks in the context of the 
‘aid reforms’. For an example of this argument in the context of SSC, see CSOs Statement on South-South Cooperation, 
during the 2009 Nairobi conference, available in the 2010 Reality of Aid report (RoA 2010) and the statement by the 
Southern CSO Alliance (2019) in the context of BAPA+40. 
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The challenge to forge spaces of participation  
 
As examined in Chapter 3, since the 1990s social mobilisation in ‘traditional’ donor countries, often in 
partnership with groups in recipient countries, have been part of the development cooperation landscape. 
Social mobilisation challenged the purposes and impacts of ODA, contested projects negatively impacting 
on the lives of local populations and championed greater transparency in the sector through the use of 
information technologies and information politics as a tactic. In most DAC members, spaces for 
participation have been negotiated and built along the intertwined policy realms of foreign policy and 
development assistance, usually gravitating towards the latter. This happened because throughout the 20th 
century, development assistance grew as a policy field in its own right: with specialised ‘aid bureaucracies’ 
(Lancaster 2007; Milani, Lopes, and Suyama 2013; Yanguas and Hulme 2015) and specialised aid-
accountability mechanisms, as the UK ICAI, Japan’s NGO-JICA Desk, the World Bank Inspection Panel 
and beyond.616  
 
Development scholars have examined domestic civil society participation in donor countries through two 
intertwining lenses: ‘aid constituencies’ and ‘aid monitoring movements’. While the former refers to CSOs 
interested in shaping aid policies and practices due to their global development activism (Eyben and 
Ferguson 2004; Lancaster 2007), the latter is characterised by its transparency, and notably budgetary 
transparency activism (McGee 2013; Jensen and Winthereik 2013; Honig and Weaver 2019).617 Moreover, 
pro-accountability social mobilisation in DAC members has often revolved around three major 
understandings of state responsibility: (i) domestic accountability to taxpayers for spending in development 
abroad; (ii) international accountability to global non-binding commitments donors agreed on, notably the 
0.7 % ODA/GNI target; and (iii) legal and para-legal responsibility for ‘doing-no-harm’ and eventually 
redressing socio-environmental damages and misconducts618 incurring from development projects abroad.  
 
Mobilisation and participation dynamics in large SSC providers exhibits, nonetheless, its own set of 
underpinning logics. On the one hand, as illustrated in the cases examined in the previous section, CSOs 
based in rising powers had to develop their own ways to engage Southern providers in the particularities of 
their (re)emerging global developmental roles. On the other hand, Southern-based CSOs had to navigate 
the tensions between rising powers’ differentiation-based global development activism and what many 
considered universal social justice values. When compared to the activism on North-South aid, differences 
can be retrieved in two dimensions.  
 
616 This tendency is reverting since the mid-2010s with some countries merging their foreign relations and development 
cooperation bureaucracies, including Australia (in 2013), Canada (in 2013) and the UK (merger announced in 2020).  
617 The transparency framing mobilised by this second group, however, have also been advanced by other domestic groups 
beyond CSOs, such as journalists and the general public (Yanguas 2018a). 
618 Following the so-called #aidtoo scandals in 2018-2019, prompted by the global #Metoo movement against sexual 
abuse, this has come to include (at least for some bilateral and multilateral donors) safeguarding, reporting and acting on 
issues of sexual exploitation and abuse and other forms of sexual harassment in the sector.  
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First, SSC pro-accountability mobilisation has grew less out of clear expectations of rising powers fulfilling 
‘a duty to reduce global poverty’ or a ‘duty to publicise state use of taxpayers’ money’—although the latter 
was certainly not absent—and more out of a sense of entitlement to engage with foreign policy priorities 
and outcomes. As seen in the case of activism around the NDB, in the anti-ProSavana campaign, and in 
the case of measuring efforts ‘from below’ in Brazil and India (in Chapters 5 and 6), public transparency 
narratives did shape SSC-related mobilisation. Yet the ways transparency was advanced was often 
connected to a broader ‘right-to-know’ and ‘right-to-participate’ in (foreign/SSC) policymaking than to 
purely budgetary concerns.619 This can be understood in light of SSC practices not straightforwardly fitting 
the public imaginaries of ‘grants to beneficiaries abroad’: because of SSC ‘mutual development’ narratives, 
of the non-monetary nature of some SSC exchanges, or because SSC remains devoid of agreed upon 
financial obligations towards meeting global poverty alleviation targets (Clemens and Moss 2005; Bracho 
2017). 
 
Second, mobilisation around SSC remains limited to specific sections of organised civil society, which 
already worked internationally or on international affairs, and to specific issues that fluctuated across the 
years (Waisbich, Pomeroy and Leite forthcoming). While civil society groups in Aidland have a clearer self-
identified identity and resources to work as ‘aid watchdogs’, those mobilising around SSC issues (knowledge 
groups, development and environmental NGOs, rights groups, labour unions, social movements and 
representatives of ‘affected communities’) not necessarily self-identified as ‘SSC monitoring movements’ or 
had the means to institutionalise a work stream around SSC. Whereas the more professionalised national 
groups within rising powers were able to secure funds with existing thematic transnational networks to 
sustain some kind of advocacy work, others only participated in fewer instances, such as in BRICS/NDB-
related activities or in transnational campaigns like the ‘No to ProSavana’, on the basis of international 
solidarity (Berrón and Brant 2015; Poskitt, Shankland and Taela 2016; Mawdsley and Roychoudhury 2016; 
Milhorance and Bursztyn 2017).  
 
Overall, social mobilisation across the three countries combined transparency, accountability and 
participation claims. While demands to participate as implementers of SSC exchanges were present in the 
three countries, claims to participate in policymaking were more visible in Brazil and India, though these 
are similarly growing within China. Participation was also understood and negotiated differently in the 
various mobilisation instances discussed above and throughout this thesis. While, in some instances, 
participation meant having communities being consulted about initiatives immediately affecting their lives 
and livelihoods (as in the case of ProSavana or the Lamu coal-power plant), in others it meant having a seat 
at the SSC policymaking table. Different conceptions of participation impacted on the tactics and 
 
619 Rights-based framings related to transparency and participation have been employed in the context of social 
accountability/non-electoral democratic control dynamics across a range of policy fields in Brazil and India (Prashant 
Sharma 2014; Isunza and Lavalle 2018) and increasingly so in foreign policy (Nel and Van der Westhuizen 2003; Lucia Nader 
and Waisbich 2014). 
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repertoires employed. Brazilian and Indian CSOs adopted what Mdlalose and Thompson (2018) termed 
‘tree shakers and jam makers’ mobilisation strategies and carved, not without tensions, both 
insider/institutionalised and outsider/contestation spaces for dialogue with ‘SSC bureaucracies’. Chinese 
organisations, on the other hand, have mainly adopted a non-confrontational approach, along the lines of 
the ‘embedded activism’, to carefully foster a space for their (critical) participation.  
 
The Indian case is one where organisations have secured the most formalised space for participation, with 
the creation in 2013 of a Forum, the FIDC (see Chapter 6). The Forum came to existence a year after 
India’s development agency, the DPA, was created and worked as an ‘invited space’ hosted by RIS to gather 
both the Indian MEA and a selected group of non-governmental actors. While some of the insiders 
recognised FIDC as a unique ‘socio-state interface’, using Pires and Vaz (2014) terminology, in a context 
where social participation has become more challenging,620 others believe the space remains limited and 
controlled.621 For certain outsiders, FIDC is ‘too civil’622. The word ‘civil’ here alludes to official 
participation processes, like the Civil BRICS,623 perceived as insufficiently radical (Bond and Garcia 2015) 
or, in Chatterjee’s (2004, 33) words, ‘sanitized and palatable’ forms of participation.624 
 
Internal divisions in terms of political views and tactics made negotiating spaces for participation around 
India’s global development footprint even more challenging. Not only was the group of CSOs already 
small625 but also the deep divisions within Indian civil society (mirroring their evolving political views on 
whether and how to formally engage the Indian state under Modi’s BJP rule) hindered the creation of a 
larger ‘SSC constituency’.626 Actors like Oxfam India, the BRICS Feminist Watch and the People’s Forum 
on BRICS became leading voices on BRICS/NDB-related matters between 2015-2017 but also their 
engagement faded away since. Demobilisation is a result of a combination of factors. This includes the 
invisibility of India’s development cooperation among domestic groups already overburden with domestic 
developmental issues; growing domestic social turmoil and pressure over the voluntary sector under Modi’s 
second term; and shrinking international funding to work on ‘Global India’. 
  
In Brazil, the coalition monitoring Brazilian SSC has secured less formalised spaces for participation but 
encompassed a wider range of actors and networks (professionalised NGOs, critical academics, social 
 
620 INT-IN-8; INT-IN-1. 
621 INT-IN-20; INT-IN-2; INT-IN-3; INT-IN-10; INT-IN-14. 
622 INT-IN-10. 
623 The Civil BRICS, proposed and held for the first time by the Russian government in 2015, was set-up mirroring the ‘civil-
society track’ or ‘civil society summit’ increasingly found in other intergovernmental processes like the C20 in the G20.   
624 Some participants also pointed to engrained gender and caste dynamics in FIDC, which, in their view, make this space a 
very elite-dominated one and thus little representative of the broader diversity of Indian society (INT-IN-20; INT-IN-14; INT-
IN-2; INT-IN-3). 
625 One interviewee characterised the initial landscape of Indian CSOs and their relation to the agenda of SSC along the 
following profiles: ‘oblivious’, ‘informed disengagement’, ‘cautious optimism’ and ‘enrichment’ (INT-IN-8). 
626 INT-IN-10; INT-IN-6. 
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movements, labour unions and/or foundations) tracking different dimensions of ‘rising Brazil’ 
(multinationals in the extractive industry, agribusinesses, foreign policy and the internationalisation of state 
social policies and their bureaucracies). For most of the 2010s, these groups, self-identified as a coalition of 
‘progressive social voices’, acted along the dual-line of ‘critical-collaboration’ and ‘contestation’. The former 
includes advocating for certain policy issues and policy instruments to be included in Brazilian SSC 
cooperation and partnering with state institutions (including ABC, BNDES and certain line-ministries) to 
design, implement and evaluate SSC initiatives and improve accountability practices. The latter speaks to 
‘naming and shaming’ and resistance campaigns, like the ‘No to ProSavana’ campaign or the ‘Affected by 
Vale’ campaigns against the Brazilian giant mining company Vale, also in Mozambique (Berrón and Brant 
2015; Milhorance and Bursztyn 2017; Cezne 2019). Activism on international issues decreased considerably 
in the last few years, mirroring the retreat of Brazilian SSC and a growing sense of urgency, among CSOs, 
to look and work domestically (Waisbich 2021).   
 
The breadth and diversity of Brazilian civil society engagement with SSC finds no parallel in the other two 
countries. It also strongly contrasts with the dynamics in China, where a fairly small group of development 
and environmental CSOs, China-based INGOs, think tanks and independent journalists have been carving 
spaces for participation around China’s Going Out and its developmental and environmental initiatives and 
impacts. There is, however, a growing demand by Chinese NGOs, such as China Foundation for Poverty 
Alleviation, to act as implementers of state projects (Hsu, Hildebrandt and Hasmath 2016; Qiang 2019). 
Chinese organisations are also late comers to BRICS/NDB issues and have so far adopted a very low-
profile.627 Nonetheless, organisations in China have shown growing willingness and capacity to craft 
politically safe ways to mobilise around Chinese overseas investments in the last years, including in the 
context of the BRI.628 The new agency, CIDCA, might also facilitate this in the years ahead, creating a single 
focal point for groups to engage with.629 Contrasting with Brazil and India, social mobilisation in China was 
not openly discursively rooted in a ‘right-to-scrutinise’, to demand states officials to explain policy choices, 
to participate in foreign policy-related decisions, or to openly dissent. Rather, and following the ‘embedded 
activism’ paradigm, organisations have took longer to mobilise and are cautiously doing so by acting closer 
to the state as civic partners helping Chinese state institutions and companies to ‘improve’ their international 
development engagements (Yeophantong 2020; Waisbich forthcoming b).  
 
Finally, a reflection on the implications of an increased globally polarised field for the negotiation of spaces 
for participation in large Southern providers. Southern-based CSOs have for decades participated in global 
debates, partnered with Northern donors and INGOs, and navigated the implications of doing so. 
 
627 This is visible inside the Coalition for Human Rights in Development, in the context of the NDB advocacy, but also in the 
fact that groups in China have had a very limited participation in BRICS-related grassroots mobilisation by networks of 
activists under the loose umbrella of the ‘BRICS-from-below’ or the ‘People’s Forum on BRICS’ (Waisbich 2016).  
628 INT-CH-1. 
629 INT-CH-16; INT-CH-5; INT-CH-4. 
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However, entering the ‘SSC monitoring world’ has generated its own set of politics. Brazil, China and India-
based CSOs close connections to, and strong reliance on foreign funding from the ‘traditional’ development 
apparatus created different degrees of governmental resistance and suspicion. Although Southern 
governments themselves received funds from ‘traditional’ donors to enhance the management or the 
‘knowledge component’ of their cooperation systems,630 ‘SSC monitoring movements’ proximity to Aidland 
was often used to de-legitimise or curb social mobilisation, as in the case of ProSavana or in the recently 
updated legal restrictions to operate in India and China.631 Dependence on the development apparatus is 
now a hindrance. As exposed by one interlocutor: ‘Southern funding has to come through (…) How can 
we monitor taking money from Germany?’.632 Building domestic support for this kind of citizen oversight 
role within Brazil, China and India remains a major challenge for the social mobilisation in the years ahead 






This chapter examined SSC accountability politics ‘from below’. It looked at social mobilisation crosscutting 
domestic and global scales and at how civil society groups in Brazil, China and India have claimed, 
problematised and attempted to negotiate transparency, participation and alternative development models 
in SSC.  
 
Building on the cases of the ‘No to ProSavana Campaign’, the cross-regional mobilisation around the 
BRICS bank, the monitoring of China’s global environmental footprint, and on the multiple instances of 
‘measuring from below’ discussed in previous chapters, I discussed how civil society sought to contest 
official development models embedded in South-South initiatives and challenge SSC policymaking 
conceptions. A first contribution made in this chapter was to highlight that SSC accountability politics ‘from 
below’ are indissociable from, on the one hand, mobilisation on foreign policy issues and, on the other, 
from social disputes over development models, policies and instruments and over how rising powers share 
them. 
 
Another contribution of this chapter revolves around the nature of social mobilisation, underscoring that 
it has occurred along a continuum of embedded or institutionalised collaboration and contentious politics, 
 
630 As mentioned, countries like the United Kingdom or Germany have been funding knowledge activities in all three 
countries. In the UK case, this includes funding for China’s Center for International Knowledge on Development, India’s RIS-
based Global Development Centre, and the BRICS Policy Centre-led Dialogues on International Cooperation in Brazil. 
631 INT-BR-47; INT-BR-36; INT-IN-8; INT-IN-20; INT-BR-40. A discussion of that in the context of Brazilian foreign policy can 
be seen in the advocacy tool-kit put together by the NGO Conectas on how to work with foreign policy in rising powers (see 




with Brazil and India landscapes being more internally diverse than the Chinese one in the ways different 
organisations self-identity and engage the state on SSC issues. In all three countries, however, there are 
several groups willing to partner with the state and SSC implementing actors to promote accountability 
reforms, through what scholars have described as ‘internal-external reformist alliances’ (Fox and Brown 
1998; Fox 2007a; Honig and Weaver 2019). This meant, in all three cases, having to navigate the tensions 
of acting both through showing disagreement and dissent and, at the same time, acting as partners in 
‘improving’ SSC institutions to consolidate the field domestically. This was the case, in Brazil, of the Food 
and Nutrition Security Forum working alongside ABC on a cooperation policy for the sector or 
independent think tanks like Articulação SUL and BPC partnering with ‘SSC bureaucracies’ to improve their 
SSC institutional-settings, including their M&E frameworks, as discussed in Chapter 5. This is also the case 
of Indian organisations in FIDC or Chinese NGOs and think tanks working along policy banks and 
companies to improve socio-environmental regulations for overseas operations.   
 
Looking at the issues of contention, I have suggested that some SSC modalities have been more contested 
than others, enabled by the materiality and political visibility of certain SSC exchanges and by transnational 
networks already mobilised around certain themes and issues, such as infrastructure building and 
agricultural development. My analysis also shows variation across the three countries and within countries 
in what issues become problematic and how civil society actors have claimed accountability and negotiated 
with ‘SSC bureaucracies’. Not all groups employed rights-based accountability language or self-identified as 
‘negatively affected’ by projects. Rather some self-identified as watchdogs or (critical) partners. Generally 
speaking, in India the most prevalent mode of engagement was the one of ‘friendly critique’, in Brazil of 
‘critical collaboration’ and in China of ‘constructive engagement’.  
 
Against this backdrop, what can this collection of citizen-led accountability politics inform about the 
unfolding politicisation and consolidation of SSC? First, they illustrate the socially contested nature of 
foreign policy in emerging powers and its intersections with global development, with more or less political 
space for national civil society groups to articulate their expectations and objections, and with particular 
national configurations that allow for certain disputes to be thought and fought and others not. Second, 
accountability claims ‘from below’ reveal a range of unfolding domestic social justice battles and their 
connection to persistent forms of national and global inequalities. Demanding accountability offers a 
possibility for some of the ‘losers’ from development processes at home to articulate claims globally, to  
‘connect struggles’ (Aguiar and Pacheco 2016) and ‘articulate resistance’ (Pomeroy and Silva 2017). Third, 
mobilisation instances illustrate ongoing, open-ended, processes of interaction with and contestation of 
SSC initiatives by domestic publics in rising powers. This means that social mobilisation itself is going 
through its consolidation phase, after having expanded in the early 2010s, based on a favourable set of 
conditions, including the politicisation and problematisation of SSC accountability by external actors, 




This brings a new set of challenges for SSC accountability mobilisation ‘from below’ in the years ahead. 
First, to sustain and expand mobilisation in times of change and uncertainty going beyond the 
professionalised development and rights-oriented NGOs and increasing the popular basis of domestic SSC-
related debates. Second, to connect with groups beyond borders ‘affected’ by Brazil, China and India’s 
expanded developmental roles. This is important considering that CSOs within rising powers do not 
necessarily self-identify as ‘SSC constituencies’. Rather they seem to advance identities and modus operandi 
of highly transnationalised social justice groups, which have encountered global Brazil, India and/or China 
as part of their work and will keep acting on and reimagining domestic and global justice simultaneously.  
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8. Revisiting (in)visible South-South cooperation accountability 
politics and reimagining global development responsibilities 
 
 
What can the kaleidoscopic landscape of problematisations of and negotiations over accountability reveal 
about contemporary South-South cooperation and broader global development politics? After an extensive 
survey of different ways SSC accountability is being understood and disputed in Brazil, China and India, in 
this concluding chapter I revisit and expand the main contributions of this study. 
 
I open the chapter by re-examining the ‘accountability turn’ in SSC and its significance to understanding, 
first, unfolding disputes around power, status and recognition in development cooperation, and, second, 
how foreign policy and development cooperation are conceived and disputed domestically within rising 
powers. Next, I provide a crosscutting analysis of the main drivers for Brazil, China and India to start acting 
upon the ‘accountability problem’ and craft ways to practice accountability in their SSC engagements. While 
doing so, I reflect on the differences in political salience and visibility of existing SSC accountability politics 
across these various geographies. I close this chapter with a reflection on ongoing intractable negotiations 
over a new agreement on ‘shared but differentiated’ global development responsibilities for the years ahead.  
 
 
The ‘accountability turn’ in South-South cooperation 
 
 
This thesis is the first full academic inquiry on accountability in/of SSC. Following a critical empirically-
grounded research approach, this investigation contributes to debunking some of the myths around 
accountability and what it means to Southern partners. The findings I articulate here critically engage with 
the widespread idea that SSC is either opaque or unaccountable and that ‘Non-DAC’ Southern providers, 
like Brazil, China or India, do not care about or act on accountability issues. Neither does my investigation 
reify or romanticise SSC. Instead, it complexifies our understanding of how accountability is being 
conceived and disputed in global and domestic arenas in the context of SSC.  
 
Thinking with and beyond accountability deficits  
 
The comparative inquiry offered here challenges simplistic—and often Orientalist—narratives about 
Southern providers’ accountability ‘deficiencies and absences’ and, at the same time, acritical narratives 
about an ‘exceptionally benign, horizontal and mutually-beneficial’ SSC. Navigating political and epistemic 
claims about North/South and ODA/SSC differential identities, the thesis offers a contribution to 
understanding SSC accountability politics along their own grain. My research endeavour, recognises, on the 
one hand, the conceptual-analytical limits of simply assimilating SSC into existing ODA accountability 
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standards and tools, and into the already documented bargains over ‘aid accountability’. On the other hand, 
it also acknowledges the mutually constitutive dynamics between the two ‘sub-fields’, ODA and SSC, and 
evolving understandings and expectations on what accountable development cooperation means in the 21st 
century.    
 
Through an empirically-driven mapping, tracing and analysis of disputes over accountability in/of SSC 
across different geographies and scales, the study offers a nuanced, multidimensional, multi-casual depiction 
of the tensions and conflicts over how, whether and to whom powerholders and ‘SSC bureaucracies’ explain 
and justify their development cooperation-related engagements. It draws a complex picture of how 
accountability is currently being conceptualised and negotiated in global development-related arenas (at the 
OECD, at the UN and in other diplomatic and para-diplomatic fora) as well as in domestic policy and political 
arenas in Brazil, China and India (in public debates, expert debates, intra and inter-bureaucratic bargains and 
in state-society interfaces).  
 
Attentive to relationality, power and scale in international development and foreign policy dynamics, this 
thesis locates current SSC accountability politics into unfolding negotiations of rising powers’ roles and 
identities in the field of global development. At the same time, it situates disputes over accountability as 
part of ongoing domestic negotiations, inside rising powers, over public behaviour and policy choices in 
matters of foreign policy and development cooperation. As such, the plurality of accountability dynamics 
unfolding in and across SSC partners identified and analysed here have to be taken not as accomplished 
‘solutions’ to the ‘accountability problem’ but rather as ongoing disputes over global and domestic 
development responsibilities and over how to justify those to a range of publics.  
 
Dilemmas of difference  
 
This thesis contributes to filling some of the gaps left by existing scholarship on rising powers in 
international development. I show how state and non-state actors in rising powers navigate ways to 
conceive and practice accountability in development cooperation differently, based on a will to do and show 
doing accountability ‘in a Southern way’. This finding converges with previous work (both within IR and 
in other disciplines) on rising powers’ resistance-and-innovation stances towards global norms, resulting 
from their moderate global reformism and their authority and capacity to create new competing global 
norms and policy ideas (Narlikar 2013; Esteves and Assunção 2014; Milhorance and Soule-Kohndou 2017; 
Kenkel and Destradi 2019).  
 
My analysis also shows that categories like Northern/Southern, Asian/Latin American, liberal 
democracy/non-liberal democracy help to illuminate durable sociopolitical and symbolic disputes around 
rising powers’ role in global development and thus to understand the emergence of certain geopolitical and 
epistemic disputes over accountability in/of SSC. These categories matter politically and situate Aidland’s 
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disciplining attempts to make Southern providers to align with an (often imagined) idea of ‘proper’ donor 
behaviour, which includes ideas and practices of accountability. Yet alone these categories do not fully 
explain variation in diplomatic behaviour. They do not account, for instance, for how and why India 
remains more vocally resistant to negotiating and experimenting with SSC accountability than China. 
Likewise, these categories are important but insufficient to make sense of the translation and localisation 
strategies and of the presence, or absence, of domestic disputes around SSC accountability in each of the 
three countries. Using India once again, SSC domestic accountability politics can only be understood at the 
crossroads of multiple factors, such as: the assertive and defensive foreign policy on development issues; 
little appetite to collaborate with DAC donors; relatively small materiality and little (perceived) distributive 
effects of SSC to domestic audiences; and the role played by internal ‘SSC champions’ as both global norm 
entrepreneurs and gatekeepers at home.  
 
The combined use, therefore, of macro-level conceptual tools that locate Southern providers in global 
hierarchies of power, status and development and meso-level ones that pay attention to actors and institutions 
proved to be an appropriate approach to start unpacking a kaleidoscopic landscape on the move. It allowed 
for capturing the kinds of accountability debates taking place, at this particular point in time, and the kinds 
of instruments being negotiated and adopted in both postcolonial democracies like Brazil and India as well 
as in single-party regimes like China. It also allowed for assessing country variation and their context-
specific forms of friction and hybridity between local and global norms.  
 
 
Politicised consolidation: problematisations, negotiations and reforms   
 
 
This thesis illuminates different dimensions of contemporary SSC consolidation dynamics, through the lens 
of its disputed nature and growing politicisation. In my inquire, politicisation and disputes over 
accountability are indissociable phenomena. Politicisation generates a set of socio, technical and 
(geo)political disputes over whether and how SSC providers can or should justify their development 
cooperation policies and practices to domestic and external stakeholders. Concurrently, disputes over SSC 
accountability—narrow or broad; procedural or substantial—contribute to the politicisation of the field 
both domestically and at the global level. 
   
Following this first assertion, through my empirical, bottom-up, inquiry I found that that emerging ‘arenas 
of conflict’ over SSC accountability (Fox 2007a) represent disputes unfolding at different scales of state 
responsibility (national and global), based on different logics of political control (managerial, intra-
governmental, intergovernmental and state-society relations), and responding to competing views of how 
governments are expected to explain, justify and be sanctioned for their SSC-related actions. Looking at 
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this landscape through its disputed nature is important because it allows to recast often flat accounts of 
accountability in development cooperation—and its presence or absence—into broader epistemic and 
geopolitical negotiations between Northern and Southern providers over power, status and responsibilities 
to manage global challenges, amid changing geographies of global governance and development in the 21st 
century. My findings are also important in what they reveal of development cooperation as a policy field in 
rising powers, and of particular materialisations of intermestic sociopolitical bargains over certain 
developmental sectors and over foreign policy engagements taking place within ‘Southern protagonists’, 
like Brazil, China and India, at this particular juncture.  
 
Global and domestic politicisation   
 
A first feature of this kaleidoscopic landscape relates to what I termed global disputes over accountability 
in/of SSC. Global disputes are shaping and being shaped by the contemporary politico-normative 
pluralisation and fragmentation in world politics, in general, and in global development, in particular. As 
such, and in order to understand how SSC accountability is rendered a public or policy problem at the 
global level one has to first recognise the situatedness of existing OECD-DAC norms and practices and of 
the unfinished negotiations that constitute them.  
 
The story of global accountability norms entering the field, I argued, is the tale of a soft, non-binding, 
normative regime crafted in a particular resilient institutional locus: the OECD-DAC ‘donors’ club’. Actors 
in this ‘closed space’ (Eyben 2013) managed to secure the DAC’s normative role by renegotiating an always 
internally contested consensus among its members and constantly updating its technical-political 
understandings of what accountability was and how it should be practiced. The numerous changes in the 
concept and metrics of ODA over the years illustrate this point. Despite the internal divergences, DAC 
members converged towards a set of shared understandings of ‘aid accountability’ as an instrument to, first, 
regulate competition among donors and regulate aid relations between ‘rich donors’ and ‘poor recipients’. 
Second, to showcase donors’ generosity and respect for taxpayers’ money. Not only have concepts like 
ODA (defined ‘concessional flows’) and its components (such as ‘aid modalities’ and ‘discount rates’) 
became categories of aid governmentality, but also abiding by OECD-DAC rules on quantifying, evaluating 
and reporting has shaped donorship politics. Together they have produced boundary-making and 
disciplining dynamics among donor countries and between them and countries in the South. 
 
This is equally a tale of pro-accountability reforms and tools being agreed and put in place globally and 
nationally in donor and recipient countries alike. These have been negotiated among a range of stakeholders 
(donors, recipients, domestic constituencies, ‘aid monitoring movements’ and development experts). 
Importantly, the very act of establishing mechanisms to ‘fix’ aid accountability deficits (oversight forums, 
transparency infrastructures or M&E artefacts) has generated its own discontents and debates on how to 
improve accountability tools, according to diverse expectations of what kind of control, justification and/or 
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information they should provide. The successive reforms of World Bank’s Inspection Panel illustrate this 
point. 
   
Acknowledging the situatedness of accountability, auditing and measuring regimes in Aidland is important 
not only as a sociohistorical background to the emergence of SSC accountability as ‘problematic’ in the 
field, but also as a set of geopolitical and epistemic drivers for the disputes between ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
development cooperation communities over what constitute appropriate behaviour and responsibilities in 
the field. These ‘doxic battles’ (Esteves and Assunção 2014) illuminate why the transparency of SSC flows, 
the so-called ‘heterodox practices’ of SSC providers, and issues around measurement of SSC became 
politically salient in global development debates in the last decade. Ongoing political-normative 
fragmentation in the field also help explaining why ‘SSC champions’ have responded to the different 
external pressures and accountability calls (from traditional development donors, transnational networks of 
activists, and from their own Southern peers) first through differentiation-based resistance stances, trying to 
circumvent the need to justify development cooperation to global audiences, and then through differentiated 
integration in global development accountability debates. Joining the club of ‘providers’ in a ‘Southern way’ 
meant trying out their own concepts and tools to justify SSC flows and their impact, and gave rise to a 
series of global and domestic forms of negotiations over how to practice accountability in/of SSC. 
  
A second feature of the contemporary landscape are the domestic disputes over SSC accountability within 
Southern providers. Looking at three ‘rising powers in international development’, I argued that the current 
SSC consolidation moment is marked by a range of sociopolitical dynamics and bargains that illustrate the 
increasingly contested nature of this policy field within Brazil, China and India. The consolidation moment 
is characterised by greater internal pressure on the three governments (and on numerous ‘SSC 
bureaucracies’ and implementing actors) and multiple negotiations over how this greater global 
development role interacts with, contributes to or undermines these countries’ domestic development 
imperatives, international identities and foreign policy priorities. Throughout this thesis I employed the 
correlated notions of ‘dilemmas’, ‘tensions’, ‘traps’ and ‘anxieties’ to characterise the foreign policy and 
domestic policymaking trade-offs rising powers face when balancing different policy goals, including 
promoting development at home and abroad. The nascent policy field in Southern providers is one that 
cannot fully dissociate, discursively or in practice, between development ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’ and between 
solidarity and interests (Milani 2018). It fits very uncomfortably the mythic rationale that historically framed 
‘traditional’ development aid as state action to ‘help developing others’ and ‘fight poverty elsewhere’.  
 
The ways these tensions play out domestically varied not only across countries, but also with time. Brazil is 
a case where economic growth in the early 2000s was followed by a political-economic crisis that strongly 
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affected the pace and sustainability of SSC institutionalisation.633 This scenario accentuated the trade-offs 
and generated new pressures for explaining the purposes of ‘cooperating with other developing countries’ 
and showing the results of these initiatives thus making domestic politics an important piece in the overall 
puzzle. Though less dramatic, economic slowdown in China has also accelerated institutional reforms in its 
‘aid/SSC system’. China’s own domestic development anxieties and its interactions with a profound re-
shifting of China’s place in the world contributed, often through the lenses of performance and reputation, 
to insert issues of state and corporate accountability in/of SSC into the domestic agenda. 
 
While recognising the growing but still bounded nature of politicisation of foreign policy and SSC matters 
within the three countries this study revealed politically salient themes, issues and sectors around which 
SSC accountability issues have already emerged. It also revealed the coexistence of public and expert policy 
debates around SSC accountability in domestic arenas on both specific SSC initiatives and to the broader 
role Brazil, China and India play as ‘development actors’. These debates reveal four types of domestic 
sociopolitical disputes around SSC unfolding within Southern providers: i) SSC-specific management and 
bureaucratic disputes over development cooperation policies, budgets, delivery and measurement; ii) meta-
foreign policy disputes over rising powers’ identity, global role and partnerships; iii) meta-developmental 
state disputes over the role of the state promoting economic growth and fighting poverty at home and 
abroad; and iv) meta-citizenship disputes over citizen participation in SSC/foreign policymaking. 
 
The will to reform and to practice accountability differently  
 
Besides the disputes, this thesis has shown a growing will by different stakeholders within Brazil, China and 
India to act upon, reform and/or experiment practicing accountability in SSC. How to make sense of the 
set of factors driving ‘pro-accountability reforms’ in large Southern providers? Here I discuss three 
crosscutting findings.  
 
A first driver relates to SSC policy reform and institutionalisation dynamics. For different reasons, and as a 
direct consequence of the expansionary phase in the early 2000s, in the 2010s, Brazil, China and India 
initiated a range of SSC institutionalisation reforms. In all three countries, accountability-specific reforms 
(related to transparency, measurement, audit and/or citizen participation) constituted part of a broader SSC 
policy management and governance reformist wave. Reforms were geared either towards specific sectors 
or institutions (e.g., India’s LOCs/IDEAS) or to the national SSC institutional frameworks (e.g., China’s 
strengthening CIDCA’s planning role and Brazil developing evaluation guidelines for its South-South and 
trilateral cooperation). The contested nature of this institutionalisation domestically, I suggested, made 
 
633 A similar pattern can be found elsewhere. See, for instance, Medina and Muñoz (2019) for a detailed account of 




reforms not only a management matter but also an object of disputes and bargains within state institutions 
and between those responsible for SSC and other stakeholders within and outside the state, under 
progressively more pluralistic or distributive policy configurations around SSC in each country. The story 
of Brazilian SSC quantification tool, the Cobradi report, and its many internal and external discontents 
powerfully illustrate this point.    
 
A second driver is the pro-accountability social mobilisation (both domestic and transnational) by emerging 
‘SSC monitoring movements’: networks of civil society actors (i.e., knowledge actors, CSOs, social 
movements, journalists) concerned with SSC policymaking and its results. These ‘SSC monitoring 
movements’, as I labelled them, worked both as sources of social pressure on powerholders but also as 
partners in reforming ‘SSC bureaucracies’. Monitoring movements also represent emerging ‘constituencies’ 
or ‘publics’ around SSC in Brazil, China and India and illustrate emerging inter-subjective perceptions of 
the growing sociopolitical and material effects of SSC initiatives to different domestic actors.  
 
A third driver has been the existence of what development accountability scholars characterise as internal 
and external ‘reformers’ and ‘alliances’ for pro-accountability policy and social change (Fox and Brown 
1998; Bebbington 2006). In each country, reformers and alliances shaped how SSC accountability-related 
policy and institutional changes were designed, moved forward and/or stalled. Particularly in the case of 
transparency and measurement tools, the will to reform joined the will certain public institutions and 
development practitioners had to communicate and showcase SSC. Their progressive engagement with 
issues of accountability is thus indissociable from a growing diplomatic will to showcase solidarity (and 
generosity) towards other developing countries and to showcase their developmental successes for both 
domestic legitimacy and political authority and for international projection purposes. The more SSC was 
linked to a status and legitimacy-seeking strategy of political leaders and of particular ‘SSC bureaucracies’ 
or individuals within them, as in the case of Brazil during the PT era and in the case of China in the more 
recent years, the greater institutional-bureaucratic incentives to experiment with counting and other 
accountability tools.    
 
While examining alliances, I have also highlighted the importance of ‘traditional’ development actors 
(bilateral donors, UN agencies, foundations and INGOs) in partnering with governments, ‘SSC 
bureaucracies’ and knowledge actors and CSOs in rising powers to socialise them into expected 
‘good/appropriate’ accountability practices. ‘Traditional’ development actors were key in fostering this first 
wave of SSC accountability policy debates and reforms. They have provided political, financial, and 
technical support to SSC policy communities inside rising powers to experiment with publicising 
quantifying and evaluating SSC flows and to progressively insert ‘development effectiveness’ into the 
agenda. Yet rather than a unidirectional socialisation, or even co-optation, I have shown that the ways to 
conceive, assess and show SSC developmental impacts are under negotiation between rising powers and 
209 
 
the development apparatus. The example of emerging evaluations of South-South and triangular 
cooperation in Brazil and in China, and the negotiations over methodologies and over what ‘success’ or 
‘impact’ means in SSC, illustrate this point.   
 
Visible and invisible accountability politics: prevalent ‘measurementalities’ and the materiality-political salience nexus 
 
The multi-sited nature of this research further allows for a critical a crosscutting examination of what I call 
here ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ disputes over SSC accountability. In this section, I revisit the ensemble of SSC 
accountability politics mapped in this thesis and reflect on what appears to be the more prevalent issues, 
themes and logics. While doing so, I also turn to longstanding debates about de-/re-politicisation of 
development cooperation.  
 
From the multiple globally circulating understandings of accountability and how to practice it, the issue of 
measurement (quantifying SSC flows and assessing SSC performance and impact) arose as politically salient 
in both global and domestic SSC accountability debates. Measuring SSC was also the object of multiple 
sociotechnical, scientific and (geo)political controversies. How to make sense of this salience? The growing 
importance given to measurement by actors in Aidland and SSC-land alike reveals the prevalence and 
stickiness of audit cultures and ‘measurementalities’ in the field. In particular, it speaks to an ongoing 
disciplining intent by the development apparatus for legitimacy purposes, whereby to make rising powers 
conform with existing development cooperation norms—including quantifying, assessing and reporting 
development cooperation flows—is to secure the boundaries of what it means to be a development 
cooperation provider. Disciplining also responds to a practical need to bring Brazil, China and India to the 
‘donor table’ and making them co-responsible for funding development abroad (Esteves 2017) and for 
securing the resources needed to achieve the 2030 Agenda (and now the post-Covid 19 green and equitable 
recovery challenges). 
 
SSC measurement battles, analysed throughout this thesis unfolded from the confluence of, on the one hand, 
the willingness and desire—but not always the capacity—of DAC donors and ‘aid monitoring movements’ 
to make Southern providers to comply with reporting and evaluation norms and practices. And, on the 
other hand, of rising powers—among other SSC champions—starting, in the mid-2010s, to invest in 
measuring and showcasing what they saw as their ‘solidarity-based’, ‘mutually-beneficial’ and ‘successful’ 
cooperation initiatives. Considering that solidarity or generosity are far from the only drivers behind SSC—
which is knowingly permeated by geopolitical and geoeconomics ambitions—measurement battles also 
aided rising powers’ governments to circumvent stricter development cooperation financial and normative 
commitments and avoid having to justify fulfilling them to global audiences.  
 
Whilst expressing their will to conceptualise and practice SSC accountability (or at least the counting and 
reporting dimensions of it) in a ‘Southern way’, rising powers have exhibited different diplomatic and para-
210 
 
diplomatic stances. Brazil adopted a more critical-compromising diplomatic posture in global arenas, 
echoing a long foreign policy tradition to act as a bridge between the North and South. Brazilian state and 
non-state actors have devised tools and methodologies to measure SSC and have sought to build common 
understandings among Southern providers. India, alternatively, adopted a critical-blocking diplomatic 
stance based on strong differentiation claims as a ‘non-Western’, ‘Southern’ and/or ‘Asian emerging power’. 
Indian quasi-official actors—such as the MEA-affiliated think-thank RIS—adopted active knowledge and 
policy entrepreneur roles to foster ‘Southern-grown’ ideas around measuring SSC aiming less at creating a 
consensus than securing a regime based on the plurality of national-led solutions. As for China, it showed 
no willingness to proactively lead on the diplomatic or para-diplomatic discussions or to engage in 
diplomatic and epistemic battles over measuring SSC. While upholding its right to develop a solution ‘with 
Chinese characteristics’ to the accountability problem, China adopted a less active and less confrontational 
role (out of a mix of pragmatism and disinterest) both at the UN and in other para-diplomatic spaces, like 
the RIS-led Delhi Process or in the NeST.  
 
However sticky development ‘measurementalities’ might be, the political salience of measurement in 
contemporary SSC is also embedded in its own politics and generates its own measurement paradoxes, as I 
labelled them, whereby Southern providers embark on counting and showcasing exercises while having to 
deal with two sets of political costs. First, the costs of proving, or performing, ‘effectiveness of SSC’ to the 
international community based on tools and knowledges that might not fit their own development 
cooperation purposes and practices. Second, the costs of enhanced visibility of SSC among domestic 
constituencies fuelling domestic disputes over rising powers’ international identities as 
‘developing/Southern’ countries and the real and imagined trade-offs between promoting development at 
home and abroad.  
 
Tracing the particular materialisations of measurement paradoxes in Brazil, China and India allowed for 
drawing empirical and conceptual interconnections between global and domestic accountability politics. 
Echoing James Scott’s (1999, 27) proposition that ‘measurements are decidedly local, interested, contextual, and 
historically specific’, in each country I have located the domestic-specific manifestations of the measurement 
paradox within broader dynamics of shifting foreign policy and development provider identities and 
context-specific public management and public policies cultures. In the case of Brazil, for instance, the will 
to measure responded to a survival strategy by the ‘SSC policy community’ to show results and keep 
resources to SSC flowing amidst a deteriorating political-economic scenario. It was also about fighting 
political legitimacy and policy battles not only along the North-South divide but also in domestic and global 
competitive markets for developmental policy solutions.  
 
Alongside measurement, the workings of Southern national or Southern-led multilateral development 
banks constituted another recurrent theme around which SSC accountability has been problematised and 
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negotiated, within Brazil, China and India, and in transnational arenas. Growing disputes around South-
South development finance, particularly for infrastructure building, points to a direct link between the 
materiality of this form of South-South exchange and its political salience (and significance) to a range of 
domestic and international stakeholders.  
 
This study found across all research sites the simultaneity of different accountability logics (i.e., financial, 
managerial, legal, social) underpinning disputes and negotiations over the purposes, workings and impact 
of Southern development banks. Coexisting logics indicate the role different domestic constituencies played 
in problematising certain types of ‘SSC accountability deficits’ (i.e., transparency, socio-environmental 
safeguards, audit and compliance) as much as their continuous pressure on powerholders and oversight 
bodies to move forward with their preferred set of reforms. Common to the three countries, pro-
accountability reforms were pursued mainly to respond to concerns over project performance, diplomatic 
reputation and domestic support for infrastructure building abroad. In doing so, reforms tried to safeguard 
or sustain South-South development finance schemes as a soft power and economic diplomacy tool rather 
than to improve ‘development effectiveness’ of funded projects on the ground.  
 
Lastly, disputes related South-South infrastructure building abroad were not treated by domestic publics as 
stand-alone issues. Rather they fed into broader internal policy and public debates on the developmental 
state, private-public collusion and corruption, or on sustainable/green development models. This 
interconnectedness clearly appeared in the different social mobilisation instances, examined throughout this 
thesis. Through different strategies, civil society groups within Brazil, China and India have challenged 
Southern development banks’ promises to deliver ‘much needed infrastructure’ to several parts of the 
Global South while pleasing different economic actors inside rising powers. Instead, social mobilisation 
sought to make visible that there are always losers to these processes.634 While modest in size and impact  
and not always capable to penetrate mainstream political and policy debates, these subnational SSC 
accountability politics, ‘from within’ and ‘from below’, are already present in many initiatives and tend to 
grow in tandem with SSC own expansion.  
 
Less visible accountability politics  
 
Contrasting with the explicit acknowledgement of the need to act on and ‘fix’ measurement or development 
finance accountability issues, problematisations of SSC accountability ‘from below’ in large SSC providers, 
subnational politics in partner countries and transnational activist campaigns remain less politically salient 
forms of SSC accountability politics. Equally absent have been voices from other Southern partners, with 
certain exceptions, notably in the Chinese case.  
 
634 For a discussion of social contestation and uneven development in the context of infrastructure, notably dam-building, 
in Brazil and India, see Huber and Joshi (2015); Hochstetler (2016); Atkins (2019). 
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The relative invisibility of ‘subnational politics’ and ‘mutual accountability’ in South-South relations is worth 
unpacking. As argued extensively throughout this thesis, accountability dynamics in SSC do not necessarily 
reproduce the exact same ‘trust dilemmas’ between ‘Northern/rich’ donors and ‘Southern/poor’ recipients 
or the ‘taxpayers’ money’ accounting imperatives found in Aidland. Rather SSC introduces its own mix of 
tensions to this issue. Framing the relationship as ‘demand-driven’, ‘government-to-government’, ‘win-win’ 
partnerships has, in many ways, allowed rising powers to overlook the social impacts of their actions and 
dismiss initial criticism and calls for political accountability or redress—regardless from who was raising 
it—under the banner of non-interference. Official SSC framings of mutual gains combined with durable 
resentments towards colonial and contemporary international hierarchies have also removed the political 
incentives for other Southern governments to speak out in global forums as they did when denouncing ‘aid 
asymmetries’ in the past. 
 
Nonetheless, as SSC continued to expanded, it became clear that SSC practices are infused with power 
asymmetries and that being officially ‘solidarity-based’ or ‘demand-driven’ does not make SSC free from 
‘partnership issues’ to be negotiated. Discomfort from domestic stakeholders and Southern experts with 
procurement conditionalities or socio-environmental impacts on the ground in the case of Indian LOCs or 
with levels of public indebtment towards China, are examples of areas where South-South relations have 
been already discussed and negotiated beyond the simplistic assumptions that SSC is necessarily mutually 
beneficial.  
 
So far critical voices in government, academia and/or civil society challenging the official consensus from 
within, especially in India and China, have remained limited. Moreover, while having manged to flag 
tensions and contradictions in certain SSC initiatives, critics have been less successful in bringing about 
sustained changes. In certain cases, like the Chinese dam-building in the Mekong region or the coal-power 
plant in Kenya, civil society actors have successfully mobilised, legally and transnationally, and explored 
fractures along subnational lines and growing global concerns with the environment and climate-neutral 
futures. In other cases, however, including the mobilisation on Indian agricultural investments in Ethiopia 
or on coal-plant building in Bangladesh, social actors did not succeed in discursively convincing others of 
the ‘problematic nature’ of certain projects or generating any ‘accountability crisis’ capable of shifting power 
dynamics to revert projects or address their negative outcomes on certain marginalised groups. Yet one 
could assume that the more SSC expands and becomes entangled with pre-existing streams of unequal local 
development, the more it will generate resistance and contestation ‘from within’ and ‘from below’, as the 







Accountability calls and their de-/re-politicisation effects 
 
A last crosscutting reflection refers to the effects of the ‘accountability turn’ on contemporary SSC politics. 
Problematisations of accountability in the field of development have historically contributed to both de- 
and re-politicise development cooperation. In the case of SSC, as I show in this thesis, ‘traditional’ donors 
have discursively used accountability issues to question and discipline rising powers. While often embedded 
in Aidland’s own  technical or sanitised conceptions of ‘development/aid accountability’, calls coming from 
the development apparatus are politicising as they generate agonism—in Mouffe’s (1993) 
conceptualisation—and unveil material and symbolic disputes unfolding in a ‘post Western’, ‘beyond aid’, 
world in-the-making. Accountability demands ‘from below’, from civil society groups, have also worked to 
re-politicise SSC: requesting SSC providers to justify policy options and results as means to question SSC 
principles and their application, and to contest outcomes on the ground. Similarly, growing subnational 
politics within rising powers or in the other Southern partner have also generated disputes around SSC 
accountability and thus contributed to bring politics back to South-South government-to-government, ‘elite 
brokerage’, developmental deals, showing that the state and elite are no monolithic entities.  
 
Concurrently, accountability calls by ‘traditional donors’, Aidland practitioners or global ‘aid monitoring 
movements’ are equally de-politicising when embedded in technical, technological, and exclusively 
quantification conceptions of what accountability is and how it should be practiced. These calls can and do  
lead SSC providers into the same ‘rendered technical’ (T. M. Li 2007) managerial conceptions of 
accountability as financial or number-based accounts on development cooperation flows, performance and 
impact, or into data-driven technical/technological ‘fixes’ for different constituencies to monitor flows.  
 
Rising powers’ responses to these multiple accountability calls can be seen as both de-/re-politicising. While 
reducing growing accountability (or responsibility) calls to finding new ways to measure SSC monetary 
flows and contributions to the Agenda 2030, governments and experts have de-politicised the debate. 
Concurrently, by disputing the counting of flows and seeking alternative ways to account for development 
cooperation, and generating measurement battles and controversies, Southern practitioners also rendered 
some development cooperation sociotechnical politics visible. By exposing Aidland’s obsession with 
monetary quantification and quasi-experimental evaluations and de-naturalising ‘generosity rankings’, they 
contributed to render visible the connection between knowledge and power, thus (re)politicised 
development cooperation. 
 
However, while SSC champions’ quest to innovate (conceptually, methodologically, technically) in 
practicing measurement, simultaneously mimicking and subverting DAC/ODA standards, is undoubtedly 
political it is not necessarily transformative. Rising powers’ reformist stances certainly contest power 
asymmetries in inter-state relations (and contribute to pluralism in international affairs) but they neither 
214 
 
necessarily question underpinning international hierarchies nor alter intra-states dynamics that create and 
perpetuate marginalisation and inequality across geographies.   
 
 
Reimagining development cooperation responsibilities in the 21st century  
 
 
I end this chapter with a reflection on the years ahead. A recurrent theme in this thesis has been the disputed 
nature of Brazil, China and India’s public responsibilities towards promoting development at home and 
abroad and the tensions between these two. As the 21st century unfolds, the divide ‘at home/abroad’ 
becomes even blurrier, as poverty and inequality mount in Northern donors, new geographies of inequality 
emerge in the South, and ‘universal’ development agendas, including the climate emergency, gain salience 
(ECLAC 2014; Horner and Hulme 2017). 
 
In this context, many have called for a new agreement on ‘global development responsibilities’. Calls were 
quickly channelled into debates on financial (or monetary) contributions and metrics to count it, with some 
suggesting the adoption of a ‘universal financial scaled contribution’ for SDGs (Sumner et al. 2020). 
Agreeing on new targets is, hence, at the core of present and future bargains between traditional 
development actors and middle-income countries (MICs), including Brazil, China and India. There are 
major challenges to a future agreement on a new target including the lack of consensus within an 
‘heterogenous South’ (Lauria and Fumagalli 2019) on the need for large(r) developing economies to commit 
to financial targets and the implications of this commitment to both their status of emerging-while-still-
developing countries and the historical debt Northern countries have towards the developing world.   
 
Understanding the current impasse requires taking seriously the genesis of existing responsibilities in the 
field and how Southern countries perceived them. As exposed in this thesis, in the process of forging a 
‘community of donors’ and, for a set of sociohistorical reasons, including colonialism, Northern donors 
have agreed on ‘special responsibilities’ (Bukovansky et al. 2012). In particular, donors agreed on a financial 
commitment for ODA poverty alleviation efforts (the 0.7% GNI ODA target). As for most of norms in 
the field, this is a non-binding commitment, which explains why the majority of DAC members keep failing 
to meet it.635 
 
 
635  The target is, nonetheless, hard-law in some countries, like the UK. In the most recent years, the target was only met by 
the UK, Germany, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, and Sweden, as well as by three non-OECD countries, namely Qatar, 
Turkey, and Saudi Arabia (Sumner et al. 2020). Gulrajani and Calleja (2019) have also shown, through the Principled Aid 
Index, that poverty alleviation or priority to assisting the so-called Least Developed Countries is not the main driver for aid 
allocation in all DAC donors.   
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So far there is no commonly agreed-upon conception of ‘responsibilities’ or ‘financial commitments’ in the 
context of development exchanges between developing/Southern countries. Absence of agreement is 
above all a politically principled position. SSC providers’ differentiated integration as ‘development partners’ 
assumes that ODA financial targets emerged from an historical debt turned into a financial compromise 
while SSC comes from a different rationale, reiterated since the 1978 BAPA, of solidarity and collective 
self-reliance.636  
 
This principled position became, nonetheless, harder to sustain in the last decades as the global geographies 
of development kept changing, including due to austerity and political retreat in the West. Tensions only 
increased from 2015 onwards with the successive calls for the ‘rising South’ to be included as an ‘additional 
source of financing for development’, illustrated by the initial (and frustrated) hopes that BAPA+40 would 
unequivocally insert SSC into the SDGs paradigm with clear financial responsibilities. These calls were met 
with discomfort by several in SSC-land, fearing the new debates on ‘financing for development’ (‘from 
billions to trillions’ under a so-called ‘universal development’ paradigm) could dilute the hardly fought 
‘Northern duty’ to uplift the South based on ideas of global equity and of reparation for centuries of colonial 
exploitation (Besharati 2017; Esteves 2017). 
 
There is currently a clear intellectual, political and normative divide within major Southern providers. On 
the one hand, there are voices who reject the idea of ‘global responsibilities’ for SSC, based on hard(er) 
interpretations of the CBDR principle. This is for instance the line adopted by the G77+China in its official 
statements that clearly emphasise the complementary nature of SSC vis-à-vis North-South cooperation in 
issues of financing for development.637 Scholars like Zhang (2020, 244) believe China’s current position 
reflect this hard(er) stance and that ‘China will never commit to DAC’s 0.7% GNI target, as there is still a 
big poor population at home’.  Similarly, Indian experts used the CBDR principle to contest the need for 
SSC providers to agree on responsibilities, arguing instead that responsibility in SSC is chiefly towards 
meeting partners’ demands in a horizontal way (M. Chakrabarti 2019). According to this script, bilateral 
South-South exchanges would be inherently ‘responsible’ and ‘responsive’ and would not require additional 
global responsibility regimes, and even less so regimes based on financial commitments.  
 
Other Southern voices argued, alternatively, in favour of Southern providers accepting an indirect set of 
financial responsibilities towards the global community, albeit in more flexible formats than the 0.7% ODA 
 
636 As discussed in Chapter 4, in the 2009 Nairobi outcome document, UN members once again defined SSC as based on 
solidarity from MICs to other developing countries and thus a financial complement to North-South cooperation not a 
substitute. The idea of complementarity, a constant in G77+China statements, was once more emphasised in the context 
of BAPA+40, in 2019. 
637 This stance is visible in G77+China Ministerial Declaration of September 2019 that states: ‘As North-South cooperation 
is the main channel of development financing, the international community must uphold the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” (CBDR) and push North-South cooperation to continue to play its key role. Developed 
countries should bear the primary responsibility in financing for development’ (G77 2019b, para. 28). 
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target. There have been proposals for the use of ‘self-differentiation’, alike in the ‘nationally-determined 
contributions’ in the climate change regime, where each country could set its own parameters (Bracho 2017) 
or for operationalising the notion of ‘differentiated/differential’ commitments for SSC under a ‘concentric 
responsibilities’ regime: a ‘CBDR 2.0’ (Esteves et al. 2019). Despite being on the table at least since the set-
up of the ‘equator-less’ GPEDC, in 2012, the notion of ‘differential responsibilities’ was neither clarified 
nor formally discussed among Southern providers.  
 
To make matters more complex, under an ever-thinning multilateralism,638 rising powers’ resistance to take 
on formal financial responsibilities have been met with traditional donors backtracking on theirs. Under 
this ‘burden-sharing game’ (Bracho 2017), traditional donors diluted their commitments while emerging 
powers decided not to collectively agree on any, not even under alternative frameworks of ‘concentric 
responsibilities’, and diplomatically acted to block initiatives that could restrict their autonomy and growth 
aspirations. Facing this deadlock, many commentators started to believe that the notion of ‘differentiated 
responsibilities’ was becoming less of a tool to promote global equity and more of a cover for large Southern 
economies to retreat on global responsibilities while some Northern donors do the same (Bracho 2015; 
Sumner et al. 2020). The intractable nature of the current debates is visible in the fact that the GPEDC 
never achieved a buy-in from Brazil, China and India. Moreover, the BAPA+40 conference not only 
advanced little in creating a more robust normative backbone for SSC but also, symbolically, was a UN 
development-related document without any explicit mention to the 0.7% target.  
 
In this context, is useful to take a step back and critically reflect on the terms of the debate. Although most 
of the North-South impasse has revolved around financial targets, is clear that the ongoing disputes go 
beyond the monetary dimension. Rather there are two interlinked impasses. The first one is politico-
normative and concerns issues of status and recognition in international affairs and of ongoing bargains 
over who has (or should have) special duties and responsibilities. The second one is financial-accounting 
and revolves around how these special responsibilities should be allocated. The rather narrow focus on 
financial responsibilities is at the same time inescapable considering the ‘financing for development’ turn in 
the field and a source of resistance from Southern partners, in particular rising powers.  
 
This financial lens generates, as shown throughout the thesis, particular responses from and effects on large 
Southern providers, notably a continuous denunciation of the structuring inequalities that constitute the 
field and a will to engage in status-seeking global measurement battles to redefine their own position in the 
ranking of ‘responsible’ and ‘generous’ states. At the same time, it pushes governments and practitioners in 
SSC-land to perform quantifiable successes while navigating the domestic tensions of greater scrutiny over 
 
638 The expression ‘thinning multilateralism’ was employed by development experts in a 2019 conference hosted by UNDP 
Seoul Policy Centre (UNDP 2019) and refers to the current changes in global governance and the challenges multilateral 
institutions face to address global challenges, in a range of policy domains. 
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their development cooperation flows. Amidst an increasingly competitive, when not polarised, 
configurations few in Aidland have recognised that even without having formal financial targets, Brazil, 
China and India (and others, including Turkey or Qatar) have steadily increased their financial contributions 
to the UN development system in the last decade (Mao 2020; IPEA/ABC 2018; Haug 2020). Likewise, the 
narrow focus on financial responsibility also renders invisible and unthinkable other types of responsibilities 
or contributions, such as in the case of non-(exclusively) monetary development cooperation efforts and 
the policy ideas and imaginaries of development and social change embedded in them. The current double-
crisis of climate emergency and the pandemic of Covid-19 are powerful reminders of the need to rethink 
global development responsibilities in the years ahead with and beyond common but differentiated financial 
targets. Reconceptualising responsibilities might also offer an opportunity to go back to some of the 
original, and in many ways never achieved, promises of South-South cooperation to reimagine development 





1. A note on navigating the ‘Western-centric bias’ and essentialised North-
South binaries in South-South cooperation research 
 
A negative otherness is particularly hard to theorize,  
because we are required to theorize what these societies are not.   
(Kaviraj 2010, 36) 
 
An equator-less, inclusive global partnership exposes the fractures and fluidity of  the imagined geographies of  development 
cooperation, where both differences and similarities are exaggerated to create acceptable locations in the new landscape. 
(Eyben and Savage 2013, 467) 
 
 
Researching accountability in/of  SSC feels like navigating an agitated sea. Writing about ‘travelling theories’ 
and their ‘global peregrinations’, Edward Said (1991) argues that the places of  origin of  theories are 
‘irreducible first conditions’, providing limits and applying pressures to which agents respond. As a 
travelling concept, accountability can be taken along the same lines. The political construction of  the term 
and its associated keywords in liberal democracies (‘transparency’, ‘right to know’, ‘whistle-blower’, 
‘advocacy’, ‘openwashing’, ‘social accountability’) has driven scholars and those designing development 
accountability interventions towards ‘linguistic determinism’ (Fox 2018, 68).639 Translation challenges and 
linguistic uneasiness are powerful reminders of  the knowledge politics embedded in the concept and how 
the term, in English, has circulated and imposed itself  as the hegemonic term to define a set of  practices 
around how power is (should be) exercised and controlled, including in development cooperation.  
Unease is also related to the fact that calls for accountability, in its English rendition, historically intersects 
with Southern countries’ experiences of  being told how to govern and manage their own public affairs. For 
many Southern-based development practitioners, accountability became a term used as a ‘loan world’ 
(Eyben 2008), whose meaning is tightly associated with the international actors that diffuse it. These 
linguistic and semantic translation hiccups, which constantly popped in my own research, are crucial to 
 
639 In Latin languages, the direct translation of accountability read as ‘to provide an account’ rather than ‘to hold or be held 
accountable’ (rendre comptes, rendir contas, prestar contas, in French, Spanish and Portuguese, respectively). At the same 
time, these languages offer a set of concepts that still coexist alongside the term ‘accountability’. In Portuguese, while ‘to 
give an account’ (prestar contas) is a term closely related to the financial accountability, other concepts such as 
‘responsabilisation’, ‘oversight’ and ‘citizen oversight’ (responsabilização, fiscalização or controle and controle democrático 
não-eleitoral or controle social, respectively) describe different control dynamics. In Brazil is increasingly common to see the 
term ‘accountability’ added—in English and Italic—after these native terms (Pinho and Sacramento 2009). As for China, 
Dermort’s (2009) discourse analysis study with Chinese business managers shows, for instance, a lack of consensus on how 
to translate accountability into Chinese languages, with interviewees offering Chinese equivalents: xin ren 信 任, ke kao xing 
可 靠 性 , ke yi lai xing 可 以 赖 赖 性 , jie shi 解 , and bian hu 辩 护.  In my own conversations with people working in the 
development sector in China, and in particular NGO workers connected to international networks, I was told it was initially 
difficult to find a translation for the term ‘accountability’, due to a confusion between the terms ‘responsibility’ and 
‘accountability’. My interlocutors said this has been clearer now, with the major differentiation being the external factor: 
accountability is understood as a pressure from outside whereas responsibility is more internal to the individual/institution. 
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understand some countries’ resistance to the concept of  accountability; perceived as yet another Western 
imposition.  
 
Yet, with the rise in visibility and importance of  SSC, accountability has imposed itself  as an issue for many 
Southern providers and in ways worth empirically investigating in their own terms. This thesis fully engages 
with recurrent policy, academic, and normative claims—particularly in SSC-land—pointing to the 
conceptual and political challenges to understand SSC accountability dynamics on purely traditional 
OECD-DAC terms. These claims rightly highlight that SSC do not respond to the same notions of  
responsibility and political control and the same sociopolitical circumstances that prompted ODA 
accountability to become a political and academic problem in the first place. To respond to this decolonial 
call is thus to attempt situating the contours of  the original ‘aid accountability problem’, including the need 
to rebalance power relations between donors and recipients, promote ‘inclusive aid’, democratise 
development national and global governances, and/or provide detailed accounts to national taxpayers on 
resources invested to fight poverty abroad.  
 
Thinking SSC accountability from the South is also about recognising the existence of  accountability issues 
that are specific to SSC, fully embracing postcolonial warnings that modernity in the South is not adequately 
understood as a ‘counterfeit of  a Euro-American “original”’ (Comaroff  and Comaroff  2012, 117). On the 
contrary: it demands to be apprehended and addressed in its own right. Decolonising the study of  SSC 
accountability is to recognise the ‘Western-centric bias’ in SSC research (Six 2009; Muhr 2016; Bergamaschi, 
Moore and Tickner 2017; Mawdsley, Fourie and Nauta 2019) and to continue circumventing 
Western/Eurocentrism when studying foreign policy in the South (Acharya and Buzan 2019; Tickner and 
Smith 2020). However, one has also to be aware of  the risk of  over-essentialising the differences between 
North-South and South-South cooperation and hardening North-South divides that impede the very act 
of  critically inquiring on SSC accountability.  
 
As an implicated researcher aware of  the ‘simultaneous indispensability and inadequacy’ (Chakrabarty 2008 
[2000], 6) of  universals I have frequently reflect on how to disentangle actors’ discourse about SSC—and 
its differentiation claims—from the social world of  SSC politics that researchers need to unpack. In other 
words: up to what extent the differential nature of  SSC requires us to study SSC accountability differently? 
Rather than a definitive answer I start responding to this question drawing on the reflections of  critical 
scholars like Cesarino (2013) when she suggests ‘provincializing’ the rather totalising concepts from aid 
scholarship so as to embrace more open-ended configurations of  SSC with all its potentialities, internal 
contradictions, and its ‘ebbs and flows’ (Cesarino 2019). SSC, she argues, lacks the robustness at the level 
of  policy found in Northern donors and in more traditional policy domains within Southern providers 




Looking the recent (and heated) politico-administrative reforms in major aid donors like the US and the 
UK, one could challenge Cesarino’s (2013, 12) characterisation of  ‘cold landscape of  Northern 
development aid’ and acknowledge that aid motivations and domestic pressures change across countries 
and in a same country over time (Lancaster 2007; Veen 2011; Milani 2019). While doing so, one must 
nonetheless recognise the effects of  robust and consolidated ‘development cooperation bureaucracies’ in 
the practice of  different development providers and in the frequency, intensity and visibility of  domestic 
disputes, including accountability disputes. As such, accountability politics in SSC providers differ from the 
dynamics observed in DAC donors, where the ‘aid/IDC’ policy field is more consolidated and the set of  
stakeholders, interests, and policy bargains more explicit and politically salient.640 Rather than an Orientalist 
broken-mirror representation of  Northern/Western aid systems, characterisations of  SSC as ‘emergent’ 
(Cesarino 2013), ‘in-the-making’ (Cabral 2016), and more recently ‘under consolidation’ (Mawdsley 2019) 
make both explicit and not-always-explicit discursive and political confrontation determine the conditions 




640 Veen’s (2011) study is largely based on legislative debates in a set of European donors, while in my case legislative 
debates could only be used as one among other data sources because international development-related legislative 
debates in Southern providers remain limited. For initial reflections on SSC legislative debates, see Waisbich (2019).   
IV 
 
2. Methodological diary 
 
Mapping Accountability Politics: Charting out contention and controversies around accountability in South-South 
cooperation 
 
During the first year of research, and relying on secondary data, media, and documental review, I have 
mapped (i) coexisting and conflicting discourses, narratives, and ideas around accountability in/of SSC, and (ii) 
a series of relevant SSC accountability politics cases/practices in emerging economies (focussing on Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico and South Africa). Initial taxonomies were created out of these mapping exercises, looking 
to the context-specific ways in which the ‘SSC accountability problem’ was understood.   
 
Preliminary taxonomy for global narratives around accountability in South-South cooperation  
 
In my preliminary taxonomy for salient, coexisting, and competing global discourses/narratives around 
SSC accountability, I have codified a set of policy/political discourses and narratives (and correlated 
practices) in terms of their ‘policy ideas’ (King 1973) or ‘accountability logics’ (Berghmans, Simons and 
Vandenabeele 2017), the nature of the spaces where those ideas are debated, the main actors shaping them, 
and the eventual accountability practices and mechanisms entailed. This taxonomy constituted a heuristic 
device to guide me in reading a very complex landscape. Rather than trying to fix accountability 
ecosystems—always contextual, relational, and thus multiple—this exercise allowed me to capture policy 
discourses and their competing logics. 
 
The four thematic clusters I have identified to be explored in-depth, revised, and/or complemented with 
fieldwork data were: (i) Accountability as horizontality; (ii) Accountability as transparency; (iii) Accountability as 
learning; and (iv) Accountability as participation.  I have presented and discussed this taxonomy, exploring actors 
and processes behind each of them, in four academic conferences in 2018: BRICS Policy Diffusion and 
Development Cooperation Workshop (IDS-Sussex, February 2018), the Development Studies Association 
Rising Powers Group meeting (LSE-London, April 2018), the International Conference on Policy 
Diffusion and Development Cooperation (UNIFESP-Sao Paulo, May 2018), Development Studies 
Association Annual Conference (Manchester, June 2018).  
 
Preliminary mapping of South-South cooperation accountability politics 
  
My second mapping exercise consisted of coming up with a list of past and current SSC accountability 
politics manifestations/instances/cases, involving a broader range of SSC actors (countries, development 
banks and policy networks). Those were codified as potential cases studies (see Table 1, below). For each 
manifestation, I have identified the most salient accountability issue at stake (transparency, citizen 
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participation, socioenvironmental norms, development outcomes), the level (national or global) the 
manifestation takes places and a provisional coding for the type of accountability politics they represent, 
based on the existing literature around international public accountability. 
 
The cases were used to build the overall PhD argument are different forms or types of accountability politics 
assemblages to be retrieved from spaces, sites or arenas of contention (either specific countries or development 
cooperation initiatives, programmes, or projects) in one country (Brazil, India, or China) or one 
international actor (the BRICS-led New Development Bank - NDB or the Network of Southern Think 
Thanks – NeST). By approaching the object in this manner, I used countries and the transnational arena as 
sites/arenas where exemplary forms of multi-level accountability politics take place rather than embarking 
on a classical structured focused case comparison (George and Bennett 2005; Bovens, Curtin and Hart 
2010). 
 
Proposed selection criteria 
 
The framework for case selection stems directly from the mapping exercise, in line with the imperatives of 
a grounded theory approach rather than a pre-designed comparative framework. Importantly, criteria are 
open to reinterpretation, recodification and reorganisation as fieldwork progresses. Table 2 presents the 
criteria for coding and selecting accountability politics cases for the in-depth inquiry during fieldwork. Based 
on these criteria, I have selected accountability politics manifestations for the subsequent multi-case study 
analysis. What I call ‘cases’ here refer to sites, institutions, processes, and governmental tools. They are not 
classic ‘case studies’, but rather exemplary forms of accountability politics assemblages. ‘Cases’ feature 
different types of assemblages, all of them comprised of multiple accountability politics playing out 
simultaneously, while bounded by a set of identifiable accountability logics. Table 3 presents a list of such 
assemblages related to Brazilian and Indian development cooperation.   
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Case Issue Type Level 
New Development Bank (NDB): politics of accountability in a Southern-led multilateral development bank (engagement with 
civil society, consultation with affected communities, information disclosure practices) 
Citizen 





Brazil: Formal and informal state-society interfaces, such as the Food and Nutritional Security Council – CONSEA and other 
multi-stakeholders’ policy dialogues, and its role in Brazilian SSC policy-making  
Citizen 
participation   
politics of diagonal 
accountability 
National  
India: Accountability politics in cross-regional civil society alliances to contest land grabbing in Ethiopia Development 
outcomes  




Brazil: Accountability politics in cross-regional civil society alliances to contest land grabbing in Mozambique and challenging 








Brazil: Accountability politics in official SSC reporting and measuring initiatives: COBRADI (IPEA-led), SSC Platform (ABC-led) 
and ABC Working Group on Monitoring and Evaluation and civil society-led SSC budgetary transparency initiatives 
Transparency, 
reporting and 




Mexico: Accountability politics in official AMEXCID reporting and measurement initiatives (Transparency Platform, Registry) Transparency, 
reporting and 




India: Accountability politics in engaging with civil society in development cooperation-related initiatives (Asia-Africa Growth 
Corridor Consultations and the Indian Forum for Development Cooperation – FIDC) 
Citizen 
participation  




Network of Southern Think- Tanks (NeST): Accountability politics in ‘policy networks’ negotiating common frameworks for 
conceptualizing, measuring and monitoring and evaluating SSC  
Transparency, 
reporting and 
measurement    
politics of peer 
accountability 
Global  





politics of external 
accountability 
National  
China: The politics of stock exchange regulations for Chinese investments overseas and the case of NDB’s Green Bonds 




































Forms of SSC accountability politics – From where, in 
the main state decision-makers, the ‘contention’ is 
coming from?  
From within/institutional – other state actors 
From below – civil society actors 
From outside – international development actors and partners, market  
Object of the ‘contention’ – What to account for? 
What is being claimed? 
Transparency, monitoring and evaluation, policy coordination, 
participation, outcomes, etc. 
Actors in the ‘contention’ – Who is negotiating 
accountability? Who is being asked to provide an 
account? 
Line-ministries, other state actors, development partners, traditional 
donors, international organisations, national civil society, international 
civil society, etc. 
Level - Where is this ‘contention’ taking place? Where 
is this accountability arrangement located? 
National or global? What country? What global policy space? 
Types of accountability (1) – Why to account? What is 
the source of the obligation or directionality?  
Horizontal, vertical, diagonal 
Types of accountability (2) – To whom? Partner government (country B), State institutions in country A, 
citizens in country A, citizens in country B, international development 
community, public in general 






Table 3 – Researching SSC accountability politics: thematic clustering   
 





SSC reporting, measurement, and evaluation initiatives (e.g the COBRADI 
report developed by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency and IPEA) 
Brazil  
Showcasing-results from a trilateral cooperation (e.g WFP-Centre for Excellence 
Against Hunger)  
Brazil 
Network of Southern Think-Tanks – NeST negotiating common frameworks 






Policy-level: Formal and informal state-society interfaces (e.g. Food and 
Nutritional Security Council) 
Brazil 
Policy-level: Citizen participation through the Indian Forum for Development 
Cooperation 
India 
Project-level: Cross-regional civil society alliances (e.g. No to Pro-Savana 
Campaign) 
Brazil 
Project-level: Citizen participation in the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor 
Consultations 
India  
Policy-level: Negotiating New Development Bank policies for consultation with 




Setting-up BNDES socio-environmental norms for overseas investments Brazil 
Setting-up environmental safeguards in Indian concessional loans and the role 
of the DFID-India working group 
India 






3. A note on writing from within SSC-land and from Cambridge  
 
My positionality is multifaceted, not least due to the multi-sited nature of this research. When engaging my 
participants in the field, I presented myself as a Brazilian SSC expert and a PhD candidate at the University 
of Cambridge.641 Being a Brazilian researcher and a practitioner in the field of SSC since 2011 and a doctoral 
researcher in a prestigious Northern university, worked most of the times as an enabler to me. My previous 
belonging to SSC-land—both as a ‘critic’ and as a ‘programmer’, in Tania Li’s (2007) words—often made 
me an insider ‘studying my own tribe’ (Prashant Sharma 2014, 30). This granted me access to institutions, 
their staff, and to documents,642 but also meant I had first-hand experiences of some of the processes I was 
tracing or was part of social and policy networks I was inquiring about. Whereas the role of scholars in the 
analytical obsession with public accountability ‘gaps’ is widely recognised (e.g. Flinders 2014), in my case 
another boundary had been crossed by actively working along the academic-policy lines: I had published 
policy pieces about issues I was now asking people about or had participated in SSC evaluations I was now 
academically assessing. I suppose that most of my Brazilian participants perceived me as this hybrid 
research-activist, something I have never tried to hide or underplay. In a way it also explained—to them, as 
much as to myself—my interest in SSC accountability as a research topic. My positionalities in India or 
China were more straightforward, yet still plural. I was mainly an outsider, a young white woman that could 
mobilise either the ‘Brazilian researcher-practitioner credential’ or the ‘Cambridge PhD student’ as 
convenient.  
 
My relation to each of the three countries was uniquely distinct and so was my research access. I had greater 
access in Brazil, due to my nationality and years-long professional and social connections in SSC-land and 
in Brazilian foreign policy and public policy circles, more broadly. In India, a country I visited for the first 
time in 2012 and have since returned periodically for short-research and policy advocacy trips, I have relied 
on my established connections to certain stakeholders working on Indian development cooperation (mostly 
in academia and civil society). The Indian SSC community remains a comparatively small one (Chenoy and 
Joshi 2016) and often these contacts have subsequently facilitated (formally or informally) my access to 
more closed policy spaces, such as governmental institutions. China is the site where I had the most limited 
access and connections. My previous engagement was significantly more superficial, having conducted 
China-related research previously but visited the country for the first time in 2017 to attend two academic 
conferences just before joining the PhD. Since, I have returned annually for a series of academic and policy 
events in Beijing, Shanghai, and Hong Kong, where I also conducted my fieldwork. Lacking a wide network 
of connections and the language skills, I relied on development practitioners and academics I had previously 
 
641 In my introductions I often referred to the differentiation languages like Portuguese or Spanish allow for in the verb ‘to 
be’ between a nature of something (ser) and a state of being (estar). 
642 For instance, I have formally or informally met several of ABC staff. Others researching SSC before me have traditionally 
described Brazilian cooperation bureaucracy as open, but this has somehow changed in the recent years—in particular for 
ABC—following the increase of scrutiny on their work, particularly in the wake of the ProSavana controversy (Cesarino 
2019; INT-BR-20; INT-BR-53).  
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met and on the valuable in-country network of my Cambridge colleagues as to get insights into 
policymaking dynamics.  
 
In all three countries, I also reached out to research participants I had never spoken to or met before. I 
believe my multiple identities—as a Brazilian having worked and participated in the field and my acquired 
Cambridge credentials, including being under the supervision of a Northern researcher widely accepted in 
Southern-led policy and research spaces—have worked to enable my access to new actors. I have 
extensively played on these multiple positionalities, using it in a rather plastic way, to gain access to 
information. I have also played, not without risking reifying strong and toxic social and knowledge-
production power asymmetries, on my both young and female researcher to create ‘no-threatening’ 
exchanges spaces with often male dominated policy circles (S.-M. Kim 2019). While doing so I have often 
relied on less formality-charged interview settings with my research participants, enabling two-way 
conversations to appear and flow. The topic of accountability has itself generated opportunities for 
participants to ask me what I understood as accountability or how was I conceptually framing this issue, 
reinforcing the widely acknowledged conceptual breadth of the term, in its global/English rendition, but 
also its knowledge politics. Interviews were also rich moments of self and join reflections about the field, 
its shifting dynamics, or the role of Southern (critical) researchers and its tensions. Those were ‘candid 
conversations with colleagues’ (Mosse 2005, 13). In some cases, particularly with Brazilians and sometimes 
with Indians, interviews were charged with unsettling nostalgia about past dynamics and/or uncertainty 
about the future.  
 
Researching plurality and unfolding change  
 
Researching SSC-land is to deal with plurality, complex institutional frameworks, and change. SSC remains 
a fragmented, non-centralised policy agenda in most of the countries, which implies having to navigate 
several ‘SSC bureaucracies’, and those who inhabit them, at the same time. For many of them, SSC—or 
‘the international work’ and within that SSC—was a marginal agenda. While doing my PhD I was constantly 
confronted with the challenges of studying ‘emerging’, ‘in-the-making’ (Cesarino 2013; Cabral 2016), 
‘shifting’ (Mawdsley 2019a), and even ‘retreating’ SSC processes (Suyama, Waisbich and Leite 2016; 
Abdenur 2018).  
 
On the one hand, this meant tracing processes and movements that were still unfolding643 and, in the case 
of Brazil, it meant studying rapidly shifting, if not eroding, dismantling SSC policies. A field Cesarino (2019) 
recently described as an ‘unstable ground’, full of ‘ebbs and flows’. Despite focusing my research on 
contemporary SSC, many spoke to me in the past tense (longing for what has no longer there) or in a 
 
643 A reflection I have come to appreciate while reading (Platzky 2020) doctoral research on contemporary social 
movements in Brazil and South Africa. 
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cautious present tense (uncertain about the implications of ongoing changes), the latter being true for 
Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian interlocutors. This forced distance has freed some participants to critically 
reflect on the issues and on their own positions, preferences, and actions. I wanted my conversations over 
accountability also to be reflections on institutional and individual learnings, and in some cases, they were. 
 
These changing landscapes borne, nonetheless, conceptual, methodological, and political implications. 
Once, when presenting an excerpt of my research to a mostly Brazilian audience, one researcher asked me 
why I was not using the past tense to refer to my research. Her question echoed my own lingering concerns 
about my moving-topic and to the speed it was becoming an historical research object. At the time I 
responded that while part of my research belonged to the recent past there were dimensions of Brazilian 
SSC that were still in place under different circumstances. I tried to sound convincing to that audience, but 
this discomfort never left me. Even if policy and institutional changes have also touched India and China’s 
SSC ecosystems, Brazilian politics and international engagements are substantially different from the ones 
that characterised the previous expansionary phase. The scenario today is also different from the ‘retreat 
moment experienced’ under Rousseff’s or from the ‘turn-to-the-right’ following her impeachment (Amorim 
2016; Suyama, Waisbich and Leite 2016). In last than two decades Brazil went from middle-power, to 
emerging-power, and to middle-power again, in a process of ‘status downgrading’ (Casarões 2020). The 
anti-globalisation nationalist wave that covered part of the West has also reached Brazil since the far-right 
president, Jair Bolsonaro, took power in 2019. The implications are manyfold. The role of presidents in 
shaping Brazilian foreign policy is widely acknowledged in the literature and matters greatly to how Brazilian 
global projection (Cason and Power 2009). However, Bolsonaro’s election is unique due to the extreme 
political-ideological shift it represents from past governments and to his views on world affairs, including 
a strong dismissal of the South-South axis that guided Brazilian foreign policy during the Workers Party 
era.   
 
While disputes around Brazilian ‘Southern credentials’ and its SSC are constitutive of country’s domestic 
accountability politics and did not start with Bolsonaro (Waisbich 2020b; also Chapter 5), the current shifts 
matter to the symbolic battles being fought around global development. Understanding these shifting 
dynamics under an extremely polarised (when not toxic) environment is the task of scholars like myself. 
While doing so, we are invited to critically reflect on the ways academics and practitioners have embarked 
on an overly enthusiastic journey about the SSC agenda in the recent past and to carve a new place for 
critical SSC thinking in the current context paying attention to the gaps between visible discursive changes 
and their practical translations and to the counter-movements happening below-the-radar within SSC 
bureaucracies. Above all, is about reflecting on change while recognising that ‘commitments to SSC cannot 
simply be rolled back to the status quo ante’ (D. Marcondes and Mawdsley 2017, 698–99) and that SSC 
accountability politics are to some degree and form here to stay. 
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4. List of Interviews and List of Institutions  
 
Interview ID Institution Type Country  Type Interview code  
Interviewee 1  National NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-1 
Interviewee 2 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-2 
Interviewee 3 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-3 
Interviewee 4 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-4 
Interviewee 5 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-5 
Interviewee 6 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-6 
Interviewee 7 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-7 
Interviewee 8 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-8 
Interviewee 9 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-9 
Interviewee 10 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-10 
Interviewee 11 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-11 
Interviewee 12 National NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-12 
Interviewee 13 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-13 
Interviewee 14 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-14 
Interviewee 15 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-15 
Interviewee 16 International organisation Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-16 
Interviewee 17 International organisation Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-17 
Interviewee 18 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-18 
Interviewee 19 International organisation Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-19 
Interviewee 20 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-20 
Interviewee 21 International NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-21 
Interviewee 22 National NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-22 
Interviewee 23 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Informal INT-BR-23 
Interviewee 24 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-24 
Interviewee 25 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-25 
Interviewee 26 International organisation Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-26 
Interviewee 27 National NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-27 
Interviewee 28 Government institution Brazil  Informal INT-BR-28 
Interviewee 29 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-29 
Interviewee 30 Government institution Brazil  Informal INT-BR-30 
Interviewee 31 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Informal INT-BR-31 
Interviewee 32 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-32 
Interviewee 33 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-33 
Interviewee 34 Government institution Brazil  Informal INT-BR-34 
Interviewee 35 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-35 
Interviewee 36 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-36 
Interviewee 37 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-37 
Interviewee 38 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-38 
Interviewee 39 Government institution Brazil  Informal INT-BR-39 
Interviewee 40 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-40 
Interviewee 41 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-41 
Interviewee 42 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Informal INT-BR-42 
Interviewee 43 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Informal INT-BR-43 
Interviewee 44 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-44 
Interviewee 45 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-45 
Interviewee 46 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-46 
Interviewee 47 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-47 
Interviewee 48 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-48 
Interviewee 49 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-49 
Interviewee 50 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-50 
Interviewee 51 National NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-51 
Interviewee 52 International organisation Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-52 
Interviewee 53 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-53 
Interviewee 54 International NGO Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-54 
Interviewee 55 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-55 
Interviewee 56 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-56 
Interviewee 57 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Informal INT-BR-57 
Interviewee 58 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-58 
Interviewee 59 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-59 
Interviewee 60 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Informal INT-BR-60 
Interviewee 61 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-61 
Interviewee 62 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-62 
Interviewee 63 National NGO Brazil  Informal INT-BR-63 
Interviewee 64 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-64 
Interviewee 65 International organisation Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-65 
Interviewee 66 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-66 
Interviewee 67 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-67 
Interviewee 68 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-68 
Interviewee 69 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-69 
Interviewee 70 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-70 
Interviewee 71 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-71 
Interviewee 72 Academic/Think-Tank Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-72 
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Interviewee 73 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-73 
Interviewee 74 Government institution Brazil  Semi-Structured INT-BR-74 
Interviewee 75 National NGO China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-1 
Interviewee 76 International NGO China  Informal INT-CH-2 
Interviewee 77 Academic/Think-Tank China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-3 
Interviewee 78 Academic/Think-Tank China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-4 
Interviewee 79 Academic/Think-Tank China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-5 
Interviewee 80 Academic/Think-Tank China  Informal INT-CH-6 
Interviewee 81 International NGO China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-7 
Interviewee 82 International NGO China  Informal INT-CH-8 
Interviewee 83 International NGO China  Informal INT-CH-9 
Interviewee 84 International NGO China  Informal INT-CH-10 
Interviewee 85 Academic/Think-Tank China  Informal INT-CH-11 
Interviewee 86 International organisation China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-12 
Interviewee 87 Government institution China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-13 
Interviewee 88 Government institution China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-14 
Interviewee 89 International organisation China  Semi-Structured INT-CH-15 
Interviewee 90 International NGO China  Informal INT-CH-16 
Interviewee 91 Academic/Think-Tank China  Informal INT-CH-17 
Interviewee 92 Academic/Think-Tank India Semi-Structured INT-IN-1 
Interviewee 93 National NGO India Semi-Structured INT-IN-2 
Interviewee 94 National NGO India Semi-Structured INT-IN-3 
Interviewee 95 International NGO India Semi-Structured INT-IN-4 
Interviewee 96 Academic/Think-Tank India  Informal INT-IN-5 
Interviewee 97 International NGO India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-6 
Interviewee 98 Academic/Think-Tank India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-7 
Interviewee 99 National NGO India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-8 
Interviewee 100 Academic/Think-Tank India  Informal INT-IN-9 
Interviewee 101 National NGO India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-10 
Interviewee 102 Academic/Think-Tank India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-11 
Interviewee 103 International NGO India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-12 
Interviewee 104 Government institution India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-13 
Interviewee 105 National NGO India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-14 
Interviewee 106 Government institution India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-15 
Interviewee 107 Academic/Think-Tank India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-16 
Interviewee 108 Government institution India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-17 
Interviewee 109 Academic/Think-Tank India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-18 
Interviewee 110 International NGO India  Informal INT-IN-19 
Interviewee 111 Academic/Think-Tank India  Semi-Structured INT-IN-20 
Interviewee 112 Academic/Think-Tank India  Informal INT-IN-21 
Interviewee 113 Academic/Think-Tank Other development partner  Informal INT-ODP-1 
Interviewee 114 Academic/Think-Tank Other development partner  Informal INT-ODP-2 
Interviewee 115 Traditional donor Other development partner  Informal INT-ODP-3 
Interviewee 116 International organisation Other development partner  Semi-Structured INT-ODP-4 
Interviewee 117 Traditional donor  Other development partner  Semi-Structured INT-ODP-5 
Interviewee 118 Traditional donor  Other development partner  Semi-Structured INT-ODP-6 
Interviewee 119 Traditional donor Other development partner  Semi-Structured INT-ODP-7 
Interviewee 120 Traditional donor Other development partner  Semi-Structured INT-ODP-8 
Interviewee 121 International organisation Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-1 
Interviewee 122 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-2 
Interviewee 123 Government institution Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-3 
Interviewee 124 International organisation Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-4 
Interviewee 125 International NGO Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-5 
Interviewee 126 Government institution Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-6 
Interviewee 127 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-7 
Interviewee 128 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Informal INT-OSS-8 
Interviewee 129 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Informal INT-OSS-9 
Interviewee 130 International organisation Other SSC actors Informal INT-OSS-10 
Interviewee 131 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Informal INT-OSS-11 
Interviewee 132 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-12 
Interviewee 133 International organisation Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-13 
Interviewee 134 Government institution Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-14 
Interviewee 135 Academic/Think-Tank Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-15 
Interviewee 136 International organisation Other SSC actors Semi-Structured INT-OSS-16 





Australian National University Australia  
BNDES - Brazilian National Development Bank  Brazil 
Conectas Human Rights Brazil 
Embrapa - Brazilian Agricultural Research Company Brazil 
ESG – Brazilian War College  Brazil 
FASE - Federation of Organs for Social and Educational Assistance Brazil 
Federal University of Santa Catarina Brazil 
FGV - Getúlio Vargas Foundation Brazil 
FNDE - National Fund for Educational Development, Government of Brazil  Brazil 
IBASE - Brazilian Institute of Social and Economic Analysis Brazil 
INESC - Institute for Socioeconomic Studies Brazil 
IPEA - Institute of Economic Applied Research Brazil 
Ministry of Education, Government of Brazil  Brazil 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Brazil  Brazil 
Ministry of Health, Government of Brazil   Brazil 
Ministry of Justice, Government of Brazil  Brazil 
Nike Consultoria Brazil 
PUC-Rio - Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro Brazil 
SAGI - Office of Evaluation and Information Management, Government of Brazil  Brazil 
SESAN - Food and Nutritional Security Secretary, Government of Brazil  Brazil 
TCU - Federal Court of Accounts  Brazil 
University of Brasília, Brazil  Brazil 
ABC - Brazilian Cooperation Agency, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brazil  
Anonymous UN agency in Brazil  Brazil  
Articulação SUL - South-South Cooperation Research and Policy Centre Brazil  
Cebrap - Brazilian Centre for Analysis and Planning  Brazil  
CERESAN - Reference Center on Food and Nutrition Sovereignty and Security, Rural Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro 
Brazil  
CGFome - Former General-Coordination of International Action against Hunger, Government of Brazil  Brazil  
CGU - Office of the Comptroller General  Brazil  
DIEESE - Inter-Union Department of Statistics and Socio-Economic Studies Brazil  
ENAP – National Public Administration School Brazil  
Strategic Affairs Secretariat, Presidency Office, Government of Brazil  Brazil  
China Agriculture University China  
CIKD - China Centre for International Knowledge on Development  China  
Greenovation Hub China  
Greenpeace China China  
International Institute of Green Finance China  
Renmin University of China China  
Embassy of France to India France 
Heinrich Böll Foundation India  Germany  
Oxfam Hong Kong  Hong Kong  
Centre for Policy Research India 
Export-Import Bank of India India 
Jawaharlal Nehru University India 
Praxis Institute  India 
PRIA - Society for Participatory Research In Asia India 
Action Aid India  India  
Centre for Financial Accountability India  
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India India  
O.P. Jindal Global University India  
Observer Research Foundation India  
Oxfam India India  
PWESCR - Programme on Women's Economic, Social and Cultural Rights India  
RIS - Research and Information System for Developing Countries India  
 United Nations Development Programme in Mexico International  
BRICS Feminist Watch  International  
DAWN - Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era International  
Food and Agriculture Organisation in Brazil  International  
International Budget Partnership International  
IPC-IG - International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth International  
New Development Bank  International  
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development  International  
Southern Voice  International  
The Asia Foundation China   International  
The Asia Foundation India  International  
United Nations Development Programme in Brazil  International  
United Nations Development Programme in China  International  
WFP CEAH - World Food Programme Centre of Excellence Against Hunger in Brazil International  
AMEXCID - Mexican Agency for International Development Cooperation Mexico  
Oxfam Mexico Mexico  
N'weti, Mozambique Mozambique 
IGD - Institute for Global Dialogue South Africa 
National School of Government South Africa 
Oxfam South Africa South Africa 
SAIIA - South African Institute of International Affairs South Africa 
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University of Pretoria South Africa 
University of the Western Cape South Africa 
University of Cambridge United Kingdom 
University of Manchester United Kingdom 
Development Initiatives United Kingdom  
Global Witness United Kingdom  
United Kingdom Department for International Development Office in Brazil  United Kingdom  
United Kingdom Department for International Development Office in India United Kingdom  





5.   Table of Evaluations of South-South cooperation (Brazil, China, India) 
 
 
Project name  Year  Nature  Authorship  Public availability  Country  
Brazil-FAO-WFP Purchase from 
Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) 
2014 Learning and results 
report 
PAA Africa programme  Yes Brazil 
Supporting the development of 
the cotton sector in the C4 
countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Chad, and Mali) - Cotton-4' 
2015 External ex post 
evaluation 
Articulação SUL; PLAN Yes Brazil 
Brazil-WFP contribution to 
Mozambique's National School 
Feeding Programme (PRONAE) 
2015 Independent 
assessment 
Action Aid Brasil  Yes Brazil 
Brazil-WFP Centre of Excellence 
against Hunger interventions 
(2011-2016)  
2016 External ex post 
evaluation 




Development in Management of 
South-South and Triangular 
Cooperation 
2016 Internal ex post 
evaluation with 
external consultants  
Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
No Brazil 
Brazil-UNICEF Trilateral South-
South Cooperation Programme 
2016 Learning and results 
report 
Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
Yes Brazil 
"Memories of ProSavana" 2016 Independent 
assessment - civil 
society organisation 
study  
FASE, Brazil  Yes Brazil 
"Advancing South-South 
Cooperation in Education and 
Skills Development" 
2016 Independent 
assessment - based on 
NeST evaluation 
framework  
Brazilian Center for 
International Relations - 
CEBRI, Brazil  
Yes Brazil 
Brazil-ILO South-South 
Cooperation for the Promotion 
of Decent Work in Cotton-
Producing 
Countries in Africa and Latin 
America 
2017 Internal evaluability 
assessment  
Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
No Brazil 
Brazil-FAO-WFP Purchase from 
Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) 
Senegal  
2017 PAA Decentralised 
Evaluation 
Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
Yes Brazil 
Brazil-FAO Support to National 
and Sub-regional Strategies for 
Food and Nutritional Security 
and Overcoming Poverty in 
Countries of Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
2018 Review Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
No Brazil 
Brazil-FAO-WFP Purchase from 
Africans for Africa (PAA Africa) 
Malawi 
2018 PAA Decentralised 
Evaluation 
Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
Yes Brazil 
Brazil-WFP contribution to 
Mozambique's National School 
Feeding Programme (PRONAE) 
2018 PAA Decentralised 
Evaluation 
FAO and International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive 
Growth - IPC-IG 
Yes Brazil 
Cooperation Brazil-Cuba-Haiti 
for Strengthening the Haitian 
Health System 
2018 External ex post 
evaluation 
Commissioned to individual 
external consultant  
No Brazil 
Brazil-UNICEF Trilateral South-
South Cooperation Programme 
2019 External ex post 
evaluation 
Articulação SUL Yes Brazil 
Cotton Shire Zambeze (Malawi 
and Mozambique)  
2020 External ex post 
evaluation 
Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation - 
Embrapa, Brazil; 
International Center for 
Tropical Agriculture - CIAT, 
Colombia 
No Brazil 
Cotton Vitoria (Kenya, Tanzania 
and Burundi) 
2020 Internal ex post 
evaluation  
Brazilian Agricultural 
Research Corporation - 
Embrapa, Brazil 
No Brazil 
SENAI vocational educational 
training centres (Angola, Cape 
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, East 
Timor, Paraguay, Colombia) 
2011-2016 Internal evaluation 
missions and reviews 
National Service for 
Industrial Training - SENAI, 
Brazil  
No Brazil 
Brazil-FAO Strengthening School 
Feeding Programmes in the 
Framework of the Zero Hunger 
2016-2017 Review Commissioned to individual 




Initiative in Latin America and 
the Caribbean 2025 
"Perceptions on China-Lao 
Agricultural Investments" 
2015 Independent 
assessment - civil 
society organisation 
study 
Oxfam Hong Kong Yes China  
China-UNFPA partnership on 
South-South and Global 
Cooperation 
2016 Internal mid-review  UNFPA China No China  
"A Civil Perspective on China’s 
Aid to Cambodia" 
2016 Independent 
assessment - civil 
society organisation 
study  
The Asia Foundation Yes China  
China-Tanzania Cooperation in 
agriculture 
2018 Independent 
assessment - with 
UNOSSC grant, based 
on NeST evaluation 
framework 
China Institute for South-
South Cooperation in 
Agriculture - CISSCA, China  
Yes China  
"The case China-Pakistan 
Economic Corridor" 
2018 Independent 




Institute - DiE, Germany  
Yes China  
China-UNFPA South-South & 
Triangular Cooperation (2016-
2019) 
2019 Internal final-review UNFPA China No China  





tank study  
Research and Information 
System for Developing 
Countries - RIS, India  
No India 
"India’s Development 





tank study  
Research and Information 
System for Developing 
Countries - RIS, India  
Yes India 
"India’s Development 
Cooperation with Bangladesh: A 
Focus on Lines of Credit" 
2017 Independent 
assessment - civil 
society organisation 
study  
Participatory Research in 
Asia - PRIA, India  
Yes India 
A case study on Indo-Bangla 
Lines of Credit' 
2019 Independent 
assessment - civil 
society organisation 
study with UNOSSC 
grant  
Centre for Policy Dialogue, 
Bangladesh 
Yes India 
"Case Study on India and 
Mozambique: Solar Technology" 
2019 Independent 




Research and Information 
System for Developing 
Countries - RIS, India  
Yes India 
"A case study of the Indian 
Technical and Economic 
Cooperation Programme" 
2020 Independent 
assessment - civil 
society organisation 
study with UNOSSC 
grant  
Public Affairs Centre, India No India 
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